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Abstract	
	
MDMA	(3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine	or	‘ecstasy’)	is	well-known	for	its	
empathic	and	sociable	effects	(Bogt,	Engels,	Hibbel	&	Van	Wel,	2002).	Indeed,	there	
is	a	body	of	work	that	discusses	the	role	the	drug	plays	in	social	bonding	(Beck	&	
Rosenbaum,	1998;	Duff,	2008;	Farrugia,	2015;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Solowij,	Hall	&	Lee,	
1992).	However,	there	has	been	extremely	limited	research	looking	at	MDMA’s	
impact	specifically	on	romantic	relationships	(Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006).	Hence,	this	
thesis	explored	couples’	experiences	of	intimacy	on	MDMA	and	how	this	intertwines	
with	their	relationship.	Semi-structured	interviews	with	ten	couples,	using	visual	
methods	(Reavey,	2011;	Del	Busso,	2009;	Majumdar,	2011),	and	eight	individual	
written	diaries	(Kenten,	2010)	were	analysed	using	a	thematic	approach	(Braun	&	
Clarke,	2006).	A	‘bubble’	(Sloterdijk,	1999	cited	in	Klauser,	2010)	is	argued	to	
organically	form	around	couples	on	MDMA,	producing	a	distinct	affective	
atmosphere	of	muted	fear,	worry	and	shame	and	heightened	feelings	of	safety	and	
love,	which	mediates	emotional	and	discursive	‘practices’	of	intimacy	(Gabb	&	Fink,	
2015).	Movement,	spaces	and	objects	are	also	argued	to	facilitate	intimacy,	
producing	new	subjectivities	which	alter	boundaries:	between	self	and	world;	within	
the	self;	and	between	self	and	other	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Yet	beneath	the	
seeming	‘flow’	to	MDMA	experiences,	couples	construct	clear,	symbolic	boundaries,	
segmenting	these	experiences	from	both	everyday	life	(Douglas,	2001),	and	other	
people	(Stenner,	2013).	The	research	is	argued	to	have	key	implications	for	drug	
theory	and	practice,	namely	that	drug	use	is	not	only	an	individual	act	(Duff,	2008)	
but	also	relational	in	nature	–	its	meaning	partly	determined	by	how	it	interweaves	
with	important	relationships	in	people’s	lives.	
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Preface	
	
I	was	introduced	to	electronic	music	by	a	close	friend	many	years	ago	and	
since	that	point	have	been	fascinated	by	the	dance	music	scene.	MDMA	(or	‘ecstasy’	
as	it	is	more	commonly	known)	has	become	an	integral	part	of	dance	culture	
(Pilcher,	2008),	and	the	drug	has	even	been	claimed	to	have	inspired	this	style	of	
music	(Rietveld,	1998).	The	diverse,	nuanced	accounts	of	MDMA	use	given	by	people	
I	knew	and	by	non-academic	books	–	experiences	that	were	both	meaningful	and	
often	a	positive	force	in	people’s	lives	–	defied	the	representation	of	MDMA	within	
mainstream	epidemiological	drugs	research	in	which	the	dominant	narrative	is	a	
largely	negative	one;	centred	on	harm,	risk	and	addiction.	Such	a	contradiction	
propelled	me	into	exploring	memories	of	‘change’	and	‘openness’	in	relation	to	
individuals’	MDMA	use	at	masters	level	(Anderson	&	McGrath,	2013).	
As	I	embedded	myself	further	in	the	literature	during	my	masters,	I	came	
across	more	complex	accounts	of	drug	use	in	qualitative	studies.	For	example,	Beck	
and	Rosenbaum	(1994)	highlight	how	users	reported	the	‘deepen[ing]	of	
relationships’	(p59)	as	a	key	motivator	for	use	and	the	women	in	Hinchliff	’s	(2001)	
study	describe	MDMA	use	as	permanently	easing	anxiety	and	enhancing	social	
interactions.	These	studies	illustrated	to	me	how	mainstream	drugs	research	
abstracted	MDMA	experiences	from	both	the	contexts	within	which	they	took	place	
and	the	meanings	of	those	experiences	for	the	individuals	concerned.	Moreover,	it	
seemed	that	by	failing	to	respect	the	way	people	engage	in	meaning-making	
practices,	drugs	research	also	failed	to	understand	why	people	take	a	drug	like	
MDMA	in	the	first	place.	Indeed,	it	seemed	that	MDMA	created	a	space	for	certain	
kinds	of	things	to	happen,	transformations	of	self	and	relationships,	which	were	not	
taking	place	in	everyday	society,	and	made	me	question	the	logic	behind	shutting	
down	such	possibilities.	
One	of	the	most	key	relationships	in	people’s	lives	was	strangely	absent	from	
the	nuanced,	qualitative	research	–	romantic	connections.	Considering	the	centrality	
of	intimate	relationships	to	everyday	lives,	Jamieson	(1998)	argues	that	they	have	
replaced	the	family	as	the	primary	site	of	intimacy,	the	ramifications	of	ecstasy	use	
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within	this	context	seem	especially	significant.	This	realisation	planted	the	seed	for	
what	would	later	develop	into	this	PhD	project	exploring	couples’	use	of	MDMA.	And	
it	was	these	more	complex	accounts	of	drug	use	in	combination	with	excellent	
critical	social	psychology	teaching	and	supervisory	guidance	which	set	the	tone	for	
the	approach	of	this	thesis	i.e.	a	commitment	to	exploring	MDMA	experiences	as	
multiple	and	meaningful,	as	both	structured	by	and	influencing	the	intimate	
relationships	within	which	they	take	place.	The	thesis	is	organised	as	follows:	
Chapter	One	provides	the	empirical	background	of	this	project;	reviewing	key	
debates	in	the	intimacy	literature	as	well	as	explaining	why	MDMA	use	might	be	an	
interesting	context	for	intimacy.	The	way	drug	use	has	been	thought	about	and	
studied	will	also	be	considered.		
Chapter	Two	outlines	the	theoretical	orientation	of	this	thesis,	grounded	in	
process	theory	as	interpreted	by	British	social	psychologists.	In	particular,	attention	
is	drawn	to	how	embodiment,	emotion	and	space	might	be	reconceptualised	within	
this	framework.		
Chapter	Three	presents	the	methodological	and	analytical	approach	of	the	
work,	informed	by	the	voices	of	drug	users	themselves	and	deep	empiricism.	The	
two	empirical	studies	of	the	thesis	are	outlined:	the	first,	performed	with	couple	
interviews	and	visual	methods	and	the	second,	involving	individual	written	diaries	
and	optional	interviews.	The	thematic	analytical	approach	used	with	the	data	is	also	
outlined.		
Chapter	Four	is	the	first	analytical	chapter	and	proposes	that	couples	find	
themselves	in	a	protective	bubble	where	more	‘negative’	emotions	are	kept	at	bay	
and	‘positive’	emotions	proliferate.	Within	this	bubble,	they	feel	more	emotionally	in	
tune	with	one	another,	can	disclose	relationship	concerns	and	leave	behind	difficult	
feelings.		
Chapter	Five	explores	how	subjective	experience	is	materially	as	well	as	
discursively	distributed.	In	particular,	different	patterns	on	movement	within	MDMA	
spaces	are	proposed	to	produce	distinct	subjectivities:	playful,	embodied	and	
merged;	a	process	mediated	by	shifting	boundaries	within	and	beyond	the	self.		
Chapter	Six	examines	the	role	of	symbolic	boundaries	in	couples’	MDMA	
experiences.	This	involves	exploring	how	MDMA	use	is	spatially	and	temporally	
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segmented	from	everyday	life	as	well	as	the	borders	couples	construct	to	keep	other	
people	out	of	their	experiences.		
Chapter	Seven	discusses	the	overall	findings	of	the	thesis	in	addition	to	
engaging	in	reflexivity	regarding	the	research	process.	The	implications	of	these	
findings	for	drugs	research	are	also	considered.		
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Chapter	One	–	Intimacy	and	MDMA	
	
the	single	best	use	of	MDMA	is	to	facilitate	more	direct	communication	between	
people	involved	in	a	significant	emotional	relationship		
(Greer	&	Tolbert,	1986,	p326)	
	
Over	thirty	years	have	passed	since	Greer	and	Tolbert	(1986)	made	such	a	bold	claim	
yet	little	ground	has	been	made	towards	determining	its	merit.	MDMA	(3,4-
methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine	or	‘ecstasy’)	was	made	illegal	in	the	United	
States	in	1985,	but	prior	to	this	Greer	and	Tolbert	had	been	administering	MDMA	to	
referred	patients.	The	pair	rarely	initiated	therapeutic	interaction	during	sessions,	
preferring	to	leave	individuals	or	couples	to	determine	their	own	experience	in	a	
supportive	environment,	but	were	available	to	respond	to	requests	(Greer	&	Tolbert,	
1998).	Despite	Greer	and	Tolbert	(1986)	framing	their	most	significant	finding	as	the	
drug’s	interpersonal	effects	–	28	out	of	the	29	participants	reported	improvements	
in	their	personal	relationships	in	the	days,	weeks	and	months	after	taking	MDMA	–	
in	the	years	since,	research	exploring	the	intersection	of	MDMA	and,	in	particular,	
romantic	relationships	has	been	scant.	In	fact,	there	have	been	only	three	studies	
where	couples’	use	of	MDMA	is	a	significant	feature	and	these	are	not	particularly	
detailed	(Rodgers	et	al.,	2006;	Topp,	Hando,	Dillon,	Roche	&	Solowij,	1999;	Vervaeke	
&	Korf,	2006).	This	thesis	seeks	to	redress	this	omission;	arguing	why	MDMA	might	
be	an	interesting	context	for	intimacy	and	how	this	might	foreseeably	influence	a	
couple	relationship.		
Due	to	the	lack	of	existing	research	on	MDMA	use	in	couples,	this	chapter	will	
examine	two	distinct	bodies	of	literature,	in	turn:	drugs	research,	spanning	
epidemiology,	psychology,	cultural	studies	and	anthropology,	and	intimacy	research,	
which	draws	from	mainly	psychology	and	sociology.	First,	it	will	be	argued	there	is	a	
split	in	the	way	drug	use	has	been	conceptualised	within	academic	research.	On	the	
one	hand,	epidemiological	studies	frame	drug	use	in	terms	of	harm	and	risk	with	
pleasure	largely	absent,	and,	on	the	other,	cultural	studies	portrays	drug	use	as	part	
of	a	youthful	postmodern	search	for	identity	and	embraces	ideas	of	pleasure	(Hunt,	
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Moloney	&	Evans,	2009).	However,	while	this	is	still	a	useful	heuristic	in	thinking	
about	the	field	of	drug	studies,	two	further	caveats	will	be	added,	drawing	on	more	
recent	MDMA	research.	The	link	between	MDMA	and	intimacy	will	be	outlined,	
considering	both	the	drug’s	acute	prosocial	qualities	and	more	long-term	bonding	
effects,	before	pointing	to	why	couple	relationships	will	be	focussed	on.	
This	chapter	will	then	turn	to	the	intimacy	literature	to	provide	a	framework	
for	how	to	think	about	intimacy	on	MDMA.	In	particular,	this	section	will	explore	the	
disclosing	model	of	intimacy	advanced	by	Giddens	(1992)	and	contrast	this	model	
with	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	practices	approach	to	intimacy	–	the	latter	argued	as	
better	able	to	explain	the	inherent	diversity	of	people’s	lived	experiences	of	
intimacy.	From	this	point,	how	intimate	practices	are	shaped	by	social	and	cultural	
frameworks	will	be	explored	in	more	depth;	examining	how	the	Euro-North	
American	context	idealises	specific	kinds	of	intimacy,	and	how	other	factors,	such	as	
gender,	intersect	with	this	cultural	context.	
	
1.1	MDMA	
	
It	is	argued	here	that	the	recreational	consumption	of	MDMA	could	feasibly	
intertwine	with	intimacy	within	a	romantic	relationship.	In	order	to	understand	why	
this	might	be	so,	research	examining	the	social	effects	of	MDMA	use	will	be	
explored.	Prior	to	and	in	order	to	contextualise	this	body	of	work,	a	brief	general	
introduction	to	MDMA	will	be	given	and	how	academic	research	has	framed	drug	
use	will	be	examined.		
In	the	UK,	MDMA	is	listed	as	a	Class	A	drug	under	the	Misuse	of	Drugs	Act	
(1971).	This	is	considered	to	be	the	most	dangerous	category	of	substances	and,	as	
such,	carries	the	harshest	penalties:	seven	years	for	possession	and	up	to	life	in	
prison	for	supply	and	production.	While	the	USA	made	MDMA	illegal	in	1985	and	still	
categorises	it	as	of	absolutely	‘no	medical	use’,	it	was	banned	even	before	that	in	the	
UK,	in	1977.	The	drug	is	most	known	for	its	energy-enhancing,	social	and	euphoric	
effects	(Bogt,	Engels,	Hibbel	&	Van	Wel,	2002),	which	have	been	suggested	to	
explain	its	central	position	on	the	illicit	drug	scene	for	the	past	30	years	(Home	
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Office,	2016).	While	ecstasy	is	most	strongly	associated	with	the	dance/rave	culture	
from	the	late	1980s	onwards,	before	the	drug’s	wider	dissemination	it	was	known	as	
‘empathy’	to	a	group	of	American	psychotherapists	in	the	1970s	who	used	it	to	
facilitate	their	sessions	with	patients	(Greer	&	Tolbert,	1986),	including	relationship	
therapy	(Ronson,	2016).	When	MDMA	was	made	illegal	the	majority	of	this	
therapeutic	work	came	to	a	halt,	though	some	went	underground	(Stolaroff,	2004),	
but	has	been	revived	in	the	past	decade	or	so	in	clinical	trials	for	the	treatment	of	
mainly	PTSD	(Mithoefer	et	al.,	2012;	Sessa,	2011).		
	
1.1.1	Terminology:	MDMA	or	ecstasy?		
	
Before	embarking	on	a	review	of	the	drugs	literature,	it	is	worth	considering	the	
distinction	between	‘MDMA’	and	‘ecstasy’.	Both	are	often	used	interchangeably	in	
popular	and	media	discourses	as	well	as	within	the	research	community,	though	this	
is	generally	with	qualification	in	the	latter.	This	is	because	the	two	are,	in	theory,	
synonymous,	with	MDMA	referring	to	the	chemical	compound	(3,4-methylenedioxy-
N-methylamphetamine)	and	ecstasy	used	as	its	street	name	–	where	the	compound	
is	usually	presented	and	sold	in	a	particular	way	i.e.	compressed	into	small	pills.	
Historically,	however,	while	MDMA	has	been	sold	as	‘ecstasy’,	ecstasy	has	not	always	
just	consisted	of	MDMA.	Other,	very	chemically	similar	compounds	such	as	MDA	(3,	
4-methylenedioxyamphetamine)	and	MDEA	(3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine,	
also	known	as	MDE)	have	been	sold	as	ecstasy	in	addition	to	ecstasy	pills	containing	
a	range	of	substances	other	than	MDMA	such	as:	amphetamine	(speed),	caffeine,	
ketamine	and	even	the	potentially	fatal	PMA	(para-Methoxyamphetamine)	(Parrott,	
2004).	
Arguably,	if	we	are	trying	to	explore	meanings	of	drug	use	in	the	context	of	
intimacy,	then	it	seems	fitting	to	incorporate	the	terms	people	use	to	describe	their	
experience.	Ecstasy	or	sometimes	‘E’	is	still	the	most	commonly	heard	term	from	
users	(Banta-Green	et	al.,	2005).	Although	there	have	been	suggestions	that	the	
term	‘MDMA’	is	becoming	more	popular	and	that	the	term	is	associated	with	the	
‘purer’	crystal	form	of	the	drug	(Edland-Gryt,	in	press).	Therefore,	due	to	both	the	
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importance	of	the	social	context	within	which	ecstasy	is	embedded	and	employing	
terminology	that	users	self-identify	with,	this	thesis	will	treat	the	terms	MDMA	and	
ecstasy	as	synonymous.	
	
1.1.2	Approaches	to	understanding	drug	use	
	
Academic	discussion	around	drug	use	has	been	described	as	split	into	two	main	
threads:	epidemiology	and	cultural	studies	(Hunt,	Moloney	&	Evans,	2009).	A	
quantitative,	epidemiological	approach	tends	to	focus	on	harm	and	risk,	while	largely	
ignoring	the	pleasures	or	benefits	of	drug	use	and	has	been	the	dominant	paradigm	
within	drugs	research	for	several	decades	(Moore,	2008;	Mugford,	1988).	In	
contrast,	cultural	studies	views	drug	use	in	the	context	of	a	youthful,	postmodern	
search	for	identity	and	pleasure	and	has	employed	qualitative	methods.	While	this	
split	still	provides	a	useful	heuristic,	the	neatness	of	this	distinction	has	frayed	in	
recent	years	and	requires	two	further	caveats.	Firstly,	there	has	been	a	raft	of	
quantitative,	experimental	studies	exploring	how	the	acute	effects	of	a	number	of	
illicit	drugs	have	therapeutic	potential	(Baggott	et	al.,	2016;	Frye,	Wardle,	Norman	&	
de	Wit,	2014;	Hysek	et	al.,	2013;	Wardle	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Wardle,	Kirkpatrick	&	de	
Wit,	2014;	Schmid	et	al.,	2014).	For	example,	LSD’s	enhancement	of	emotional	
empathy	and	prosocial	behaviour	was	hypothesised	to	explain	its	usefulness	in	LSD-
assisted	psychotherapy	for	anxiety	in	patients	with	a	life-threatening	illness	(Dolder,	
Schmid,	Müller,	Borgwardt	&	Liechti,	2016).	There	is	a	large	body	of	research	
particularly	concerning	the	therapeutic	usefulness	of	MDMA,	as	this	has	received	the	
most	attention	when	performing	clinical	trials,	which	will	be	examined	later	in	this	
chapter	regarding	the	social	effects	of	MDMA	use.		
Secondly,	there	is	a	growing	body	of	research	mapping	the	socio-material	
relations	of	alcohol	and	other	drug	consumption	(AOD).	Whereas	the	cultural	studies	
approach	tends	to	focus	on	how	drug	use	intersects	with	youth	cultural	practices	
within	the	dance	scene,	socio-material	AOD	research	concentrates	on	‘the	variety	of	
actors	and	forces	that	interact	to	produce	AOD	use	subjects,	practices	and	contexts	
in	unpredictable	and	locally	specific	ways’	(Bøhling,	2014,	p362).	In	practice,	this	
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means	greater	heed	is	paid	to	the	places	and	spaces	of	drug	use	and	the	social	and	
affective	forces	which	interweave	with	them,	with	researchers	drawing	on	
theoretical	sources	such	as	Giles	Deleuze,	cultural	geography	and	affective	theory	
(Keane,	2011).	It	is	suggested	these	studies	still	broadly	sit	within	a	cultural	studies	
approach	as	defined	by	Hunt,	Moloney	and	Evans	(2009),	but	merit	individual	
attention	due	to	how	they	enrich	understandings	of	how	drug	experiences	are	
produced.	Before	exploring	these	caveats	further,	the	literature	around	
epidemiology	and	cultural	studies	will	be	examined,	with	a	particular	focus	on	
MDMA	use.	
Academic	research	of	ecstasy	has	largely	functioned	within	the	‘pathology	
paradigm’	(Mugford,	1988)	of	epidemiological	studies,	focussing	on	the	acute	and	
long-term	health	consequences	of	taking	the	drug,	rather	than	trying	to	understand	
why	people	use	it	(Holland,	2001).	Concerns	within	these	studies	are	threefold:	
determining	the	numbers	of	people	using	ecstasy	in	the	general	population,	
pinpointing	defining	features	of	ecstasy	users	and	identifying	the	problems	that	use	
causes	(Hunt	et	al.,	2009).	It	is	estimated	that	9.4%	of	adults	in	the	UK	have	ever	
taken	MDMA	in	their	lifetime	(Home	Office,	2016).	In	the	past	year,	1.5%	of	surveyed	
adults	reported	they	had	taken	the	drug,	amongst	those	aged	16-24	the	usage	rate	
rises	to	4.5%	(Home	Office,	2016).	The	rise	in	popularity	of	the	recreational	drug	–	
with	usage	rates	peaking	in	2001-2	–	is	often	linked	to	the	prevalence	of	rave	culture	
which	begun	in	the	late	1980s	(Measham,	2004).	Since	that	point	there	had	been	a	
decline	in	the	numbers	of	people	using	the	drug,	until	2013	when	usage	rates	once	
again	rose	and	have	been	flat	since	that	point	(Home	Office,	2016).	This	means	there	
has	been	no	significant	increase	or	decrease	in	ecstasy	use	from	1996	to	the	present	
day,	with	MDMA	remaining	the	third	most	consumed	illegal	drug,	after	cannabis	and	
cocaine	(Home	Office,	2016).		
Secondly,	there	is	an	extensive	body	of	work	investigating	risk	factors	for	
ecstasy	use.	These	studies	tend	to	highlight	personal	characteristics,	generally	
treated	as	benign,	and	a	range	of	behaviours,	construed	as	undesirable.	Studies	have	
found	greater	usage	rates	among	club	and	party-goers	(Teter,	McCabe,	Boyd	&	
Guthrie,	2003),	younger	people	(Webb	et	al.,	1996;	Measham,	Parker	&	Aldridge,	
1998),	and	people	who	self-identify	as	lesbian,	gay	or	bisexual	(Boyd,	McCabe	&	
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d’Arcy,	2003;	Rosario,	Hunter	&	Gwadz,	1997;	Stall	&	Wiley,	1988;	Signorile,	1997).	In	
turn,	behaviours	associated	with	ecstasy	use	are	investigated	to	add	to	this	risk	
profile	e.g.	unsafe	sexual	practices	and	a	greater	number	of	sexual	partners	
(Klitzman,	Greenberg,	Pollack	&	Dolezal,	2002;	Klitzman,	Pope	&	Hudson,	2000),	use	
of	other	illicit	drugs	(de	Win	et	al.,	2006;	Pedersen	&	Skrondal,	1999;	Zimmermann	
et	al.,	2005;	Turner,	Russell	&	Brown,	2003;	Adlaf	&	Smart,	1997;	Measham	et	al.,	
2001)	and	novelty-seeking	behaviour	(Dughiero,	Schifano	&	Forza,	2001).		
Finally,	there	has	been	a	plethora	of	research	identifying	the	harms	of	MDMA	
use,	including	short-term	issues	such	as	low	mood	(Peroutka,	Newman	&	Harris,	
1988),	anxiety	and	fatigue	as	well	as	acute	effects	like	water	intoxication	
(hyponatremia)	(Campbell	&	Rosner,	2008),	over-heating	(hyperthermia)	(Green	&	
O'shea	&	Colado,	2004),	kidney	injury,	liver	injury	(Campbell	&	Rosner,	2008)	and	
heart	attack	(Nutt,	2012).	While	more	long-term	harms	tend	to	focus	around	
cognitive	problems	like	memory	decline	(Blagrove	et	al.,	2011),	depression	(Roiser	&	
Sahakian,	2004)	and	other	mental	health	issues	(Lieb,	Schuetz,	Pfister,	Von	Sydow	&	
Wittchen,	2002)	and	potential	neurotoxicity	(Curran,	2000;	McCann,	Ridenour,	
Shaham	&	Ricaurte,	1994).		
Some	effects	are	relatively	well-established,	for	example	there	is	a	large	body	
of	research	examining	cognitive	deficits	in	ecstasy	users	(Blagrove	et	al.,	2011;	
Montgomery,	Hatton,	Fisk,	Ogden	&	Jansari,	2010;	Gouzoulis-Mayfrank	et	al.,	2000;	
Morgan,	1999;	Parrott,	Lees,	Garnham,	Jones	&	Wesnes,	1998),	with	heavy	users	
experiencing	more	serious	issues	(Bolla,	McCann	&	Ricaurte,	1998;	Parrott	and	
Laskey,	1998).	Other	effects	have	attracted	far	more	debate	–	such	as	whether	
MDMA	is	neurotoxic.	Animal	studies	have	indicated	this	might	be	the	case	(Fischer	et	
al.,	1995;	Ricaurte	et	al.,	1985),	with	neuronal	recovery	occuring	in	rats	but	only	
partially	in	larger	primates	(Ricaurte	et	al.,	2000).	Human	studies	have	also	shown	
damage	to	the	serotonergic	neurotransmitter	system	(Benningfield	&	Cowan,	2013),	
as	serotonin,	which	regulates	mood,	appetite	and	sleep,	is	one	of	the	main	
neurotransmitters	affected	by	MDMA	use.	However,	the	relevance	of	these	studies	
to	humans	has	been	questioned	(Saunders,	1997).	With	studies	criticised	for	
allegedly	giving	disproportionately	large	dosages	of	MDMA	to	animals	(Doblin	et	al.,	
2014;	Schmidt	et	al.,	1986).	Furthermore,	if	MDMA-induced	neurotoxicity	is	related	
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to	metabolic	disposition,	then	if	is	species-dependent	as	has	been	claimed,	there	
would	be	limited	generalisability	of	cross-species	analysis	(Baumann,	Wang	&	
Rothman,	2007;	de	la	Torre	&	Farré,	2004).	To	sum	up,	some	researchers	continue	to	
argue	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	class	MDMA	as	neurotoxic	(Parrott,	2013),	while	
others	state	that	whether	MDMA	is	neurotoxic	is	still	open	to	question	and	suggest	
that	it	may	still	be	the	case	that	damage	caused	by	consumption	is	reversible	
(Cowan,	2007;	Green,	King,	Shortall	&	Fone,	2012).	
Cases	of	extreme	harm,	including	death	have	been	recorded,	however,	the	
number	of	fatalities	caused	by	MDMA	is	actually	relatively	low:	it	is	implicated	in	37–
50	deaths	and	viewed	as	solely	responsible	for	10–17	deaths	every	year	in	the	UK	
(Advisory	Council	for	Misuse	of	Drugs,	2009).	The	50	deaths	per	year	from	ecstasy	
(500,000	users)	are	dwarfed	by	the	40,000	deaths	per	year	from	alcohol	(40	million	
users)	(‘Most	dangerous	drug?’	2014):	it	translates	to	a	0.0001%	rate	of	fatality	for	
ecstasy	use	versus	a	1%	fatality	rate	for	alcohol.	This	means	that,	on	average,	
someone	is	10,000	times	more	likely	to	die	from	drinking	alcohol	than	from	taking	
ecstasy.	
An	alternative	understanding	of	MDMA	use	centres	around	the	meanings	and	
pleasures	people	derive	from	using	drugs	and	the	spaces	within	which	they	use	
them,	classed	under	the	rubric	of	cultural	studies	by	Hunt,	Moloney	and	Evans	
(2009).	This	has	historically	come	from	within	the	cultural	studies	domain	but	also	
includes	research	from	disciplines	such	as	sociology,	anthropology	and	psychology.	
These	approaches	largely	focus	on	young	people’s	use	of	MDMA	within	dance	
culture;	the	cause	of	the	drug’s	rise	in	popularity	at	the	end	of	the	1980s	and	its	now	
global	reputation	as	a	‘party	drug’.	The	suitability	of	its	use	within	the	context	of	
dance	culture	is	emphasised:	MDMA	is	energising	to	the	point	of	inducing	people	to	
dance,	connects	you	to	others	and	has	been	described	as	enhancing	music	(Bogt	et	
al.,	2002).			
The	practice	of	young	people	using	MDMA	at	dance	parties	has	been	
variously	described	as:	a	post-industrial	rite	of	passage	(Northcote,	2006),	a	rebellion	
against	social	norms	(Jordan,	1995),	a	social	and	leisure	activity	(Hunt	&	Evans	2003;	
Olsen,	2009)	and	an	expression	of	a	neo-tribal	lifestyle	(Brookman,	2001).	Young	
people’s	use	of	MDMA	as	related	to	a	search	for	a	more	adult	identity	is	described	
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by	Northcote	(2006)’s	study,	where	nightclubs	are	conceptualised	as	‘liminal	spaces’	
with	transformative	potential	(Turner,	1987).	Combined	with	drug	use,	nightclubs	
become	places	where	everyday	social	structures	are	suspended,	and	social	
relationships	are	temporarily	reformulated	(Northcote,	2006).	Young	people	can	
craft	their	own	independent	identity,	mimicking	adult-type	friendships	and	
partnerships	in	an	intimate	and	free	‘practice’	environment	(Northcote,	2006).	This	
playing	with	the	possibilities	of	adult	life,	albeit	in	the	hedonistic	context	of	music,	
sexuality	and	dance,	is	suggested	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	biographical	
transitions	of	young	adults	(Northcote,	2006).	While	historically	MDMA	users	have	
been	viewed	to	be	members	of	a	deviant	subculture	(Jordan,	1995),	some	
researchers	argue	that	this	ignores	the	heterogeneity	of	ecstasy	users	and	the	way	in	
which	drug	users	have	become	mainstream:	they	are	‘normal	people	with	full	
rounded	lives,	who	also	happen	to	use	Ecstasy’	(Solowij,	Hall	&	Lee,	1992,	p10).	This	
angle	of	research	has	been	termed	the	‘normalisation	thesis’	(Parker,	Aldridge	&	
Measham,	1998;	Measham	&	Shiner,	2009).	Ecstasy	use	is	no	longer	the	preserve	of	
a	particular,	cohesive	group,	Olsen	(2009)	argues,	but	fits	into	late	capitalist	leisure	
and	consumption	patterns,	with	ecstasy	meeting	a	need	for	a	quick-fix	provider	of	
desirable	social	qualities:	energy,	sociability	and	openness.			
As	outlined	earlier,	there	is	a	growing	body	of	work	tracing	the	socio-material	
relations	constitutive	of	what	people	do	on	drugs	(e.g.	Bøhling,	2014;	Dilkes-Frayne,	
2014;	Duff,	2008,	2014;	Farrugia,	2015;	Fraser	&	Moore,	2011;	Keane,	2011;	Malins,	
2004;	Potts,	2004;	Race,	2011,	2015).	Notably,	these	studies	redefine	context	and	
describe	it	in	terms	of	the	ways	human	and	non-human	bodies	interrelate	in	specific,	
local	contexts,	rather	than	equating	context	with	the	wider	structures	of	economics,	
politics	and	culture	(Duff,	2007).	This	has	manifested	in	considering	how	AOD	
practices	are:	affectively	modulated	by	the	organisation	of	people	in	club	spaces	
(Bøhling,	2014);	continually	unfolding	and	mediated	by	people	and	objects	within	a	
music	festival	setting	(Dilkes-Frayne,	2014)	and	entangled	with	the	layout	of	city	
space	(Malins,	2004).	In	addition,	drug	use	has	been	argued	to	facilitate	greater	
intimacy,	communication	and	friendship	for	young	men	along	with	particular	spatial-
material	arrangements	(Farrugia,	2015)	and	be	intertwined	with	online	sex	apps	
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which	gives	rise	to	new	modes	of	interaction	between	men	who	have	sex	with	men	
(Race,	2015).		
In	the	work	of	Bøhling	(2014)	it	is	highlighted	how	different	levels	of	business	
and	social	interaction	on	nightclub	floors	are	preferred	over	others.	For	example,	
some	participants	emphasised	the	energy	and	uplift	from	being	in	a	crowd	of	people	
while	others	preferred	the	spaciousness	of	the	dance	floor	and	the	more	diffuse	
organisation	of	bodies	occurring	later	in	the	night.	Bøhling	(2014)	draws	attention	to	
how,	through	these	distinctions,	‘two	distinct	but	intertwined	affective	dynamics	
[are]	crystallized’	(p379).	The	first	was	primarily	alcohol-driven	and	revolved	around	
social	interactions:	dancing,	talking,	cheering	and	clapping,	while	the	second	was	
drug-driven	and	involved	less	obvious	signs	of	sociality	and	a	greater	focus	on	the	
movement	of	ones’	own	dancing	body.	These	affective	dynamics	were	also	
temporally	staggered,	with	the	drug-driven	dynamic	emerging	later	in	the	course	of	
the	night,	though	the	two	phases	should	still	be	understood	as	porous	and	
overlapping.	The	utility	of	this	kind	of	analysis	is	outlined	by	Dilkes-Frayne	(2014)	as	
enabling	a	shift	in	focus	from	who	is	acting	to	what	is	occurring.	This,	in	turn,	widens	
the	scope	of	harm	reduction	from	attempting	to	constrain	action	or	remove	actors	
to	considering	how	opportunities	for	acting	in	non-harmful	ways	could	be	mediated	
by	drugs,	spaces	and	objects.	
This	socio-material	body	of	work	seems	to	be	a	fruitful	evolution	of	
qualitative	drugs	research.	It	acknowledges	the	multitude	of	elements,	such	as	the	
spaces	and	objects	of	drug	use,	which	coalesce	to	produce	drug	use	experiences,	and	
how	these	spatial-material	contexts	might	shape	(though	not	determine)	the	
pleasures	and/or	harms	of	use.	The	wider	purpose	of	this	approach	is	nicely	summed	
up	by	Bøhling	(2014,	p379)	as	‘stress[ing]	the	need	to	subtly	map	these	differences’	
in	socio-material	relations	in	order	to	avoid	attributing	to	certain	elements	–	such	as	
the	drug	itself,	the	crowds	of	bodies	or	dance	music	–	‘specific	(context	independent)	
capacities’.	In	other	words,	portraying	a	particular	drug	as	solely	responsible	for	a	
particular	kind	of	experience.	Socio-material	studies	recognise	the	importance	of	the	
specific	way	in	which	people	and	objects	are	entangled	with	one	another	and	thus	
avoids	reducing	drug	use	to	simplistic	categories	of	risk,	peer	pressure	or	benefit.	
However,	in	narrowing	focus	to	the	‘event’	(Dilkes-Frayne,	2014)	or	‘local	context’	
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(Duff,	2011)	of	drug	use,	this	body	of	work	could	be	seen	to	neglect	how	individual	
histories,	desires	and	the	character	of	personal	relationships	shape	the	possible	
socio-material	relations	enacted,	and	their	value.	Thinking	about	individual	
biography	as	an	example,	how	adolescent	shyness	might	contribute	to	the	
meaningfulness	of	the	free-flowing	communicative	capacities	experienced	on	drugs	
(see	participant	‘Kate’,	Hinchliff,	2001,	p461)	or	how	a	traditional	upbringing	might	
enhance	the	pleasures	of	ecstasy	(see	Duff,	2008,	p388).	In	fact,	it	could	be	argued	
such	biographical	emphasis	is	in	keeping	with	the	very	specific	focus	of	mapping	
socio-material	relations,	but	provides	a	way	to	consider	all	relevant	factors	to	any	
drug	experience,	including	temporally	and	spatially	distant	memories	and	feelings.	
This	line	of	argument	will	be	picked	up	again	in	the	next	chapter,	when	considering	
how	the	theoretical	approach	of	this	thesis	would	conceptualise	drug	experiences.	
Common	to	the	socio-material	framework	outlined	above,	and	the	broader	
cultural	studies	approach	within	which	it	arguably	sits,	is	a	sense	that	drug	use	is	not	
just	pathological,	but	is	embedded	meaningfully	within	people’s	lives,	forming	part	
of	their	social	networks	and	activities;	rather	than	being	an	isolated,	risky	activity	
separate	from	the	rest	of	life,	as	depicted	by	the	epidemiological	approach.	
Epidemiological	approaches	to	drug	studies	have	been	accused	of	‘pleasure	erasure’	
(Moore,	2008;	Duff,	2008):	stripping	research	of	drug	use	from	the	pleasures	which	
often	motivate	their	consumption.	This	emphasis	could	risk	producing	a	distorted	
picture	of	drug	use,	which	exaggerates	the	risks	involved	and	arguably	makes	it	
harder	to	target	effective	harm	reduction	interventions	(Duff,	2008;	Foster	&	
Spencer,	2013).	For	example,	Foster	and	Spencer	(2013)	make	the	case	that	
upholding	normative	understandings	of	drug	use	as	purely	dangerous	invites	
resistance	from	young	people	who	see	drug	use	differently:	as	dichotimised	into	
responsible	‘just	social’	(p229)	and	irresponsible	use.	Taking	a	risk-only	orientated	
approach	to	the	study	of	MDMA	thus	could	be	argued	to	have	the	potential	to	derail	
the	goal	of	harm	reduction	and	prevention	initiatives.	Instead	of	a	didactic	portrayal	
of	clubbing	and	raves	as	spaces	of	‘excess	risk’	(Moore	&	Valverde,	2000,	p528),	the	
cultural	studies	discourse	attempts	to	tap	into	the	motivations	and	spaces	of	drug	
use	and	the	voices	of	drug	users	themselves.	
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It	is	noticeable	that	the	representations	of	many	studies	within	the	cultural	
studies	approach	(excluding	the	socio-material	body	of	work)	emphasise	the	social	
identities	–	understood	here	as	the	group	memberships	which	define	an	individual	–	
intertwined	with	MDMA	use	and,	indeed,	often	only	those	within	the	dance	culture	
setting.	Experiences	of	MDMA	in	Northcote’s	(2006)	study	were	discussed	in	relation	
to	participants’	identity	as	young	people	and	how	clubbing	could	be	viewed	as	a	
transitional,	liminal	space	between	childhood	and	adulthood.	In	a	similar	vein,	
Brookman	(2001)	considers	how	MDMA	consumption	can	facilitate	an	individual	to	
claim	an	identity	within	the	neo-tribe	of	‘raver’,	which	is	focussed	on	shared	musical	
appreciation,	pleasure	and	(often)	specific	consumer	goods.	Yet,	MDMA	use	takes	
place	in	a	variety	of	contexts	(see	Olsen,	2009)	and	operates	beyond	the	level	of	
social	identity.	MDMA	is	also	well-known	for	its	impact	on	personal	relationships,	
dubbed	the	‘love	drug’	(Saunders,	1997),	yet	this	aspect	has	received	comparatively	
little	attention.	Indeed,	MDMA	users	discuss	the	drug’s	entactogenic	qualities,	
experiences	of	emotional	communion,	oneness,	relatedness,	emotional	openness,	as	
a	crucial	part	of	the	desire	to	take	it	(Farrugia,	2015;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Vollenweider,	
Gamma,	Liechti,	&	Huber,	1998).	The	repercussions	these	effects	might	have	on	a	
‘significant	emotional	relationship’	(Greer	&	Tolbert,	1986,	p326)	were	highlighted	at	
the	beginning	of	this	chapter	and	will	now	be	explored	in	more	depth.			
	
2.1	Social	effects	of	MDMA	use	
	
MDMA	is	documented	as	producing	a	wide	variety	of	psychological	and	physiological	
effects,	most	commonly	characterised	by	enhanced	mood,	sociability,	openness,	
energy	and	empathy	towards	others	(Bogt	et	al.,	2002).	As	can	be	seen,	many	of	
these	effects	are	prosocial	in	nature.	Sociable	behaviours,	such	as	increased	
confidence	and	friendliness,	have	been	reported	by	both	recreational	users	(Bogt	&	
Engels,	2005;	Sumnall,	Cole	&	Jerome,	2006)	and	under	controlled,	experimental	
conditions	(Vollenweider,	Liechti,	Gamma,	Greer	&	Geyer,	2002;	Kirkpatrick	et	al.,	
2014).	Indeed,	MDMA	was	ranked	the	most	sociable	drug	in	an	international	survey	
of	drug	users,	with	‘feeling	closer	to	people/empathy’	the	most	frequently	
	 18	
highlighted	aspect	of	increase	in	sociability	(Morgan,	Noronha,	Muetzelfeldt,	Feilding	
&	Curran,	2013).	Another	study	found	up	to	90%	of	people	said	that	MDMA	made	
them	feel	closer	to	others	(Peroutka,	Newman	&	Harris,	1988)	and	users	cite	
prosocial	effects	as	a	motivation	for	use	(Bravo,	2001;	Sumnall	et	al.,	2006).		
Since	therapeutic,	clinical	research	into	MDMA	has	been	revived	(see	
Mithoefer	et	al.,	2011;	Sessa,	2011),	experimental	efforts	to	determine	the	
‘psychological	mechanisms’	(Roberts	&	May,	2014,	p1503)	underlying	MDMA’s	
affiliative	effects	have	picked	up	speed	(e.g.	Baggott	et	al.,	2016;	Frye,	Wardle,	
Norman	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Hysek	et	al.,	2013;	Wardle	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Wardle,	
Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Schmid	et	al.,	2014).	Improvements	in	interpersonal	
relationships	have	also	been	spoken	of	in	relation	to	the	drug	in	both	anecdotal	
reports	(Adamson,	1985;	Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Greer	&	Tolbert,	1986;	Holland,	
2001)	and	qualitative	studies	(Farrugia,	2015;	Hilden,	2009;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Solowij,	
Hall	&	Lee,	1992).	Thinking	about	romantic	relationships	in	particular,	the	data	is	
limited	and	the	resulting	picture	mixed	but	it	includes	findings	that	MDMA’s	
influence	is	potentially	lasting	and	beneficial	(Rodgers	et	al.,	2006),	with	over	a	
quarter	reporting	improved	relationships;	detrimental	(Topp,	Hando,	Dillon,	Roche	&	
Solowij,	1999),	40%	of	their	329	ecstasy	users	described	ecstasy-related	relationship	
problems	in	a	6	month	period;	and	ambiguous	(Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006),	depending	
on	whether	ecstasy-using	partners	were	still	together	or	not.	
	 There	are	several	conceptualisations	of	the	drug’s	social	effects	at	work	in	
the	literature:	firstly,	MDMA	is	irrelevant	or	damaging	to	social	relationships	(Topp	
et	al.,	1999),	secondly	MDMA	has	acute	prosocial	effects	(Frye,	Wardle,	Norman	&	
de	Wit,	2014;	Baggott	at	al.,	2016)	(positioned	as	valuable	within	the	
psychotherapeutic	context)	and	finally,	the	drug	has	the	potential	to	fortify	
interpersonal	bonds	(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Farrugia,	2015).	In	fact,	the	
presumption	of	relational	harm	is	sometimes	built	into	studies,	which	set	out	to	
measure	drug-related	problems	including	intimate	partner	violence	(Topp	et	al.,	
1999).	However,	more	common,	is	the	total	omission	of	relationships	from	studies	of	
MDMA	use,	even	those	examining	long-term	consequences	(see	Parrott,	2001).	And,	
when	the	impact	of	the	drugs	use	on	relationships	is	included,	analysis	does	not	
venture	beyond	considering	whether	normal	relationship	‘functioning’	can	be	
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maintained	(Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006)	or	go	beyond	making	a	broad	
acknowledgement,	and	barely	elaborated,	account	of	individual	improvements	in	
‘interpersonal	functioning’	(Soar,	Parrott	&	Turner,	2009).		
	 The	second	notion,	that	MDMA	has	acute	prosocial	effects,	which	are	
valuable	within	the	psychotherapeutic	context,	is	played	out	in	recent,	experimental	
studies.	A	range	of	potential	mechanisms	underlying	MDMA’s	sociality	are	identified,	
including:	increased	emotional	empathy	(Hysek	et	al.,	2013;	Schmid	et	al.,	2014),	an	
increase	in	perceived	reward	regarding	sociable	behaviour	(Wardle,	Kirkpatrick	&	de	
Wit,	2014),	positively	altered	evaluation	of	the	self	(Baggott	et	al.,	2016)	and	
reduced	social	inhibitions,	social	anxiety	and	impact	of	social	rejection	(Frye,	Wardle,	
Norman	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Baggott	at	al.,	2016;	Danforth,	Struble,	Yazar-Klosinski	&	
Grob,	2016).	Within	these	experimental	studies,	MDMA’s	social	mechanisms	are	
repeatedly	contextualised	by	their	therapeutic	benefit.	For	example,	participants	
taking	MDMA	had	a	lower	perceived	intensity	of	social	rejection	and	this	was	
hypothesised	to	account	for	greater	openness	when	speaking	about	issues	during	
psychotherapy;	the	reduced	sense	of	social	rejection	had	a	less	negative	impact	on	
mood	and	self-esteem	following	difficult	sessions	(Frye,	Wardle,	Norman	&	de	Wit,	
2014).	Likewise,	the	increased	comfort	participants	felt	disclosing	emotional	
memories	was	hypothesised	as	a	boon	to	the	therapeutic	relationship,	which	can	
involve	a	lot	of	autobiographical	discussion	(Baggott	et	al.,	2016).	These	studies	take	
a	different	tone	from	many	epidemiological	accounts	of	drug	use	–	considering	the	
possibility	of	beneficial	effects	and	what	this	might	mean	within	the	therapeutic	
context	–	and	thus	begin	to	fragment	the	epidemiology/cultural	studies	dichotomy	
which	has	been	viewed	as	characterising	the	field	(Hunt,	Evans	&	Moloney,	2009).	
Nonetheless,	it	could	be	argued	these	experimental	studies	still	do	not	significantly	
step	outside	of	this	pathological	mode	of	thinking	as	it	still	medicalises	the	use	of	
MDMA	just	instead	of	pathologising	MDMA	in	itself,	it	is	now	framed	as	a	way	to	
treat	medical	problems	–	but	ultimately	this	still	results	in	the	same	‘erasure’	of	
pleasure	from	the	discourse	around	drugs	(Moore,	2008).		
Importantly,	these	studies	rarely	consider	how	the	acute	social	effects	of	
MDMA	use	might	intertwine	with	romantic	and	friend	relationships	in	people’s	lives;	
the	social	impact	of	MDMA	in	its	common,	recreational	setting.	Some	studies	
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acknowledge	the	‘attractiveness’	of	the	discovered	social	effects	to	its	recreational	
users	but	do	not	elaborate	on	it	(Wardle,	Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2014).	A	limitation	of	
many	studies	is	noted	by	several	researchers	to	be	their	artificial	laboratory	setting	
(Frye,	Wardle,	Norman	&	De	Wit,	2014;	Wardle	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Schmid	et	al.	2014).	
Despite	this	acknowledgement,	this	research	has	not	yet	sufficiently	specified	crucial	
features	of	what	would	make	a	more	naturalistic	social	setting	and	how	this	would	
be	created.	For	example,	Wardle	and	de	Wit	(2014)	draw	attention	to	a	previous	
study	which	found	some	of	the	subjective	and	behavioural	effects	of	alcohol	to	vary	
depending	on	whether	the	participant	was	tested	alone	or	with	others.	Specifically,	
participants	reported	feeling	more	intoxicated	and	stimulated	when	they	were	
tested	with	another	person	(Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2013).	This	opens	up	questions	
about	the	isolated	nature	of	experimental	MDMA	studies	and	whether	this	might	
affect	subjective	and	behavioural	effects	of	the	drug.	Furthermore,	the	social	stimuli	
used	in	these	studies	tends	to	be	digital	or	pencil-and-paper,	such	as	asking	
participants	to	rate	their	emotional	reactions	in	response	to	a	series	of	photographs	
(Schmid	et	al.,	2014)	rather	than	involving	face-to-face	interactions	(c.f	Wardle	&	de	
Wit,	2014);	again	this	could	be	a	crucial	determinant	of	experimental	outcomes.	
Taking	this	line	of	questioning	a	step	further,	another	crucial	consideration	might	be	
the	differential	impact	of	known	social	stimuli.	The	vast	majority	of	people	who	take	
MDMA	do	so	with	their	friends	and/or	partners	and	it	would	therefore	seem	crucial,	
if	we	are	considering	social	effects	of	the	drug,	to	investigate	not	only	how	we	
interact	differently	with	strangers	or	simulated	social	scenarios,	but	also	how	prior	
relationships	intertwine	with	MDMA	experiences.		
The	final	way	research	has	conceptualised	MDMA	use	is	an	enhancement	to	
more	long-term	social	bonds.	This	research	is	qualitative	in	nature,	spanning	
psychology,	sociology	and	cultural	studies,	and	questions	the	lack	of	attention	paid	
to	how	use	of	the	drug	is	integrated	into	people’s	lives.	Beck	and	Rosenbaum	(1994)	
were	the	first	scholars	to	discuss	MDMA	and	interpersonal	relationships	in	detail,	
highlighting	the	enhanced	connection	and	communication	users	reported.	
Participants	whose	initial	draw	to	MDMA	was	to	‘get	high’,	spoke	about	continuing	
use	for	other	reasons	like	the	drug’s	bonding	effects,	which	were	perceived	as	
therapeutic	in	nature.	Others	described	their	use	of	MDMA	as	‘therapeutically’	
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motivated	and	valued	the	drug	facilitating	emotionally	intimate	conversations,	which	
helped	stop	them	from	being	as	‘closed’	as	they	usually	were	(Hilden,	2009,	p149)	
and	created	‘enduring	ties’	(p157)	between	them	and	their	friends.	These	bonding	
effects	were	repeatedly	spoken	about	as	permeating	beyond	the	time	and	place	of	
ecstasy	use;	leading	to	changes	in	well-being	and	social	behaviour	(Hunt,	Evan	&	
Kares,	2007;	Hinchliff,	2001),	and	solidifying	friendships	(Bahora,	Sterk	&	Elifson,	
2009).	For	example,	a	young	woman	in	Bahora,	Sterk	&	Elifson’s	(2009)	study	spoke	
about	her	ecstasy-using	friends	as	family,	emphasising	the	emotional	power	of	
ecstasy	and	how	these	shared	experiences	added	to	connections	long-term.			
Farrugia’s	(2015)	work	suggests	that	gender	might	also	play	a	role	in	the	
value	of	social	experiences	on	MDMA.	Young,	male	users	of	MDMA	enjoyed	being	
able	to	express	their	feelings	more	freely	in	intimate	conversations	and	be	more	
physically	affectionate	on	the	drug,	which	deepened	existing	friendships.	They	
presented	such	ways	of	being	as	unattainable	in	their	day-to-day	lives.	Farrugia	
argues	that	approaches	focussed	on	‘risky	young	masculinity’	(p250)	obscure	how	
men	are	playing	with	the	affective	possibilities	of	social	life	on	MDMA	and	how	this	
might	transform	their	affective	capacity	more	broadly.	The	practices	they	highlight	–	
touching,	talking,	and	emotional	intimacy	–	are	normatively	feminine	and	they	might	
feel	constrained	from	engaging	with	them	in	everyday	life.	
	 For	the	participants	in	Lynch	and	Badger’s	(2006)	study,	the	welcoming	
ambience	of	the	clubbing	community	was	key,	examining	the	putative	religious	
significance	of	dance	music	events	where	there	was	widespread	use	of	MDMA.	
Participants	highlighted	the	value	of	friendships	formed	within	this	environment,	
although	the	authors	point	to	how	attendance	was	usually	with	a	pre-existing	group	
of	friends	who	then	mediated	the	formation	of	new	friendships.	Clubbers	did	
acknowledge	the	superficiality	of	some	of	these	new	connections	but	emphasised	
how	going	clubbing	and	taking	drugs	with	good	friends	could	deepen	the	trust	and	
intimacy	in	those	relationships,	particularly	when	the	effects	of	ecstasy	had	worn	off	
and	they	still	felt	close	to	each	other.			
The	findings	of	these	studies	provide	an	insight	into	how	feelings	of	intimacy	
and	closeness	might	become	entangled	with	MDMA	use;	with	drug	use	part	of	the	
crucial	social	connections	which	shape	our	lives.	The	integrative	approach	of	these	
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researchers	stands	apart	from	studies	which	do	little	to	elaborate	on	the	role	of	
sociality	in	the	reasons	people	take	MDMA	or	decontextualise	the	prosocial	effects	
of	the	drug	from	the	friendships	they	are	experienced	within	by	the	vast	majority	of	
recreational	users.	However,	research	examining	how	these	social	effects	might	
intertwine	with	a	couple	relationship	is	scarce	(see	Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006).	Romantic	
relationships	are	central	to	people’s	lives	to	the	same,	or	arguably	even	to	a	greater,	
degree	than	friendships	(Perel,	2007).	These	relationships	have	been	argued	to	
replace	the	family	as	the	key	site	of	intimacy	(Jamieson,	1998)	and	form	the	bedrock	
of	how	home	life	is	organised	(Beaumont,	2011).	Furthermore,	an	investigation	into	
how	intimacy	is	experienced	by	couples	on	MDMA	could	be	seen	to	answer	Gabb	
and	Fink’s	(2014)	call	to	more	fully	research	factors	which	sustain	rather	than	
endanger	relationships;	they	argue	that	research	is	largely	concentrated	on	
articulating	‘stressors’	for	and	the	consequences	of	relationship	dissolution	(Walker,	
Barrett,	Wilson	&	Chang,	2010),	despite	the	value	and	prevalance	of	these	
relationship	in	people’s	lives	(Korobov	&	Thorne,	2006;	Office	for	National	Statistics,	
2014).	For	both	of	these	reasons	–	the	lack	of	MDMA	research	looking	at	couples	and	
the	need	to	examine	research	contexts	which	might	support	couple	relationships	–	
this	thesis	aims	to	seek	out	how	the	entactogenic	and	sociable	properties	of	MDMA	
are	experienced	by	couples	and	how	the	impact	of	these	might	become	embedded	
in	their	relationship.	
	
3.1	Intimacy	
	
To	conceptualise	how	MDMA	might	entwine	with	a	couple	relationship,	the	concept	
of	intimacy	will	be	used.	In	particular,	the	framework	of	intimate	relating	practices	
will	be	drawn	on	(Gabb	&	Fink.	2015;	Gabb,	2011;	Jamieson,	1998;	2005;	2012),	
argued	as	more	sensitive	than	the	disclosing	model	of	intimacy	to	the	socio-cultural	
relations	which	shape	contemporary	Euro-North	American	societies	and	the	diversity	
of	ways	people	experience	closeness.	However,	this	approach	will	be	argued	to	
benefit	from	a	focus	on	non-ordinary	contexts	for	intimacy	and	the	conceptual	tools	
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of	modern	drugs	research,	such	as	the	focus	on	the	spatial-material	‘local	context[s]’	
(Duff,	2011)	of	experiences.		
	
3.1.1	Defining	intimacy	
	
Intimacy	invokes	the	idea	of	being	close	to	someone	and	sharing	a	special	affinity	
with	them.	This	often	manifests	itself	as	living	connected	lives	(Smart,	2007)	and	
some	level	of	physical	closeness,	though	not	necessarily	of	a	sexual	nature	
(Jamieson,	2012).	In	the	past	several	decades,	the	language	of	intimacy	has	become	
prevalent	in	the	social	sciences,	which	previously	spoke	of	‘primary’	relationships	
(Jamieson,	2012).	This	has	been	argued	to	represent	a	shift	from	emphasising	the	
status	of	a	relationship	to	highlighting	relationship	quality	(Majumdar,	2011).	There	
are	many	different	understandings	of	what	intimacy	means	and	a	great	deal	of	
overlap	with	other	ideas	of	closeness	and	love.	Intimacy	can	refer	to	romantic	or	
sexual	relationships,	it	is	not	exclusive	to	this	context	and	is	also	used	in	association	
with	friends	or	family	members.	However,	this	thesis	narrows	its	focus	to	couple	
intimacy	in	particular.		
Romantic	relationships	have	been	argued	to	be	the	most	central	relationships	
in	our	lives,	apart	from	our	children	(Perel,	2007)	and	have	been	continually	found	to	
act	as	a	buffer	against	stressful	life	experiences	such	as	the	birth	of	a	child	(Collins,	
Dunkel-Schetter,	Lobel	&	Scrimshaw,	1993),	a	child’s	illness	(Hobfoll	&	Lerman,	1988)	
and	personal	illness	(Coyne	&	Smith,	1991;	Kornblith	et	al.,	2001).	Indeed,	
relationship	breakdown	can	have	a	lasting	impact	on	life	satisfaction	(Lucas,	2005),	
and	relationship	problems	are	associated	with	and	thought	to	lead	to	decreased	life	
satisfaction	(Gustavson,	Røysamb,	von	Soest,	Helland	&	Mathiesen,	2012).	Despite	
the	popularity	of	the	term	intimacy	within	academic	research,	there	is	little	to	
suggest	that	this	has	trickled	down	into	everyday	language	–	anecdotally,	being	close	
or	in	love	are	much	more	commonly	heard.	In	addition,	scholars	often	treat	the	two	
terms	as	synonymous,	for	example,	‘the	quality	of	‘closeness’	that	is	indicated	by	
intimacy’	Jamieson	(2012,	p1).	For	these	reasons,	intimacy	and	closeness	will	be	
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used	through	this	thesis	to	better	encompass	the	language	of	both	the	non-
academic	and	academic	spheres.		
	
3.1.2	A	disclosing	model	of	intimacy	
	
One	of	the	key	debates	in	the	intimacy	literature	is	around	the	extent	to	which	the	
disclosing	model	of	intimacy	has	come	to	dominate	our	relationships.	It	will	be	
argued	here	that	while	disclosure	seems	to	be	an	important	strand	for	how	we	
understand	intimacy,	it	cannot	encompass	the	totality	of	how	intimacy	is	lived	
(Jamieson,	1998).	Several	researchers	have	argued	that	contemporary	socio-
economic	conditions	have	facilitated	a	fundamental	shift	in	how	we	feel	intimate	
with	others,	so	that	increasingly	the	onus	is	on	self-expression	and	self-reflection	
(Beck	&	Beck-Gernsheim,	1995;	Beck-Gernsheim,	2002;	Bauman,	2003;	Giddens,	
1992;	Sennett,	1998).	One	of	the	most	notable	advocates	of	such	a	reading	is	
Giddens	(1992).	In	his	Transformation	of	Intimacy,	he	argues	that	people	now	seek	
the	‘pure	relationship’	where	mutual	trust	is	built	through	disclosure,	in	particular	
disclosing	‘what	is	kept	from	other	people’	(Giddens,	1992,	p138-9).	This	pure	
relationship	is	created	and	sustained	only	so	long	as	it	is	beneficial	for	both	partners	
–	rather	than	maintained	due	to	external	laws	or	social	expectations	–	and	are	liable	
to	be	dissolved	if	this	mutually	beneficial	exchange	ceases.	As	a	result,	Giddens	
(1992)	argues	that	modern	relationships	experience	greater	fragility	but	are	also	
more	democratic,	equal	and	fulfilling.	Jamieson	(2005),	a	critic	of	Giddens,	has	
termed	the	pure	relationship	as	involving	‘disclosing	intimacy’	(p1)	for	its	emphasis	
on	partners	revealing	personal	information	to	one	another.	Indeed,	disclosure	does	
seem	to	be	an	important	constituent	of	intimacy	for	many:	64%	of	divorced	
respondents	mentioned	wanting	‘someone	to	talk	things	over	with’	as	the	most	
important	factor	in	deciding	to	get	divorced	(Kitson	&	Holmes,	1992).	Self-disclosure	
in	relationships	has	also	been	linked	with	increased	relationship	satisfaction,	love	
and	commitment	(Sprecher	&	Hendrick,	2004),	as	well	as	opening	the	door	to	new	
relationship	models	built	on	continual,	honest	communication,	like	polyamory	where	
partners	have	multiple,	loving	relationships	(Klesse,	2006).	
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Yet,	within	the	literature,	the	dominance	of	this	disclosing	form	of	intimacy	
has	been	soundly	criticised	(Brownlie,	2014;	Charles,	Davies	&	Harris,	2008;	Crow,	
2002,	Duncan	&	Smith	2006;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015;	Jamieson	1998,	2005;	Irwin,	2005;	
Smart,	2007;	Smart	&	Shipman,	2004).	These	scholars	generally	acknowledge	there	
has	been	a	shift	in	how	relationships	are	lived	but	suggest	the	extent	of	this	change	
has	been	exaggerated.	Jamieson	(2005)	argues	that	disclosing	intimacy	is	‘more	of	an	
ideological	construct	than	an	everyday	lived	reality’	(p189):	there	is	a	distinction	in	
what	people	feel	they	should	be	doing	and	what	they	are	actually	doing.	Certainly,	
people	feel	as	though	they	should	be	disclosing	in	their	relationships,	68%	of	
respondents	agreed	with	the	statement	‘it	is	important	to	me	to	be	able	to	talk	
about	my	feelings’	in	the	annual	British	Social	Attitudes	Survey	(NatCen,	2007).	
However,	also	drawing	on	the	same	survey	data,	Brownlie	(2014)	found	that	this	
does	not	always	carry	over	to	how	intimacy	is	experienced	–	emotional	support	for	
many	people	did	not	mean	‘listening,	talking,	giving	advice,	and	helping	people	to	
put	their	own	lives	in	perspective	(Finch,	1989,	p33)	but	‘being	there’	for	someone	
physically	and	practically.	Being	there	for	someone	could	be	about	(theoretical)	
reachability,	who	you	could	ring	in	the	middle	of	the	night,	or	about	being	physically	
present	in	someone’s	life:	these	shared	experiences	accumulating	a	special	
knowledge	of	each	other	(Jamieson,	1998).	Couples	might	also	consider	this	to	mean	
doing	things	for	one	another:	sorting	out	finances,	helping	in	the	moving	process	or	
looking	after	children	(Brownlie,	2014).		
The	key	importance	of	practical	care	in	intimate	relations	is	highlighted	by	
research	(Jamieson,	1998).	For	example,	being	made	a	cup	of	tea	by	their	partner	
was	a	frequently	mentioned	source	of	intimacy	for	mothers	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	In	
addition,	inequalities	in	the	amount	of	practical	care	performed	by	men	and	women	
illustrate	that	we	are	not	living	completely	egalitarian	pure	relationships	(Giddens,	
1992).	Rather,	our	relationships	still	intersect	with	wider	socio-cultural	relations	such	
as	gender.	Indeed,	inequalities	in	household	work	are	one	of	the	top	five	reasons	for	
couple	conflict	(Parrott	&	Parrott,	2013),	with	married	women	still	spending	
significantly	more	time	than	married	men	on	domestic	chores	(Fuwa	2004;	Fuwa	&	
Cohen,	2007;	Knudsen	&	Wærness,	2008;	Lincoln,	2008)	despite	the	split	in	
household	labour	becoming	more	egalitarian	in	recent	decades	(Bianchi,	Milkie,	
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Sayer	&	Robinson,	2000).	This	practical	inequality	has	been	shown	to	erode	marital	
quality	for	women	(Amato,	Johnson,	Booth	&	Rogers,	2003;	Frisco	&	Williams,	2003;	
Pina	&	Bengston,	1993)	and	can	even	lead	to	separation	(Frisco	&	Williams,	2003;	
Jamieson,	1998).		
In	addition,	socio-economic	conditions	have	been	posited	as	the	reason	
modern	relationships	might	appear	more	‘fragile’,	rather	than	the	fact	these	
relationships	are	based	on	mutual	disclosure	and	dissolvable	when	this	exchange	
becomes	unsatisfying	(Giddens,	1992).	For	example,	the	lack	of	social	support	and	
binding	economic	ties	better	explains	why	some	relationships,	such	as	cohabitation,	
are	less	stable	(Jamieson,	1998).	Indeed,	couples	who	were	re-marrying	prioritised	
creating	a	support	network	for	their	step-children	and	other	family	members	
(McCarthy,	Edwards	&	Gillies,	2003);	illustrating	how	relationships	do	not	exist	as	
isolated,	standalone	units	but	are	embedded	in	a	larger	web	of	social	ties	that	
include	children	and	other	kin	(Duncan,	Edwards	&	Reynolds,	2003).	
Researchers	have	also	outlined	how	mundane	exchanges	function	to	build	
intimacy	(Duck,	1998;	Alberts,	Yoshimura,	Rabby	&	Loschiavo,	2005),	and	not	just	
deeper	exchanges	of	personal	thoughts	and	feelings.	Casual	talk	such	as	commenting	
on	plans,	a	radio	show	or	the	weather	might	appear	trivial	but	go	towards	
‘maintaining	a	sense	of	shared	reality	and	reinforcing	the	continuity	of	interactions	
that	create	a	relationship’	(Alberts	et	al.,	2005,	p302).	Significantly,	within	these	
routine,	everyday	experiences	couples	experience	intimacy	through	non-verbal	
means	of	communication	(NVC)	such	as	gestures,	physical	distance	between	people,	
body	language	and	eye	contact	(Duck,	1998).	The	importance	of	NVC	to	intimacy	is	
illustrated	through	the	spatial	metaphors	we	use	to	describe	the	process	of	
becoming	more	or	less	intimate	with	someone:	‘getting	closer’	and	‘growing	apart’	
both	conjure	up	images	of	physical	space	being	lost	or	gained.	Touch	is	also	an	
important	precursor	and	signal	for	intimacy	(Thayer,	1986),	for	example	one	partner	
in	a	long-distance	relationship	in	Holmes’	(2004)	study	laments	the	loss	of	physical	
affection	and	comfort	sought	in	the	form	of	‘hugs’	(p196),	rather	than	personal	
disclosures.	
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3.1.3	A	practices	approach:	‘Doing’	intimacy	
	
Within	the	preceding	discussion,	intimacy	has	been	shown	to	be	contingent	upon	a	
variety	of	other	elements,	such	as	practical	care	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015),	social	networks	
(Duncan	et	al.,	2003),	everyday	small	talk	(Alberts	et	al.,	2005),	physical	touch	(Duck,	
1998;	Holmes,	2004)	and	‘being	there’	for	each	other	(Brownlie,	2014).	This	seems	to	
imply	that	disclosing	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992)	cannot	account	for	the	continued	
significance	of	socio-cultural	relations	such	as	gender	and	the	diversity	of	ways	in	
which	intimacy	is	experienced.	Although	it	does	mark	the	beginning	of	a	shift	
whereby	intimate	disclosure	has	taken	a	more	prominent	position	in	the	discourse	
around	what	we	think	we	should	be	doing	in	relationships	(Brownlie,	2014)	and,	of	
course,	this	will	influence	people’s	private	lives	(Jamieson,	1998).	Indeed,	disclosure	
does	seem	to	be	of	value	to	partners	(Kitson	&	Holmes,	1992;	Klesse,	2006),	and	
linked	to	greater	contentment	(Sprecher	&	Hendrick,	2004),	despite	its	
incompleteness	as	a	conceptualisation	of	intimacy.		
In	response	to	the	incompleteness	of	disclosing	intimacy,	a	practices	
approach	has	been	argued	to	be	more	appropriate	for	the	study	of	intimacy	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015,	Gabb,	2011;	Jamieson,	1998,	2005,	2012).	Rather	than	thinking	of	a	
monolithic	entity	which	is	intimacy	for	all	people,	at	all	times	and	within	all	contexts,	
a	practices	approach	entails	thinking	in	terms	of	practices	or	acts	of	intimacy,	the	
things	people	do	to	‘enable,	generate	and	sustain’	a	subjective	sense	of	special	
closeness	(Jamieson,	2012,	p133).	This	idea	draws	from	how	Morgan	(1996,	2011)	
attempted	to	sidestep	pre-conceived	ideas	of	what	‘the	family’	meant	within	
sociology	by	focussing	on	what	families	do.	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	argue	that	a	
practices	approach	could	be	helpfully	extended	to	couple	relationships;	claiming	
there	is	a	knowledge	gap	about	the	diversity	of	things	couples	do	together,	from	
going	on	date	nights	or	carrying	out	acts	of	practical	care,	to	talking	about	deeply	
buried	secrets.	Thinking	about	intimacy	as	a	dynamic	and	diverse	collection	of	
practices	also	makes	room	for	greater	precision	when	it	comes	to	discussing	
closeness	between	couples:	we	can	identify	which	contexts	support	which	practices	
and	how	these	practices	interact	with	one	another	(Jamieson,	2012).		
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	 This	conceptual	framework	of	relating	practices	(Gabb,	2011)	has	been	used	
in	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	couples	study	and	underpins	how	intimacy	is	understood	
in	this	thesis.	While	much	of	the	literature	advancing	the	disclosing	model	of	
intimacy	have	been	criticised	for	a	lack	of	empirical	support	(Brownlie,	2014),	it	is	
difficult	to	make	the	same	claim	against	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	study	which	is	well-
grounded	in	data	and	is	notably	broad	in	scope	–	involving	50	participants	
(qualitative)	and	4494	participants	(quantitative).	An	array	of	intimate	practices	are	
identified	and	grouped	by	the	researchers	into	the	following	categories:	relationship	
work,	communication,	sex	and	intimacy	and	unsettling	coupledom;	of	which	the	first	
two	will	be	examined	here	in	further	detail.		
	
Relationship	work	
	 Relationship	work	practices	comprise	the	things	couples	do	to	build	and	
sustain	their	relationships.	This	work	is	conceptualised	by	Gabb	and	Fink	according	
to	the	history	of	nineteenth	century	ideas	of	labour	and	capital	and	feminist	theories	
of	domestic	labour	and	emotion	work	while	also	‘keeping	a	keen	eye	on	the	intensity	
of	emotions’	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015,	p18).	For	example,	the	work	of	household	chores,	
childcare	and	providing	emotional	support	–	emotion	work	(Erickson,	1993)	–	are	
viewed	as	a	‘gift’	when	performed	by	men,	since	this	is	outside	their	normative	
gender	roles,	but	not	when	women	engage	in	such	tasks.	However,	it	is	important	to	
stress	that	relationship	work	practices,	like	a	thoughtful	gesture,	a	cooked	breakfast	
or	offering	support	in	times	of	hardship,	did	not	feel	like	work	to	couples,	but	were	
rather	viewed	as	part	of	creating	and	maintaining	a	long-term	relationship	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015).		
	
Communication		
Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	bring	a	diverse	array	of	practices	under	the	rubric	of	
communication,	including	what	the	authors	describe	as	a	‘deep	knowing,	beyond	
words’	and	the	practice	of	talking	and	listening,	which	most	closely	resembles	
Giddens	(1992)	concept	of	disclosing	intimacy.	This	embodies	how	couples	can	draw	
on	their	knowledge	of	each	other	to	appreciate	what	might	be	considered	unusual	or	
inappropriate	ways	of	relating,	for	example,	explaining	why	a	partner	sometimes	
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withdraws.	Sharing	jokes,	being	playful	and	acting	silly	were	also	important	to	
partners,	with	women	rating	‘laughing	together’	as	what	they	liked	most	about	their	
relationship	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	Communication	is	proposed	as	a	key	part	of	some	
couples’	intimacy	and,	correspondingly,	non-disclosure	was	also	raised	as	a	barrier	to	
intimacy.	However,	communication	was	delimited	by	two	factors:	gender	and	life	
stage	(see	also	Brownlie,	2014).	Partners	in	later	stages	of	their	relationship	placed	
less	emphasis	on	confession	of	feelings	and	more	on	‘appreciating	the	way	dialogue,	
in	its	distinct	knowing	form,	keeps	the	relationship	alive	and	vibrant’	(Gabb	&	Fink,	
2015,	p40)	and,	indeed,	self-disclosure	was	less	associated	with	relationship	quality	
(Sprecher	&	Hendrick,	2004).	Thus,	for	older	couples,	emphasis	was	placed	on	shared	
understandings	and	knowing	of	their	partner,	rather	than	the	continual,	mutual	
disclosure	of	personal	thoughts	and	feelings,	as	most	closely	fits	with	the	idea	of	
disclosing	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992).	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	also	found	that	male	
partners	were	less	likely	to	disclose,	however	they	make	the	case	that	this	should	
not	be	read	as	‘poor’	communication	(p42),	but	rather	a	different	way	of	investing	in	
the	couple	relationship	e.g.	by	not	wanting	to	further	burden	their	partner.		
Therefore,	it	is	argued	a	practices	approach	is	more	sensitive	to	how	socio-
cultural	forces	shape	intimacy	–	for	example	through	its	appreciation	of	how	age	and	
gender	influence	tendencies	towards	disclosure.	In	addition	the	wide	scope	of	
practices	considered	–	thoughtful	gestures,	emotional	support,	cooking	dinner,	
joking,	talking,	deep	knowing	of	the	other	–	showcase	the	limitless	variety	of	how	
intimacy	is	lived.	Yet,	it	is	suggested,	the	approach	could	benefit	from	two	further	
additions.	Firstly,	a	greater	consideration	of	other,	non-ordinary	contexts	of	
intimacy.	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	firmly	frame	their	research	project	in	the	everyday	
minutiae	of	couples	at	home	together,	yet	intimacy	also	takes	place	in	a	variety	of	
(non-ordinary)	contexts	like	holidays,	trips	out,	special	occasions	and,	keeping	in	
mind	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	drug	use.	It	seems	reasonable	to	think	that	different	
contexts	will	enable	different	intimate	practices.	Of	particular	relevance	to	this	
research	project	is	the	lack	of	emphasis	in	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	work	on	the	
repertoire	of	emotional	practices,	which	may	feature	more	prominently	on	MDMA:	a	
drug	uniquely	characterised	as	an	‘empathogen’	(Bedi,	Hyman	&	de	Wit,	2010;	
Sumnall,	2006)	for	the	experiences	of	emotional	communion,	oneness,	relatedness	
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and	emotional	openness	users	describe	on	it	(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Farrugia,	
2015;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Vollenweider,	Gamma,	Liechti,	&	Huber,	1998).	Gabb	and	Fink	
(2015)	only	briefly	discuss	the	‘unburdening	of	feelings’	(p41)	in	relation	to	younger	
relationships	and	do	not	emphasise	this	as	an	important	communicative	practice.	
Secondly,	while	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	attend	to	the	impact	economic	
constraints	and	socio-cultural	conditions	have	on	practices	of	intimacy,	it	is	
suggested	they	might	not	pay	sufficient	heed	to	‘local	context’	(Duff,	2011).	As	
described	earlier	in	the	chapter,	this	is	a	concept	from	drugs	research	which	
emphasises	how	specific	spatial	and	material	arrangements	co-constitute	
experiences	of	drug	use.	For	example,	the	small,	contained	environments	of	a	garage	
and	a	bathtub	were	suggested	to	co-produce	the	intimacy	of	young	men’s	
conversations	on	MDMA	(Farrugia,	2015).	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	do	discuss	the	
material	composition	of	couples’	homes,	and	how	this	interweaves	with	other	
elements:	a	small,	overcrowded	home	exacerbated	a	lack	of	employment	
opportunities	and	financial	resources,	building	familial	tension.	Yet	how	the	
particular	material	conditions	of	the	space,	such	as	design,	lighting,	and	objects,	
shape	experience	and	feeling	are	not	attended	to.	When	objects	were	discussed,	
such	as	gifts,	their	content	and	capacity	to	mediate	connection	in	specific	ways	
(Dilkes-Frayne,	2014;	Duff,	2007;	Keane,	2011)	was	glossed	over,	with	only	the	
thoughtfulness	they	represented	paid	any	heed.	Yet,	despite	these	additions,	the	
value	of	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	work	must	still	be	stressed:	it	offers	a	deep,	rich	view	
into	the	complexity	and	‘messiness’	(Daly,	2003;	Gabb,	2009,	2011)	of	everyday	
experiences	of	couple	intimacy.		
	
Shared	emotions	
	 One	of	the	motivations	behind	MDMA	use	has	been	described	as	increased	
emotional	communion,	openness	and	communication	(Farrugia,	2015;	Hinchliff,	
2001;	Vollenweider,	Gamma,	Liechti,	&	Huber,	1998).	While	such	emotional	sharing	
are	discussed	to	a	degree	in	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	work,	they	are	less	emphasised	
and	not	distinguished	as	separate	practices.	Perhaps	they	are	simply	less	relevant	for	
a	study	centred	on	the	mundane	acts	and	gestures	which	sustain	intimacy	or	
perhaps	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	critical	stance	towards	disclosing	intimacy	makes	
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them	keener	to	place	their	emphasis	away	from	the	revelation	of	personal	feelings.	
However,	the	wider	relationship	literature	is	more	helpful	in	this	regard,	with	
concepts	such	as	partners	being	emotionally	attuned	to	one	another	(Jonathan	&	
Knudson-Martin,	2012;	Jordan,	1986;	Siegel,	2007).	Attunement	has	been	described	
as	opening	oneself	to	and	understanding	another’s	emotional	experience	
(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008;	Jordan,	1986;	Schafer,	1959;	Siegel,	2007)	and	is	a	
reciprocal	process	(Curan,	Hazen,	Jacobvitz,	&	Sasaki,	2006;	Porges,	2009).	In	fact,	
this	process	has	been	suggested	to	form	the	basis	for	love	between	partners	(Scheff,	
2011)	and	has	been	linked	to	greater	relationship	contentment	(Connolly	&	Sicola,	
2005;	Curran,	Hazen,	Jacobvitz	&	Sasaki,	2006;	Gottman,	2011).	Of	course,	how	
couples	conduct	their	relationship	and	what	they	value	is	shaped	by	cultural	context	
(Duncombe	&	Marsden,	1995;	Jackson	&	Scott,	2004).	Alain	de	Botton	(2015)	has	
argued	that	the	philosophy	of	romanticism	has	views	relationships	rooted	in	
‘wondrous	reciprocal	feeling’	(p49),	an	idea	which	will	be	explored	later	in	the	
chapter.	 		
The	focus	here	has	been	on	relationships	at	the	local,	micro	level	–	the	
everyday	interactions,	gestures	and	practices	couples	engage	in	that	build	and	
sustain	intimacy.	However,	these	practices	intersect	with	and	are	performed	within	a	
broader	socio-cultural	context.	An	understanding	of	Euro-North	American	culturally	
idealised	intimacy	scripts	will	thus	be	able	to	further	ground	and	clarify	the	nature	of	
intimate	experiences	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	
	
4.1	The	Euro-North	American	context	for	intimacy	
	
There	is	a	danger	when	considering	any	concept	that	those	thoughts	will	be	
presented	as	a-historical	and	a-cultural:	as	simply	the	way	things	are,	rather	than	the	
way	things	are	in	a	particular	socio-cultural	context	(Burr,	1995).	Yet	a	recognition	of	
socio-cultural	influence	co-exists	with	the	idea	that	culture	does	not	determine	a	
person’s	experience	of	love	and	closeness:	society	may	provide	norms	of	action	and	
thought	but	the	extent	to	which	these	are	adhered	to	depends	on	the	person	in	
question	(Watts,	2001).	Indeed,	the	degree	of	‘seriousness’	with	which	scripts	are	
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enacted	is	key:	although	we	subconsciously	internalise	norms,	we	can	also	choose	to	
draw	on	cultural	scripts	and	use	them	to	justify	and	excuse	our	actions	(Gordon,	
1990).	Keeping	this	in	mind,	this	section	will	first	interrogate	how	culture	can	be	
defined	in	the	contemporary	period	of	increasing	globalisation.	Subsequently,	the	
intimacy	‘rules’	(Barker,	2012)	of	the	socio-cultural	context	within	which	this	
research	is	performed	will	be	clarified	before	considering	how	gender	feeds	into	the	
ways	couple	intimacy	is	performed.	Finally,	the	ways	in	which	sexual	practices	and	
perceptions	might	be	shaped	by	intimacy	ideals,	including	gendered	expectations,	
will	be	explored.	It	is	hoped	this	will	provide	a	window	into	the	socio-cultural	scripts	
couples	are	aware	of,	employ	and	resist	as	they	navigate	intimacy	together.		
	
4.1.1	Defining	cultural	context	
	
Culture	has	been	described	as	the	shared	customs,	beliefs,	practices	and	discourse	
between	people	living	in	a	similar	place,	at	a	similar	time	(Kenrick,	Neuberg	&	
Cialdini,	2010).	However,	geographical	similarity	does	not	guarantee	cultural	
similarity,	this	is	complicated	by	multiple	distinctions	such	as	ethnicity,	religion	and	
class	and	the	increasingly	global	transmission	of	information	and	movement	of	
people,	indeed	11.4%	of	the	British	population	were	born	abroad	(Rienzo	&	Vargas-
Silva,	2011).	One	of	the	ways	research	has	approached	culture	is	through	the	lenses	
of	the	collectivist	‘East’	and	the	individualist	‘West’,	which	has	been	argued	as	
setting	up	an	unhelpful	dichotomy	between	the	two	concepts	(Schwartz,	1990).	
Within	this	framework,	the	West	is	thought	to	promote	the	self	and	the	needs	of	the	
individual	above	those	of	the	collective,	and	Eastern	countries	purportedly	
prioritising	being	part	of	a	group	and	deferring	to	the	needs	of	the	collective	(Earley,	
1993;	Hui	&	Triandis,	1986;	Mattila	&	Patterson,	2004;	Singelis,	Triandis,	Bhawuk	&	
Gelfand,	1995).	Societies	that	fall	under	an	‘individualist’	classification	are	mainly	
found	in	North	America	and	Europe	whereas	‘collectivist’	countries	are	located	in	
Asia,	South	America	and	parts	of	Africa	(Gire	&	Carment,	1993).		
In	an	increasingly	globalised	world	where	new	technologies	allow	
unprecedented	levels	of	communication	and	connection,	stable,	independent	
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‘zones’	of	culture,	such	as	East	and	West	seem	less	relevant	(Hermans	&	Kempen,	
1998).	All	forms	of	media	are	‘machineries	of	meaning’	(Hannerz,	1992,	p147),	
allowing	for	both	the	creation	of	new	systems	of	meaning	and	the	widespread	
dissemination	of	ideas	and	values.	If	culture	is	taken	as	local	and	homogenised,	
these	layers	of	complexity	are	missed	(Hermans	&	Kempen,	1998).	Furthermore,	to	
set	up	such	an	opposition	between	individualism	and	collectivism	has	been	
described	as	‘culturally	monochrome’	(Smart	&	Shipman,	2004,	p5):	neglecting	the	
differences	in	the	ways	intimacy	is	managed	and	experienced	across	society.	In	
accounts	from	people	of	transnational	families	(who	had	lived	in	the	UK	for	five	
years	or	more	but	had	close	kin	in	other	countries)	there	was	not	a	straightforward	
resistance	to	individualism	or	an	embracing	of	collectivism,	or	vice	versa;	rather,	
there	was	a	blending	of	individualist	and	collectivist	elements.	For	example,	the	co-
existence	of	a	desire	for	personal	choice	alongside	the	valuing	of	tradition	and	strong	
familial	ties	was	expressed	by	several	participants	–	one	participant	wants	a	love	
marriage	but	one	that	is	arranged	and	approved	of	by	her	parents	and	another	
participant	emphasises	the	importance	of	being	part	of	a	wider	Hindu	culture	but	is	
also	determined	to	marry	his	girlfriend	who,	while	Indian,	is	from	a	different	religion.	
These	accounts	illustrate	that	neither	autonomy	nor	being	embedded	within	wider	
social	networks	can	solely	characterise	people’s	experiences	and	that	such	a	one-
dimensional	approach	fails	to	capture	the	differences	in	how	people	from	the	same	
cultural	background	manage	commitments	to	tradition,	family	and	freedom	of	
choice.			
However,	distinctions	between	eastern	and	western	values	might	still	be	
seen	to	have	descriptive	merit	on	a	broad	level	–	providing	generalisations	about	the	
things	people	value	and	the	way	people	live	their	lives	–	as	well	as	underscoring	the	
idea	that	all	research	is	informed	by	locally	variable	social	and	cultural	conditions.	It	
is	therefore	worth	emphasising	the	discussion	of	intimacy	within	this	thesis	is	
situated	within	‘Euro-North	American’	(c.f	Jamieson,	2012)	ideals,	used	over	
‘western’	due	to	its	greater	specificity,	and	cannot	yield	universal	interpretations	of	
what	it	means	to	be	intimately	connected	to	another	person.			
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4.1.2	The	‘rules’	of	intimacy		
	
‘Online	ads	invite	us	to	click	for	the	top	ten	ways	to	find	our	perfect	match…Reality	
TV	shows	advise	on	how	to	fix	our	relationships.	Pop	songs	tell	us	how	to	feel	when	
falling	in	and	out	of	love…All	day	long	we	are	bombarded	by	rules	about	
relationships:	who	to	be	in	order	to	get	and	keep	one,	what	to	expect	from	one,	and	
how	to	know	it	isn’t	working	anymore.’		
(Barker,	2012,	p1)	
	
Indeed,	the	multitude	of	cultural	scripts	or	‘rules’	(Barker,	2012)	about	love	and	
relationships	in	Euro-North	American	society	appear	invisible	the	majority	of	time	as	
they	are	‘just	real	life’	(Swidler,	2001,	p.19).	Social	rules	are	defined	by	Barker	(2012)	
as	ways	of	doing	things	many	take	for	granted	and	are	trying	to	follow.	Examples	of	
commonly	held	social	rules	include	the	belief	that	a	woman	should	wait	a	certain	
number	of	dates	before	having	sex	if	she	wants	a	man	to	commit	to	a	relationship	or	
the	idea	that	when	you	are	in	a	relationship,	it	is	morally	wrong	to	have	sex	with	
anyone	other	than	your	partner.	Underpinning	these	norms	is	the	assumption	there	
is	a	right	way	to	go	about	conducting	relationships,	which	can	be	destructive	for	
those	who	consciously	keep	outside	of	the	rules,	such	as	queer	or	non-monogamous	
couples,	or	those	who	are	inside	the	rule	system	yet	struggling	to	stay	within	its	
bounds	(Barker,	2012).	This	section	will	explore	two	such	cultural	scripts:	rules	
around	work	in	relationships	and	rules	around	relying	on	instinctive	feeling	within	
relationships,	which	will	both	provide	valuable	context	when	considering	the	
intimate	landscape	couples	(unconsciously)	traverse	in	their	everyday	lives	and	
MDMA	experiences.		
	
Working	on	a	relationship	
The	idea	of	working	at	a	relationship	has	become	ubiquitous	in	modern	life,	
evident	in	self-help	literature	(e.g.	Chapman,	2014;	McKay,	Fanning	&	Paleg,	2006;	
see	Barker,	Gill	&	Harvey,	2015	for	a	critique),	professional	relationship	and	family	
support	(Chang	&	Barrett,	2009),	academic	research	(Halford,	Lizzio,	Wilson	&	
Occhipinti,	2007)	and	even	on	reality	TV	shows	which	show	what	Eldén	(2011)	calls	a	
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‘popular	therapy’	approach	(e.g.	Married	at	First	Sight,	Seven	Year	Switch).	As,	Eldén	
(2011)	argues,	this	popular	therapy	approach	is	portrayed	as	necessary	for:	‘the	
good	couple’	which:	‘consists	of	two	equal	partners,	constantly	communicating	
about	their	selves	and	their	relationship,	always	there	for	each	other,	and	respecting	
each	other’s	individuality’	(p150).	In	order	to	achieve	this	delicate	balance	of	
communication,	‘thereness’	and	respect	for	individual	selves,	the	idea	of	working	at	
the	relationship	has	become	pervasive.	Within	this	‘working	together’	discourse,	the	
expert	is	supposed	to	provide	the	route	map	for	how	to	achieve	this	status	of	being	a	
‘good	couple’,	however	Eldén	(2011)	still	emphasises	it	is	up	to	the	couple	
themselves	to	effect	this	change.		
	
Emotional	Intuition	
Yet,	the	relationships	as	work	discourse	is	counterbalanced	with	another	
predominant	cultural	ideal,	which	de	Botton	(2016)	describes	as	the	philosophy	of	
romanticism.	This	views	relationships	as	built	on	feeling:	‘when	two	people	belong	
together,	there	is	simply	–	at	long	last	–	a	wondrous	reciprocal	feeling	that	both	
parties	see	the	world	in	precisely	the	same	way’	(p49,	own	emphasis).	As	part	of	this	
discourse,	being	lead	by	intuition	is	presented	as	key	in	the	enterprise	of	love:	when	
people	belong	together	they	simply	know.	This	seems	comparable	to	Shotter’s	
(1993)	knowing	of	the	third	kind:	a	knowledge	we	feel	rather	than	discursively	
articulate,	what	might	be	more	commonly	referred	to	as	a	gut	feeling	or	instinct.		
These	two	cultural	scripts,	relationships	as	based	on	work	and	relationships	
as	based	on	intuitive	agreement	between	people,	seem	to	be	in	conflict.	However,	
cultural	rules	are	not	necessarily	followed,	or	only	partially;	creating	a	split	between	
what	couples	perceive	they	should	be	doing,	and	experiential	accounts,	the	messy	
reality	of	what	they	actually	do	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	This	split	between	cultural	ideal	
and	lived	reality	was	discussed	earlier	in	relation	to	disclosing	intimacy	(Jamieson,	
2005).	Now,	using	the	language	of	scripts	or	rules	(Barker,	2012),	the	issue	with	
disclosing	intimacy	becomes	clearer.	It	is	not	that	disclosing	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992)	
is	not	an	important	cultural	thread,	but	rather	that	it	takes	one	script,	‘intimacy	as	
self-disclosure’	and	amplifies	it	to	obscure	the	whole	range	of	intimate	relating	
practices.	Neglecting	that	people	enact	scripts	to	different	degrees	(Watts,	2001)	
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and	that	these	scripts	often	exist	in	tension	with	one	another,	contributing	to	the	
messiness	and	complexity	of	lived	relationships.		
	
4.1.3	Gender	and	intimacy	
	
Relationships	are	intensely	private	and	personal,	taking	place	between	people	who	
feel	strongly	for	one	another,	yet	they	also	play	out	against	a	much	more	public	
stage	–	that	of	pre-existing	rules,	but	also	of	pre-existing	notions	of	gender	(Dryden,	
1998;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	It	has	been	argued	a	‘token	effort’	to	think	about	and	
include	gender	as	part	of	discussions	of	relationships	is	insufficient	(Dryden,	1998),	
since	intimacy	is	always	and	inevitably	gendered	in	heterosexual	relationships,	which	
are	the	focus	of	the	present	project.	Hence,	gender	must	be	threaded	through	any	
deliberation	of	what	intimacy	and	love	look	like,	and	indeed	has	already	been	part	of	
earlier	discussions	in	this	chapter	concerning	the	importance	of	practical	care	for	
intimacy	(Jamieson,	1998),	and	the	inequality	in	how	it	is	often	performed	(Fuwa	&	
Cohen,	2007),	as	well	as	the	differing	emphasis	placed	on	disclosure	by	men	and	
women	(Brownlie,	2014;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	Within	this	work,	gender	is	
conceptualised	as	a	helpful	orientation	to	how	men	and	women	relate,	rather	than	a	
deterministic	category	which	‘fixes’	how	men	and	women	behave.	Due	to	MDMA	
being	known	as	an	empathogen	(Bedi,	Hyman	&	de	Wit,	2010;	Sumnall,	2006),	this	
section	is	focussed	on	how	gender	relations	relate	to	emotion	in	particular.			
Women	tend	to	be	more	involved	in	the	‘emotional	dimension’	of	life	than	
men	(Dryden	1999).	This	manifests	firstly	in	women	taking	on	more	responsibility	for	
maintaining	relationships	than	their	male	partners	(Jonathan	&	Knudson-Martin	
2012).	Feminist	scholars	have	argued	the	work	necessary	to	sustain	a	relationship	
requires	more	than	the	physicality	of	household	chores	and	childcare	but	the	
provision	of	emotional	care	to	family	members	(Dryden,	1998).	This	might	involve	
the	management	and	enhancement	of	others’	emotional	well-being	as	well	as	
providing	reassurance	or	listening	to	problems	and	this	predominantly	falls	to	
women	(Duncombe	&	Marsden,	1993;	Erickson,	1993;	2005).	Several	researchers	
have	argued	for	the	inclusion	of	emotional	care	within	domestic	labour	and,	
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correspondingly,	came	up	the	term		‘emotion	work’	to	describe	this	(Erickson,	1993;	
2005;	Hochschild,	1975;	Strazdins	&	Broom,	2004).	Such	a	redefinition	seeks	to	make	
visible	all	aspects	of	gendered	labour	and	disputes	the	idea	of	emotional	support	
being	intuitive	and	as	always	being	a	spontaneous	expression	of	love.	Rather,	such	a	
concept	downplays	the	time	and	effort	involved	in	such	practices	and	the	way	
emotion	work	impacts	on	personal	well-being	(Hochschild,	1983)	and	perceptions	of	
relationship	quality	(Erickson,	1993).		
Moreover,	greater	emotion	work	from	a	male	partner	is	linked	to	relationship	
satisfaction	(Erickson	1993;	Duncombe	&	Marsden	1993)	and	the	lack	of	emotional	
intimacy	from	a	male	partner	as	one	of	the	key	reasons	women	give	for	separation	
(Jamieson	1998).	Men’s	incapacity	or	inability	to	engage	in	emotion	work	and	
women’s	primary	role	in	managing	emotion	within	the	private	sphere	ties	in	with	
another	well-documented	phenomena:	the	tendency	of	men	to	discuss	and	express	
their	emotions	less	than	women	(Strazdins	&	Broom,	2004).	It	should	be	noted	that	
the	emotional	distinction	between	men	and	women	takes	place	on	the	expressive	
rather	than	experiential	level.	There	is	no	difference	in	in	the	frequency	of	self-
reported	emotional	experiences	between	men	and	women	(Simon	&	Nath,	2004)	
but	the	social	sanctions	that	exist	around	violating	emotion	rules	are	much	higher	for	
men	(Brookes	&	Good,	2001).	This	leaves	us	with	a	seeming	mismatch	between	how	
men	and	women	deal	with	their	own	emotions	and	the	emotions	of	others,	which,	
moreover,	seems	to	impinge	upon	their	experience	of	romantic	fulfillment	in	a	
heterosexual	relationship.	This	mismatch	also	collides	with	research	on	the	personal	
benefits	of	being	emotionally	open	and	expressive	(Pennebaker,	1995),	including	the	
ability	to	more	fully	connect	with	others	(Brown,	2012;	Baumeister	&	Leary,	1995;	
Laurenceau	&	Kleinman,	2006),	which	has	its	own	positive	repercussions	on	well-
being	(Siedlecki	et	al.,	2014)	and	health	(Umberson	&	Karas	Montez,	2010).	
	
4.1.4	Sex	and	intimacy	
	
Images	of	sex	abound	in	popular	culture,	from	advertisements	to	films,	and	
pornography	is	more	freely	available	than	ever	(Barker,	2011).	Sex	is	considered	as	
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part	of	a	‘complete’	life	and	to	admit	to	not	having	an	active	sex	life	has	become	a	
taboo	(Cline,	1993).		Across	sexual	advice	columns,	self-help	books	and	lifestyle	
websites,	sex	is	presented	as	a	crucial	pivot	point	for	any	relationship	and	a	builder	
of	intimacy	(Barker,	2011).	It	appears	that	intimacy	is	becoming	sexualized,	and	that	
this	is	a	relatively	recent	phenomena,	only	having	really	started	to	take	root	in	the	
20th	century,	as	Seidman	(1991)	notes	that	sexual	attraction	is	now	interpreted	as	a	
symbol	of	love	and	that	having	sex	with	someone	as	a	way	of	cementing	a	
relationship.		
Shows	like	Sex	and	the	City	and	sex	shops	such	as	Ann	Summers	set	limits	for	
the	kind	of	sex	‘hot,	adventurous	people	should	be	having’	(Barker,	2011,	p.2):	for	
the	average	couple	the	incorporation	of	some	kinky	practices	into	their	intimate	life	
is	encouraged	(Scarlet	magazine,	2005)	but	the	paraphenalia	of	what	is	seen	as	more	
‘hardcore’	BDSM	is	demonised	(Storr,	2003).	Sex	itself	is	often	taken	to	mean	
heterosexual,	penetrative	sex	(Rothblum,	1994)	but	such	a	constrictive	definition	is	
insensitive	to	many	people’s	lived,	sexual	experiences.	The	first	time	a	woman	
‘go[es]	all	the	way’	with	a	man	(Loulan,	Rothblum	&	Brehony,	1993)	holds	a	powerful	
place	in	women’s	accounts	of	sexual	experience.	Accounts	of	the	first	time	are		
remembered	by	individuals	and	and	rendered	for	the	consumption	of	others,	
irrespective	of	the	pleasure	involved,	and	disregarding	other,	often	more	pleasurable	
experiences,	that	did	not	involve	penetration	(Rothblum,	1994).		
Social	norms	around	medically	‘healthy’	sexual	functioning	are	easy	to	fall	
foul	of	according	to	the	2000	UK	National	Survey	of	Sexual	Attitudes	and	Lifestyles:	
35%	of	men	and	54%	of	women	reported	some	kind	of	sexual	‘dysfunction’	
(Macdowall	et	al.,	2006).	This	poses	questions	for	the	pre-occupation	with	‘correct’	
and	‘healthy’	sex,	when	sexual	experience	no	longer	seems	to	fit	into	the	traditional	
abnormal/normal	dichotomy	set	up	by	disorder	definitions	due	to	its	expansion	in	
areas	like	light	BDSM	(Barker,	2011).	Elliott	and	Umberson	(2008)	notes	that	the	
frequency	of	sex	was	a	potential	source	of	conflict.	A	lack	of	sex	is	construed	as	a	
threat	to	both	relationship	satisfaction	and	longevity	(Michael,	Gagnon,	Laumann	&	
Kolata,	1994;	Rubin,	1990),	with	an	expectation	that	partners	will	work	at	
maintaining	passion	in	their	relationship	(Elliott	&	Umberson,	2008).	The	required	
emotion	work	in	producing	passion,	according	to	Elliott	and	Umberson	(2008),	tends	
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to	disproportionately	fall	to	women	since	their	male	partners	desired	more	sex.	In	
particular,	women	described	the	authenticity	and	spontaneity	required	of	their	
passion	as	draining	and	could	build	resentment	(Elliott	&	Umberson,	2008).	Gender	
is	also	still	a	factor	for	how	loss	of	virginity	is	experienced,	although	its	significance	is	
diminishing,	especially	amongst	younger	cohorts	(Carpenter,	2002).		
Therefore,	while	sexual	experience	often	falls	outside	of	the	boundaries	of	
what	is	considered	‘functional’	(Macdowall	et	al.,	2006)	and	gender	differences	in	
the	frequency	of	sex	desired	are	a	source	of	friction	within	relationships,	sex	
remains,	for	many,	the	‘barometer	to	a	good	marriage’	(Ellliott	&	Umberson,	2008	
p403).			
	
5.1	Thinking	about	practices	of	intimacy	on	and	off	MDMA	
	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	link	between	intimacy	and	MDMA.	The	drug	has	
entactogenic	properties,	like	increased	empathy	(Hysek	et	al.	2013),	sociability	
(Kirkpatrick	et	al.,	2014)	and	greater	feelings	of	closeness	(Peroutka,	Newman	&	
Harris,	1988),	which	seem	to	at	least	partially	account	for	the	ways	ecstasy	use	has	
been	described	as	becoming	entangled	with	personal	relationships	(Greer	&	Tolbert,	
1986).	Most	of	the	relevant	drugs	research	is	concentrated	on	the	bonds	of	
friendships,	with	less	than	a	handful	of	studies	examining	couple	relationships,	in	
particular	(Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006).	Consequently,	the	purpose	of	this	research	
project	became	to	explore	how	couples’	meanings	and	experiences	of	closeness	
intertwine	with	their	MDMA	experiences.	In	order	to	provide	a	framework	for	how	
to	think	about	closeness	in	this	context,	the	intimacy	literature	was	reviewed.	In	
particular,	the	disclosing	model	of	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992)	was	critiqued	and	the	
practices	approach	to	intimacy	suggested	as	a	productive	alternative	(Gabb,	2011;	
Gabb	&	Fink,	2015;	Jamieson,	2011,	2012).	The	practices	approach	has	been	argued	
as	better	able	to	incorporate	the	diversity	of	elements	couple	intimacy	is	contingent	
upon,	such	as	practices	of	relationship	‘work’	like	cooking	and	couple	time	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015),	practical	care	(Jamieson,	1998)	and	emotional	closeness	(Jonathan	&	
Knudson-Martin,	2012).	It	also	makes	room	for	the	idea	that	intimacy	can	be	done	
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differently,	in	different	contexts	and	MDMA	use	was	proposed	as	an	extension	to	
the	project;	examining	intimacy	in	a	non-everyday	context.	From	a	careful	
examination	of	the	literature,	the	main	and	sub-research	questions	were	devised.	
These	will	be	considered	from	a	theoretical	perspective	in	the	next	chapter,	before	
turning	to	how	they	can	be	answered	practically	and	methodologically	within	the	
research	project	in	Chapter	Three.	They	are	as	follows:	
	
1. How	do	couples	experience	closeness	in	their	everyday	lives	and	ecstasy	
experiences?	
a. What	kind	of	activities,	spaces	and	emotions	are	productive	of	couple	
intimacy?	
	
2. How	do	people	understand	their	relationship	as	influenced	by	their	MDMA	
use?	
a. Are	there	aspects	of	the	relationship	they	feel	are	enhanced	by	their	
ecstasy	use?	
b. Are	there	aspects	of	the	relationship	they	feel	are	constrained	or	
harmed	by	their	ecstasy	use?	
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Chapter	2	–	A	psychosocial	process	account	of	experience	
	
The	previous	chapter	outlined	how	drug	use	should	be	thought	of	not	as	a	peculiar	
catalogue	of	potential	harms,	as	framed	by	the	epidemiological	model,	but	as	
contextualised	by	a	multitude	of	other	factors	e.g.	(often	pleasurable)	bodily	
experience	(Duff,	2008),	moving	through	spaces	(Duff,	2008;	Bøhling,	2014),	
closeness	with	others	(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Foster	&	Spencer,	2013),	gender	
norms	(Hinchliff,	2001;	Farrugia,	2015)	and	socio-economic	factors	(Foster	&	
Spencer,	2013).	Hence,	this	thesis	is	positioned	within	a	growing	body	of	work	which	
seeks	to	map	the	socio-material	relations	of	drug	use	(e.g.	Bøhling,	2014;	Dilkes-
Frayne,	2014;	Duff,	2008;	Farrugia,	2015)	and	recognises	that	the	things	people	do	
on	drugs	are	key	to	the	pleasures	and	meaning	of	drug	use	(Duff	2008).	Being	close	
to	others	was	highlighted	as	a	core	part	of	drug	experiences,	particularly	MDMA	
which	is	known	for	its	empathic	and	sociable	effects	(Bogt	et	al.,	2002).	Gabb	and	
Fink’s	(2015)	practices	approach	was	used	to	conceptualise	intimacy	as	the	things	
people	did	to	build	a	‘special	sense	of	shared	closeness’	(Jamieson,	2012,	p1),	rather	
than	something	a	relationship	either	had	or	did	not	have.	These	practices	ranged	
from	small	acts	of	practical	care,	like	making	a	cup	of	tea,	and	planning	special	
couple	time	to	sharing	jokes	and	grievances	about	a	long	work	day.		
	 Both	the	socio-material	approach	to	drug	use	and	the	practices	approach	to	
intimacy	have	a	focus	on	everyday	actions,	as	constrained	and	enabled	by	socio-
cultural	forces,	which	intertwine	with	the	environments	we	move	through	to	
produce	lived	experience.	In	this	chapter,	it	will	be	argued	that	such	an	emphasis	can	
be	best	developed	and	extended	within	a	psychosocial	process	account	of	
experience.	This	account	involves	an	engagement	with	the	work	of	seminal	thinkers	
such	as	Alfred	N.	Whitehead,	Henri	Bergson	and	William	James,	mainly	as	
interpreted	by	British	social	psychologists	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Brown	&	Reavey,	
2015;	Brown,	2012;	Cromby,	2007;	Stenner,	2008,	2013).	From	this	perspective,	the	
world	is	viewed	not	as	made	up	of	things,	qua	a	substance	ontology,	but	‘begins	in	
the	middle’:	viewing	relations	and	processes	as	ontologically	fundamental	
(Association	for	Process	Thought,	2017).	Experience	is	therefore	viewed	as	a	product	
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of	the	relationships	between	a	multitude	of	intersecting	processes,	like	the	
biological,	the	social,	the	psychological	and	the	spatial	and	all	structures	and	systems	
are	viewed	as	‘the	effect	of	a	coordinated	streams	of	events’	(Association	for	Process	
Thought,	2017).	First,	the	psychosocial	process	approach	will	be	examined	in	greater	
depth,	outlining	how	it	can	answer	certain	questions	more	productively	than	two	key	
approaches	within	psychology	–	cognitivism	and	social	constructionism.	Next,	
multiple	threads	which	have	been	inadequately	conceived	of	within	these	two	key	
approaches	will	be	picked	out:	embodiment,	emotion	(with	reference	to	
boundaries),	space	(with	reference	to	memory).	These	threads	will	be	discussed	in	
dialogue	with	process	psychosocial	theory	before	providing	a	final	thought	on	the	
kind	of	framing	of	drug	experiences	a	psychosocial	process	account	provides.		
	
2.1	Why	a	psychosocial	process	account?	
	
In	order	to	understand	how	a	psychosocial	process	framework	can	help	explain	
experience,	it	is	first	helpful	to	consider	how	experience	has	been	traditionally	
conceptualised.	This	section	will	use	the	discipline	of	psychology	as	its	starting	point,	
reviewing	how	it	has	thought	about	people	and	their	experiences;	broadly	
categorised	under	the	cognitive	tradition	and	social	constructionism.	Moreover,	this	
section	seeks	to	draw	attention	to	the	gaps	in	both	schools	of	thought,	which	lead	to	
a	host	of	reductive	binaries,	and	argue	that	these	issues	can	be	better	addressed	
within	a	psychosocial	process	account.	
	
2.1.1	The	psychological	context	to	people	and	their	experiences:	Two	very	different	
stories	
	
While	there	have	been	many	different	schools	of	thought	within	psychology	–	
biological,	behavioural,	phenomenological,	psychoanalytic	to	name	a	few	–	cognitive	
and	social	constructionist	psychology	will	be	examined	here.	This	is	because	
cognitive	psychology	is	generally	viewed	as	the	dominant	paradigm	in	the	field	
(Gough,	McFadden,	McDonald,	2013)	while	social	constructionist	psychology	
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represents	the	most	significant	point	of	departure	from	and,	arguably,	challenge	to	
this	paradigm.	Of	course,	it	is	not	possible	to	speak	for	all	cognitive	psychologists	or	
all	social	constructionists,	however,	it	is	suggested	these	two	categories	or	‘camps’	
(McGhee,	2001)	can	provide	a	useful	orientation	in	understanding	how	psychology	
has	thought	about	experience.			
	 In	the	late	1800s	Wilhelm	Wundt	performed	experiments	to	identify	common	
human	mental	processes.	These	experiments	were	predicated	on	the	idea	that	these	
characteristics,	such	as	perceptual	capabilities,	are	natural	objects,	existing	
independently	of	experimenters	(Danziger,	1990).	These	ideas	would	be	revived	in	
the	cognitive	revolution	in	the	1950s:	a	driving	assumption	of	which	was	the	
fundamental	similarity	between	a	computer	and	the	human	mind.	Developments	in	
computer	science	paved	the	way	for	using	computational	functionality	to	map	out	
how	we	understand	mental	processes	e.g.	memory	storage	and	retrieval	(Anderson,	
2010).	This	became	cognitive	psychology,	also	referred	to	in	this	chapter	as	
‘cognitivism’	and	‘mainstream	psychology’,	which	is	still	argued	to	dominate	the	field	
today	(Gough	et	al.,	2013).	This	focus	on	cognition	within	psychology	led	to	the	
identification	of	the	person	with	the	mind.	This	has	caused	scholars	to	speak	of	
cognitivism	as	embracing	a	‘Cartesian	subject’	(Cromby,	2004,	p798):	prefigured	by	
Descartes’	dualism	which	similarly	identifies	the	person	with	the	mind	and	sees	a	
schism	between	the	mental	and	the	physical.	While	Cartesian	dualism	couched	this	
in	the	religious	language	of	the	‘soul’	compared	to	materialist,	mainstream	
psychology’s	talk	of	the	‘mind’,	the	repercussions	are	similar.	Both	theories	seem	to	
lead	to	a	‘disembodied’	subject,	divorced	from	the	material	bodies	with	which	we	
experience	the	world.	In	addition,	the	soul	or	the	mind	is	viewed	as	the	seat	of	
consciousness	and	associated	with	our	capacity	to	reason,	whereas	emotion,	or	the	
‘passions’	as	Descartes	referred	to	them,	are	associated	with	the	body.	This	sets	up	
another	dualism	between	reason/emotion,	in	which	reason	is	supposed	to	control	
emotion;	securing	it	a	privileged	position.	This	leads	Brown	and	Stenner	(2001)	to	
argue	that:	
	
Cartesianism	interiorizes	or	individualizes	the	emotions,	which	thereby	become	
merely	symptomatic	of	more	or	less	tolerated	“leakages”	in	the	rational	
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disciplining	of	our	individual	lives.	(p86-7)	
	
From	the	perspective	of	the	rational	Cartesian	subject	of	mainstream	psychology,	
not	only	are	emotions	reduced	to	mere	‘leakages’,	errors	in	a	supposedly	rationally	
ordered	system,	there	is	also	a	process	of	‘interioriz[ation]’	and	‘individualiz[ation]’.	
We	are	considered	a	bounded,	individual	subject,	distinctly	separate	from	the	world	
around	us.	This	prompts	yet	another	binary	between	individual/society	(or	
person/world),	where	experiments	within	mainstream	psychology	try	to	abstract	
away	the	influence	of	society	in	controlled,	laboratory	conditions	or	otherwise	
conceive	of	‘social	influence’	as	a	kind	of	corrupting	force	for	the	workings	of	the	
pure,	individual	subject.	
	 In	response	to	the	interiorised	focus	of	mainstream	psychology,	social	
constructionism	flourished	in	the	1970s.	Social	constructionism	has	been	described	
as	‘a	school	of	thought	[that]	presents	“knowledge”	as	a	social	product,	the	outcome	
of	specific	relationships	and	practices	within	the	research	context’	(Gough	&	
McFadden,	2001,	p3).	Hence,	psychological	phenomena	are	viewed	not	as	fixed,	
objective	categories	of	analysis	but	as	socially	constructed:	through	language,	history	
and	culture	(McGhee,	2001).	Such	a	conceptualisation	challenges	earlier	cognitive	
understandings	which	frame	psychology	in	individualist	and	nomothetic	terms	
(Gough	&	McFadden,	2001)	and,	in	doing	so,	offered	a	radically	different	and	
insightful	way	of	understanding	the	field.	Its	scholars	are	arguably	more	diverse	than	
cognitive	psychology	and	share	a	commonality	more	akin	to	a	‘family	resemblance’	
(Burr,	2005,	p2).			
	 Constructionist	ideas	challenged	mainstream	psychology’s	search	for	
immutable	facts	through	a	focus	on	the	localised,	mutable	meanings	of	language;	a	
key	site	of	social	interaction	and,	thus,	knowledge	construction.	Within	this	
perspective,	language	does	not	simply	reflect	an	objectively	knowable	reality,	but	
creates	reality.	This	was	a	significant	challenge	to	common-sense	ideas	that	language	
was	little	more	than	a	‘bag	of	labels’	(Burr,	2006,	p22)	ready	to	be	assigned	to	pre-
existing	internal	states	and	external	features	of	the	world.	This	means	that	what	we	
consider	to	be	personhood	(e.g.	having	a	personality,	experiencing	emotions	and	
being	motivated	by	desires)	is	only	possible	with	language	and	doesn’t	somehow	
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pre-date	it,	and	that	what	we	mean	by	personhood	can	be	constructed	differently,	
using	different	language	(Burr,	2006).	This	does	not	just	mean	that	different	
languages	produce	different	ways	of	being	a	person,	though	that	is	certainly	part	of	
the	picture,	but	that	there	are	many	different	versions	of	personhood	possible	
within	the	same	language,	in	different	socio-historical	contexts.	Attention	to	the	
active	and	constructive	role	of	language	prioritised	how	people	construe	their	own	
experiences	rather	than	how	those	experiences	are	constructed	by	the	‘expert’	
experimenter	and	therefore	functioned	to	question	the	objectivity	of	‘expert’	
research	that	often	bears	little	resemblance	to	experience	(Hazen,	1994).	Things	that	
had	been	naturalised	as	objective	fact	according	to	mainstream	psychology	were	
viewed	as	cultural	and	social	constructs	within	social	constructionism,	formed	
through	the	language	people	use	e.g.	the	‘weakness’	and	consequent	oppression	of	
many	groups	such	as	women,	people	of	colour	and	LGBT	people	(Brown,	1973).	
Furthermore,	this	focus	on	socio-cultural	context	thwarted	the	focus	on	the	
cognitive	individual	and	reintroduced	the	importance	of	‘the	social’,	of	other	people,	
back	into	the	realm	of	psychology.	
	 However,	social	constructionism	brought	its	own,	seemingly	intractable,	issues.	
The	emphasis	on	how	our	experiences	were	constructed	through	language	was	often	
extended	to	the	point	of	denying	any	connection	to	the	spaces	of	the	world	‘out	
there’	(Hibberd,	2001;	Maze,	2001).	This	resulted	either	in	an	ontological	
agnosticism,	we	cannot	know	what	‘objectively’	exists,	or	a	linguistic	relativism,	
where	language	can	never	refer	to	an	external	reality,	both	of	which	refused	to	
recognise	any	properties	of	objects	that	went	beyond	their	discursive	construction	
(Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002).	This	strongly	goes	against	what	we	experience	in	each	
moment	of	our	existence:	of	us	impacting	on	the	world	and	it	impacting	on	us,	
before	and	beyond	talk.	Moreover,	it	sets	up	an	implicit	privileging	of	discourse	over	
the	body,	so	that	the	body	becomes	an	impotent	‘surface’	upon	which	discourse	is	
written	(Price	&	Shildrick,	1999),	further	entrenching	a	dualistic	perspective	of	the	
world,	where	discourse,	a	placeholder	for	the	mental	in	cognitivism	discussed	
previously,	is	held	in	a	heirarchical	relationship	with	the	physical.	The	theory	has	also	
been	critiqued	for	failing	to	provide	a	compelling	account	of	what	constitutes	
personhood,	the	person	being	portrayed	as	little	more	than	the	chooser	of	
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discourses	(Burr,	2006),	and	ignoring	the	complexity	of	personal	experience,	as	
encompassing	more	than	the	discursive	but	also	the	emotional,	the	biological,	the	
biographical	and	the	cognitive.	This	reifies	‘the	social’	and	omits	the	person,	creating	
a	‘depopulated	psychology’	(Billig,	1998).	By	failing	to	properly	theorise	individuality,	
social	constructionism	could	also	be	seen	as	reductionist	in	nature:	just	as	
mainstream	psychology	reduces	the	social	world	to	individual	characteristics	such	as	
cognitive	processes	or	personality,	constructionism	‘reduces	the	rich	texture	of	
embodied	human	life	to	its	discursive	expression’	(Cromby,	2004,	p799).	Part	of	this	
‘rich	texture’	are	feelings,	which	Cromby	(2007)	argues	are	seen	as	less	fundamental	
than	language	and	discourse,	despite	feelings	being	our	default	method	of	engaging	
with	the	world	and	underlying	our	ability	to	use	language.	Thus,	social	
constructionism	still	reinforces	the	individual/society	binary,	which	cognitivism	set	
up	(but	props	up	the	reverse	hierarchical	relation	between	these	binaries:	where	
‘society’	is	elevated	above	an	inadequately	theorised	‘individual’).		
	 Therefore,	it	is	argued,	despite	cognitivism	and	social	constructionism	telling	
two	very	different	stories	about	experience,	both	theories	seem	to	entrench	the	
same	unhelpful	binaries:	mind	or	discourse/body	(referred	to	hereafter	as	simply	the	
‘mind/body’	binary),	individual/society,	person/world,	reason	or	discourse/emotion	
(again,	‘reason/emotion’	will	be	used).	This	bifurcation	means	that	we	get	the	mind	
versus	body,	individual	versus	society,	person	versus	world,	reason	versus	emotion.	
This	oppositional	stance	then	often	leads	to	a	privileging	of	one	binary	over	the	
other	e.g.	reason	over	emotion,	mind	over	body	etc.,	and	the	reduction	of	
experience	to	that	one	category	e.g.	we	are	our	minds	or	we	are	the	discourses	we	
take	up.	Such	a	reductive	outcome	produces	an	inadequate	framing	of	experience	
by:	failing	to	take	seriously	the	materiality	of	our	embodied	selves	and	the	world	we	
live	in;	downplaying	the	role	of	emotional	life	to	make	room	for	a	blanket	focus	on	
either	the	rational	or	the	discursive	and	abstracting	away	either	the	individual	or	
society.	These	are	not	issues	that	psychology	can	afford	to	brush	to	one	side,	rather	
they	underlie	key	aspects	of	human	experience	–	we	are	always	embodied	and	
feeling	as	we	move	through	a	world	comprised	of	material	settings	and	objects;	a	
world	in	which	we	are	fundamentally	part	of	yet	distinct	from.	
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2.1.2	How	does	a	psychosocial	process	account	encourage	us	to	think?	
	
Here,	Brown	and	Stenner’s	(2009)	and	Stenner’s	(2013;	2008)	interpretation	of	the	
work	of	the	mathematician/philosopher	Alfred	N.	Whitehead	(1927–1928/1985,	
1926/1985,	1938,	1966)	will	be	used	to	argue	for	a	process-relational	ontology.	This	
ontology	lays	the	groundwork	for	a	psychosocial	process	account	which	employs	a	
non-binary	mode	of	thought,	and	can	thus	address	the	problematic	binaries	outlined	
above.	It	does	so	by	maintaining	that	an	actual	occasion	is	the	fundamental	unit	of	
reality	–	not	a	substance,	but	an	activity	of	realisation.	An	actual	occasion	is	a	unity	
of	objective	and	subjective	aspects	of	the	world,	and	provides	the	basis	for	a	‘deep’	
kind	of	empiricism	(Stenner,	2008),	which	radically	extends	the	domain	of	
subjectivity.	Thus,	fragmenting	the	dichotomisation	of	the	world	into	subjective	
human	knowers	and	objective	meaningless	matter.	Crucially,	this	process-relational	
ontology	differs	from	both	the	substance	ontology	which	underlies	cognitivism,	and	
the	linguistic	relativism	or	ontological	muteness	which	has	been	argued	to	structure	
many	social	constructionist	accounts	(Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002).		
	 The	two	fundamental	ontological	principles	required	to	explain	Whitehead’s	
non-binary	way	of	thinking	are,	according	to	Brown	and	Stenner	(2009):	
	
1. Things	(whatever	they	are:	biological,	cultural,	psychological)	are	
‘definable	as	their	relevance	to	other	things	and	in	terms	of	the	way	other	
things	are	relevant	to	them’	(p12-13).	In	other	words,	they	have	relational	
essences	(own	emphasis)	
2. ‘Things	do	not	exist	independently	of	time	but	are	constituted	by	the	
history	of	their	specific	and	situated	encounters	(their	process).	Every	
actual	thing	is	‘something	by	reason	of	its	activity’	(Whitehead,	1927-
8/1985,	p26)	(own	emphasis)	(p13)	
	
Throughout	history,	the	natural	and	social	sciences	as	well	as	the	humanities	have	
attempted	to	provide	standalone	definitions;	capturing	the	essence	of	things.	This	
hails	back	to	Plato’s	Forms	in	Ancient	Greece,	which	were	supposed	to	be	the	
perfect,	standalone	embodiment	of	what	it	meant	to	be	something	e.g.	there	are	
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many	trees	in	the	world	but	the	Form	of	treeness	contains	the	common	essence	of	
all	of	the	trees	in	the	world.	In	contrast,	rather	than	trying	to	pinpoint	a	concept	in	
an	isolated	state,	the	first	relational	ontological	principle	maintains	that	things	
(whether	biological,	psychological,	cultural	etc.)	can	only	be	defined	by	their	relation	
to	other	things.	In	other	words,	they	have	relational	essences	(Brown	&	Stenner,	
2009).	Language	is	a	good	example	of	this:	a	word	is	only	definable	using	other	
words.	A	process	ontology	is	thus	web-like	in	nature,	focussing	on	shifting	
connections	and	relations	instead	of	connecting	points	qua	themselves.	Turning	to	
the	second	principle,	the	world	is	viewed	as	constituted	through	process,	‘as	
something	by	reason	of	its	activity’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Following	this	idea,	
things	can	only	be	defined	in	the	context	of	their	past	activities	and	not	understood	
as	existing	in	some	isolated	moment	in	time.		
	 Taken	together,	these	principles	comprise	a	process-relational	ontology,	
sharply	contrasting	with	the	way	Western,	cognitive	thought	frames	the	world	as	
made	up	of	independent,	unchanging	‘things’;	a	substance	ontology	(Brown	&	
Stenner,	2009).	It	could	be	argued	that	being	so	culturally	and	historically	engrained	
it	is	hard	to	see	outside	of	these	terms;	they	frame	our	whole	way	of	viewing	the	
world.	Whitehead	(1926/1985)	termed	this	the	fallacy	of	misplaced	concreteness:	
the	mistake	of	reifying	what	is	actually	a	high-grade	abstraction	of	thought.	This	is	
the	idea	that	reality	is	fundamentally	a	‘succession	of	instantaneous	configurations	
of	matter’	(Whitehead,	1926/1985,	p63),	composed	of	inert	matter	with	the	
property	of	simple	location:	belonging	to	a	particular	point	in	time	(contra	to	being	
constituted	through	process)	and	space	(contra	to	being	relationally	definable,	as	
their	relevance	to	other	things).	Whitehead	argued	that	a	substance	ontology	was	
completely	at	odds	with	quantum	theory:	there	weren’t	unchanging,	inert	pieces	of	
matter	existing	in	external	‘containers’	of	space	and	time	but,	in	its	place,	a	‘spatial	
universe	as	a	field	of	force	or	incessant	activity’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p23)	where	
space	and	time	were	‘considered	as	relative	to	the	system	in	which	the	
measurement	was	being	made’	(Kraus,	1997,	p20).	This	motivated	the	philosopher	
and	mathematician	to	create	a	comprehensive	metaphysical	vision	which	would	
incorporate	the	understandings	of	modern	science.	A	process-relational	ontology	
was	born.	
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	 Through	this	ontology,	Stenner	(2008)	argues	Whitehead	‘provides	us	with	a	
“deep”	form	of	empiricism,	which	will	be	explored	later	on,	grounded	in	the	notion	
of	the	“actual	occasion”	of	experience	and	in	the	temporal	and	spatial	co-assembly	
of	multiplicities	of	such	occasions’	(p90).	But	what	is	an	‘actual	occasion	of	
experience’?	And	what	does	experience	mean	in	this	context?	Defining	an	actual	
occasion	requires	us	to	‘stretch’	terms	we	are	familiar	with:	allowing	terms	to	
accommodate	a	slightly	different	meaning	than	we	would	ordinarily	associate	with	
them.	This	is	because	our	object-orientated	language,	where	we	talk	in	terms	of	
‘things’,	leaves	little	room	for	articulating	a	process	ontology	(Mesle,	2008).	In	this	
instance	we	need	to	stretch	‘experience’.	An	actual	occasion	is	considered	to	be	a	
‘drop’	of	experience	but	not	in	the	usual	sense	of	the	term	i.e.	as	the	preserve	of	
human,	and	possibly	certain	forms	of	animal,	life.	Rather	than	thinking	of	experience	
as	connected	to	consciousness,	consider	this	drop	of	experience	as	more	akin	to	a	
perspective	on	the	world.	Each	actual	occasion	is	a	perspective,	which	comes	into	
being	momentarily,	and	then	fades	away,	and	these	actual	occasions	comprise	
everything	in	the	world:	from	subatomic	particles	to	rocks,	and	from	trees	to	people.	
These	actual	occasions	are	not	a	substance	or	a	material	but	an	activity	of	realisation	
and	are	thus	in	a	state	of	continual	becoming.	This	core	idea	has	been	interpreted,	
notably	by	Massumi	and	Deleuze,	as	giving	rise	to	a	universe	in	continual	flux,	where	
stability	is	ignored	or	unimportant.	However,	Brown	and	Stenner	(2009)	have	argued	
that	a	process	account	also	acknowledges	the	stability	existing	in	the	world.	For	
example,	the	perceived	stability	of	books	and	people	are	a	result	of	the	spatial-
temporal	groupings	of	actual	occasions	patterned	in	less	(e.g.	book)	and	vastly	more	
complex	(e.g.	person)	ways.	
	 As	well	as	thinking	about	an	actual	occasion	as	being	a	drop	of	experience	
which	is	continually	being	actualised,	there	is	a	second	crucial	facet	of	this	concept.	
An	actual	occasion,	or	‘event’,	is	neither	object	nor	subject,	rather	‘subjective	and	
objective	aspects	are	fused	together	in	each	occasion	of	actuality’	(Stenner,	2008,	
p98).	There	is	not	a	schism	between	objective	material	bodies	on	one	side	(the	
chairs,	trees	and	fox	in	a	garden)	and	perceiving	subjective	consciousness	on	the	
other.	Rather,	both	garden	and	person	are:	
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complexes	of	ongoing	processes,	each	of	which	entails	numerous	chains	of	
unfolding	events	in	which	‘subjects’	(experiences)	organize	the	data	of	their	
‘objects'	(expressions),	before	themselves	‘concrescing’	as	objects	
(expressions)	for	the	experience	of	the	next	‘subject’	in	the	process	(Stenner,	
Bhatti	&	Church,	2012,	p6)	
	
Therefore,	subjective	experience	is	just	as	much	a	part	of	‘objective’	nature	as	the	
chair	or	the	fox	and	basic	forms	of	subjectivity	are	also	present	in	the	continually	
unfolding	events	which	comprise	the	garden.	The	relation	between	these	subjective	
and	objective	aspects	of	the	world	is	characterised	by	Whitehead	as	one	of	‘concern’	
and	this	is	significant	for	how	a	psychosocial	process	account	can	re-engage	with	the	
materiality	of	the	world	and	our	own	bodies;	topics	constructionist	thought	has	been	
criticised	for	bypassing	(Cromby,	2004;	Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002).	A	subject	
comes	into	being	through	its	objective	concerns	or,	in	other	words,	objects	always	
co-constitute	subjectivity.	This	way	of	thinking	fragments	the	subject/object,	
person/world	binaries.	A	process	account	centered	around	a	cosmology	of	actual	
occasions	allows	us	to	say	that	objective	aspects	of	the	world	are	crucial	to	
subjective	aspects	through	a	relation	of	concern,	unlike	other	schools	of	thought	
which	have	championed	subjectivity	over	objectivity	e.g.	social	constructionism	
which	has	been	argued	as	ignoring	‘objective’	reality	(Cromby,	2004)	or	
psychoanalytic	branches	of	psychosocial	theory	which	emphasise	(unconscious)	
subjectivity	(Stenner,	2008).	A	process	account	also	allows	us	to	maintain	the	
distinctive	qualities	of	human	subjectivity,	arguably	obscured	by	Deleuze	and	
Guattari	(1987)	and	actor-network	theory	(Latour,	2005)	who	reconnect	with	the	
material	and	the	body	at	the	expense	of	‘flatten[ing]	out’	(Stenner,	2008,	p92)	the	
differences	between	human	and	non-human	bodies.	Stenner	(2008)	terms	this	
refiguring	of	subjectivity	and	objectivity	‘deep	empiricism’.	
	 Deep	empiricism	has	a	lineage	rooted	in	William	James’	radical	empiricism	and	
Deleuzian	plural	empiricism	and	is	contrasted	with	shallow	empiricism	(Stenner,	
2008).	The	latter	being	what	is	normally	meant	by	‘empiricism’:	an	objective	reality	
composed	of	valueless	matter	only	knowable	via	the	subjective	sensory	experience	
of	a	human	knower.	This	strips	out	subjectivity	from	the	world	and	nature	and	places	
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it	all	in	the	human	knower.	To	the	degree	which	the	human	knower	only	perceives	
things	which	can	be	perceived	by	all	human	knowers,	their	knowledge	is	considered	
objective,	rather	than	subjective	e.g.	this	is	the	logic	underlying	experiments	based	
on	sense	perception.	However,	deep	empiricism	‘radically	extends	and	refines	the	
domain	of	subjectivity’	(Stenner,	2008,	p94).	Deep	empiricism	does	not	recognise	
the	object	as	the	primary	‘stuff’	of	the	universe	as	in	materialism	(the	cosmology	
associated	with	cognitivist	thought)	or	the	subject	as	the	fundamental	core	of	the	
universe	as	in	idealism,	including	linguistic	relativism	(one	of	the	cosmologies	
associated	with	social	constructionist	thought).	Rather,	the	most	primary	aspect	of	
the	world	is	an	actual	occasion,	which	is	a	fusion	of	subject	and	object.	Now,	we	turn	
to	the	ramifications	this	idea	of	an	actual	occasion	has	for	our	understanding	of	
experience.	
	 	 	
2.1.3	A	reframing	of	experience	
	
‘Ask	not	what's	inside	your	head,	but	what	your	head's	inside	of’	(Mace,	1977)	
	
Deep	empiricism	is	more	in	keeping	with	modern	scientific	understandings	of	the	
world	as	‘incessant	activity’	(Stenner,	2008)	and	our	interconnected	experience	
where	we	are	both	mind	and	body,	subjects	but	concerned	with	objects.	
Furthermore,	the	concept	of	actual	occasion	allows	us	to	explain	the	difference	and	
continuity	between	humans	and	the	rest	of	the	world	(Stenner,	2008).	Humans,	
animals,	trees	and	even	rocks	are	all	made	up	of	temporal-spatial	orderings	of	actual	
occasions,	yet	the	patterning	of	actual	entities	involved	in	human	life	is	vastly	more	
complex	than	that	involved	in,	say,	a	table.	This	means	we	are	fully	part	of	the	
natural	world	and	we	cannot	be	abstracted	from	it,	there	is	no	fission	between	
person/world,	mind/matter,	subject/object,	mind/body;	or,	in	other	words:	‘The	
psyche	is	never	disembodied	and	the	body	is	never	de-worlded’	(Stenner,	2008,	
p106).	We	can	also	leave	behind	the	troubling	view	of	the	natural	world	as	devoid	of	
subjectivity,	which	becomes	extremely	difficult	to	maintain	when	considering	certain	
organisms,	particular	high-level	animal	life	(Stenner,	2008).	The	integral,	
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interdependent	relationship	of	mind	to	matter,	person	to	world,	subject	to	object,	
also	faciliates	a	more	encompassing	vision	of	reality,	which	can	account	for	the	ways	
in	which	aspects	of	reality	are	intertwined	with	one	another.	This	discussion	has	
taken	place	at	a	relatively	abstract	level,	laying	the	groundwork	for	a	more	in-depth	
discussion	of	what	this	might	mean	for	our	everyday	experience	as	embodied	beings	
who	move	through	space,	think,	feel	and	remember.	
	 In	a	psychosocial	process	account,	experience	is	produced	through	the	
intersection	of	multiple	processes,	such	as	the	biological,	the	psychological,	the	
social	and	the	spatial.	Experience	is	the	becoming	of	objective	reality,	realised	
through	‘an	interlocked	plurality	of	modes’	(Whitehead,	1926/1985,	p87	cited	in	
Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p31).	Process	theory	‘begins	in	the	middle’	(Association	for	
Process	Thought,	2016)	and	so	to	consider	an	aspect	of	the	world,	is	to	ask	–	what	
mediates	it?	This	means	psychologists	are	not	confined	to	one	aspect	of	experience,	
such	as	the	cognitive	or	the	discursive,	but	can	‘follow	the	psychological	wherever	
[it]	lead[s]	us’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p5).	Drawing	on	the	two	ontological	
principles	outlined	in	the	previous	section,	nothing	‘can	be	abstracted	from	its	
broader	scheme	of	relationality	and	process’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p37).	This	
means	an	aspect	of	experience	can	never	be	considered	in	isolation	from	its	process,	
its	history	of	specific	and	situated	encounters,	or	its	relationships.	Practically,	drug	
use	cannot	be	carved	out	of	human	experience	and	examined	as	a	separate	
category,	existing	in	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	world	or	the	stream	of	events	
which	lead	up	to	it,	as	the	epidemiological	model	discussed	in	the	first	chapter	seeks	
to	do.	This	can	be	seen	more	clearly	in	an	example,	taken	from	a	participant’s	
written	memory	of	taking	MDMA:	
	
He	is	excited,	buoyed	by	the	atmosphere	of	the	group…This	will	be	his	first	
time	on	MDMA,	and	his	first	time	dancing	in	a	club.	At	theatre	school,	he	had	
always	been	among	the	worst	in	his	dance	class	-	frequently	reprimanded	for	
his	lack	of	rhythm	and	seemingly	unable	to	enjoy	any	aspect	of	dance	or	
dance	music.		
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It	takes	a	little	while	before	they’re	inside	the	club,	but	once	inside	his	fear	
begins	to	dissipate.	He	feels	more	and	more	at	ease	as	he	takes	in	his	
surroundings,	the	music	reverberating	through	his	body	–	dirty,	pulsing	
sawtooth	sounds	that	remind	him	of	the	music	his	father	used	to	play.	A	
really	funky,	uplifting,	energising	kind	of	music.		
Everything	feels	so	easy.	Far	from	being	unsure	of	how	to	move,	he	is	
compelled	to	dance	as	the	bass	takes	hold	of	his	body	and	forces	him	to	rock	
in	time	with	the	beat…	
	
He	would	never	have	dreamed	of	moving	like	this	in	front	of	other	people	but	
it	feels	so	right	–	he’s	Michael	Jackson,	he’s	Justin	Timberlake!		
	
He	overhears	a	girl	in	the	group	attracting	the	attention	of	one	of	her	friends.	
'Don't	you	think	he's	a	good	dancer?'	she	asks,	and	as	they	both	stand	
watching	him,	he	beams	in	the	knowledge	that	he	needn't	ever	have	worried.	
	
(Anderson	&	McGrath,	2013,	Toby,	Memory	1)	
	
This	experience	is	crucially	shaped	by	the	‘history	of	situated	and	specific	
encounters’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p13):	the	‘dirty,	pulsing	sawtooth	sounds’	his	
father	used	to	play,	which	make	the	alien	environment	of	the	club	feel	more	familiar	
and	the	anxiety	he	felt	previously	around	dancing,	‘he	had	always	been	among	the	
worst	in	his	dance	class’	contextualises	the	significance	of	his	now	‘easy’	
movements.	In	addition,	being	on	MDMA	cannot	be	cut	out	from	the	relationships	
within	which	it	is	enmeshed,	how	it	is	connected	to	the	‘energising’	music	and	the	
way	it	‘reverberat[es]	through’	and	‘takes	hold’	of	his	body,	the	uplifting	space	of	the	
club,	the	‘atmosphere’	of	the	group	of	friends	he	goes	with,	the	conversations	of	his	
companions,	‘“Don’t	you	think	he’s	a	good	dancer?”’	and	his	feeling	of	success,	‘he’s	
Michael	Jackson,	he’s	Justin	Timberlake!’.	While	socio-material	approaches	to	drug	
use	(e.g.	Bøhling,	2014;	Dilkes-Frayne,	2014;	Duff,	2008;	Farrugia,	2015)	map	the	
relational	elements	of	drug	use,	they	could	be	argued	to	overlook	the	importance	of	
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the	‘history’	of	encounters	leading	up	to	the	drug	experience,	such	as	biographical	or	
relationship	histories.			
Finally,	a	note	about	how	deep	empiricism	can	alter	our	understanding	of	
experience.	As	previously	described,	deep	empiricism	views	experience	and	feeling	
as	dispersed	into	the	the	world,	rather	than	located	solely	within	us.	This	entails	an	
understanding	of	subjectivity	as	always	co-constituted,	produced	in	concert,	and	
therefore	frames	feelings,	sensations,	memories	and	perceptions	as	inseparable	
from	the	circumstances	and	settings	which	prompt	them	(Langdridge,	Barker,	
Reavey	&	Stenner,	2012).	Experience	cannot	be	adequately	explained	with	reference	
only	to	the	‘psychology	of	an	isolated	individual’	since	circumstances	are	always	
‘“folded	into”’	the	experience	(Langdridge	et	al.,	2012,	p15).	This	is	a	significant	
statement,	particularly	with	regard	to	the	discipline	of	psychology.	For	example,	
considering	anger,	it	is	not	only	the	particular	subjective	experience	which	
determines	the	ascription	of	anger	but	a	sense	of	rejection	felt	in	an	empty	flat	after	
being	cancelled	on	by	a	new	beau,	sheer	hopelessness	at	breaking	a	favourite	mug	at	
the	end	of	an	awful	day	or	incredulity	at	another	unbelievable	political	result.	The	
psychological,	the	social	and	the	material	are	all	necessary	in	understanding	these	
experiences,	for	example	the	empty	flat	(material)	physically	embodies	and	
emphasises	the	evening	of	loneliness	ahead,	accentuating	the	rejection	felt	
(psychological)	after	a	cared-for	person	prioritises	something	or	maybe	even	
someone	else	(social).	
	
2.3	Mind	and	body:	Two	attributes	of	the	same	process	
	
Throughout	Western	history	a	fission	between	body	and	mind	has	existed	(Bordo,	
2003;	Drew,	1990;	Burkitt,	1999).	The	body	has	traditionally	been	subjugated	to	the	
ethereal	soul	or,	since	the	enlightenment,	our	mental	faculties,	which	comprise	the	
unitary,	rational	subject	of	cognitivism.	This	mind/body	binary	has	been	argued	as	
further	entrenched	by	social	constructionism	which	replaces	the	mind	with	discourse	
and	the	body	is	formulated	as	inscribed-upon	‘surface’	(Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002;	
Cromby,	2004).	Yet,	people	are	always	embodied	beings.	We	learn	all	we	know	
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through	seeing,	hearing,	tasting,	smelling	and	touching	the	world	around	us;	possible	
only	due	to	our	embodied	perspective.	Furthermore,	the	bodies	we	have	(their	
gender,	colour,	(dis)ability)	make	certain	experiences	possible	and	constrain	other	
potentialities	(Bayer	&	Shotter,	1998).	Life	is	fundamentally	different	if	you	are	male	
or	if	you	have	a	chronic	disease:	the	physicality	of	our	existence	shapes	the	way	we	
interact	with	the	world	and	the	way	it	interacts	with	us,	continually	(re)forming	our	
sense	of	self.	A	tenable	theoretical	framework	must	fully	flesh	out	the	relationship	
between	our	consciousness	and	our	embodied-ness.	A	commitment	to	the	
terminology	of	embodiment	rather	than	the	body	has	been	argued	as	important	(Del	
Busso,	2009).	While	the	latter	separates	off	the	body	as	a	separate	‘thing’,	the	‘tool’	
implied	in	social	constructionist	thought	(Grosz,	1994)	or	‘appendage’	of	Cartesian	
rationalism,	embodiment	represents	an	integration	of	two	previous	binaries	
(discourse/body	or	mind/body)	and	an	implicit	recognition	that	our	whole	way	of	life	
is	embodied	(Weiss	&	Haber,	1999).	Such	a	commitment	to	embodiment	will	be	
adhered	to	in	this	work,	except	when	the	argument	makes	it	necessary	to	distinguish	
between	the	mind	and	the	body.	
The	work	of	Spinoza	(1677/1993),	as	interpreted	by	Brown	and	Stenner	
(2009),	and	the	arguments	of	Johnson	(2008)	will	be	used	to	explore	the	relationship	
between	the	mind	and	the	body.	Process	thought	and	phenomenology	have	a	
shared	heritage	in	Spinoza,	however	phenomenological	ideas	will	not	be	the	focus	
here,	rather	how	Spinozist	concepts	have	been	developed	by	process	thinkers.	An	
argument	will	be	made	for	the	crucial	role	our	bodies	play	in	our	experience	and	
knowledge	of	the	world.	The	relationship	of	the	mind	to	the	body	will	be	sketched	
out	in	a	Spinozist	fashion,	his	parallelism	allowing	for	an	equal	weighting	of	these	
two	aspects	of	experience.	The	central	role	of	the	body	in	producing	experience	will	
be	further	emphasised	through	Johnson’s	work	which	explores	how	even	things	
which	have	been	cast	as	completely	disembodied,	e.g.	conceptual	meaning,	are	still	
grounded	in	the	body’s	movement	within	and	manipulation	of	the	world.		
Under	a	Spinozist	reading	of	embodiment,	‘we	do	not	know	“the	world”	but	
rather	the	way	in	which	the	world	affects	us’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p114)	
(emphasis	in	original)	and,	crucially,	this	‘we’	includes	our	bodies.	Spinoza	dispensed	
with	a	Cartesian	notion	of	the	body-as-machine,	secondary	to	the	vacillations	of	the	
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mind;	instead	seeing	this	process	of	being	affected	as	primarily	mediated	by	our	
bodies.	It	is	worth	noting	the	significance	accorded	to	this	felt	relation	of	being	
affected,	an	emphasis	that	will	be	taken	up	in	the	next	section	concerning	emotion.	
Instead	of	viewing	the	mind	and	the	body	as	binary	opposites,	two	different	
substances,	Spinoza	thought	of	the	mind	and	body	as	different	attributes	of	the	
same	substance.	Thus,	thought	(distinguishing	consciousness	from	objects)	is	one	
attribute	of	a	single	substance	and	extension	(the	physical	field	of	objects)	is	
another.	Individual	minds	and	bodies	are	then	seen	as	finite	modes	of	thought	and	
extension,	respectively.	This	approach	is	argued	to	retain	a	distinction	between	mind	
and	body	while	also	making	redundant	the	heirarchical	mind/body	binary	(Brown	&	
Stenner,	2009).	Spinoza	terms	this	single	substance	Nature	or	God	but	Whitehead’s	
(1927–1928/1985)	process	ontology	might	provide	a	more	satisfying	account.	If	
process	is	ontologically	fundamental	then	the	single	substance,	of	which	mind	and	
body	are	two	aspects	of,	would	not	be	a	‘substance’	at	all	but	a	process.	More	
specifically,	this	unity	could	be	the	underlying	activity	of	occasions	or	events	being	
actualised,	as	outlined	earlier	in	the	chapter	as	the	process	of	the	becoming	of	actual	
occasions.	
Whereas	Cartesianism,	and	the	cognitivist	thought	which	arose	from	it,	
identified	the	body	as	inherently	passive	and	controlled	by	the	active	mind,	for	
Spinoza	activity	and	passivity	can	instead	be	associated	with	either	attribute	‘since	
both	attributes	are	“expressions”	of	the	underlying	unity	of	these	unfolding	scenes	
of	activity,	encounter	and	transformation’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p117).	Spinoza’s	
‘parallelism’	allows	him	to	describe	that	a	body’s	diminished	power	to	act	as	a	result	
of	an	encounter	is,	when	that	body	is	conceived	under	the	attribute	of	thought,	also	
a	less	powerful	mind.	This	has	two	advantages.	Firstly,	there	is	no	need	to	envision	a	
point	of	connection	between	mind	and	body,	there	are	different	registers	of	the	
same,	underlying	unity.	Secondly,	it	realises	the	importance	of	the	body	in	what	it	
means	to	be	human.	A	Spinozist	approach	recognises	our	nature	as	embodied	beings	
and	how	fundamental	this	is	to	our	existence:	our	bodies,	along	with	our	minds,	
mediate	all	experience	and	knowledge	of	the	world.	This	idea	can	be	strengthened	
by	looking	beyond	Spinoza’s	arguments	to	a	modern	understanding	of	embodiment.	
Johnson’s	(2008)	work	will	be	used	to	buttress	the	argument	for	body	as	mediator,	
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exploring	in	more	detail	how	this	process	takes	place	as	well	as	explaining	how	a	
concept	usually	considered	as	totally	disembodied,	conceptual	meaning,	is	grounded	
too	in	an	embodied	being	in	our	world.		
	
2.3.1	Our	experiencing,	meaning-making	bodies	
	
‘A	person	is	not	a	mind	and	a	body.	These	are	not	two	“things”	somehow	
mysteriously	yoked	together.	What	we	call	a	“person”	is	a	certain	kind	of	bodily	
organism	that	has	a	brain	operating	within	its	body,	a	body	that	is	continually	
interacting	with	aspects	of	its	environments	(material	and	social)	in	an	ever-changing	
process	of	experience.’		
(Johnson,	2008,	p11)	
	
Johnson’s	(2008)	core	argument	is	that	the	body	is	the	starting	point	to	our	
experience	and,	moreover,	that	our	body’s	movement	within	and	manipulation	of	
the	world	forms	the	basis	for	all	meaning	–	what	he	correspondingly	calls	embodied,	
immanent	meaning.	This	contrasts	with	the	cognitive	view	of	the	world	which	
associates	the	mind	and	language	with	meaning	and,	as	such,	gives	us	a	
propositional	understanding	of	meaning	where	concepts	are	organised	in	an	orderly	
fashion	through	grammar	and	expressed	in	statements	like	‘The	delivery	will	be	late’,	
‘she	is	the	friendliest	person	I	have	ever	met’	and	‘we	live	in	uncertain	times’.	To	
understand	why	meaning	originates	in	the	body,	we	need	to	return	to	an	insight	
from	Whitehead’s	(1927–1928/1985)	process	philosophy:	we	are	fully	part	of	the	
natural	world;	different	in	degree,	not	kind.	Instead	of	a	‘top-down’	process	where	
meaning	originates	from	the	supernatural	and	disembodied	mind	and	is	imposed	
upon	the	body,	embodied	meaning	is	built	from	the	‘bottom	up’,	from	the	continual	
interaction	of	a	biological	organism	with	its	(social	and	material)	surroundings:	
	
it	sees	meaning	and	all	our	higher	functioning	as	growing	out	of	and	shaped	
by	our	abilities	to	perceive	things,	manipulate	objects,	move	our	bodies	in	
space,	and	evaluate	our	situation.	(Johnson,	2008,	p11)	
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This	is	crucial.	Since	we	are	not	just	in	our	environment	but	of	it,	meaning	must	itself	
be	a	naturalistic	process.	It	is	our	existence	as	a	biological	organism	moving	through	
and	interacting	with	our	environment	that	allows	us	to	learn	and	understand	what	
things	mean	or,	in	other	words,	how	something	connects	with	something	else.	The	
bodily	basis	of	meaning	is	pointed	to	by	how	we	make	sense	of	ourselves	through	
bodily	movement:	
	
We	literally	discover	ourselves	in	movement.	We	grow	kinetically	into	our	
bodies.	In	particular,	we	grow	into	those	distinctive	ways	of	moving	that	
come	with	our	being	the	bodies	we	are.	In	our	spontaneity	of	movement,	we	
discover	arms	that	extend,	spines	that	bend,	knees	that	flex,	mouths	that	
shut,	and	so	on.	We	make	sense	of	ourselves	in	the	course	of	moving.	
(Sheets-Johnstone,	2011,	p117).	
	
To	be	alive	is	to	move,	we	are	only	truly	still	in	death.	We	are	in	constant,	sensuous	
contact	with	our	world;	‘we’	and	the	‘world’	are	not	separate	but	always	intertwined	
(Johnson,	2008;	Sheets-Johnstone,	2011).	A	further	demonstration	of	this	continual	
organism-environment	interaction	which	underpins	embodied	meaning-making	
comes	from	babies.	They	do	not	deal	in	statements	or	propositions	or	concepts,	yet	
we	would	still	say	they	are	learning	about	the	world	and	what	their	actions	mean	
through	the	use	of	their	bodies	and	its	capabilities	–	its	perceptive	abilities,	
coordinated	motor	functions,	bodily	expression	etc.	(Johnson,	2008).	For	example,	
babies	learn	about	object	permanence,	that	objects	continue	to	exist	when	they	
cannot	see	or	hear	them,	through	placing	a	favourite	toy	under	a	blanket	and	then	
feeling	it	is	still	there	when	they	reach	back	for	it.	Johnson	(2008)	claims	that	this	
embodied,	preconceptual	meaning-making	doesn’t	end	when	we	become	adults	but	
in	fact	underlies	all	our	conceptual	understanding.	
	 The	propositional	understanding	of	meaning	previously	discussed,	of	
concepts	organised	by	grammar	into	statements,	has	been	synonymous	with	
‘meaning’	for	centuries.	This	has	been	largely	at	the	expense	of	emotions	and	
feelings	which	have	been	almost	entirely	divorced	from	the	realm	of	conceptual	
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meaning;	considered	‘subjective’	and	too	difficult	to	handle.	Yet,	Johnson	(2008)	
argues,	this	is	a	fatal	error.	Feelings	and	emotions	are	crucial	to	our	ability	to	
experience	meaning	and	to	reason.	From	the	discipline	of	neuroscience,	Damasio	
(2006)	provides	examples	of	patients	who	experienced	trauma	to	emotional	centres	
of	the	brain	and	then	couldn’t	reason	on	an	even	a	very	basic	level.	He	describes	a	
patient	who	was	incapable	of	deciding	which	of	two	dates	would	be	best	for	their	
next	appointment,	going	over	and	over	minute	details	for	and	against	the	alternative	
dates	for	half	an	hour	before	Damasio	intervened.	Johnson	uses	the	example	of	
someone	who	is	doubtful	of	his	claims	to	further	reinforce	this	idea	of	meaning	as	
grounded	in	our	bodily,	felt	experience.	He	instructs	the	reader	to	ask	themselves	
what	such	an	experience	of	‘doubting	what	Johnson	is	saying’	amounts	to.	He	draws	
on	the	pragmatists,	who	will	also	prove	crucial	to	the	understanding	of	emotion	
sketched	by	the	sociologist	Burkitt	(2014)	in	the	next	section,	to	describe	how	our	
experience	of	doubt	is:	
	
a	fully	embodied	experience	of	hesitation,	withholding	of	assent,	felt	bodily	
tension,	and	general	bodily	restriction…Doubt	retards	or	stops	the	
harmonious	flow	of	experience	that	preceded	the	doubt.	You	feel	the	
restriction	and	tension	in	your	diaphragm,	your	breathing	and	perhaps	in	
your	gut	(p53).	
	
As	will	be	explored	with	Burkitt,	these	embodied	feelings	do	not	merely	go	along	
with	your	doubt,	they	are	your	doubt.	Thus,	the	strong	bias	against	thinking	of	
cognitive	meaning	as	grounded	in	emotional	experience	in	Western	culture	comes	
from	the	way	we	are	thinking	about	this	conceptual,	cognitive	meaning:	as	
abstracted	and	disembodied	in	propositional	statements.	But,	as	has	been	shown,	
concepts	are	embodied	processes	of	appraisal	and	relation:	we	feel	our	doubt	in	our	
bodily	tension	and	a	baby	grasps	causation	through	the	use	of	its	motor	functions,	to	
push	one	toy	car	into	another,	and	perceptive	faculties,	to	see	the	other	car	move	
off	with	force,	which	allows	the	baby	to	draw	a	causal	connection	between	the	two	
events.	Meaning	is	grounded	in	our	emotionally	experiencing	bodies,	first	and	
foremost.		
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	 Through	a	psychosocial	process	framework,	we	are	embodied,	thinking,	
feeling	people,	rather	than	seeing	the	body	as	a	thing-like	tool	controlled	by	the	
mind	as	in	cognitivism,	or	inscribed	with	discourse,	as	in	social	constructionism.	
Brown	and	Stenner’s	(2009)	reading	of	Spinozist	(1677/1993)	thought	was	used	to	
argue	that	minds	and	bodies	are	modes	of	two	different	attributes	of	a	single	
substance.	Whitehead’s	(1927–1928/1985)	cosmology	was	used	to	convert	this	idea	
of	‘substance’	into	a	process	ontology,	with	mind	and	body	different	aspects	of	the	
the	same	underlying	activity	of	realisation,	the	continual	becoming	of	actual	
occasions.	Practically,	this	entails	a	greater	appreciation	for	and	receptivity	to	both	
the	way	our	embodied	self	impacts	and	is	impacted	by	the	world,	as	body	is	no	
longer	subordinate	to	an	active	mind.	The	role	of	our	bodies	in	mediating	our	
experience	of	the	world	was	further	highlighted	through	the	person-environment	
interaction	which	is	the	basis	for	all	our	experience	and,	indeed,	all	meaning	(person	
is	understood	here	as	meaning	both	mind	and	body).	This	fragments	old	dichotomies	
between	mind	and	body,	person	and	world;	these	are	seen	as	abstractions	of	the	
same	organism-in-environment	process.	Instead	of	associating	our	body	with	only	
the	biological	body,	the	physical	‘thing’,	and	seeing	everything	else	as	external	to	it,	
we	should	appreciate	that	environment,	culture	and	social	relations	are	deeply	
interwoven	with	our	embodied	self	(Johnson,	2008).	This	should	precipitate	a	move	
away	from	seeing	embodied,	emotional	experience	as	outside	the	privileged	domain	
of	cognitive,	conceptual	meaning.	Both	need	to	be	taken	seriously	and	this	means	
we	need	to	attend	to	the	meaning-making	structures	of	the	body	as	well	as	those	
embroiled	in	syntax	and	propositions,	the	traditional	reserves	of	conceptual	
meaning.	After	establishing	the	fundamental	unity	between	mind	and	body	and	the	
body’s	central	role	in	meaning-making,	this	chapters	pans	its	focus	outward	to	
consider	what	it	means	for	a	body	to	be	affected.	
	
2.4	Being	affected		
	
‘we	do	not	know	“the	world”	but	rather	the	way	in	which	the	world	affects	us’		
(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p114)	(emphasis	in	original)	
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It	could	be	argued	that	feelings	are	our	default	method	of	engaging	with	the	world:	
we	are	taught	how	to	speak,	but	we	are	born	feeling	(Cromby,	2007).	Babies	use	
bodily	and	facial	cues	to	express	their	emotions	long	before	they	can	communicate	
with	language	(Holinger	&	Doner,	2003).	We	first	learn	how	to	navigate	through	our	
world	by	what	we	feel,	these	sensations	orientate	us	and	give	meaning	to	the	
situations	we	encounter,	forming	part	of	the	body’s	meaning-making	structures,	as	
previously	outlined	(Johnson,	2008).	Furthermore,	without	feelings	and	emotions	
‘nothing	would	attract	or	repel	us	and	motivate	us	to	act’	(Fuchs,	2013,	p13),	the	
world	would	hold	no	meaning	for	us.	For	example,	it	is	the	feeling	of	comfort	you	get	
when	you	eat	ice-cream	that	keeps	drawing	you	back	to	the	freezer	and	it	is	the	
sense	of	accomplishment	you	feel	when	a	student	understands	something	for	the	
first	time	that	makes	teaching	worthwhile.		
Therefore,	it	seems	fair	to	say	we	are	‘feeling	bodies’	(Cromby,	2015,	p1):	
searching	for	and	managing	feeling	is	fundamental	to	human	life,	from	basic	survival	
to	living	a	contented	life.	It	seems	surprising	therefore	that	mainstream,	cognitive	
psychology	operates	with	the	idea	of	a	rational	subject,	where	emotions	are	little	
more	than	‘leakages’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2001,	p87)	under	the	control	of	a	rational	
system.	Indeed,	if	it	is	investigated	a	little	further	this	opposition	between	reason	
and	emotion	becomes	completely	untenable.	As	was	discussed	in	relation	to	
embodiment,	damage	to	the	emotional	centres	in	our	brain	precludes	the	ability	to	
reason	on	even	a	very	simple	level	(Damasio,	2006)	and	our	embodied	feelings	
crucially	constitute	our	experience	of	and	ability	to	reason	(Johnson,	2008).	By	
reducing	experience	to	discourse,	social	constructionist	thought	has	been	argued	to	
ignore	feelings,	which	are	embodied	states	(Cromby,	2007).	For	example,	a	
blindfolded	person	feels	something	put	on	their	tongue,	they	are	told	it’s	a	cherry	
but	may	be	doubtful.	It	is	only	when	they	bite	into	the	cherry	and	feel	the	juice	flow	
across	their	tongue	that	they	are	certain.	This	is	a	felt,	sensuous	way	of	knowing	
which	is	different	from	knowledge	communicated	through	the	medium	of	language.	
Furthermore,	this	is	continuous	with	Shotter’s	(1993)	more	complex	concept	of	
‘knowing	of	the	third	kind’.	This	is	what	might	be	colloquially	referred	to	as	a	‘gut	
feeling’	or	‘instinct’,	his	argument	is	that	this	is	not	simply	a	random	occurrence	but	
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an	embodied	record	of	many	other	encounters	and	outcomes:	a	knowledge	we	feel,	
rather	than	discursively	frame	or	reason	through,	when	presented	with	a	scenario.			
In	the	past	decade	or	so,	there	has	been	an	‘affective	turn’	within	the	social	
sciences,	emphasising	‘the	dimension	of	feeling	and…the	experience	and	expression	
of	emotions’	(p1-2)	as	well	as	issues	of,	perhaps	unconscious,	influence	such	as	
suggestibility,	social	influence	and	contagion	which	go	into	people’s	affective	lives	
(Stenner,	2013).	This	turn	to	affect	has	been	concerned	with	what	cannot	be	
expressed	in	discourse	and	or	adequately	explained	by	existing	ways	of	thinking	
(Stenner,	2013).	If	feelings	are	such	as	core	part	of	our	experience,	why	then	has	a	
focus	on	feeling	and	emotion	taken	so	long	to	gather	momentum?	In	answer,	
Cromby	(2007)	points	to	the	ineffability	of	emotional	experience,	a	point	Fuchs	
(2013)	reinforces:	‘The	phenomena	in	question	are	generally	fleeting,	diffused,	
hardly	delimitable	and	even	harder	to	describe’	(p2).	It	has	been	easier	to	focus	on	
that	which	can	be	more	clearly	communicated,	our	linguistic	thoughts	and	their	
discursive	expression,	or	the	collection	of	thoughts	into	rational	statements,	rather	
than	the	difficult	translation	and	conceptualisation	of	bodily	sensations	and	feelings	
(Cromby,	2007;	Fuchs,	2013).	This	section	will	use	the	scholars	Burkitt	(2014)	and	
Stenner	(2013)	to	sketch	out	an	understanding	of	emotion	as	both	embodied	feeling	
and	produced	through	systems	of	relations.	Before	looking	at	their	arguments	in	
more	depth,	it	is	helpful	to	define	the	main	terms	of	the	affective	domain.	
	
2.4.1	Defining	feeling,	emotion	and	affect	
	
‘Emotion’,	‘feeling’	and	‘affect’	are	all	well-established	in	the	academic	world	that	
peers	into	our	experience.	These	terms	will	be	separately	defined	but	the	phrase	
‘affective’	will	be	used	in	this	thesis	to	encompass	any	and	all	of	the	above.	Affect	is	
defined	here	in	a	Spinozist	manner,	as	interpreted	by	the	psychosocial,	process	
thinkers	Brown	and	Stenner	(2009).	Under	this	reading,	affect	is	a	‘modification’	of	
the	body	by	which	its	‘power	of	action…is	increased	or	diminished,	aided	or	
restrained,	and	at	the	same	time	the	idea	of	these	modifications’	(Spinoza	
1677/1993	cited	in	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p119).	In	other	words,	an	affect	is	an	
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arrangement	of	the	relations	between	bodies	from	which	a	determination	to	act	
emerges.	This	is	very	similar	to	a	Deleuzian	understanding	of	affect	as	an	
‘augmentation	of	the	body’s	capacity	to	act’	(Deleuze	(1988,	1992)	does	describe	his	
philosophy	as	‘Spinozist’),	although	there	are	differences	between	the	positions,	e.g.	
Deleuze	makes	no	distinction	between	different	bodies,	which	has	been	argued	to	
ignore	a	crucial	distinction	between	humans	and	non-humans	(Stenner,	2008).	
These	modifications	of	affect	occur	in	the	encounters	between	bodies	(even	when	
only	the	image	of	a	body	is	present)	and	the	kinds	of	modifications	possible	depend	
on	the	complexities	of	those	bodies.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that,	for	Spinoza,	
there	can	be	no	knowledge	without	affect,	‘we	do	not	know	“the	world”	but	rather	
the	way	in	which	the	world	affects	us’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p114)	and	our	bodies	
mediate	this	process	of	affect,	acknowledging	our	status	as	embodied	beings	
compared	to	the	disembodied	psyche	of	Cartesian	thought	(Cromby	2004).		
Emotion	and	feeling	have	both	been	referred	to	so	far	in	this	chapter,	but	
they	are	not	interchangeable.	In	fact,	there	is	a	widely	accepted	distinction	between	
them	–	the	essence	of	which	will	be	maintained	in	the	definitions	outlined	here.	
Emotions	are	considered	to	be	more	complex	than	feelings	(Fuchs,	2013;	Cromby,	
2007),	constituted	both	by	an	embodied	response	and	a	motivation	to	act	in	
particular	ways	(De	Sousa,	2010).	There	is	widespread	philosophical	support	for	
emotions	having	an	‘aboutness’	to	them,	they	are	directed	towards	events,	
situations	and	people	yet:	‘this	intentionality	is	of	a	special	kind:	it	is	not	neutral,	but	
concerns	what	is	particularly	valuable	and	relevant	for	the	subject’	(Fuchs,	2013).	In	
contrast,	feelings	‘are	not	directed	at	specific	objects	or	situations;	thus,	they	lack	
intentional	“aboutness”’	(Fuchs,	2013,	p5)	and	have	been	characterised	as	being	
more	‘raw’;	the	phenomenological	aspect	of	the	more	complex	emotional	state,	
which	organises	and	motivates	action	(Cromby,	2007).	Hence,	feelings	will	be	
defined	in	this	thesis	as	the	‘bodily	sensation	which	is	central	to	all	experiences	of	
emotion’	(Burkitt,	2014,	p7),	such	as	the	sensation	of	pleasure,	while	emotions	are	
bodily	feeling	as	well	as	the	social	meanings	we	ascribe	to	these	experiences	and	the	
contexts	within	which	they	emerge,	such	as	guilt.	This	means	that	all	emotions	
involve	feelings	but	not	all	feelings	involve	emotion.	While	to	say	emotion	comprises	
feeling	and	the	social	meaning	we	accord	to	that	feeling	is	relatively	uncontroversial,	
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the	final	part	of	Burkitt’s	(2014)	definition	–	for	emotion	to	be	identified	with	the	
contexts	within	which	they	emerge	–	is	much	more	divisive.	It	is	Burkitt’s	emphasis	
on	the	contextual	embeddedness	of	emotion,	where	emotion	emerges	from	
patterns	of	relationship	between	a	person	and	the	the	world	(including	other	
people),	which	will	be	focussed	on	here	and	which	is	argued	to	make	his	approach	
suited	to	a	dialogue	with	a	psychosocial	process	account.	
	
2.4.2	Relational	patterns	
	
The	relational	embeddedness	of	emotions	and	feelings	is	emphasised	in	this	thesis	
and	conceptualised	using	Burkitt	(2014)	and	Stenner’s	(2013)	work.	Both	scholars	
contest	the	way	cognitive	psychology	has	considered	emotions	and	feelings	to	be	
substances,	prompted	by	some	external	cause,	that	exist	‘inside’	of	us;	more	
specifically,	they	reside	in	our	head,	confined	either	to	our	mind	or	brain,	while	the	
body	is	little	more	than	convenient	container.	This	idea	has	been	solidified	by	our	
object-orientated	language	where	names	(anger,	jealousy,	sadness)	encourage	us	to	
think	of	feelings	and	emotions	as	things	in	themselves	(Burkitt,	2014).	This	painting	
of	emotion	as	intrapsychic	state	is	advanced	by	the	way	psychological	literature	
variously	conceptualises	emotion	as:	an	attachment	style,	a	way	of	thinking,	a	
genetic	predisposition	and	a	personality	trait	(Stenner,	2013).	Instead,	they	view	
emotions	as	produced	through	‘patterns’	(Burkitt,	2014)	or	‘systems’	(Stenner,	2013)	
of	relationship.	While	Burkitt’s	account	of	affective	life	is	relatively	comprehensive,	
including	the	relationship	of	feeling	to	emotion,	Stenner	focusses	on	the	paradox	
behind	how	such	systems	are	created.		
Beginning	with	Burkitt	(2014),	he	makes	the	claim	that	when	we	discuss	how	
we	feel	we	are	expressing	our	relationship	to	someone	(or	something).	To	say	you	
are	in	love,	for	example,	is	to	say	something	about	your	(special)	relationship	with	an	
object	or	person	that	exists	in	the	world.	Indeed,	if	the	world	is	fundamentally	made	
up	of	interrelated,	dynamic	process	and	events,	then	an	event	can	only	be	
understood	through	its	relation	to	other	events	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Whitehead,	
1927–1928/1985).	Emotions	and	feelings	thus	emerge	from	‘patterns	of	relationship	
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between	self	and	others,	between	self	and	world’	(Burkitt,	2014,	p2,	emphasis	in	
original),	where	these	relations	are	themselves	fluid	and	dynamic;	continually	
unfolding	processes.	There	are	no	things	in	themselves	called	emotions	which	can	be	
separately	cut	out	and	examined,	rather	they	emerge	from	and	thus	can	only	be	
understood	within	relational	processes.	Emotion	is	not	a	thing	that	moves	us	to	act,	
but	rather	‘as	movement	itself	within	relations	and	interaction’	(Burkitt,	2014,	p9).	If	
emotion	is	inseparable	from	a	vast	entanglement	of	relations,	then	we	need	to	
appreciate	emotion	as	a	thoroughly	contextual	phenomena.	Burkitt	(2014)	suggests	
we	can	think	of	emotion	as	embedded	within:	the	situation	within	which	it	arises,	
people’s	personal	history	and	socio-cultural	conditions,	each	of	which	will	now	be	
expanded	on	in	turn.		
Emotions	are	products	of	the	situations	within	which	they	develop,	the	
specifics	of	situations	shape	the	emotion	produced	and	the	meanings	ascribed	to	it.	
For	example,	a	husband’s	jealousy	cannot	be	separated	from	the	kiss	he	witnesses	
between	his	wife	and	his	sister,	which	violates	both	his	values	of	faithfulness	and	
familial	loyalty.	His	jealousy	would	be	fundamentally	different	if	he	saw	a	picture	of	
his	wife	with	her	arm	around	her	colleague	or	if	he	thought	his	wife	was	flirting	with	
the	waiter.	Furthermore,	the	personal	biography	of	the	people	involved	in	any	
situation	is	important:	their	past	experiences	produce	embodied	dispositions	to	feel	
and	behave	in	a	certain	way	and	orient	them	in	any	given	situation	(Burkitt,	2014).	
Burkitt	gives	the	example	of	a	child	whose	father	taught	him	that	an	act	of	violence	
could	restore	dignity	and	then	goes	on	to	violently	assert	himself	in	response	to	a	
perceived	slight	in	adulthood.	Furthermore,	to	see	this	purely	as	a	conditioned	
cognitive-behavioural	style,	Burkitt	(2014)	argues,	ignores	the	socio-cultural	
conditions	within	which	such	acts	take	place.	Namely,	cultural	ideas	around	
masculinity	(the	man	as	protector	of	kin	and	his	own	honour	(Connell	&	
Messerschmidt,	2005),	regardless	of	legal	ramifications	(Marsh,	Rosser	&	Harré,	
1978)	and	the	lack	of	resources	people	from	poorer	socio-economic	backgrounds	
have	(violence,	however,	is	an	attainable	method	of	restoring	dignity).	Thus,	
emotion	itself	is	not	‘the	primary	unit	of	analysis’	(Burkitt,	2014,	p18),	rather	this	
approach	sees	the	meaning	of	emotion	through	location	in	social	relations,	which	
are	always	unfolding	as	continual,	dynamic	processes.	Though	this	is	not	to	say	we	
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should	reduce	emotions	only	to	these	factors	since	they	are	fundamentally	felt	too.	
As	Burkitt	(2014)	summarises:	
	
without	the	body-mind	we	could	not	feel	our	situations	and	patterns	of	
relationship	with	others,	yet	without	the	social	meanings	of	these	relations	
and	situations	our	feelings	and	emotions	would	be	random	and	meaningless	
(p15).		
	
What	Burkitt	(2014)	refers	to	as	‘patterns’	of	relationship	in	situations	
emotion	emerges	from,	Stenner	(2013)	speaks	of	as	‘dynamic	micro-social	systems’	
(p53),	of	which	emotion	is	an	attribute.	For	example,	jealousy	names	the	relationship	
between	a	subject	and	a	rival	they	want	to	exclude.	This	rival	threatens	to	interrupt	a	
(real	or	imagined)	relationship	between	the	subject	and	the	object	of	their	
affections.	This	subject-object-rival	triad	is	the	micro-social	system	and	‘in	this	sense	
jealousy	is	as	much	a	‘location’	or	a	‘position’	as	an	individual	experience’	(Stenner,	
2013,	p46).	The	fundamental	continuity	between	Burkitt’s	and	Stenner’s	account	is	
this	dual	emphasis	on	emotion	as	an	‘individual	experience’	(Stenner,	2013,	p46),	or	
how	emotions	are	fundamentally	felt	(Burkitt,	2014,	p15),	and	emotion	as	a	location	
in	social	relations.	What	Stenner	(2013)	adds	to	this	is	a	consideration	of	how	these	
social	relations	are	produced,	specifically	via	thirdness	or	what	is	desired	as	excluded	
from	the	system,	rather	than	what	is	included:		
	
Jealousy	and	envy	can	be	understood	as	attributes	of	psychosocial	‘systems’	
that	are	produced	and	re-produce	themselves	through	the	mechanism	of	the	
excluded	third	(p45)	
	
Jealousy	is	a	function	of	a	subject’s	desire	to	exclude	the	third	(the	rival)	and	
this	is	what	Stenner	means	when	he	says	it	is	produced	through	‘the	mechanism	of	
the	excluded	third’.	Yet	his	argument	goes	beyond	the	rival	simply	interrupting	an	
existing	relationship	between	a	subject	and	an	object.	Rather,	his	assertion	is	that	
the	relationship	between	a	subject	and	an	object	is	mediated	by	the	rival,	the	
‘excluded	third’,	in	what	he	calls	foundation	by	exclusion.	While	he	uses	emotion	as	
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an	example,	this	idea	applies	to	all	phenomena;	inviting	us	to	think	about	how	they	
are	created	and	maintained	not	only	through	what	is	included	but	what	is	excluded,	
its	‘thirdness’:	
	
‘it	is	through	a	relation	to	the	exclusion	or	expulsion	of	‘the	third’	or	of	
‘thirdness’	that	unity	and	identity	are	created	and	maintained.		The	
implication	is	that	behind	the	foundation	of	something	unified	(something	
that	might	be	described	as	a	system)	there	lurks	expulsion	and	exclusion,	and	
that	this	exclusion	is	necessary	(rather	than	incidental)	to	the	ongoing	
constitution	of	the	system.’	(p3)	
	
‘System’	is	used	here	broadly	to	refer	to	a	social	system,	an	organism,	a	
system	of	experience	or	of	knowledge;	therefore	we	can	conceive	of	a	couple	and	
their	MDMA	experiences	as	systems	in	this	sense.	Initially,	let	us	think	about	the	
couple	as	a	unified,	ordered	system	and	how	this	might	be	related	an	exclusion	of	
‘thirdness’.	At	first	glance,	coupledom	is	all	about	two	people:	their	meeting,	coming	
together	and	establishing	a	more	long-lasting	connection.	However,	on	closer	
inspection,	we	can	see	thirdness	or,	indeed	a	specific	‘third’,	loom	large.	Historically,	
romantic	togetherness	has	been	been	predicated	on	a	‘unified,	exclusive…dyad’	
(Finn,	2012,	p2):	the	couple	only	exists	as	a	social	system	because	others	are	kept	
out	(sexually	and/or	emotionally).	In	this	way,	the	excluded	third	can	be	said	to	
mediate	between	the	two	positions	in	the	system	and	thus	actually	be	creative	of	
the	system.	A	mediator	is	easy	to	overlook	since	it	is	the	very	thing	that	must	be	
overlooked	in	order	for	a	relation	to	be	formed	through	it.	Take	as	an	example	a	
sexually	monogamous	couple:	the	relationship	between	the	two	partners	is	
mediated	by	the	others	they	are	not	sexually	intimate	with.	If	these	non-sexually	
intimate	others	were	not	‘included	as	excluded’	(Stenner,	2013,	p3,	referencing	
Agamben)	then	what	would	unify	the	couple	as	a	system?	
However,	just	as	a	system	is	mediated	and	thus	created	via	the	excluded	
third,	it	can	also	be	interrupted	and	destabilised	via	the	excluded	third.	To	say	we	
have	become	aware	of	the	mediator	is	to	say	it	has	interrupted	the	relation	it	was	
previously	mediating.	As	Stenner	(2013)	explains,	we	are	rarely	aware	of	the	
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mediating	role	of	language	in	communicating	with	one	another.	This	changes	though	
if	we	speak	a	foreign	language,	suddenly	the	formerly	invisible	mediator	disrupts	our	
communicative	efforts	and,	in	doing	so,	becomes	very	visible.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	
this	might	apply	to	the	previous	example:	a	drunken	liason,	the	excluded	thirdness,	
could	interrupt	and	potentially	destroy	the	couple	system,	showing	just	how	crucial	
its	exclusion	was	to	the	unity	of	the	sexually	monogamous	couple.	Therefore,	‘the	
relationship	of	the	system	to	the	thirdness	of	its	noise	is…fundamentally	ambivalent’	
(Stenner,	2013,	p25),	being	both	productive	(third-as-mediator)	and	disruptive	
(third-as-interruptor).	If	such	oscillations	take	place,	then	thinking	of	any	system,	
including	the	micro-social	system	from	which	emotion	emerges,	would	seem	to	open	
up	questions	like:	where	does	the	border	lie	between	third-as-mediator	and	third-as-
disrupter?	How	does	this	vary	from	person	to	person,	from	relationship	to	
relationship?	Psychosocial	process	theory	is	concerned	with	the	spaces	and	borders	
between	systems	for	this	very	reason:	they	are	areas	of	transformation,	where	
‘something	new	is	created’	(Stenner,	2008;	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009),	in	this	case	
where	a	system	is	unsettled.		
To	sum	up,	it	was	argued	that	previous	understandings	of	emotion	focussed	
too	much	on	an	individual’s	psychic	experience,	at	the	expense	of	a	consideration	of	
the	relationships	within	which	emotion	is	embedded:	social	relations	which	were,	in	
turn,	contextualised	by	wider	cultural	conditions	and	personal	histories	(Burkitt,	
2014).	This	entails	seeing	emotion	as	patterns	of	relationship	(Burkitt,	2014).	The	
way	in	which	social	relations	are	(re)produced	was	elaborated	by	Stenner	(2013)	as	
via	the	excluded	third.	His	argument	that	a	social	system	is	constituted	by	what	is	
included-as-excluded	was	shown	to	be	helpful	in	framing	how	emotional	
transformation	can	take	place	–	when	third-as-mediator	becomes	third-as-disruptor,	
jealousy	is	produced.	Even	emotions	produced	through	patterns	of	relationship	that	
seem	to	concern	only	two	people,	such	as	love,	were	argued	as	mediated	via	an	
excluded	third	e.g.	the	exclusion	of	‘all	others’.	Paradoxically,	this	concern	with	
thirdness	and	what	is	excluded	can	reveal	much	about	how	a	system	is	constituted,	
and	how	it	can	fragment.		
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2.5	A	relational	understanding	of	materiality	
	
The	social	theorist	Bruno	Latour	(1996,	2005)	argues	there	has	been	a	widespread	
neglect	of	the	material	world	–	objects,	spaces	and	settings	–	in	the	social	sciences	
due	to	the	structuring	effects	of	the	person/world,	subject/object	binaries.	Latour	is	
speaking	specifically	about	sociology,	his	disciplinary	home,	but	his	claims	could	be	
seen	to	extend	to	(cognitive	and	social	constructionist)	psychology	as	well.	The	
material	world	has	been	identified	as	‘objective’	and	therefore	requires	the	
attention	of	the	natural	sciences,	split	from	‘subjective’	humanity	which	is	the	
proper	focus	of	the	social	sciences.	This	schism	portrays	subjective	human	
endeavours	as	spoiling	objective,	natural	scientific	enquiries	and	vice	versa,	resulting	
in	the	neglect	of	materiality	Latour	speaks	of.	There	have,	however,	been	multiple	
efforts	to	reconnect	with	the	material	world	in	social	theory	(Stenner,	2008):	
Latour’s	actor-network	theory	(ANT)	being	one	key	example	of	a	trend	which	also	
includes	feminist	and	queer	theory	and	Deleuzian	post-structuralism.	These	theories	
tend	to	trace	socio-material	relations	in	processes	of	assemblage	and,	in	doing	so,	
unsettle	clear	subject/object	distinctions	and	raise	questions	about	the	nature	of	
subjectivity.	Stenner	(2008)	praises	these	moves	but	contends	that,	in	the	process	of	
reconnecting	with	the	material,	these	theories	have	a	tendency	to	‘flatten	out’	(p92)	
the	distinction	between	human	and	non-human	bodies.	This	thesis	intends	to	retain	
a	process-relational,	binary-eschewing	approach	to	materiality	while	simultaneously	
acknowledging	the	obvious	and	crucial	distinction	between	people	and	things.	This	
dual	focus	will	be	referred	to	as	‘psycho-material’.	How	this	would	work	from	a	
metaphysical	perspective	has	already	been	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter.	To	
reiterate,	the	domain	of	subjectivity	is	extended	outside	of	the	‘head’	in	a	
psychosocial	process	account	since	the	fundamental	unit	of	the	world,	an	actual	
occasion,	is	considered	to	be	a	fusion	of	both	object	and	subject	(Stenner,	2008).	
This	explains	the	continuity	between	humans	and	the	rest	of	life,	everything	is	
constituted	by	the	becoming	of	actual	occasions,	yet	also	the	distinction	between	
them:	the	patterning	of	these	occasions	becomes	vastly	more	complex	with	respect	
to	human	life	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	
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	 How	this	psycho-material	focus	operates	empirically	in	relation	to	the	spatial	
and	material	aspects	of	human	experience	will	be	explained	in	this	section.	Firstly,	it	
will	explore	a	psychological	framing	of	space,	Kurt	Lewin’s	(1936)	‘life-space’.	
Psychosocial	theorists	Steve	Brown	and	Paula	Reavey	use	Lewin’s	work	to	reconsider	
how	spaces	and	objects	can	matter	to	people’s	lives	through	the	‘feelings	of	
affordance’	they	can	offer,	particularly	in	the	context	of	memory.	The	scholars	Bruno	
Latour	and	Michel	Serres	will	be	used	to	supplement	these	ideas	further	and	explore	
the	active	role	objects	take	in	‘allowing’	and	‘forbidding’	action	(Latour,	2005,	p72)	
and	slowing	down	and	stabilising	human	relations	(Serres,	1995),	while	leaving	to	the	
side	problematic	ideas	about	the	equivalence	of	all	(human	and	non-human)	bodies.	
Combined,	these	theorists	make	a	strong	argument	for	the	ways	materiality	makes	a	
difference	to	our	experience	and,	as	a	result,	subjectivity	is	approached	here	as	
materially	as	well	as	discursively	mediated	(Foucault,	2000a,	2000b,	1988,	1987	cited	
in	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Finally,	the	threads	of	emotion,	embodiment	and	space	
discussed	throughout	the	chapter	will	be	brought	together	in	the	concept	of	
‘affective	atmosphere’	(Anderson,	2009),	which	emanates	from	but	is	not	reducible	
to	the	relationships	between	(human	and	non-human)	bodies.	Together,	these	
arguments	once	again	disrupt	simplistic	binaries	to	show	how	subject	and	object,	
person	and	world	are	not	oppositional	but	co-constitute	our	experience.	
	
2.5.1	Spatial	affordances	
	
‘Space’	brings	to	mind	many	things:	the	infinite	vastness	of	the	world	outside	the	
Earth’s	atmosphere,	the	physical	spaces	of	home,	work	and	the	outside	world	and	
the	more	metaphorical	‘space	to	think’.	To	call	it	a	nebulous	concept	then,	
potentially	referring	to	any	form	of	dimensionality,	would	seem	apt	(Massey,	1994).	
Space	has	rarely	been	viewed	as	a	focal	point;	instead	seen	as	the	backdrop	to	the	
activities	of	life	(Massey,	1994,	1999;	Lefebvre,	1991).	This	is	the	traditional	
‘container’	understanding,	where	space	is	an	inert	frame	within	which	events	take	
place,	argued	as	an	abstraction	of	how	spaces	really	work	by	the	Marxist	philosopher	
Lefebvre	(1991);	different	spaces	actually	mean	different	spatial	practices.	For	
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example,	the	space	of	a	shopping	centre	emerges	from	the	practices	of	buying	and	
selling,	the	relationships	between	consumers	and	shop	owners	in	addition	to	the	
shop	owner’s	positioning	in	glass	shopfronts.	The	space	of	the	shopping	centre	is	not	
conceived	of	as	passive	but	composed	of	active,	spatial	practices.	Space	is	similarly	
understood	here	as	relationally	produced,	but	framed	within	a	process	account.	
The	container	model	of	space	could	be	seen	as	very	much	aligned	with	a	
substance-orientated	view	of	the	world:	space	is	a	static	‘thing’.	In	contrast,	a	
process-orientated	view	sees	the	world	as	made	up	of	interlocking	processes.	Thus,	
space	is	not	an	external	thing	we	are	in	but	a	process;	it	interweaves	with	other	
threads	(embodiment,	emotion,	cognition,	social	relations	etc.)	to	produce	
experience.	In	other	words,	our	lives	don’t	take	place	in	space,	rather	they	are	
spatial.	Another	way	of	thinking	about	this	distinction	is	in	terms	of	intensive	and	
extensive	terms.	Extension	is	that	which	extends,	which	has	measurable,	physical	
dimensions	–	the	space	of	maps,	buildings	and	playgrounds	–	and	can	be	easily	
divided	(DeLanda,	2005).	On	the	other	hand,	intensive	properties	are	that	which	
cannot	be	divided,	such	as	processes	of	perception,	emotion	and	memory.	Extensive	
properties	are	synonymous	with	our	folk	understanding	of	‘space’.	Kurt	Lewin	(1936)	
developed	an	understanding	of	space	that	was	based	on	intensive,	rather	than	
extensive	connections	i.e.	as	incorporating	the	full	range	of	connections	that	make	
situations	meaningful	for	people,	like	memory	and	emotion,	he	calls	this	‘life-space’.		
Life-space	expounds	on	the	Whiteheadian	idea	of	relational	essences:	
suggesting	it	is	intensive	relationships	between	things	that	give	them	their	meaning,	
rather	than	‘simple	location’	in	time	and	space.	It	does	this	by	showing	how	
important	connections	that	go	over	the	boundaries	between	mind	and	body,	person	
and	world,	people	and	things,	space	and	time	can	be.	Lewin	(1936)	developed	the	
concept	of	life-space	in	response	to	what	he	perceived	as	inadequacies	with	the	
Euclidean	model	of	measurement	of	extensive	properties:	it	was	too	rigid	and	fixed	
to	explore	psychological,	spatial	experience	(Tucker,	2017);	space	as	it	is	for	us	as	
acting,	thinking	beings	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2017).	Instead,	life-space	can	consider	all	
actual	and	possible	‘connections	that	link	the	immediate	scene	to	other	spaces	and	
actors,	which	are	crucial	to	understanding	any	given	psychological	event’	(Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015,	p50).	This	allows	us	to	consider	less	physical	or	material	concerns	e.g.	
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the	ways	in	which	the	past	or	imagined	futures	are	folded	into	and	have	an	impact	
on	the	current	situation.	As	a	result	of	being	less	concerned	about	temporal	or	
spatial	distance	than	about	the	connectedness	between	human	and	non-human	
bodies,	it	is	possible	to	better	understand	the	spaces	of	‘any	given	psychological	
event’.	For	example,	Brown	and	Reavey	(2015),	draw	on	Lewin’s	(1936)	example	of	a	
woman	who	has	argued	with	her	husband	that	morning	and	is	now	working	at	a	
factory	loom:	
	
Relationships	‘outside’	work	can	then	be	said	to	have	an	effect	on	and	shape	
the	woman’s	conduct	‘inside’	the	workplace.	We	might	say	that	the	quarrel,	
which	happened	earlier	that	morning,	is	still,	in	a	sense,	ongoing.	It	has	been	
prolonged	into	the	day,	where	it	forms	part	of	how	the	woman	manages	the	
problem	of	the	broken	thread…	The	woman	may	be	imagining	other	things	
she	might	have	said,	or	perhaps	is	finding	new	things	to	be	angry	about	in	the	
words	her	husband	spat	at	her.	The	past	is	still	acting	on	the	present,	through	
the	work	of	recollection.	(p50)	
	
Key	to	Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)’s	argument	here	is	that	while	we	can	break	up	our	
time	into	discrete	units,	this	is	secondary,	‘our	lives	flow,	only	subsequently	do	we	
add	in	the	breaks	and	punctuations’	(p5).	If	our	experience	‘flow[s]’	then	to	explain	
the	argument’s	influence	in	terms	of	an	intermediary	effect	on	the	woman’s	mood	
does	not	make	sense,	since	this	would	‘create	an	artificial	distinction	between	past	
and	present’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p50);	our	past	is,	in	a	sense,	still	ongoing	in	the	
present	moment	and	that	includes	the	woman’s	argument	with	her	husband.	These	
past	recollections	are	suggested	to	influence	present	possibilities	for	action,	for	
example,	she	may	overreact	to	the	situation	of	a	thread	breaking	at	her	loom.	
Therefore,	it	is	the	relationship	the	woman	has	to	an	earlier	scene	which	is	crucial	to	
understanding	the	event	and	the	range	of	possibilities	for	action	within	it,	rather	
than	temporal	or	spatial	distance.		
Drawing	on	the	concept	of	life-space	also	alters	our	understanding	in	two	
further	ways:	firstly,	when	we	think	in	terms	of	relationally	defined	space,	continuity	
over	time	looks	quite	different	and,	secondly,	it	illustrates	the	way	material	
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arrangements	can	afford	certain	feelings,	thoughts	and	actions.	Brown	and	Reavey	
(2015)	discuss	life-space	particularly	with	regard	to	memory.	They	argue	for	an	
‘expanded’	view	of	memory,	where	remembering	is	facilitated	by	the	setting	within	
which	one	remembers.	In	contrast	to	a	cognitive	view	of	memory	where	the	mind	is	
a	computer,	retrieving	previously	stored	information,	an	expanded	concept	of	
memory	sees	the	process	as	not	confined	to	the	head	but	part	of	a	wider	field	which	
also	does	the	work	of	remembering.	Therefore,	the	spaces	and	objects	of	memory	
are	crucial.	They	employ	James	Gibson’s	concept	of	affordance,	which	describes	the	
relationship	between	an	organism	and	its	environment,	to	make	this	clearer.	His	
ecological	psychology	emphasised	how	an	organism	and	its	environment	evolve	
together,	through	the	exchange	of	meaning.	These	meanings	are	‘behavioural…	signs	
to	an	organism	that	actions	are	possible’	(Pickering,	2007,	p72).	Therefore,	an	
affordance	is	an	action	made	possible	to	an	organism	through	its	environment	and	
may	be	embodied	in	natural	objects,	nuts	that	may	be	picked	and	pools	that	may	be	
drunk	from,	or	cultural	objects,	cupboards	to	store	items	in	or	a	pathway	to	walk	
down.	Humans	can	also	detect	‘higher	grade’	affordances	which	are	shaped	by	
cultural	knowledge	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015)	e.g.	the	strong	cultural	stories	around	
water	as	a	place	of	transformation,	for	example	baptism,	shape	how	we	might	
understand	a	pool	in	the	middle	of	a	forest	as	a	space	of	reinvention	and	
purification.	As	such,	spaces	and	objects	not	only	afford	possibilities	for	acting	but	
also	for	thinking,	feeling	and	understanding.	This	makes	the	person/world	binary	no	
longer	tenable:	the	two	are	intricately	interwoven	within	such	an	ecological,	
relational	approach.	It	places	spatial	affordances	as	a	complementary	addition	to	our	
arsenal	of	psychosocial	process	concepts.	Human	experiences	or	mental	events	are	
not	simply	‘triggered’	by	an	external	environmental	cause,	rather	they	are	co-
constituted	with	a	particular	environment.		
	 Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)	discuss	spatial	mediation	of	experience	with	
respect	to	memory,	how	a	material	affordance	(or	‘higher	order	invariance’)	can	
alter	the	flow	of	past	to	present	and	structure	current	possibilities	for	action	and	
feeling.	The	way	in	which	this	affordance	persists	through	time,	or	as	Lewin	(1936)	
understands	time:	changes	in	life-space,	cannot	be	understood	in	extensive	terms	
where	measurement	is	extrinsic	to	the	surface,	a	grid	placed	on	top	as	in	a	Euclidean	
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understanding	of	space.	Rather,	measurement	is	intrinsic	to	the	surface	itself,	about	
the	consistent	relationship	between	points.	To	make	this	clearer,	let’s	consider	an	
example.	In	this	instance	a	girl/wall/adult	invariance	persists	through	countless	
alterations	in	life-space	to	afford	certain	present	understandings	of	agency	during	an	
interview	with	Bella	who	was	sexually	abused	for	a	year	as	a	child	(Brown	&	Reavey,	
2015).	As	Bella	recalls	sitting	on	a	wall	with	her	close	friend	at	the	time,	the	abuser’s	
daughter,	she	oscillates	between	asserting	her	own	agency	–	she	continued	this	
important	friendship,	despite	the	abuse	–	and	calling	her	own	agency	into	question	–	
she	recalls	the	sexualised	way	the	abuser	lifted	her	down	from	the	wall,	compared	to	
how	he	lifted	his	own	daughter	down	‘like	you	do	with	a	child’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	
2015,	p93)	(emphasis	in	original).	The	wall	here	is	suggested	to	‘condense…and	
simplif[y]	the	dynamics	of	power’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p92)	(emphasis	in	original)	
as	it	presents	a	more	powerful	adult,	who	can	easily	navigate	the	height	of	the	wall,	
and	a	powerless	child,	who	cannot.		
This	girl/wall/adult	spatial	arrangement	thus	forms	an	invariance	for	the	
woman	as	she	seeks	to	negotiate	her	possibilities	for	agency	around	it	in	the	
present:	as	witnessed	in	the	way	her	subject	position	shifts	from	agentic	(in	relation	
to	choosing	to	continue	being	friends	and	sitting	on	the	wall)	to	powerless	(as	the	
abuser	unacceptably	sexualises	her	as	he	lifts	her	down	from	the	wall).	This	
girl/wall/adult	invariance	is	crucial,	Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)	argue,	as	it	shows	the	
ambiguity	often	erased	from	memories	of	child	abuse	in	which	people	are	told	the	
only	subject	position	open	to	them	is	one	of	powerless	‘victim’.	This	is	problematic	
as	such	ambiguity,	e.g.	a	sense	of	choice,	however	limited,	could	take	on	significance	
and	open	up	an	enhanced	sense	of	agency	and	possibilities	for	action	in	the	present	
e.g.	I	made	choices	despite	the	abuse,	so	I	can	make	choices	now.	A	relationally-
defined	space	of	possible	actions	(i.e.	life-space)	can	be	seen	as	having	implications	
that	go	beyond	the	context	of	memory	to	psychological	experience	more	generally.	
Material	arrangements	can	afford	certain	feelings	and	actions,	as	shown	by	the	way	
the	girl/wall/adult	invariance	structured	feelings	of	agency	–	confirming	the	
significance	of	the	material	world	for	co-constituting	our	lives.	Furthermore,	life-
space	shows	how	continuity	over	time	can	be	seen	to	arise	not	from	extrinsic	
measurement,	where	space	is	a	container,	but	intrinsic	measurement,	from	the	
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relationships	between	people	and	things.	And	space	as	relationally	produced	
fundamentally	unsettles	the	person/world	binary,	which	proved	so	troublesome	
earlier	in	the	chapter	for	explaining	our	lived	experience.		
	
2.5.2	Objects	
	
There	are	both	human	and	non-human	–	animals,	objects,	material	settings,	plant	
life	–	bodies	in	the	world,	yet	the	social	sciences	have	tended	to	focus	on	humanity	
alone.	In	order	to	further	explore	the	materiality	of	existence	and	understand	how	
objects	can	play	an	active	role	in	our	experience	of	the	world,	we	turn	now	to	
Latour’s	ANT.	While	Lewin’s	concept	of	life-space	provides	an	encompassing	vision	of	
the	importance	of	intensive	connections	and	how	these	transform	experience,	ANT	
details	the	points	of	connection	themselves,	the	objects	or	non-human	bodies	that	
are	doing	the	connecting.		
	 Latour	(2005)	views	the	gravest	mistake	of	the	social	sciences	as	the	
conceptualisation	of	the	‘social’	as	a	static,	pre-existing	thing,	which	can	be	used	to	
explain	any	given	state	of	affairs.	According	to	Latour,	something	was	understood	to	
be	‘social’	or	to	‘pertain	to	society’	when	it	could	be	defined	as	not	having	certain	
properties	such	as	being	completely	natural,	economic	or	biological	and	as	having	
other	qualities:	it	must	attain,	support,	sustain,	reproduce	or	destabilise	the	social	
order	in	some	way.	The	‘social’	then	becomes	the	glue	holding	everything	else	
together,	which	produces	the	bizarre	scenario	where	the	‘social’	is	invoked	to	
explain	social	life.	In	contrast,	Latour	argues	that	the	social	is	not	a	pre-existing	thing	
but	is	constituted	by	the	associations	between	human	and	non-human	‘actors’:	the	
social	is	what	is	glued	together	by	these	many	other	connectors.	The	task	of	the	
social	sciences	then	becomes	the	tracing	of	these	associations.	We	can	see	
comparisons	here	between	Latour’s	understanding	of	the	social	and	Lewin’s	
understanding	of	life-space.	This	speaks	to	the	two	theories’	overlapping	focus:	they	
see	the	world	not	in	terms	of	passive	frames,	such	as	extensive	space	or	a	reified	
conception	of	the	social,	but	as	dynamically	produced	through	relationships,	or	
‘associations’	in	Latour’s	language.		
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	 The	tracing	of	connections	between	human	and	non-human	actors	allows	
ANT	to	more	deeply	engage	with	objects,	embodiment	and	materiality.	As	part	of	
this	program,	Latour	appreciates	the	power	of	objects,	which	‘don’t	sleep’	and	make	
‘associations	which	don’t	break	down’	(p70),	unlike	more	fragile	social	ties.	He	also	
asserts	that	he	will	treat	objects	as	‘full-blown	actors’	that	have	agency.	This	is	a	
highly	controversial	claim	–	agency	has	been	treated	as	a	special	reserve	of	humanity	
–	and	was	criticised	earlier	in	the	chapter	for	‘flatten[ing]	out’	(Stenner,	2008,	p92)	
the	distinction	between	human	and	non-human	actors.	Agency	does	feel	like	a	
counterintuitive	choice	of	word,	yet,	perhaps,	Latour	isn’t	attempting	to	negate	the	
clear	differences	between	humans	and	non-humans,	but	is	(overzealously)	
responding	to	the	social	sciences’	long	omission	of	non-human	actors	and	seeks	to	
reaffirm	their	crucial	position	in	the	production	of	the	social	world.	Regardless,	we	
don’t	have	to	accept	that	objects	have	agency	in	the	same	way	as	humans	in	order	
to	appreciate	the	way	in	which	they:	
	
might	authorise,	allow,	afford,	encourage,	permit,	suggest,	influence,	block,	
render	possible,	forbid,	and	so	on.	(Latour,	2005,	p72)	
	
Within	this	understanding,	objects	play	an	active	role,	they	‘authorise’	or	
‘encourage’	or	‘forbid’	action	and	are	thus	intrinsic	to	how	events	are	managed	and	
negotiated.	Under	a	reading	of	Latour,	objects	are	not	inert	background	but	
important	figures	in	people’s	experience,	acting	as	‘non-human	participant[s]’.	They	
make	possible,	restrict,	encourage,	point	to,	lead,	halt	and	magnify	different	
outcomes,	activities	and	experiences.	For	example,	within	a	mental	health	ward,	the	
tinted	glass	and	visibly	locked	doors	facilitate	observation	of	its	patients	and	
materialise	their	status	as	‘risky’	individuals	who	require	containment.	One	
participant	describes	how	the	flimsy	curtains	of	a	high-risk	room	and	translucent	
glass	create	a	feeling	of	‘being	constantly	watched’,	an	experience	she	refers	to	as	
‘awful’	(McGrath	&	Reavey,	2013,	p13-14).	In	fact,	large,	visible	locks	in	mental	
health	wards	have	actually	been	found	to	increase	violent	episodes	(Bowers	et	al.,	
2006).		
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	 The	French	philosopher	Michel	Serres	builds	on	Latour’s	central	idea	of	the	
active	role	of	objects	while	maintaining	a	more	credible	distinction	between	objects	
and	people.	Like	Latour	(2005),	Serres	sees	objects	as	crucial	mediators	of	human	
relationships	and,	as	such,	jointly	productive	of	human	experience.	Serres	(1995)	
describes	objects	as	slowing	down	and	stabilising	social	relations	–	without	them	
such	relationships	would	be	‘as	airy	as	clouds’	(p87)	–	while	also	being	culturally	
encoded	with	multiple	meanings,	as	the	roles	they	play	can	shift.	Thus,	there	is	no	
hard	dichotomy	between	the	social	world	and	the	material	world:	objects	are	social	
and	the	social	is	material.	In	addition,	there	is	not	an	insistence	of	the	equivalence	of	
objects	and	humans,	rather	the	slow,	anchoring	role	objects	play	is	noted	for	its	
differentiation	from	more	‘airy’	(Serres,	1995,	p87)	human	social	relations.		
	
2.5.3	Materially	mediated	subjectivity	
	
The	significance	of	the	spaces	and	objects	of	the	material	world	to	our	experience	
has	been	illustrated.	Now,	how	this	feeds	into	how	we	think	about	subjectivity,	
traditionally	conceived	as	opposite	to	materiality,	will	be	considered.	Brown	and	
Stenner	(2009)	adopt	Foucault’s	(1988)	‘art	of	living’	to	explore	how	subjectivity	is	
constituted	through	the	multiple,	overlapping	processes	of	our	experience:	
discursive,	material	and	social.	Brown	and	Stenner	(2009)	see	Foucault’s	later	work	
as	offering	a	shift	from	viewing	subjectivity	‘as	something	“implanted”	or	“inscribed”	
on	the	body”	(p172)	to	looking	at	unfolding	practices,	‘technologies	of	the	self’	
(Foucault,	2000a),	which	are	culturally	and	historically	situated.	These	practices	form	
the	connection	someone	has	with	their	own	subjectivity,	such	as:	thinking	about	the	
events	in	their	life	and	how	they	felt,	moving	their	bodies,	expressing	emotions	or	
personal	reflections	with	others,	working	in	a	particular	industry	or	area,	
accumulating	specialised	knowledge	and	recognising	(or	being	recognised)	as	a	
member	of	a	particular	social	group	e.g.	man,	transgender	person,	mother,	teacher,	
employee,	friend.	The	self	is	therefore	described	as:	‘the	shifting	form	which	both	
contains	our	sense	of	self	and	continuously	interacts	with	and	is	marked	by	the	
forces	which	sustain	living’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p172).	These	‘forces’	include	
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discourse,	cognition,	emotion	as	well	as	material	forces	such	as	embodied	
movement,	objects	and	other	material	features	of	the	world.	The	self	is	thus	
conceived	of	as	materially	as	well	as	discursively	distributed	and	contextualised,	as	
well	as	actively	formulated	with	and	through	material	spaces.	Within	this	
understanding,	objects	are	integral	to	but	not	deterministic	of	the	subjective	self	
(Stenner,	2008);	according	with	a	relational	understanding	of	our	spatialised	
experiences	(Lewin,	1936;	Latour,	2005).	Therefore,	space	and	materiality	will	be	
viewed	within	this	work	as	consisting	of	overlapping	processes	which	constitute	our	
experience	and	as	a	contributory	thread	to	the	active	formulation	of	subjectivity,	
providing	the	setting	for	‘technologies	of	the	self’.		
	
2.5.4	Affective	atmospheres	
	
‘we	do	not	live	in	a	merely	physical	world;	the	experienced	space	around	us	is	
always	charged	with	affective	qualities.’	(Fuchs,	2013,	p2)	
	
A	crucial	way	in	which	emotion,	space	and	embodiment	can	be	seen	to	overlap	is	in	
the	concept	of	‘affective	atmosphere’,	which	can	be	thought	of,	again,	as	relationally	
produced.	Drawing	on	Marxist	and	phenomenological	insights,	Anderson	(2009)	
describes	an	affective	atmosphere	as:	
	
indeterminate…dynamic…[and	having]	singular	affective	qualities	that	
emanate	from	but	exceed	the	assembling	of	bodies.	(p77)	
	
It	is	the	‘assembling’	or	connecting	of	human	and	non-human	bodies	that	is	pivotal,	
how	they	‘affect...one	another	as	some	form	of	‘envelopment’	is	produced’	(p80).	
The	relations	between	‘multiple	types’	(p80)	of	bodies	produce	an	atmosphere,	
though	in	its	production	it	‘exceed[s]’	those	relations.	This	‘envelopment’	seems	to	
take	on	a	kind	of	diffuse	spherical	quality,	though	this	is	indeterminate	and	shifting.	
Anderson’s	definition	may	seem	ambiguous	and	it	is,	willfully	so,	since	ambiguity	is	
at	the	heart	of	the	phenomena.	There	is	a	sense	in	which	an	atmosphere	is	very	
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much	present	and	strongly	felt:	we	have	all	experienced	the	inexplicable	power	of	an	
atmosphere	whether	that	be	the	cosiness	of	home,	the	electric	tension	in	a	room	
after	an	argument	or	the	chilling	feel	of	a	deserted,	poorly	lit	industrial	space.	We	
also	experience	atmospheres	in	a	spatial	way,	as	emerging	from	a	particular	context,	
from	cities	and	places	to	an	interpersonal	atmosphere	that	emanates	from	a	
particular	collection	of	bodies:	for	example,	the	dyadic,	affective	resonance	between	
a	couple	(Sloterdijk,	1998	cited	in	Klauser,	2010).		
Emotion	and	feeling	are	central	to	this	understanding:	an	atmosphere	has	a	
‘singular	affective	qualit[y]’	which	is	striking	to	whoever	encounters	it;	felt	as	a	
‘bodily	resonance’	(Fuchs,	2013,	p2)	since	all	emotion	emerges	with	and	through	
bodily	feeling,	as	argued	earlier	with	regard	to	a	psychosocial	process	account	of	
emotion	(Burkitt,	2014).	We	are	drawn	into	atmospheres	as	we	perceive	them	to	be	
emanating	from	a	particular	space	or	interpersonal	environment,	they	affect	and	
move	us	without	our	consent,	seeming	to	come	from	‘outside’	of	us.	Many	people	
can	also	experience	the	same	atmosphere	emanating	from	the	same	space	to	the	
extent	which	we	might	consider	them	as	having	an	‘objective’	level	of	continuity	
(Fuchs,	2013).	Indeed,	there	are	whole	professions,	such	as	set	design,	landscape	
gardening	and	architecture,	which	focus	on	the	arranging	features	of	the	
environment,	e.g.	sounds,	lights,	objects,	in	order	to	intensify	and	shape	
atmospheres	(Böhme,	2006).	Yet	despite	this	potency,	atmospheres	also	seem	to	
linger	just	outside	of	‘rational	explanation	and	clear	figuration.	Something	that	
hesitates	at	the	edge	of	the	unsayable.’	(Anderson,	2009,	p78).	The	emphasis	here	is	
on	affective	atmosphere	as	paradoxical:	
	
[they]	hold	a	series	of	opposites	–	presence	and	absence,	materiality	and	
ideality,	definite	and	indefinite,	singularity	and	generality	–	in	a	relation	of	
tension.	(p80)		
	
Once	again,	there	is	a	troubling	of	traditional,	pre-held	binaries.	They	both	exist	and	
do	not	exist	in	that	they	‘belong’	to	the	perceiving	subject,	atmospheres	cannot	be	
present	without	someone	there	to	perceive	them,	and	‘belong’	to	objects,	
atmospheres	emerge	from	the	relationships	between	the	different	material	
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elements	that	constitute	them.	Atmospheres	are	quasi-autonomous	yet	not	free-
floating,	rather	a	supervening	quality	on	the	environment	and	bodies	that	produce	
them.	This	mixing	together	and	troubling	of	the	distinction	between	the	objective	
and	the	subjective	is	what	makes	the	atmospheric	concept	so	interesting	–	
recognised	as	neither	one	nor	the	other:	neither	subjective	nor	objective,	neither	
personal	nor	impersonal,	neither	singular	nor	vague	–	and	potentially	fruitful	when	
dealing	with	the	indeterminacies,	contradictions	and	tensions	of	human	existence.	
	
2.6	Conclusions	
	
A	psychosocial	process	account	has	been	elucidated	and	argued	to	better	situate	
human	experience:	specifically,	our	emotional,	embodied	and	spatial	experience.	
Such	an	account	views	the	world	as	constituted	through	interconnected	processes	
and	can	be	seen	to	disrupt	reductive	binaries	between	person/world,	
individual/society,	mind/body,	subject/object,	viewing	them	as	interdependent	
rather	than	oppositional.	The	metaphysical	groundwork	for	this	position	was	
described	as	the	Whiteheadian	concept	of	an	actual	occasion	as	the	fundamental	
unit	of	reality,	which	is	neither	subject	nor	object	but	a	fusion	of	the	two.		
Within	this	account,	our	understanding	of	emotion	is	transformed	from	an	
isolatable,	interior	substance	to	arising	from	the	‘patterns’	(Burkitt,	2014)	or	
‘systems’	(Stenner,	2013)	of	relationship	between	ourselves	and	others,	between	
ourselves	and	the	world.	Emotion	is	thus	a	thoroughly	contextualised	phenomena	
and	we	need	to	consider	the	web	of	relations	from	which	emotions	arises,	which	
Burkitt	narrows	to:	the	particular	situation,	the	personal	history	of	the	
person/people	involved	and	broader	socio-cultural	context.	Yet,	emotions	are	also	
fundamentally	embodied	and	felt	–	bodily	feeling	is	central	to	all	experience	of	
emotion	(Burkitt,	2014).	This	means	that	emotions	are	now	longer	‘in’	us	but	occur	
through	an	interaction	between	us	and	the	world,	they	are	distributed	affairs.	This	
has	the	advantage	of	releasing	them	from	their	bonds	of	being	purely	‘subjective’,	
with	no	relevance	to	the	‘objective’	world	of	matter	and	facts.	It	has	also	been	
argued	as	important	to	consider	what	the	systems	of	relationship	which	give	rise	to	
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emotion	exclude	(Stenner,	2013).	The	answer	to	this	question	about	what	thirdness	
is	excluded	from	the	system	can	reveal	much	about	the	constitution	of	phenomena.	
Going	forward,	this	means	drawing	out	the	personal,	affective	experiences	of	
couples	as	well	as	practicing	a	careful	awareness	of	the	relational	web	which	
produces	emotional	experience,	rather	than	focussing	on	emotion	as	a	unit	of	
separable	enquiry	in	and	of	itself.	More	broadly,	attention	will	be	paid	to	what	is	
being	excluded	in	order	for	phenomena	(e.g.	emotions	like	love	and	jealousy	as	well	
as	couple	relationships)	to	flourish.		
Turning	to	embodiment,	our	bodies	were	argued	as	equally	important	as	our	
minds,	the	former	responsible	for	all	experience	and	meaning.	Spinoza’s	(1677/1993	
cited	in	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009)	parallelist	thought	was	argued	to	provide	a	useful	
way	of	thinking	about	the	mind	and	body	as	modes	of	two	different	attributes	
(thought	and	extension)	of	a	single	process;	the	process	of	the	becoming	of	actual	
occasions.	This	framing	was	reinforced	by	Johnson’s	(2008)	more	modern	
understanding	of	experience	as	an	organism-environment	process	of	interaction,	
which	both	‘body’	and	‘mind’	were	abstractions	of.	The	fact	that	we	are	fully	part	of	
the	natural	world,	rather	than	simply	in	it	(a	process	ontology	views	humanity	as	
different	in	degree	not	kind	from	other	phenomena)	suggests	that	meaning	is	also	
natural,	resulting	from	the	interrelation	of	a	biological	organism	and	the	socio-
material	world.	This	places	even	things	that	have	previously	been	considered	well	
outside	of	the	bodily	arena	as	fundamentally	embodied	phenomena,	such	as	
conceptual,	cognitive	meaning.	Carrying	these	ideas	forward	within	this	thesis,	
attention	must	be	paid	to	our	whole,	embodied	selves	as	well	as	to	what	our	bodily	
feelings	can	tell	us	about	the	meaning	of	experiences.		
Finally,	space	has	been	described	in	this	chapter	as	dynamic	and	relationally	
produced;	not	as	an	external	container	we	are	in	but	a	process,	intertwining	with	the	
embodied,	emotional,	cognitive,	social	and	biological	to	produce	our	experience.	
Hence,	our	lives	do	not	take	place	in	space,	but	are	spatial.	Lewin’s	(1936)	concept	of	
‘life-space’	was	discussed	as	providing	a	helpful	lens	through	which	to	view	our	
spatial	experience:	as	focussed	on	the	intensive	connections,	such	as	memory,	
perception	and	emotion,	crucial	to	any	given	situation,	rather	than	extensive	
measurement.	In	addition,	Brown	and	Reavey’s	(2015)	exploration	of	difficult	
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memories	using	life-space	was	argued	to	show	how	material	arrangements	can	
afford	certain	ways	of	being	and	feeling.	Latour’s	(2005)	and	Serres’	(1995)	ideas	
were	used	to	strengthen	how,	respectively,	objects	can	‘allow’	action	and	stabilise	
‘airy’	human	relations.	Together,	these	scholars	were	claimed	to	make	a	strong	case	
for	how	our	subjectivity	is	materially	modulated	(Foucault,	2000a,	2000b,	1988,	1987	
cited	in	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Finally,	both	human	and	non-human	bodies	
coalesced	in	the	production	of	an	‘affective	atmosphere’	(Anderson,	2009).	This	
concept	ties	together	the	strands	of	emotion,	embodiment	and	space:	it	is	both	
strongly	felt,	as	the	eerie	atmosphere	of	a	dimly	lit	park,	and	yet	strangely	diffuse;	
emerging	from	but	exceeding	the	collection	of	bodies	which	give	rise	to	it	and	also	
experienced	as	occurring	spatially,	within	a	particular	context	such	as	a	room,	city	or	
in	the	space	between	two	people.	Incorporation	of	affective	atmospheres	calls	for	
careful	heed	to	paid	to	the	paradoxical	nature	of	our	experience	and	how	this	hovers	
between	ourselves	and	our	environments,	neither	quite	separate	from	the	other.	It	
will	also	be	important	to	consider	the	fundamental	role	materiality	plays	in	co-
constituting	subjectivity,	agency	and	action.		
Thus,	we	are	left	with	a	richer,	psychosocial	process	account	of	experience	
which	sees	us	as	enmeshed	within	a	relational	web,	out	of	which	arises	our	
emotional	experience.	And	yet	we	also	personally	feel	this	relationship	web	in	our	
meaning-making	bodies	as	they	move	through	active,	intensive	space.		
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Chapter	Three	–	Methodology	
	
The	theoretical	boundaries	of	the	thesis	have	now	been	delineated.	In	this	chapter,	
how	these	framed	the	methodological	and	analytical	process	will	be	discussed.	The	
chapter	can	be	seen	as	structured	into	four	areas.	The	first	details	the	concerns,	
namely	of	voice	and	power,	that	informed	the	research	project	and	the	research	
questions	arrived	at.	The	second	section	examines	how	these	concerns	shaped	
methodological	decisions	and	provides	detailed	reasoning	for	the	research	design	of	
the	two	studies	performed:	couple	interviews	and	diary	solicitation.	Thirdly,	the	full	
procedures	followed	during	recruitment	and	the	data	collection	process	will	be	
detailed	and	the	ethical	issues	which	informed	these	explored.	Reflexivity	and	
validity	will	be	addressed	in	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis.	In	the	final	section,	
‘Analytical	steps’,	the	framework	and	process	of	analysis	is	examined.	Thematic	
analysis	was	used	and	the	ontological	and	epistemological	decisions	that	
underpinned	this	process	will	be	articulated.	This	will	be	followed	by	a	thorough	
exposition	of	the	different	stages	of	analysis	and	the	approaches	used	to	interrogate	
the	data.	
	
3.1	Talking	to	drug	users	
	
Almost	every	psychoactive	drug	has	been	regarded	by	some	society	as	a	dire	
threat	to	public	order	and	moral	standards,	while	a	source	of	harmless	
pleasure	by	others.	Almost	every	society	has	one	drug	whose	use	is	tolerated,	
while	others	are	regarded	with	deep	suspicion.	(Saunders,	1997,	p17)	
	
Drug	use	is	an	enduring	fact	of	almost	all	cultures,	in	all	time	periods	(Jay,	2012).	As	
the	words	of	Nicholas	Saunders,	author	of	numerous	books	on	ecstasy	use	and	
culture,	show,	different	drug	perceptions	are	little	more	than	a	twist	of	the	cultural	
kaleidoscope	away.	Within	Euro-North	American	culture,	the	use	of	alcohol,	caffeine	
and,	to	some	extent,	tobacco	is	‘tolerated’	while	cannabis,	MDMA,	cocaine,	LSD,	
heroin	and	psilocybin	mushrooms	are	‘regarded	with	deep	suspicion’.	This	schism	
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could	be	seen	as	reproduced	in	alcohol	and	tobacco	research	which	frequently	
include	discussions	of	pleasure	in	contrast	to	illicit	drugs	research	where	these	are	
largely	absent	(Moore,	2008).	In	order	to	understand	why	these	illicit	drugs	are	seen	
as	a	‘dire	threat	to	public	order	and	moral	standards’,	it	is	vital	to	consider	who	is	
saying	so.	
Voice	and	power	are	fundamentally	entangled:	whoever	has	voice,	has	power	
and	whoever	has	no	voice,	has	little	power.	If	this	is	so,	we	have	to	ask	whose	voice	
is	legitimised	when	it	comes	to	drugs?	It	is	proposed	there	are	several	
institutions/populations	who	have	the	most	say:	the	Government,	‘experts’	in	the	
field	-	usually	found	in	the	disciplines	of	psychology,	medicine	and	epidemiology	
(Moore,	2008),	the	media	and	the	(concerned)	public.	Moreover,	while	there	some	
exceptions,	by	and	large,	each	of	these	subordinates	the	voices	of	drug	users	
themselves.	This	is	so	even	in	academic	research	that	seeks	to	explore	alternative	
conceptualisations	outside	of	drugs	as	‘dire	threat’.	David	Nutt,	a	well-known	
neuropsychopharmacologist	within	illicit	drugs	research,	famously	said	horse	riding	
was	more	dangerous	than	taking	ecstasy	(Nutt,	2009)	and	emphasised	the	ubiquity	
of	drug	use	in	society,	even	amongst	the	highest	ranking	politicians	(Nutt,	2015).	Yet,	
he	still	positions	his	research	as	free	of	the	‘bias’	of	drug	users	themselves,	publicly	
declaring	he	does	not	and	has	never	taken	drugs	(Nutt,	2015).		
Thus,	the	voices	of	drug	users	remain	illegitimate	in	almost	all	quarters	
(Moore,	2008;	Móró,	Simon,	Bárd	&	Rácz,	2011).	There	is	a	striking	similarity	here	
with	discussions	of	mental	distress	(for	why	‘distress’	is	more	suitable	than	‘illness’	
see	Cromby,	Harper	&	Reavey,	2013),	where	the	voices	of	service	users	have	also	
been	ignored	in	favour	of	psychiatric	explanations	of	distress	(McGrath,	2012).	
However,	recently	the	experiences	of	service	users	have	become	more	visible,	for	
instance,	service	users	must	now	be	represented	on	all	mental	health	trust	boards	
and	be	part	of	service	evaluation	(D.	O.	H.,	1999),	though	there	are	still	questions	
raised	over	the	extent	to	which	they	can	actually	affect	change	(Beresford,	2002).	
Drug	users	have	not	experienced	the	same	change	in	fortune.	Turning	to	the	field	of	
drugs	research	particularly,	we	can	see	the	struggle	for	voice	as	underpinned	by	
what	Moore	(2008)	terms	‘research	capital’	(p354).	This	research	capital	controls	
access	to	the	resources	within	the	field,	like	funding	and	policy/practical	influence.	
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Moore	emphasises	the	serious	health	risks	drugs	research	competes	with,	such	as	
cancer	and	heart	disease,	and	suggests	that	within	this	climate	it	makes	sense	to	
emphasise	drug-related	harms.	In	addition,	the	‘evidenced-based’	approach	of	
Government	and	health	organisations	is	more	suited	to	the	hard,	objective	‘facts’	of	
quantitative	research,	rather	than	the	contextually	situated,	interpretative	findings	
of	qualitative	research,	which	has	included	the	views	of	drug	users	(e.g.	Beck	&	
Rosenbaum,	1994;	Bahora,	Sterk	&	Elifson,	2009;	Duff,	2003,	2008,	2009;	Farrugia,	
2015;	Foster	&	Spencer,	2013;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Hunt,	Evans	&	Kares,	2007;	Levy,	
O’Grady,	Wish	&	Arria,	2005;	Moore	&	Miles,	2004;	Moore	&	Measham,	2008;	Olsen,	
2009;	Solowij,	Hall	&	Lee,	1992).	Politically	too,	there	are	risks	in	being	considered	
‘pro-drug’	or	not	taking	the	harms	of	drug	use	seriously.	David	Nutt,	mentioned	
previously,	is	a	prime	example:	he	was	sacked	as	chairman	of	the	Government’s	
Advisory	Council	for	the	Misuse	of	Drugs	after	criticising	the	decision	to	increase	
penalties	for	cannabis	use	(Travis,	2009).		
However,	drug	users	have	not	simply	been	silent	or	powerless.	There	is	a	long	
history	of	published	works	discussing	personal	experiences	of	drug	use	such	as	
Thomas	De	Quincey’s	Confessions	of	an	Opium	Eater	and	Aldous	Huxley’s	Doors	of	
Perception	as	well	as	many	books	detailing	drug	users’	views	from	a	secondhand	
perspective	(Pilcher,	2008;	Saunders,	1997).	It	has	also	been	argued	that	key	
thinkers,	such	as	Freud,	Sartre,	Foucault	and	Deleuze,	developed	their	theories	as	a	
result	of	their	encounters	with	drugs	–	ideas	which	have	gone	on	to	vitally	shape	
modern	understandings	(Boothroyd,	2006).	Drug	use	has	always	intermingled	with	
the	arts:	featuring	in	some	of	the	most	well-known	cult	movies	e.g.	Pulp	Fiction,	
Trainspotting,	American	Beauty,	and	music	e.g.	Happy	Mondays,	The	Beatles,	The	
New	Order;	even	coming	to	be	an	intrinsic	part	of	whole	musical	genres	such	as	acid	
house,	reggae,	punk	and	drum’n’bass.	Drug	users	have	also	effected	their	own	
change.	Johann	Hari	(2015)	tells	the	story	of	injecting	drug	users	in	Vancouver	who	
were	tired	of	the	high	number	of	overdoses	and	took	matters	into	their	own	hands	–	
creating	their	own	harm	reduction	services	and	eventually	winning	the	support	of	
local	government.	Drug	users	have	also	set	up	advocacy	organisations	such	as	the	
International	Network	of	People	who	Use	Drugs.		
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This	is	not	to	say	that	drug	users’	voices	are	the	only	voices	that	matter,	but	
that	they	are	part	of	a	spectrum	of	drug	use	understandings	and,	as	such,	deserve	to	
be	heard.	Indeed,	deserve	to	be	at	the	centre	of	drugs	research,	policy	and	practice.	
We	consult	patients	on	the	level	of	medical	care	they	receive	and	their	experiences	
of	health	and	illness,	customers	on	the	quality	of	a	product	or	service	and	students	
on	their	university	experience.	People	who	are	on	the	receiving	end	of	a	service	tend	
to	be	very	much	in	the	picture	when	it	is	designed,	developed	and	delivered.	Of	
course,	there	are	exceptions	to	this,	such	as	prisoners	within	the	criminal	justice	
system.	The	criminalisation	of	drug	use	thus	serves	to	place	drug	users	in	a	
marginalised	position	of	immorality	and	unworthiness,	though	there	have	been	a	
multitude	of	voices	in	recent	times	to	officially	regulate	(The	Global	Commission	on	
Drug	Policy,	2014)	or	decriminalise	drug	use	(e.g.	Ireland,	Portugal	and	Czech	
Republic	all	have	policies	of	decriminalisation),	including,	notably,	the	World	Health	
Organisation	(WHO,	2014),	a	branch	of	the	United	Nations.	Furthermore,	many	aims	
held	by,	say,	research	disciplines	might	actually	be	better	facilitated	by	a	deeper	
understanding	of	drug	user’s	experiences	e.g.	health	interventions	may	strike	more	
of	a	chord	if	couched	in	the	language	of	drug	users	themselves,	recognising	their	
interpretation	of	harm.	The	top-down	imposition	of	institutional	ideas	of	harm	may	
serve	to	alienate	the	very	people	they	are	trying	to	reach	(Foster	&	Spencer,	2013).		
	
3.2	Research	design	
	
The	research	project	was	qualitative	in	design,	with	data	gathered	through	two	
methods,	couple	interviews	and	individual	diaries/interviews,	and	subsequently	
amalgamated	for	analysis.	The	analytical	chapters	therefore	draw	on	the	whole	data	
set,	organised	thematically.	Issues	of	power	and	voice	identified	previously	within	
drugs	research	shaped	the	research	design.	Arguably,	qualitative	methodology	itself	
is	particularly	suited	to	addressing	these	concerns	since	it	focusses	on	personal	
meanings	within	an	exploratory	context,	rather	than	dealing	in	pre-defined	
categories,	as	found	in	quantitative	research	paradigms	(Willig,	2001).	Thus,	
qualitative	research	concerns	itself	with	the	generation	of	participant-focussed	
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understandings,	so	could	be	seen	as	aptly	placed	to	facilitate	divergent	ideas	which	
challenge	existing	models	of,	for	example,	the	‘pathological’	(Mugford,	1988),	
‘immoral’	(Goode,	2000)	or	‘irrational’	(Pennay	&	Moore,	2010)	drug	user.		
	 This	commitment	to	keeping	participant	voices	at	the	centre	of	the	research	
was	advanced	by	the	data	collection	methods	chosen.	The	interviews	were	all	semi-
structured	and	centred	on	participants’	self-selected	items	in	order	to	give	
participants	more	room	to	steer	the	interview	process	(e.g.	Reavey,	2011).	Diaries	
also	offered	an	insight	into	participants'	lives	and	an	opportunity	for	them	to	tailor,	
edit	and	cut	out	content,	in	order	to	tell	the	stories	they	wanted	to	tell	(Plummer,	
2001).	Yet,	it	is	recognised	that	research	cannot	straightforwardly	‘give	voice’	to	
participants,	rather	researcher	influence	is	omnipresent,	for	example	the	selection	of	
particular	participant	quotes	in	analysis	amplifies	some	voices	and	understandings	
and	silences	others	(Fine,	1992;	Keane,	2011).	
3.3	Couple	interviews	
	
The	first	method	of	data	collection	was	semi-structured	couple	interviews.	Whether	
or	not	to	interview	couples	together	or	apart	has	been	the	subject	of	methodological	
debate	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	2014).	With	the	decision	sometimes	framed	as	a	truth-
seeking	exercise,	underpinned	by	the	assumption	that	one	interviewing	style	
provides	a	window	into	the	‘real’	relationship	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	2014).	Such	
understandings	were	eschewed	within	this	research,	where	different	interactional	
contexts	were	recognised	as	shaping	the	accounts	produced	(Heaphy	&	Einarsdottir,	
2013).	The	choice	was	made	to	interview	couples	together	here	for	several	reasons.	
Firstly,	a	joint	interview	can	provide	rich	data.	It	can,	for	example,	allow	a	glimpse	of	
couple	dynamics	in	practice,	rather	than	the	dynamic	as	told	by	one	partner	in	an	
individual	interview.	Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	individual	is	not	a	sufficient	
unit	of	analysis	in	research	that	purports	to	be	centred	on	the	couple	(Duncombe	&	
Marsden,	1996).	Joint	interviews	have	been	highlighted	as	particularly	appropriate	
when	‘studies	focus	on	negotiations	between	partners	or	shared	relationship	
construction’	(Heaphy	&	Einarsdottir,	p56);	and	this	research	was	concerned	with	
how	couples	constructed,	negotiated	and	interpreted	MDMA	experiences	and	
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closeness.	This	technique	has	been	employed	by	a	number	of	researchers	working	
within	the	broad	remits	of	relationship	and	family	research	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	
2014;	Dryden,	1998;	e;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).		
The	richness	of	couple	data	can	also	be	seen	in	the	ways	partners	elaborate	
on	and	contest	each	other’s	accounts.	The	response	of	a	listener	can	guide	what	is	
remembered	(Pasupathi,	2001)	and	couples	have	been	found	to	jointly	construct	
memories,	the	details	of	which	may	not	have	been	remembered	in	individual	
settings	(Harris,	Sutton	&	Barnier,	2010).	There	is	also	the	possibility	for	partners	to	
interrupt	and	contradict	each	other,	providing	alternate	perspectives.	Such	sites	of	
dispute	can	be	illuminating,	particularly	when	considering	how	meanings	are	
negotiated	between	couples	(Dryden,	1998).	Furthermore,	the	comfort	of	
participants	is	arguably	enhanced:	being	interviewed	with	a	partner	you	know	and	
trust	can	make	the	interview	process	feel	more	manageable.	A	couple	can	present	a	
united	front	and	navigate	the	interview	questions	together.		
	 Finally,	joint	interviews	can	also	be	justified	from	an	ethical	perspective.	
Bjørnholt	and	Farstad	(2014)	point	out	how	information	might	be	revealed	in	an	
anonymous,	interview	situation	that	would	not	be	revealed	to	a	partner	or	family	
members.	Preserving	anonymity	of	such	disclosures	is	often	not	possible	in	research	
projects	where	both	partners	or	several	family	members	are	interviewed	separately,		
since	such	data	is	clustered	together	in	the	analysis.	If	both	partners	are	there,	
couples	can	consent	(or	not)	in	the	moment	to	a	disclosure	and	are	aware	that	they	
are	speaking	in	a	‘public’	setting	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	2014).		
	 However,	there	are	disadvantages	to	conducting	interviews	in	this	manner.	
One	partner	may	dominate	the	conversation,	speaking	over	or	for	the	other	person	
and	disclosure	can	be	constrained	(Beitin,	2008).	Individual	diaries	were	used	as	a	
separate	method	of	data	collection	to	counterbalance	these	possibilities	and	provide	
an	outlet	to	speak	freely,	if	that	was	needed.		
	
3.3.1	Visual	methods:	objects	and	timelines	
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The	psychosocial	process	perspective	taken	within	this	research	advocates	for	a	deep	
empiricism	where	the	domain	of	subjectivity	is	radically	redefined,	avoiding	the	
bifurcation	of	the	world	into	meaningless,	objective	reality	and	value-laden	
subjective	experience	(Stenner,	2008).	As	Stenner,	Bhatti	and	Church	(2012)	
elaborate:	
	
Experience	is	central	to	this	account,	but	experience	is	emphatically	not	
limited	to	the	modes	of	conscious	subjective	experience	associated	with	
human	beings,	and	it	is	never	separated	from	its	‘objects’.	Indeed,	following	
Whitehead,	they	define	experience	as	the	process	of	assembling	and	
patterning	objects	(what	Whitehead	calls	prehension).	(p9)	
	
Thus,	experience	is	fundamentally	entangled	with	objects;	indeed,	experience	is	
produced	through	many,	interrelating	threads	(e.g.	perception,	memory	and	the	
discursive	domain)	of	this	‘process	of	assembling	and	patterning	objects’.	It	is	not	
possible	to	abstract	experience	away	from	its	embodied,	material	and	social	context.		
Therefore,	objects,	embodiment	and	the	material	world	are	not	secondary	aspects	
of	the	world	but	crucial	to	our	experience,	the	two	intertwined	with	one	another:	
subjectivity	is	within	the	natural,	objective	world	and	we	are	only	subjects	through	
our	object-related	concerns.	This	re-engagement	with	materiality	has	been	
facilitated	by	researchers	through	the	use	of	visual	methodologies	such	as	photo	
production	and	elicitation	(Del	Busso,	2009;	Majumdar,	2011),	videos	(Pink,	2001;	
Holliday,	2004;	Shrum,	Duque	&	Brown,	2005),	spatial	interviews	(McGrath	&	
Reavey,	2015;	McGrath,	2012)	and	emotion	maps	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).		
Therefore,	visual	methods	were	incorporated	within	the	interviews:	couples	
were	asked	to	bring	five	objects	or	photos	(Del	Busso,	2009;	Majumdar,	2011),	each	
item	representing	a	time	they	had	taken	MDMA	together.	These	were	explained	as	
prompts	to	help	them	talk	about	their	experiences	and	would	not	be	kept	by	the	
researcher.	In	the	latter	half	of	the	interview,	couples	were	also	asked	to	draw	a	
timeline	of	their	relationship	which	was	retained	(c.f	Iantaffi,	2011).	The	decision	to	
use	visual	methods	reflected	a	concern	with	the	materiality	of	existence	(Reavey,	
2011),	the	world	of	tables,	doors,	rooms	and	bodies;	an	aspect	some	social	
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constructionist	schools	of	thought	have	been	argued	to	neglect	(Brown	&	Stenner,	
2009;	Burkitt,	1999;	Bordo,	1998;	Cromby	&	Nightingale,	1999;	Csordas,	1999;	
Gillies,	et	al.,	2004;	2005;	Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002).	However,	materiality	is	a	
crucial	constituent	of	the	psychosocial	process	perspective	taken	in	this	work;	we	
exist	within	interconnected	social	and	material	webs	(Stenner,	2008).	This	does	not	
indicate	a	return	to	the	‘real’	or	‘objective’	world	of	positivist	scientific	paradigms,	
however,	but	a	recognition	that	neither	objects	or	subjects	are	what	the	world	is	
made	up	of.	Instead,	the	primary	‘stuff’	of	existence	is	a	fusion	of	the	two,	with	
subjectivity	coming	into	being	through	its	objective	concerns	(Stenner,	2008).		
	 Visual	methods	also	clearly	accord	with	the	multi-modal	nature	of	our	
experience:	we	deal	in	words,	images,	smells,	tastes	and	kinaesthetic	feelings	
(Reavey,	2011).	Indeed,	visual	images	can	be	especially	evocative	in	research	
settings;	accessing	different	aspects	of	an	experience	(Willig,	2001).	The	recent	surge	
of	interest	in	visual	methods	within	psychology	(e.g.	Barker	et	al.,	2008;	Cromby,	
2012;	Del	Busso	&	Reavey,	2013;	McGrath	&	Reavey,	2015;	Reavey	&	Johnson,	2008;	
Tucker	&	Smith,	2013),	hails	from	a	history	of	visual	modalities	in	social	science	
disciplines	such	as	anthropology	(Pink,	2001)	and	sociology	(Prosser,	1998;	Knowles	
&	Sweetman,	2004).	Asking	participants	to	select	items	has	been	argued	to	shift	the	
power	dynamic	between	researcher/researched	because	it	gives	participants	the	
opportunity	to	reflect	on	and	bring	what	they	feel	is	relevant	to	their	experience	and	
thus	shape	the	focus	of	the	research	encounter	(Harcourt	&	Frith,	2008;	Radley	&	
Taylor,	2003).	Facilitating	the	research	to	be	more	participant-led	was	a	core	concern	
when	making	methodological	decisions,	as	outlined	earlier	in	the	chapter.	Using	
visual	prompts,	like	objects	and	the	timeline,	can	also	provide	a	safer	method	of	
communication	–	acting	as	an	intermediary	between	researcher	and	researched,	
something	for	participants	to	speak	through	and	to	(Boden	&	Eatough,	2014).	In	
addition,	such	physical	prompts	might	further	help	participants	ground	their	
accounts	in	‘concrete	experiences’	(Silver	&	Reavey,	2010,	p1643),	lending	specificity	
and	detail	to	the	discussion	while	avoiding	generalised	talk	about	their	experiences	
(Reavey,	2011).	This	generalised	talk	has	been	argued	as	more	prone	to	repeating	
rehearsed	narratives,	which	have	been	glossed	over	and	represented	in	a	standard	
format	(Reavey	&	Johnson,	2008).	Photo	production,	rather	than	elicitation,	was	
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dismissed	on	two	grounds:	heightened	anonymity	concerns	due	to	the	illegality	of	
drug	use	and	the	additional	requirement	of	continuing	MDMA	use	this	would	
impose.		
	
3.4	Writing	diaries	
	
The	second	method	of	data	collection	was	solicited	individual	diaries	and	optional	
interviews.	Participants	were	asked	to	write	daily	entries	for	a	week,	several	days	
before	taking	MDMA	with	their	partner	and	several	days	afterwards.	They	were	
intended	to	capture	everyday	minutiae	that	might	be	omitted,	glossed	over	or	
simply	forgotten	as	well	as	providing	an	outlet	to	communicate	sensitive	or	less	
positive	information.	Diaries	have	been	used	in	social	science	research,	particularly	
in	health	research	(Kenton,	2010)	and	can	be	used	as	part	of	qualitative	(Elliott,	
1997)	or	quantitative	research	paradigms	(Corti,	1993).		
	 Everyday	moments,	while	argued	to	form	the	fabric	of	how	couples	relate	to	
one	another	are	often	paid	little	heed	in	relationship	research	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	
Diaries,	by	recording	events	much	closer	to	when	they	take	place,	can	therefore	be	
seen	as	capturing	details	other	forms	of	data	collection	might	miss	(direct	experience	
sampling	also	captures	data	in	‘real-time’	as	participants	responds	to	assessment	
cues	e.g.	mobile	phone	notifications,	but	is	more	intrusive	and	onerous	in	nature	
than	the	diary	format	(Scollon,	Prieto	&	Diener,	2009)).	Particularly	referred	to	here	
is	the	interview,	an	extremely	popular	qualitative	method	(Turner	III,	2010),	which	
has	been	critiqued	for	providing	standardised,	generalised	narratives	(Haug,	1987).	
Discursive	psychology	emphasises	how	the	things	we	say	are	drawn	from	the	range	
of	discourses	that	society	makes	available	to	us	(Henriques,	1984;	Potter	&	
Wetherell,	1987;	Parker,	1992)	and	tend	to	generalise	(Edwards,	1994)	and	
normalise	(Graham	&	Slee,	2007)	our	experience.	The	more	frequently	recalled	or	
culturally	significant	the	experience,	the	more	generalised	a	story	gets	e.g.	stories	
about	‘loss	of	virginity’	resulted	in	glossed	over,	standardised	stories	whereas	
‘initiating’	and	‘touching’	prompted	more	diverse,	revealing	depictions	of	sexual	
events	(Kippax,	Crawford,	Waldby	&	Benton,	1990).		
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Relationships	could	be	seen	as	fertile	ground	for	the	exposition	of	standard	
narratives	of	experience	(Alea	&	Vick,	2010):	with	couples	rehearsing	stories	of	‘big’	
moments	such	as	first	meeting,	the	beginning	of	cohabitation	or	marriage	as	well	as	
familiar	stories	of	relational	progression	e.g.	the	honeymoon	period,	commitment	
uncertainty,	becoming	comfortable	with	one	another.	This	was	borne	out	in	the	
interviews	conducted,	it	was	often	difficult	for	couples	to	talk	about	everyday	
moments	or	the	details	of	specific	events,	rather	than	a	general	sense	of	their	
experience.	Drug	experiences	may	not	be	considered	as	rehearsed	in	the	same	way,	
the	range	of	dominant	drug	discourses	is	narrow,	with	pathology	and	immorality	at	
the	forefront	as	well	as	hedonism.	There	are,	of	course,	other	drug	discourses	such	
as	drugs	as	a	normal	part	of	life	(the	‘normalisation’	thesis:	Parker,	Aldridge	&	
Measham,	1998)	and	tools	for	self-improvement	(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994).	But	the	
continued	marginalisation	of	drug	use	through	its	illegal	status	and	ostracism	within	
the	political	sphere	and	mainstream	media	means	that	participants	may	feel	they	
have	to	resist	prevalent	discourses.	Again,	resulting	in	standardised	talk.	Such	
resistance	was,	understandably,	found	in	the	interviews.	Researchers	can	be	
associated	with	authority	or	authoritative	ways	of	thinking,	therefore	participants	
could	have	associated	me	with	the	authoritative	position	on	drugs.	Certainly,	several	
went	to	lengths	to	assure	me	that	they	were	not	going	to	decry	drugs	(implying	that	
might	be	what	I	wanted	them	to	do)	and	rebutting	notions	of	drug	use	as	‘bad’	and	
‘fake’.	Furthermore,	the	discourse	of	drugs	as	outside	of	normal	lives,	deviant	or	
pathological,	combined	with	the	tendency	to	generalise	within	interview	scenarios	
anyway,	meant	it	was	difficult	to	get	a	sense	of	how	drugs	were	embedded	into	the	
everyday	lives	of	participants.	In	contrast,	diaries	could	contextualise	these	
experiences,	how	they	were	prepared	for,	what	came	after,	‘provid[ing]	a	better	
understanding	of	the	natural	flow	of	various	behaviors	and	their	interrelatedness’	
(Stopka,	Springer,	Khoshnood,	Shaw	&	Singer,	2004,	p74).		
	 Diaries	were	also	used	to	capture	sensitive	(Kenton,	2010)	and	less	positive	
(Corti	et	al.,	1990)	details	of	participants’	lives.	For	example,	sex	can	be	seen	as	
sensitive;	with	research	marking	an	‘intrusive	threat’	to	a	usually	private	area	(Lee,	
1993,	p4).	It	is	suggested	that	diaries	are	an	easier	method	through	which	to	divulge	
sensitive	information,	perhaps	due	to	the	lessened	visibility	of	the	researcher.	This	is	
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not	to	say	that	the	researcher’s	presence	is	not	felt,	the	women	of	Pini	and	
Walkerdine’s	(2011)	video	diary	study	asked	questions	to	the	camera,	‘is	this	what	
you	want?’;	there	was	still	a	sense	of	performing	for	an	audience	but	at	a	distance.	
Furthermore,	the	diary	is	a	confessional	device	(Harvey,	2011)	–	a	well-understood	
concept	in	post-modern	media	(Foucault,	1979)	–	which	can	enable	greater	
reflection	than	alternative	methods	(Holliday,	2004).	Unlike	interviews,	which	
require	almost	immediate	responses	to	particular	questions,	participants	have	space	
to	think	when	writing	a	diary	and	are	more	free	to	either	simply	not	answer	a	
question	(as	was	the	case	with	participants	who	missed	days	of	the	diary	or	ignored	
particular	questions)	or	determine	what	they	want	to	talk	about.	For	this	study,	
questions	were	included	as	a	guide	in	the	diary	as	well	as	participants	being	
encouraged	‘to	write	about	anything	that	feels	important	to	you	about	MDMA	use	
with	your	partner.’	(Appendix	Seven).	Moreover,	the	opportunity	a	diary	affords	to	
go	back	over	and	edit	what	you’ve	written	also	provides	a	space	for	reflection.	This	
process	is	helpful	as	well	in	centring	on	the	voices	of	drug	users	and	what	they	want	
to	say,	one	of	the	concerns	of	this	research,	as	they	have	greater	‘editorial	control’	
over	what	is	finally	presented	to	the	researcher,	than	in	a	traditional	interview	
(Holliday,	2004,	p1603).		
	
3.4.1	Diary	interviews	
	
When	invited	to	take	part	in	the	diary	research,	participants	were	also	made	aware	
of	an	optional	diary	interview	they	could	complete.	These	interviews	took	place	after	
the	diary-writing	week	and	were	structured	around	what	was	written	in	the	diary.	
Kenton	(2010)	advocates	strongly	for	this	diary,	diary-interview	method	due	to	the	
depth	of		understanding	it	can	provide.	A	participant	can	clarify,	elaborate	or	retract	
elements	of	their	diary	as	well	as	providing	much-needed	context,	such	as	the	
broader	significance	or	prevalence	of	the	events	or	feelings	contained	therein.	
Indeed,	it	was	found	that	these	interviews	provided	rich,	contextualised	data,	
shedding	new	light	on	the	diaries.	However,	unlike	Kenton	(2010),	it	was	decided	
that	the	diary	interviews	would	be	an	optional	part	of	the	interview	process.	The	
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accompanying	interview	was	not	stipulated	as	a	requirement	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	
to	accommodate	people	who	did	not	want	to	talk	face-to-face	for	whatever	reason	–	
due	to	the	illegality	of	the	activity	under	discussion,	for	instance	–	and,	secondly,	for	
the	more	pragmatic	reason	of	not	wanting	to	overburden	voluntary	participants.	
Diaries	take	a	reasonable	amount	of	time	and	effort	to	fill	in	daily;	an	additional	
interview	might	push	participants	beyond	the	bounds	of	the	commitment	they	were	
prepared	to	offer.	This	was	particularly	relevant	to	this	research,	where	the	eligible	
sample	was	already	very	small	and	it	was	thought	prudent	to	offer	manageable	ways	
of	taking	part.		
	
3.5	Participant	recruitment	
	
Participants	were	recruited	through	advertising	(22)	and	word-of-mouth	(6).	The	
research	was	advertised	primarily	through	online	sources.	The	online	discussion	
forum	reddit.com,	using	the	subreddits	‘drugs’	and	‘MDMA’	(8),	and	the	harm	
reduction	website	rollsafe.org	(8)	proved	the	most	successful	avenues.	The	research	
also	garnered	participants	through	the	Students	for	Sensible	Drug	Policy	facebook	
group	(2)	and	bluelight.org	(2).	In	addition,	a	facebook	page	‘Couples	and	MDMA	
Research’	was	set	up,	which	received	211	likes	and	several	messages	asking	for	
further	information,	however	this	did	not	translate	into	participation.	Outside	of	the	
online	sphere,	a	classified	was	placed	in	the	Big	Issue	(2)	and	recruiting	via	word-of-
mouth	involved	asking	people	I	already	knew	if	they	would	be	willing	to	participate	
(4)	or	if	they	knew	anyone	that	met	the	inclusion	criteria	and	might	be	interested	(2).	
The	adverts	used	for	both	studies	are	included	in	Appendices	One	and	Two	for	
reference.	
	 The	demographic	details	of	the	participants	from	both	studies	are	listed	in	
the	tables	below:	
	
Study	One	–	Couple	interviews	
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Names		 Age	 Location	 Relationship	length	 Relationship	status	
Kara	and	Liam	 33/36	 UK	 13	years	 cohabiting,	engaged	
Jenny	and	Mark	 30/33	 USA	 8	years	 cohabiting,	engaged	
Eva	and	Lars	 27/29	 EU	 18	months	 cohabiting	
Emily	and	Dan	 40/40	 USA	 24	years	 married	with	children	
Rachel	and	Joe	 60/51	 UK	 20	years	 cohabiting	
Helena	and	Jakub	 29/34	 UK	 6	years	 cohabiting,	married	
Leanne	and	Matt	 26/26	 UK	 7	years	 cohabiting	
Ayesha	and	Sam	 25/25	 UK	 18	months	 cohabiting	
Abby	and	Ryan	 40/42	 UK	 21	years	 cohabiting	with	
children	
Clara	and	Nick	 26/35	 USA	 2	years	 cohabiting,	engaged	
	
Study	Two	–	Individual	Diaries	
	
Name(s)	 Age	 Location	 Relationship	
length	
Relationship	status	 Diary	
interview?	
Tomàs	 33	 EU	 5	years	 cohabiting,	married	 N	
Karl	 27	 EU	 3	years	 cohabiting	 Y	
Ethan	 27	 UK	 6	years	 cohabiting	 N	
Effy	and	
Aron	
(completed	
together)	
29/33	 USA	 5	years	 cohabiting,	married	 N	
Ken	 37	 EU	 6.5	years	 cohabiting,	married	 N	
Carrie	 24	 EU	 2.5	years	 cohabiting	 Y	
Melanie	 27	 UK	 4.5	years	 cohabiting	 N	
	
As	can	be	seen,	although	the	participant	group	was	varied	in	age	(25	-	62),	
geographical	location	(UK:	14;	USA:	8;	EU	[outside	of	UK]:	6)	and	relationship	length	
(18	months	-	24	years)	in	other	ways	it	was	demographically	alike	e.g.	exclusively	
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heterosexual	and	largely	middle	class.	Furthermore,	the	research	was	voluntary,	
which	might	have	further	exaconerbated	the	middle	class	concentration	of	the	
sample,	since	financial	compensation	for	their	time	might	be	less	needed.	It	is	also	
important	to	consider	that	the	majority	of	participants	were	recruited	through	
online	sources	(20),	forums	mainly	for	the	discussion	of	drug	use	and	harm	
reduction,	but	also	sometimes	policy.	Participants	recruited	through	these	means	
are	likely	to	have	more	knowledge	around	drugs	or	be	more	concerned	with	safety	
than	the	general	population	of	drug	users	(Chiauzzi,	DasMahapatra,	Lobo	&	Barratt,	
2013).	This	was	reflected	in	how	some	participants	spoke	about	developments	in	
drug	research,	the	frequency	with	which	harm	reduction	practices	were	brought	up	
and	the	strength	of	participants’	views	regarding	the	illegality	of	drug	use.	Though	
still,	this	was	not	the	case	for	all	participants.	This	is	mentioned	not	to	question	the	
validity	of	their	experiences,	which	I	am	extremely	appreciative	of	and	have	
illuminated	this	topic,	but	to	highlight	how	the	recruitment	strategies	employed	may	
have	led	to	a	particular	kind	of	sample.		
To	garner	a	more	demographically	diverse	sample,	face	to	face	recruitment,	
such	as	outside	or	inside	nightlife	venues,	with	financial	incentives	may	have	been	a	
viable,	additional	strategy.	The	targeting	of	different	geographical	locations	has	also	
been	found	to	produce	participants	more	varied	in	terms	of	their	class	and	sexuality	
(Duff,	2005).	However,	this	was	a	‘hidden’	(Duff,	2005)	population	group	in	terms	of	
the	small	sample	size	and	reluctance	to	discuss	illegal	activities	so	could	be	
considered	particularly	hard	to	access.		
	
3.6	Ethical	considerations	
	
The	research	followed	the	ethical	guidelines	set	out	by	the	British	Psychological	
Society	(“Code	of	Ethics	and	Conduct,”	2009)	and	the	London	South	Bank	University	
(LSBU)	Code	of	Practice.	It	was	approved	by	the	LSBU	Ethics	Committee	before	any	
data	collection	took	place.	The	major	ethical	issues	that	were	raised	by	the	project,	
and	how	they	have	been	addressed,	are	outlined	in	detail	below.	
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3.6.1	Confidentiality	
	
Due	to	the	sensitive	nature	of	the	research,	particular	care	was	taken	to	retain	
confidentiality.	The	steps	taken	to	protect	anonymity	were	outlined	in	detail	to	
participants	informally	over	email	and	website	message	systems	and	formally	
through	the	Participant	Information	Sheets	(Appendices	Three	and	Four)	and	at	the	
beginning	of	the	interview.	All	interview	recordings	were	stored	on	my	private,	
personal	laptop,	which	is	password	protected,	and	transcribed	into	password	
protected	word	files.	Any	physical	materials	produced	through	the	couple	
interviews,	such	as	demographic	sheets	and	relationship	timelines,	were	stored	in	a	
locked	filing	cabinet	at	LSBU.		
	 Confidentiality	was	further	ensured	by	me	alone	having	access	to	
participants’	real	names	and	contact	details.	All	identifying	information	(including	
names	of	people	and	places)	was	changed,	with	pseudonyms	assigned	by	me	at	the	
data	transcription	stage.	A	participant’s	real	name	was	also	not	linked	to	their	data	in	
any	way,	with	each	interview	or	diary	assigned	a	successive	participant	number.	
Again,	only	I	listened	to	the	interview	recordings,	with	just	the	two	project	
supervisors	having	access	to	the	full,	altered	interview	transcripts	and	diaries.	No	
details	were	passed	onto	third	parties,	like	the	police,	and	participants	were	aware	
of	this.	The	limitations	of	maintaining	confidentiality	were	also	communicated,	while	
simultaneously	reinforcing	the	seriousness	of	breaking	confidentiality:	it	is	
something	only	to	be	undertaken	in	exceptional	circumstances.	For	example,	a	
serious	concern	about	the	risk	of	significant,	physical	harm	to	the	participant	or	
someone	else.	In	the	event	of	a	need	to	break	confidentiality,	participants	would	
have	been	informed	of	this,	unless	the	urgency	or	circumstances	of	a	situation	had	
made	this	untenable.	In	actuality,	there	was	nothing	that	any	of	the	participants	said	
that	suggested	breaking	confidentiality	might	be	the	appropriate	course	of	action.	
	
3.6.2	Informed	consent		
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Securing	informed	consent	was	a	fundamental	part	of	the	recruitment	and	data	
gathering	process.	The	majority	of	participants	were	recruited	via	online	
advertisements;	autonomously	volunteering	to	be	part	of	the	research.	This,	
combined	with	the	lack	of	any	financial	incentive	to	participate,	could	be	seen	to	
help	ensure	free,	informed	consent.	The	voluntary	nature	of	participation	was	
emphasised,	particularly	for	participants	recruited	through	word-of-mouth,	lest	they	
feel	any	kind	of	personal	obligation	to	take	part.	All	participants	were	also	told	they	
could	withdraw	at	any	time	(which	was	restated	at	interview).	This	was	especially	
reinforced	in	the	diary	study,	since	completing	the	diary	was	tied	to	use	of	MDMA	in	
the	future.	In	order	to	avoid	compelling	future	illicit	drug	use	three	measures	in	
particular	were	used.	Firstly,	participants	were	asked	to	complete	the	diary	when	
they	‘next	happen[ed]	to	be	taking	MDMA	with	your	partner’	so	as	not	to	encourage	
participants	to	take	MDMA	solely	for	the	purposes	of	the	study.	Secondly,	in	my	first	
contact	with	a	potential	participant	after	they	had	initially	expressed	interest,	there	
was	no	presumption	of	participation	e.g.	‘If	you	decide	to	take	part,	let	me	know	-	I	
will	send	you	the	diary	guideline	and	we	can	go	from	there.’	Finally,	when	they	had	
agreed	to	take	part,	it	was	made	clear	that	such	an	agreement	did	not	obligate	them	
to	actually	complete	the	diary.		
	 Each	participant	was	also	fully	informed	about	the	purpose	and	nature	of	the	
research.	This	was	communicated	informally	via	email,	where	participants	were	
given	study	details	and	invited	to	ask	questions,	and	in	the	Participant	Information	
Sheets	(Appendices	Three	and	Four)	and	Consent	Form	(Appendix	Five)	which	were	
sent	after	initial	expression	of	interest.	The	Information	Sheets	allowed	potential	
participants	to	consider	more	closely	what	involvement	would	mean	and	get	back	in	
touch	if	they	wished	to	take	part.	The	absence	of	a	stipulated	time	limit	meant	they	
could	reflect	over	the	decision	at	will.	The	Consent	Form	contained	details	of	
conditions	under	which	a	break	in	confidentiality	would	be	deemed	permissible,	
which	it	was	felt	important	to	provide	participants	with	at	an	early	stage.	Official	
consent	was	obtained	through	signing	the	Consent	Form,	prior	to	any	data	
collection.	At	the	beginning	of	the	interviews	and	via	email	before	the	diaries,	
informed	consent	was	further	ensured	by	repeating	several	key	points:	they	could	
withdraw	participation	at	any	time	(even	if	post-interview	or	diary	writing,	their	data	
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would	still	be	removed	if	requested	before	the	write-up	stage),	the	whole	interview	
would	be	recorded	and	they	didn’t	have	to	answer	any	questions	they	didn’t	want	
to.		
	
3.6.3	Interviews	
	
The	time	and	location	of	interviews	was	purposely	kept	flexible	in	order	to	make	the	
research	process	as	convenient	as	possible.	Interviews	were	conducted	at	all	time	
periods:	in	the	evenings,	during	weekdays	and	at	weekends,	whatever	suited	their	
schedule.	Due	to	the	dispersed	locale	of	participants,	Skype	interviews	were	
presented	as	an	option.	Both	the	individual	diary	interviews	and	three	of	the	couple	
interviews	were	carried	out	in	this	way;	with	all	participants	at	home	at	the	time	of	
the	interview.	For	the	face-to-face	interviews,	a	number	of	different	locations	were	
suggested,	such	as	a	private	room	at	LSBU,	the	participant’s	home	or	another	
convenient	location.	Only	one	couple	chose	to	be	interviewed	at	LSBU,	two	couples	
were	interviewed	in	private,	rented	spaces	and	four	couples	selected	their	home	as	
the	place	of	interview.		
Qualitative	research	is	known	for	its	flexible	approach	to	data	collection:	
often	going	where	participants	feel	most	at	ease.	The	comfort	level	of	participants,	
important	in	any	study,	was	considered	particularly	crucial	for	this	research	project	
due	to	the	illegality	and	personal	nature	of	the	issues	under	discussion.	It	was	
important	that	passersby	could	not	overhear	the	interviews,	since	this	might	inhibit	
participant	disclosure	or,	more	seriously,	potentially	compromise	participants’	
professional	and	personal	lives.	Hence	public	spaces	like	cafes,	sometimes	used	for	
qualitative	interviews	(Herzog,	2005),	were	not	provided	as	an	option	here.	While	a	
private	space	was	available	at	LSBU,	this	was	not	always	suitable	due	to	the	
geographical	dispersal	of	the	sample.	In	these	instances,	the	research	grant	provided	
by	LSBU	was	vital	to	securing	private	meeting	spaces	in	which	two	of	the	interviews	
took	place:	one	due	to	concerns	around	the	proximity	of	the	couples’	home	to	other	
significant	places	in	their	lives	and	one	because	the	couple	preferred	meeting	me	
outside	of	their	home,	since	we	had	never	met	before.		
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My	personal	safety	was	also	catered	to	when	conducting	interviews.	
Whenever	I	went	to	an	interview,	a	friend	was	informed	of	my	whereabouts	and	
given	a	time	by	which	I	was	to	contact	them.	No	issues	were	experienced	in	this	
regard.	
	
3.6.4	Participant	protection	
	
Care	was	taken	to	ensure	participants	were	not	exposed	to	risks	to	their	
psychological	or	physical	well-being	and	health.	Participants	were	made	aware	that	
interviews	would	explore	their	relationship	more	broadly,	as	well	as	MDMA	
experiences,	to	ensure	they	would	be	comfortable	with	this.	Due	to	the	sensitivity	of	
experiences	being	discussed,	it	was	thought	participants	might	experience	
discomfort	or	perhaps	even	distress.	To	minimise	this	risk,	several	measures	were	
put	in	place.	Individuals	were	fully	informed	about	what	the	research	would	involve	
before	they	took	part	(the	Information	Sheets	details	the	study	in	full	and	can	be	
found	in	Appendices	Three	and	Four).	It	was	also	communicated	that	participants	do	
not	have	to	answer	any	questions	they	would	prefer	not	to	and	consent	was	
explicitly	sought	in	the	interview	to	discupss	particularly	sensitive	topics,	for	
example,	sex.	Furthermore,	in	the	debriefing,	it	was	made	clear	that	participants	
were	welcome	to	contact	the	researcher	with	questions	or	any	issues	that	might	
later	come	up.	As	events	transpired,	one	participant	did	become	visibly	distressed,	at	
one	point	on	the	verge	of	tears,	and	the	offer	was	made	to	pause	the	interview	but	
they	decided	to	carry	on.	Another	couple	also	showed	signs	of	distress	as	they	
delved	into	painful	past	memories.	In	this	context,	their	freedom	to	not	answer	
questions,	or	to	leave	out	any	details	they	wanted	to,	was	re-iterated.	Both	of	these	
experiences	show	the	importance	of	considering	how	best	to	protect	participants,	
physically	and	emotionally,	during	their	research	participation,	and	to	be	mindful	of	
visible	and	less	obvious	signs	of	distress	or	discomfort.	
In	addition,	as	already	detailed,	pressure	was	not	put	on	participants	to	
engage	in	potentially	harmful,	illicit	activities.	To	this	effect,	no	direct	financial	
compensation	was	offered,	lest	this	provided	an	incentive	for	this	behaviour.	Instead	
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individuals	were	not	left	‘worse	off’	for	their	participation	in	the	study:	refreshments	
and	travel	expenses	were	provided,	although	none	of	the	participants	chose	to	
accept	the	latter	offer.	
	
3.7	Analysing	the	data	thematically	
	
Thematic	analysis	was	decided	upon	as	the	analytical	approach	for	this	work,	
employing	Braun	and	Clarke’s	(2006)	guidelines,	bearing	much	similarity	to	‘thematic	
decomposition’	(see	Stenner,	1993;	Bower	et	al.,	2002).	It	has	been	described	as	a	
rarely	acknowledged	but	often	used	method	of	qualitatively	analysing	data	(Boyatzis,	
1998;	Roulston,	2001).	In	fact,	even	claimed	to	be	a	foundational	method	in	some	
sense	since	searching	for	‘thematizing	meanings’	(Holloway	&	Todres,	2003,	p347)	is	
one	of	the	few	commonalities	across	many	qualitative	analytthical	methods.	The	
research’s	focus	on	specific,	concrete	experiences	and	the	material	aspects	–	bodies,	
spaces	and	objects	–	that	coalesce	to	produce	them,	as	discussed	previously,	
discounted	narrative	and	interpretative	phenomenological	analysis	(IPA)	and	
discourse	analysis.	
	 Both	narrative	and	discourse	analysis	have	been	criticised	for	reducing	all	
human	experience	to	the	discursive	or	‘text’	(Nightingale	&	Cromby,	2002).	The	
materiality	of	the	world	‘out	there’	is	ignored	or	denied	in	favour	of	how	it	is	
constructed	through	our	talk	(Gergen,	1994;	1999).	The	process-relational	ontology	
at	the	heart	of	this	research	recognises	the	discursive	as	one	among	many,	
interlocking	strands	of	experience,	but	also	pays	heed	to	the	material	world	within	
which	we	live	(Stenner,	2008);	an	aspect	narrative	and	discourse	analysis	do	not	
expressly	cater	to.	Furthermore,	narrative	analysis	focusses	on	how	people	make	
meaning	from	the	stories	they	tell	about	their	life,	or	a	particular	topic	such	as	illness	
(Riessman,	2003)	or	gender	and	sexuality	(Mair,	2010),	as	well	as	the	fallout	from	
when	these	stories	cannot	be	reconciled	or	resolved.	However,	this	does	not	lend	
itself	to	a	focus	on	extra-discursive	elements	to	experience,	such	as	embodiment	and	
materiality	which	have	been	emphasised	within	deep	empiricism	(Stenner,	2008;	
Stenner,	Bhatti	&	Church,	2012).	Furthermore,	this	lends	itself	more	to	a	general	
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account	of	experience,	rather	than	the	focus	on	specific	experiences	this	research	
hoped	to	generate.	IPA,	while	it	has	been	used	to	consider	embodied	experience	
(Eshtehardi,	2014;	Larkin,	Eatough	&	Osborn,	2011),	again	pays	little	attention	to	the	
spaces	and	objects	that	co-produce	our	experience.	It	could	also	be	considered	quite	
a	rigid	form	of	analysis:	tied	to	a	particular	theoretical	orientation	(a	hermeneutic,	
phenomenological	account	of	experience)	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006)	and	purely	‘data-
driven’,	not	allowing	for	theoretical	concerns	to	guide	coding	of	the	data.	
	 In	contrast,	thematic	analysis	has	an	inbuilt	flexibility	regarding	
epistemological	and	ontological	position,	for	example,	it	can	be	conducted	from	
either	a	constructionist	or	a	realist	perspective	and	can	either	be	data-	or	theory-
driven.	The	flexible	approach	of	thematic	analysis	is	well	suited	to	accommodating	
the	theoretical	positioning	of	the	data	e.g.	the	analysis	of	materially-situated	
experiences	within	a	process-relational	ontology,	which,	to	recap,	views	the	world	as	
constituted	through	interrelated	processes	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	
	
3.7.1	Making	analytical	decisions	
	
Braun	and	Clarke’s	(2006)	understanding	of	thematic	analysis	was	drawn	on.	
Thematic	analysis	is	described	as	involving	the	search	for	themes	or	patterns	within	
the	data	and	the	authors	outline	a	systematic	process	to	enable	this	search.	
Furthermore,	a	theme	not	only	‘represents	some	level	of	patterned	response	or	
meaning	within	the	data	set’	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006,	p82),	but	is	also	concerned	with	
more	than	prevalence,	‘captur[ing]	something	important	about	the	data	in	relation	
to	the	research	question’	(p82).	There	are	multiple	choices	to	be	made	before	
conducting	the	analysis.	Firstly,	the	focus	of	the	analytical	coding	must	be	
considered:	either	providing	a	rich	description	of	the	entire	data	set	or	an	in-depth	
account	of	one	particular	aspect.	Secondly,	the	coding	performed	can	be	inductive	
and	data-driven	or	deductive	and	theory-driven.	Thirdly,	semantic	meanings	can	be	
searched	for	in	the	data,	that	do	not	go	beyond	explicit	or	surface	meanings	of	what	
participants	have	said.	Alternatively,	latent	meanings	may	be	looked	for,	which	go	
beyond	what	is	explicitly	said	to	what	is	inferred	or	implied;	in	other	words,	what	
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underpins	the	semantic	content	of	the	data.	Finally,	an	epistemological	choice	must	
be	made.	On	the	one	hand,	realist/essentialist	ideas	see	language	as	simply	
reflecting	an	external	reality,	and	thus	people’s	experiences	as	straightforwardly	
related	to	the	data.	On	the	other	hand,	a	constructionist	approach	considers	reality	
as	socio-culturally	situated	and	constructed	through	language,	with	the	data	a	socio-
cultural,	contextual	product.	The	first	series	of	alternatives	tend	to	be	found	
together	–	descriptive	of	the	entire	data	set,	inductive,	semantic	and	realist	–	as	do	
the	second	series	–	focussed	on	one	aspect	of	the	data	set,	deductive,	latent	and	
constructionist	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006);	the	former	often	resembling	IPA	(e.g.	Smith,	
Flowers	&	Larkin,	2009)	and	grounded	theory	approaches	(e.g.	Charmaz,	2011)	and	
the	latter	bearing	likeness	to	discourse	and	narrative	analysis	(e.g.	Wetherell,	Taylor	
&	Yates,	2001;	Mair,	2010).		
While	this	research	is	more	closely	aligned	with	the	second	series	of	
theoretical	choices	Braun	and	Clarke	(2006)	outline,	it	does	not	do	so	
straightforwardly.	The	research	was	conducted	from	a	critical	realist	perspective,	
which	could	be	seen	to	straddle	the	realist/relativist	boundary,	since	it	acknowledges	
l)	(Willig,	1999;	Burr,	1995).	Indeed,	the	process-relational	ontology	that	informed	
this	research	embraces	a	paradoxical	way	of	thinking	that	questions	the	binary	
choice	of	realism	versus	relativism.	Rather	than	viewing	such	opposites	as	separate	
and	contradictory,	process-relational	thought	understands	them	as	part	of	a	unified,	
interdependent	process	(Mesle,	2008).	This	also	translated	to	the	coding	process,	
which	attempted	to	span	the	divisions	set	up	by	Braun	and	Clarke	(2006),	though,	as	
previously	said,	could	be	characterised	as	falling	more	on	the	latter	‘side’	of	the	
debate:	whole	data	set	vs.	specific	focus;	inductive	vs.	deductive;	semantic	vs.	latent;	
realist	vs.	constructionist.	The	coding	was	performed	with	a	specific	focus	in	mind,	
namely	how	couples	experienced	(or	didn’t	experience)	closeness.	Other	aspects	of	
the	data	set	were	still	coded,	however,	in	recognition	that	a	researcher	cannot	
always,	particularly	from	the	outset	of	analysis,	identify	every	relevant	piece	of	data	
for	a	distinct	focus.	The	distinction	between	inductive	and	theoretical	analysis	was	
not	considered	as	sharp	as	Braun	and	Clarke	(2006)	presented	it	to	be:	theoretical	
concerns	informed	coding	as	well	as	codes	being	produced	from	immersion	within	
and	close	study	of	the	data	that	were	not	affiliated	with	any	particular	theoretical	
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position.	However,	throughout	the	analytic	process,	research	and	theoretical	
literature	was	sought,	reviewed	and	applied	to	the	data;	therefore	theoretical	
concerns	can	be	viewed	as	key	to	the	meanings	garnered.	This	meant	that	latent	
meanings	were	looked	for	within	the	data;	how	comments	revealed	underlying	
assumptions	and	conceptualisations	that	participants	held.	Thematic	analysts	tend	
to	work	‘primarily’	at	one	level	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006),	which	might	be	considered	in	
this	case	to	be	the	latent	level,	though,	again,	content	was	also	coded	semantically	
for	the	explicit,	surface	meaning	of	comments.	Some	of	these	semantic	codes	were	
only	interpreted	later,	either	in	the	co-ordination	of	initial	or	superordinate	themes	
or	in	the	write-up	process	itself.		
	 Lastly,	the	analysis	was	performed	within	a	process-relational	framework,	
which	can	be	considered	broadly	constructionist	(Stenner,	2008).	Accounts	or	
meanings	individuals	present	are	viewed	as	being	positioned	from	a	certain	context,	
namely	the	particular	way	they	have	engaged	with	the	social,	cultural	or	economic	
conditions	they	are	in,	and	thus	not	seen	as	expressing	a	definitive	‘truth’	(Burr,	
1995).	In	contrast	to	most	constructionist	positions,	however,	which	advance	the	
primacy	of	language	and	discourse,	a	process-relational	approach	views	our	
experience	as	made	up	of	interlinking	processes,	which	encompass	the	discursive	as	
well	as	the	material	and	the	emotional	(Stenner,	Church	&	Bhatti,	2012).	This	
concern	with	materiality	and	emotion	reflects	two	recent	academic	developments:	
the	‘material	turn’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015;	Latour,	1996,	2005;	McGrath,	2012;	
Serres,	1995;	Stenner,	2008),	which	acknowledges	how	our	experience	is	grounded	
in	the	material	structures	of	the	world,	and	the	‘turn	to	affect’	(Clough	&	Halley,	
2007;	Cromby,	2007,	2012;	Wetherell,	2013,	2015),	that	seeks	to	highlight	the	vital	
role	of	feeling	in	human	life.	The	practical	application	of	these	conceptual	shifts	
involved	more	than	paying	attention	to	what	participants	were	doing	with	their	
language,	but	also	traversing	the	material	context	of	and	the	emotional	
undercurrent	to	their	experience.	The	ways	in	which	these	theoretical	concerns	
shaped	the	process	of	analysis	will	now	be	explored.	
	 Firstly,	influential	to	my	understanding	of	material	and	spatial	settings	is	the	
material	turn	within	critical	social	psychology,	including	scholars	such	as	Steve	
Brown,	Paula	Reavey,	Laura	McGrath,	Bruno	Latour	and	Michel	Serres.	For	example,	
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Brown	and	Reavey’s	(2015)	work	around	memory	and	spatial	affordances	in	dialogue	
with	Kurt	Lewin’s	(1936)	concept	of	‘life-space’	proved	particularly	fruitful.	Using	this	
approach	involved	considering	all	connections	relevant	to	any	given	experience	
participants	described,	no	matter	how	temporally	or	spatially	distant	e.g.	how	
imagined	futures	or	memories	of	the	past	were	‘folded	into’	that	present	moment.	
Furthermore,	the	intensive	connections	between	human	and	non-human	bodies,	
such	as	a	bathtub	or	cushions,	were	explored	and	how	material	arrangements	
afforded	particular	possibilities	for	action	e.g.	a	clean,	tidy	flat	afforded	new	
possibilities	for	movement	and	dance.	McGrath’s	(2012)	integration	of	Latour’s	
(1996,	2005)	and	Serres’	(1995)	understanding	of	objects	was	also	a	crucial	element.	
Latour’s	(1996,	2005)	actor-network	theory	sees	human	and	non-human	actors	as	
capable	of	mediating	our	experiences,	however	rather	than	assign	full-blown	agency	
to	objects,	which	might	be	seen	to	ignore	the	crucial	distinction	between	humans	
and	objects	(Stenner,	2008),	the	relationship	between	them	was	viewed	more	as	one	
of	stabilisation	and	co-production,	in	line	with	Serres	(1995).	A	complementary	
approach	advocated	for	by	McGrath	(2012).	Using	this	approach	involved	identifying	
the	relevant	human	and	non-human	actors	of	a	described	scenario,	these	could	be	
inanimate	objects	like	baths	or	hula	hoops	or	animals.	Following	this,	I	reflected	on	
how	the	experiences	of	my	participants	were	mediated	by	these	actors.	When	
thinking	about	non-human	actors	in	particular,	I	referred	to	Latour’s	description	of	
how	such	entities	can	‘authorise,	allow,	afford,	encourage,	permit,	suggest,	
influence,	block,	render	possible	[and]	forbid’	particular	actions	(Latour,	2005,	p72).	
In	addition,	I	considered	the	ways	in	which	these	objects	could	slow	down	and	
stabilise	(Serres,	1995),	intangible	human	relations	and	the	cultural	meanings	with	
which	such	objects	were	encoded.	Anderson’s	(2009)	work	on	affective	atmospheres	
was	also	useful	when	analysing	the	data.	He	emphasises	the	singularity	and	
ambiguity	of	atmospheres:	at	once	strongly	felt	yet	just	beyond	‘rational	explanation	
and	clear	figuration’	(Anderson,	2009,	p78).	An	atmosphere	seems	to	belong	to	the	
collection	of	human	and	non-human	bodies	it	arises	from	but	also	seems	to	exceed	
them,	producing	something	quasi-independent.	Again,	the	analysis	sought	to	trace	
the	intensive	connections	between	humans	and	non-humans	entities	but	now	
thought	was	also	given	to	the	atmosphere	that	emanated	from	these	interweaving	
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elements	and	how	this	is	informed	by	cultural	stories,	such	as	water	as	a	place	of	
transformation	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).		
	 Secondly,	our	feelings	and	emotions	are	key	to	how	we	affect	and	are	
affected	by	our	world	and	Burkitt’s	(2014)	relational	approach	was	instrumental	in	
translating	this	into	the	analytical	process.	He	argues	that	emotions	do	not	exist	
‘inside’	of	us	but	emerge	from	‘patterns	of	relationship	between	self	and	others,	
between	self	and	world’	(Burkitt,	2014,	p2,	italics	in	original).	In	turn,	we	also	feel	
these	relational	webs	within	which	we	are	enmeshed.	Since	our	world	is	made	up	of	
interconnected	processes,	we	cannot	disentangle	emotion	from	this	relational	web,	
rather	it	is	always	deeply	contextualised	in:	the	situation	it	emerges	in,	personal	
biography	and	socio-cultural	conditions	(Burkitt,	2014).	These	different	elements	
were	used	as	filters	to	colour	my	thoughts	when	analysing	the	data.	First,	care	was	
paid	to	the	situational	context	of	the	described	emotion,	this	included	the	material-
spatial	surroundings	and	the	social	environment,	since	experiences	can	never	be	
abstracted	from	their	socio-material	contexts	(Stenner,	Bhatti	&	Church,	2012).	
Then,	how	the	expressed	emotion	could	be	seen	as	a	continuation	of	personal	and	
relational	history	was	considered	before	paying	heed	to	our	socio-cultural	
constructions	of	that	emotion,	for	example	modern	conceptualisations	of	love	as	
‘work’	(Eldén,	2011).	Finally,	the	felt	nature	of	emotion	was	honed	in	on;	how	these	
feelings	were	experienced	on	a	bodily	level.	Stenner’s	(2013)	work,	argued	to	share	
the	same	dual	focus	of	emotion	as	a	social	location	and	an	individual	experience,	
was	also	instrumental	in	the	analysis.	The	‘triangular	structure	of	relations’	(Stenner,	
2013,	p1)	necessary	for	jealousy	between	an	object,	subject	and	rival	was	noted	and	
consideration	was	paid	to	the	role	‘the	third’	played	e.g.	whether	it	silently	
mediated,	disrupted	or	reinvigorated	the	couple	system.	Each	theoretical	concern	
discussed	here	was	therefore	applied	to	and	shaped	the	course	of	the	analysis:	
Brown	and	Reavey’s	(2015)	consideration	of	people	and	aspects	of	the	material	
world	which	may	be	temporally	and	spatially	distant	from	the	present	situation,	
Latour’s	(1996,	2005)	focus	on	how	objects	could	‘encourage’	and	‘block’	particular	
actions,	Anderson’s	(2009)	understanding	of	atmospheres	emanating	from	
collections	of	(human	and	non-human)	bodies	and	Burkitt’s	(2014)	and	Stenner’s	
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(2013)	framing	of	emotion	as	arising	relationally	and	therefore	deeply	embedded	in	
social	context.		
	
3.6.2	Step-by-step	process	
	
The	interviews	were	transcribed	into	separate	Word	files	and	the	diaries	were	all	
received	digitally	as	Word	files.	Coding	was	initially	performed	in	Word,	using	the	
‘review	>	comments’	feature,	with	each	code	successively	numbered	and	entered	
into	an	Excel	spreadsheet.	Within	Excel,	the	codes	were	clustered	into	a	set	of	initial	
themes.	These	initial	themes	were	then	drawn	out	into	a	mind-map	format	and	
compared	across	the	whole	data	set,	producing	superordinate,	encompassing	
themes.	Once	this	was	completed,	data	extracts	were	collated	for	each	
superordinate	theme	and	again	entered	into	Excel.		
The	six	steps	described	by	Braun	and	Clarke	(2006)	in	relation	to	thematic	
analysis	were	used	as	a	guide.	Since	thematic	analysis	is	rarely	explicitly	
acknowledged,	it	has	tended	to	not	follow	a	thorough,	methodical	process	as	other	
methods	have.	The	systematised	approach	outlined	by	Braun	and	Clarke	were	
therefore	used	to	lend	rigor	to	the	analysis.	Immersion	in	the	data	is	a	primary	
principle	of	qualitative	research	(Pope,	Ziebland	&	Mays,	2000).	It	began	here	with	
independently	transcribing	each	interview	(Riessman,	1993).	Transcription	was	
verbatim,	while	it	did	not	follow	the	strict	conventions	of	approaches	like	
conversation	analysis,	additional	details	were	included	to	aid	contextualisation	and	
understanding	of	what	participants	said.	For	example,	non-verbal	information	like	
laughter,	pauses	(longer	than	three	seconds),	alterations	in	tone	and	pitch	or	
significant	emphasis	on	particular	words	were	noted.	The	recordings	were	then	
played	all	the	way	through	and	the	transcripts	checked	against	them.		
After	the	transcription	process,	I	further	immersed	myself	in	the	data	by	re-
reading	and	making	notes	on	the	transcripts.	Instead	of	coding	the	entire	data	set,	
coding	was	performed	within	a	specific	frame:	I	was	searching	for	how	participants	
made	sense	of	and	constructed	closeness	within	their	relationship	and	MDMA	
experiences.	Initial	ideas	were	discussed	with	the	supervisory	team	and	relevant	
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literature	investigated.	This	literature	then	helped	informed	the	second	stage	of	
analysis,	identifying	codes	for	the	data.	A	code	represents	the	most	basic	element	of	
the	data	that	is	interesting	to	the	analyst	in	some	way	(Boyatzis,	1998).	What	was	
‘interesting’	about	the	data	was	inductive	in	that	it	was	firmly	grounded	in	the	data	
yet	theoretical	in	the	way	it	drew	on	literature	identified	in	the	first	stage,	such	as	
Sloterdijk’s	(1999,	cited	in	Klauser,	2010)	concept	of	the	‘bubble’	and	Ben	Anderson’s	
(2008)	understanding	of	‘affective	atmospheres’,	as	well	as	the	general	theoretical	
concerns	outlined	earlier:	a	focus	on	feelings	and	the	material	world.	Different	
categories	of	codes	included	but	were	not	limited	to	how	partners	conceptualised	
their	relationship,	‘separate	lives’	vs.	‘intertwined	lives’,	‘relationship	as	inevitable’;	
how	couples	managed	their	emotions	together,	‘open	and	understanding	
communication’,	‘deeper	connection,	more	than	love’,	‘felt	understanding’;	the	role	
of	spaces	and	objects,	‘ritual	preparation	of	space’,	‘objects	enriching	experience’,	
‘physical	world	mirroring	internal	world’;	the	ways	MDMA	was	variously	perceived,	
as:	‘relationship	aid’,	‘therapy’,	‘fun	shared	experiences’,	‘foundational	to	the	
relationship’	vs.	‘not	foundational	to	the	relationship’	and	understanding	of	the	self	
and	how	this	shifted	over	the	course	of	the	relationship	and	MDMA	use,	‘authentic	
self’	vs.	‘inauthentic	self’,	‘emotional	sense	of	self’,	‘changes	to	the	self’,	‘best	
possible	self’.		
The	next	and	third	stage	of	analysis	involved	searching	for	themes	from	the	
codes	collected.	Coding	was	performed	for	each	interview	transcript	or	diary	
separately	to	retain	the	distinctness	of	the	experiences	and	allow	for	couples’	
constructions	of	closeness	on	MDMA	to	be	linked	to	their	constructions	of	closeness	
within	their	relationship	in	everyday	life.	For	each	interview	transcript	or	diary,	codes	
were	clustered	into	potential	themes.	These	were	tampered	with	and	re-worked,	
eliminating	repetitive	codes,	for	instance,	before	data	extracts	corresponding	to	all	
the	codes	for	a	particular	theme	were	collated.	Each	theme	was	then	named	
appropriately,	according	to	the	codes	within	it.	Thematic	maps	of	the	data	were	
drawn	by	hand	for	each	interview	or	diary,	providing	a	sense	of	how	the	themes	
were	interrelated	and	which	ones	were	sub-themes	of	another,	main	theme	(see	
Appendix	Eight	for	an	example).	The	thematic	maps	for	each	interview	or	diary	were	
then	compared	and	contrasted.	This	allowed	me	to	draw	a	thematic	map	which	
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covered	the	most	prevalent	or	pertinent	themes	for	the	whole	data	set.	This	was	
redrafted	several	times	and	compared	to	the	collection	of	individual	thematic	maps	
to	check	for	accuracy	of	representation.		
Next,	the	fourth	analytical	stage	reviewed	and	finalised	themes.	The	collated	
extracts	for	each	theme	were	read	together	to	check	for	intra-theme	cohesiveness:	
sometimes	the	data	extract(s)	did	not	fit	with	the	overall	theme	and	was	removed	to	
form	a	new	theme	or	there	was	simply	too	much	diversity	within	the	data	extracts	to	
cluster	them	as	a	theme.	A	revised	thematic	map	was	drawn	at	the	culmination	of	
this	process.	The	whole	data	set	was	then	re-read	to	explore	whether	the	themes	
decided	upon	were	a	‘good	fit’	for	the	data	set	as	a	whole.	This	step	is	considered	
particularly	important	as	with	any	form	of	analysis	that	seeks	to	interpret	data,	there	
is	a	danger	of	abstracting	too	far	away	from	the	data	itself	–	the	intuitive	link	
between	data	and	analysis	then	lost.	The	fifth	stage	was	to	describe	each	theme	and	
consider	the	overall	story	that	I	was	making	from	the	data.	Literature	was	again	
sought	to	help	make	sense	of	the	narrative,	for	sub-themes	like	attunement	(from	
the	superordinate	‘Inside	the	bubble’	theme)	and	playful	space	(from	the	
superordinate	theme	‘Shifting	boundaries,	(un)moving	bodies’).	The	final	stage	
involved	selecting	the	quotes	that	would	represent	the	themes	the	best:	either	
because	they	were	striking,	‘I	want	to	love	you	even	more,	let’s	take	MDMA’,	an	
interesting	turn	of	phrase	perhaps,	like	‘never	drop	without	your	significant	other	
cause	that	way	lies	ruin’	or	embodied	the	commonality	of	what	participants	had	
said.		
While	this	is	presented	as	a	step-by-step	analytical	process,	it	wasn’t	always	
performed	so	rigidly.	There	was	movement	between	stages,	for	instance	reading	the	
collated	extracts	of	a	theme	might	prompt	a	memory	of	a	similar	comment	in	a	
previously	analysed	interview	or	diary,	which	was	then	coded	for.	Or	a	code	could	
inspire	investigation	of	a	theoretical	connection	–	participants	spoke	of	feeling	rather	
than	knowing	a	concept,	which	was	linked	with	Shotter’s	(1993)	‘knowing	of	the	
third	kind’.	In	addition,	describing	the	story	of	each	theme	and	how	the	overall	story	
might	piece	together	was	not	left	to	the	final	stages	but	mentally	considered	and	
worked	up	in	notes	throughout.		
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	 Early	in	the	analysis	I	became	interested	in	how	movement	on	MDMA	was	
intertwined	with	the	way	couples	were	feeling.	This	interest	prompted	discussion	of	
Sloterdijk’s	‘theory	of	spheres’	in	a	supervisory	meeting:	as	we	move	through	life,	
Sloterdijk	argues,	we	move	through	‘spheres’	of	‘intimate’	and	‘enclosed’	spaces;	the	
product	of	‘joint	inhabiting’	(1999,	p1011,	cited	in	Klauser,	2010).	Sloterdijk	uses	the	
metaphor	of	a	‘bubble’	to	refer	to	the	most	intimate	spaces	of	human	togetherness	
and	this	became	the	‘emotional	bubble’	of	the	first	theme.	Much	further	along	in	the	
analytical	process,	when	revising	the	final	thematic	map,	it	became	clear	how	
inhabiting	spheres,	of	space	and	of	emotion,	underpinned	all	three	superordinate	
themes:	the	second	theme	focussed	on	atmospheric	spheres	that	were	related	to	
movement	in	some	way	and	the	third	on	the	protective	boundaries	of	these	spaces.	
Thus,	the	final	superordinate	themes	were:	
	
1. Inside	the	bubble:	An	emotional	safe	haven	
Discusses	the	distinct	emotional	pattern	of	MDMA,	and	how	this	is	shaped	by	and	
shapes	couples’	everyday	interactional	dynamic.	In	particular,	the	grounding	of	these	
experiences	in	gender	relations	and	the	disclosing	model	of	intimacy	is	explored.	
	
2. Shifting	boundaries,	(un)moving	bodies	
Explores	how	movement,	spaces	and	objects	coalesce	to	produce	new	subjectivities,	
which	can	fragment	the	limits	of	the	self.	
	
3. ‘Never	drop	without	your	significant	other.	That	way	lies	ruin’:	The	
boundary	work	of	couples	who	use	MDMA	together	
Discusses	the	boundaries	couples	construct	around	their	MDMA	experiences	and	
how	these	impact,	and	often	enhance,	the	intimacies	experienced.		
	
Each	of	these	three	superordinate	themes	underlies	an	analytical	chapter	in	the	
thesis.	Chapter	Four	will	describe	in	detail	the	concept	of	the	emotional	bubble	and	
how	couples’	MDMA	experiences	can	be	framed	by	and	understood	through	it.	
Chapters	Five	and	Six	are	interested	in	how	MDMA	experiences	influence	
boundaries:	of	the	self	in	Chapter	Five	and	of	the	drug	experience	in	Chapter	Six.	
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Both	will	consider	how	the	material	conditions	of	MDMA	use	–	the	spaces,	objects	
and	movement	of	bodies	–	impinge	upon	the	experiences	of	couples	and	what	this	
might	mean	for	our	understanding	of	closeness	on	MDMA.	
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Chapter	Four	–	Inside	the	bubble:	An	emotional	safe	haven	
	
The	German	philosopher,	Peter	Sloterdijk,	morphologises	social	togetherness	in	his	
‘theory	of	spheres’.	As	we	move	through	life,	he	argues,	we	move	through	‘spheres’	
of	‘intimate’	and	‘enclosed’	spaces;	the	product	of	‘joint	inhabiting’	(1999,	p1011,	
cited	in	Klauser,	2010,	p4).	He	invokes	several	spherological	types	in	the	explanation	
of	this	theory,	one	of	which	is	the	‘bubble’	metaphor.	The	bubble	represents	the	
most	intimate	spaces	of	human	togetherness,	‘the	fragile	space	of	resonance	
between	people	as	we	find	it	in	symbiotic	relations’	(1998,	cited	in	Klauser,	2010,	
p4).	The	‘fragile	space	of	resonance’	of	Sloterdijk’s	‘bubble’	provides	an	apt	
metaphorical	lens	through	which	to	see	the	affective	quality	of	couples’	MDMA	
experiences.	Moreover,	the	bubble	draws	attention	both	to	the	separateness	of	the	
affective	atmosphere	within	it	–	MDMA	feels	like	a	safe	haven	for	many	couples	–	as	
well	as	symbolising,	through	its	transculent	exterior,	how	everyday	lives,	histories	
and	cultural	contexts	still	influence	this	space.	
	 The	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter	explores	the	emotional	bubble	that	
couples	described	on	MDMA	and	how	it	augments	possibilities	for	closeness	within	
and	beyond	the	drug	experience.	Since	couples	are	what	they	do	(Gabb	&	Fink,	
2015),	practices	of	closeness	will	be	focussed	on	and	how	they	were	entangled	with	
this	distinct	emotional	dynamic.	Moments	of	attunement	couples	experienced	will	
be	explored	first,	which	involved	sharing	in	and	responding	to	their	partner’s	
emotional	state.	These	moments	will	be	described	as	grounded	in	the	more	
stereotypically	‘positive’	patterns	of	relating	such	as	love,	safety	and	happiness	and	
the	greater	connection	participants	felt	to	their	own	emotions	and	to	the	emotions	
of	others	within	the	bubble.	The	latter	empathic	effect	being	consistently	reported	
by	recreational	users	(Morgan,	Noronha,	Muetzelfeldt,	Feilding	&	Curran,	2013)	and	
under	controlled	conditions	(Hysek	et	al.,	2013;	Schmid	et	al.,	2014).		
	 Secondly,	the	bubble’s	capacity	to	insulate	couples	from	more	‘negative’	
emotional	patterns	like	fear,	anger,	shame	and	worry	while	enhancing	feelings	of	
safety	will	be	highlighted;	again	reflecting	current	experimental	studies	that	have	
shown	MDMA	to	impair	recognition	of	negative	emotionality	while	increasing	the	
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ability	to	pinpoint	positive	emotions	(Hysek,	Domes	&	Liechti,	2012;	Hysek	et	al.,	
2013).	This	emotional	readjustment	is	proposed	to	allow	couples	to	disclose	more	
freely;	in	particular	the	sharing	of	relationship	issues	and	personally	distressing	
memories.	Finally,	entering	this	new	emotional	space	will	be	outlined	as	tied	to	
muting	of	emotion	in	a	slightly	different	way:	the	erasure	of	previous	tensions,	a	
‘clean	slate’	on	which	couples	could	relate	to	each	other	anew.	
	
4.1	‘We’re	just	on…the	exact	same	wavelength’:	Moments	of	emotional	
attunement		
	
The	term	attunement	suggests	multiple	elements	being	tuned	to	a	common	chord,	
like	notes	on	a	piano	(Fuchs,	2013).	While	Fuchs	discusses	this	in	terms	of	the	
alignment	between	self,	body	and	space	that	takes	place	when	we	are	in	a	certain	
mood,	he	is	drawing	on	Heidegger’s	concept	of	mitbefindlichkeit:	people	being	
attuned	with	one	another.	In	the	literature	around	couple	relationships,	attunement	
has	been	described	as	sharing	in	a	partner’s	emotional	experience	and	responding	
sensitively	to	their	emotional	state	(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008).	As	discussed	in	
Chapter	One,	the	literature	frames	attunement	as	a	positive	quality	of	a	relationship	
(Curran,	Hazen,	Jacobvitz	&	Sasaki,	2006;	Gottman,	2011;	Jonathan	&	Knudson-
Martin,	2012),	which	it	either	has	or	does	not	have	but	can	be	worked	towards	
(Jonathan	&	Knudson-Martin,	2012).	However,	this	work	takes	a	different	
perspective.	Seen	through	the	lens	of	a	practices	approach	to	intimacy	(Gabb	&	Fink,	
2015)	set	within	a	process	ontology	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009),	a	relationship	does	not	
exist	within	a	binary	state	of	being	attuned	or	not	attuned	but	is	comprised	of	events	
or	moments	of	attunement.	These	moments	arise	and	fade,	woven	into	the	overall	
patterning	of	practices	which	form	the	fabric	of	the	couple	relationship.		
Two	overlapping	threads	will	be	elaborated	on	in	the	analysis	which	follows.	
Firstly,	couples	seemed	to	experience	moments	of	attunement	on	MDMA,	and,	for	
many,	their	value	was	mediated	by	gendered	ways	of	relating.	Secondly,	these	
experiences	of	attunement	were	produced	through	multiple,	interconnected	layers	
of	experience,	rather	than	only	the	affective	mode	(Stenner,	Church	&	Bhatti,	2012).	
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One	couple	that	spoke	repeatedly	about	such	moments	were	Mark	and	Jenny	–	both	
in	their	30s,	engaged	and	together	8	years.	Jenny	details	how	experiencing	strong,	
positive	feelings	in	tandem	on	MDMA	contributes	to	a	unique	sense	of	closeness:	
	
Mark:	I	mean	it’s	the	greatest	feeling	you	could	imagine.	I	think	that’s	the	
thing	with	it	cos	I	had	never	experienced	that	kind	of	happiness	before...It’s	
completeness,	that’s	what	you	feel		
Jenny:	erm,	and	I	think	it’s	also	just	being	next	to	someone,	knowing	they	are	
feeling	the	same	thing	and	kind	of	knowing	that	you	don’t	need	to	say	
anything…and	that,	like,	we’re	just	experiencing	this	together	and	it’s	just	
kind	of	we’re	existing	in	the	same	space	and	it’s	almost	like	we’re	just	on	the	
feeling	of	being	on	the	exact	same	wavelength	with	another	person,	erm,	is	
just	deeply…feel	really	connected	to	them	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
It	is	the	mutuality	of	‘feeling’,	a	word	she	repeats	several	times,	which	is	at	the	heart	
of	her	description.	Such	empathic	attunement	is	conventionally	understood	as	
bridging	the	emotional	gap	between	people;	a	process	of	‘tuning	into’	another’s	
feelings,	distinct	and	different	from	your	own	(Siegel,	2007).	Yet	in	the	experience	
Jenny	describes,	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	a	process	of	tuning	into	each	other,	her	
and	Mark’s	emotional	experience	already	feels	aligned:	she	believes	they	are	on	‘the	
exact	same	wavelength’	and	‘feeling	the	same	thing’.	The	explanation	of	this	unusual	
way	of	being	could	be	traced	to	the	abundance	of	positive	feelings	which	exist	in	the	
bubble	–	MDMA	produces	‘the	greatest	feeling	you	could	imagine’:	an	organic	
‘happiness’	and	‘completeness’	(Mark).	Indeed,	such	feelings	of	elation	are	
frequently	self-reported	in	studies	of	MDMA	use	(Davison	&	Parrott,	1997;	Harris,	
Baggott,	Mendelson,	Mendelson	&	Jones,	2002;	Klitzman,	2006).	Hence,	the	drug’s	
capacity	to	produce	such	intensely	positive	feelings	might	be	seen	to	provide	a	
guarantee	that	‘they	are	feeling	the	same	thing’	(Jenny).	
	 However,	it	could	be	argued	that	there	is	more	than	the	affective	dynamic	of	
MDMA	at	work	here,	other	experiential	layers	are	woven	into	how	attuned	Jenny	
feels	to	Mark.	She	explains	how	part	of	it	is	‘just	being	next	to	someone’,	‘existing	in	
the	same	space’	and	‘knowing	that	you	don’t	need	to	say	anything’.	Spatial	and	
	115	
conceptual	‘modes	of	order’	(Stenner,	Bhatti	&	Church,	2012,	p9)	could	be	seen	as	
linked	here.	It	is	something	about	the	two	of	them	occupying	the	same	physical	
location	(spatial)	while	imagining	the	futility	of	communicating	verbally	(conceptual)	
that	feeds	into	this	close,	connected	moment.	MDMA	is	often	associated	with	
increased	sociability	and	verbal	expressiveness	(Bedi,	Phan,	Angstadt	&	De	Wit,	
2009;	Hess	&	DeBoer,	2002),	yet	here	it	is	the	capacity	to	dwell	in	silence	together,	
‘you	don’t	need	to	say	anything’	that	is	depicted	as	powerful.	Jenny’s	description	is	
reminiscent	of	one	of	the	ways	people	describe	‘being	there’	for	someone:	physically	
being	alongside	(Brownlie,	2014).	Brownlie	argues	that	emotional	support	has	been	
portrayed	too	narrowly	and	too	overtly	linked	to	‘listening,	talking,	giving	advice,	and	
helping	people	put	their	own	lives	in	perspective’	(Finch,	1989,	p33,	cited	in	
Brownlie,	2014),	and	that	while	the	importance	of	these	practices	is	explicitly	
emphasised,	the	ways	in	we	are	‘there’	for	someone	actually	vary	far	more	in	reality	
(NatCen,	2007).	Brownlie	argues	that	being	alongside	is	another	significant	form	of	
emotional	closeness,	taking	place	in	everyday	activities	such	‘watching	TV	or	going	
for	a	drive’	(p137)	that	often	involve	inhabiting	a	‘knowing	or	acknowledged’	(p138)	
silence.	In	these	everyday	contexts,	attention	is	directed	towards	other	activities	like	
reading	or	driving,	the	silence	is,	in	some	sense,	populated	by	activity.	However,	in	
the	context	of	MDMA,	this	‘knowing	or	acknowledged’	(Brownlie,	2014,	p137)	
silence	takes	place	without	such	practical	mediators.	Rather,	this	silence	stretches	
over	physically	being	with	someone,	‘existing	in	the	same	space’	and	is	interwoven	
with	the	affective	atmosphere	of	MDMA,	to	produce	a	strong	sense	of	connection,	
‘just	deeply…feel	really	connected’.		
Emily	also	talks	about	a	moment	of	‘total	connection’	with	her	husband,	Dan,	
who	she	has	been	with	for	over	twenty	years,	since	they	were	teenagers;	the	couple	
now	have	two	young	children	together:	
	
Emily:	[laughs]	and	almost	every	talk	ends	up	in,	one	of	my	favourite	things	is	
just	sitting	face	to	face	with	him	and	just	putting	my	hand	on	his	chest	to	just	
feel	really,	really	connected…and	just	like	this,	visceral	memory	I	have	so	it’s	
just	a,	a	strong	thing	that	sticks	with	me	
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Interviewer:	mmm.	How	does	that,	can	you	describe	what	that	feels	like	when	
you’re	sat	there	and	you	have	your	hand	on	his	chest?	
[pause]	
Emily:	[laughs]	I	mean	just,	it’s	just	like	a	total	connection,	of	being	
understood	and	feeling	safe	(Couple	interview:	Emily	&	Dan)	
	
A	distinct	affective	space	is	also	described	by	Emily	on	MDMA,	filled	with	positive	
patterns	of	relating	–	connection,	understanding	and	safety	–	and,	just	as	for	Jenny,	
this	is	overlaid	with	the	spatial,	embodied	mode	of	experience.	Feeling	‘really,	really	
connected’	is	wrapped	up	in	where	she	is	in	the	world,	she	is	sitting	‘face	to	face’	to	
Dan	with	‘[her]	hand	on	his	chest’;	almost	as	though	she	is	trying	to	anchor	herself	to	
the	emotional	epicentre	of	Dan’s	being.	Connection	can	seem	ethereal	but	touch	is	
tangible	and,	as	such,	can	seem	like	‘the	most	basic	way	of	connecting	with	another	
human	being’	(Johnson,	2008,	p4).	Touching	Dan’s	chest	could	therefore	physically	
ground	and	inspire	the	‘total	connection’	Emily	feels:	it	is	an	immediate,	materialised	
relatedness.	Furthermore,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	power	of	touch	dwells	in	
its	inescapable	mutuality:	as	soon	as	you	touch	someone,	they	touch	you	back	
(Gabb,	2011)	and	this	reciprocality	might	further	underscore	emotional	connection	
(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015),	explaining	why	it	‘sticks	with’	Emily	in	such	a	strong	way.		
		 Moreover,	the	physical	connection	between	Emily	and	Dan	is	not	only	a	
momentary	bodily	orientation	but	lingers	on	in	a	‘visceral’	bodily	resonance.	
Memory	is	not	only	explicit	but	also	implicit,	situations	and	sensations	experienced	
by	the	body	can	function	as	‘implicit	memory	cores’,	which	in,	certain	situations,	can	
release	their	contents	(Fuchs,	2012,	p9);	perhaps	explaining	the	longevity	of	Emily’s	
‘visceral’	memory.	Therefore,	while	the	moment	of	closeness	and	attunement	is	a	
complex	of	elements:	produced	through	the	heightened	emotional,	and	likely	
sensory	(Gouzoulis-Mayfrank,	Hermle,	Kovar	&	Sass,	1996;	Kolbrich	et	al.,	2008),	
intensity	of	MDMA	coupled	with	bodily	closeness,	touch	and	‘talk’,	the	fact	it	is	
through	her	bodily	experience,	this	‘visceral’	memory,	that	this	moment	‘sticks	with’	
her	could	be	seen	to	reaffirm	the	centrality	of	bodily	feeling	in	making	sense	of	and	
forming	connections	in	our	world	(Johnson,	2008;	Burkitt,	2014).	
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	 The	interconnection	of	a	multitude	of	elements	can	once	again	be	seen	as	
crucial	to	producing	the	attunement	Carrie	describes:	
	
Carrie:	you	can	feel	the	love	that	I	have	for	him	and	I	can	feel	the	love	that	he	
has	for	me…a	complete	feeling	of	both	giving	and	receiving…and	because	uh	
it	feels	like	I	can	feel	what	he	feels…and	it	feels	like	he	can	feel	what	I	feel	so	
that	creates	like,	that	brings	us	closer	because	we	won’t	worry:	are	you	
thinking	of	something	different	or	are	you	hiding	something?		
Interviewer:	how	is	that	love	communicated	between	you?	
Carrie:	uh,	I	think	it’s	communicated	through	like	words.	We’re	good	at	
appreciating	one	another	when	we	are	on	MDMA…	we	always	like	[to]	say	
thank	you	for	being	[laughs]…there	with	me…of	course	touch	and	feeling	and	
kissing	and	holding	hands	and	like	touching	each	other’s	body…are	part	of	it	
um.	And	just	like	being	without	having	to	say	something.		
	
Once	more,	attunement	seems	to	involve	more	than	the	affective	layer	of	
experience:	Carrie’s	feelings	cannot	be	disentangled	from	their	social	and	material	
circumstances	(Stenner,	Bhatti	&	Church,	2012;	Langdridge	et	al.,	2012).	Carrie	and	
her	partner	can	both	feel	what	the	other	is	feeling,	in	particular	their	love	for	each	
other,	yet	this	loving	attunement	is	produced	through	the	threading	together	of	
multiple	modes	of	experience.	Namely,	the	discursive	(‘we	always	like	[to]	say	thank	
you),	the	embodied	(‘kissing	and	holding	hands	and	like	touching	each	other’s	body’),	
and	the	conceptual	(‘we	won’t	worry:	are	you	thinking	of	something	different	or	are	
you	hiding	something?’;	‘just	like	being	without	having	to	say	something’).	While	the	
couple	mutually	feel	and	verbally	articulate	their	love,	it	is	also	manifested	in	not	
having	to	say	anything	at	all,	simply	being	alongside	one	another	(Brownlie,	2014).	
Just	as	for	Jenny,	there	is	a	power	and	depth	of	connection	in	being	silent	together.	
Honing	in	on	the	conceptual	layer	further,	Carrie	also	describes	a	lack	of	worry	that	
the	other	is	‘thinking	of	something	different	or…hiding	something’.	This	sneaky	sense	
evoked	by	‘hiding’	could	be	seen	as	born	from	the	total	personal	openness	required	
by	the	disclosing	model	of	intimacy,	discussed	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	thesis.	A	key	
advocate	of	this	model	is	Giddens	(1992)	who	sees	intimacy	as	primarily	composed	
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of	the	reciprocal	sharing	of	personal	thoughts	and	feelings.	Here,	the	attunement	
experienced	by	Carrie	on	MDMA	seems	to	act	as	guarantor	for	the	ultimate	
permeability	of	personal	thoughts	and	feelings	between	partners,	a	way	of	realising	
what	might	be	seen	as	an	impossible	cultural	script.		
As	well	as	emotional	attunement	being	produced	through	an	‘experiential	
mosaic’	(Stenner,	Church	&	Bhatti,	2012,	p9),	rather	than	the	affective	mode	
principally	highlighted	in	the	literature	(e.g.	Jonathan	&	Knudson-Martin,	2012),	its	
meaning	was	often	mediated	by	gender.	Since	emotion	emerges	from	patterns	of	
relationship,	rather	than	a	thing	existing	‘inside’	of	us	(Burkitt,	2014;	Stenner,	2013),	
locating	emotional	experiences	within	wider	social	relations	and	the	patterns	of	
relationship	within	which	someone	has	lived	can	be	helpful.	Indeed,	it	will	be	argued	
that	macro	gender	relations	can	clarify	the	emphasis	Jenny	places	on	the	feeling	of	
being	‘on	the	exact	same	wavelength’	as	Mark,	and	Emily	puts	on	‘being	understood’	
by	Dan,	specifically	men’s	reputed	lesser	involvement	in	the	emotional	dimension	of	
life	(Dryden,	1998).	Indeed,	Mark’s	inability	to	connect	with	Jenny	on	an	emotional	
level	has	been	a	source	of	strife	in	their	relationship,	‘there’s	a	lot	of	turmoil	over,	
um,	that	stuff…’,	and	Jenny	recalls	how	she	would	‘take	it	personally’	when	Mark	
didn’t	open	up	to	her.	Mark	reflects	on	the	difference	MDMA	made	to	the	dynamic	
between	him	and	Jenny:	
	
Interviewer:	how	different	do	you	think	you	are	together	when	you’re	not	on	
MDMA	compared	to	when	you	are?		
Mark:	I	don’t	have	much	empathy	in	normal	daily	life.	I	don’t	get	upset	at	
funerals,	I	don’t	err	express	emotion	very	well	and	so	I	think,	erm,	that	
switches	me	to	actually	feel	empathy	for	another	person	so	I	think	that	I	am	a	
much	better	listener,	erm,	for	Jenny.	I	understand	what	she’s	saying	on	a	level	
that	I	can’t	when	I’m	not	on	the	drug.	It	feels	like	I	get	what	she’s	saying	as	
opposed	to	just	thinking	about	it	[…]	
when	you’re	on	MDMA,	you	feel	like	the	other	person	truly	understands	you	
(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
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While	Mark’s	described	lack	of	emotion	might	seem	extreme,	‘I	don’t	get	upset	at	
funerals’,	it	is	an	extension	of	the	well-documented	phenomena	of	men’s	reluctance	
to	discuss	and	express	their	emotions	(Strazdins	&	Broom,	2004),	‘I	don’t	err	express	
emotion	very	well’.	Equally,	Mark	not	‘hav[ing]	much	empathy	in	normal	daily	life’	is	
representative	of	the	tendency	for	men	to	be	less	empathetic	than	women	(Mestre,	
Samper,	Frías	&	Tur,	2009),	though	again	a	more	extreme	variant	of	it.	Yet,	on	
MDMA,	Mark	‘actually	feel[s]	empathy’	and	becomes	a	‘much	better	listener’	for	
Jenny,	understanding	her	‘on	a	level	that	[he]	can’t	when	[he’s]	not	on	the	drug’.	
Hence,	MDMA	seems	to	unsettle	gendered	behaviour	in	ways	which	make	
attunement	more	possible	–	the	empathetic	level	Mark	experiences	leaves	him	
better	placed	to	share	in	and	respond	to	Jenny’s	emotional	experience.	However,	
this	is	not	a	one-sided	process,	Jenny	also	reaches	a	new	‘understanding	that	Mark	
expresses	his	emotions	in	a	different	way…now	I	know	he’s	not	like	hiding	anything	
or	closing	me	off.’	Before	taking	MDMA,	she	recalls	feeling	insecure	about	Mark’s	
inexpressiveness	in	everyday	life.	However,	feeling	so	attuned	on	MDMA	seems	to	
build	her	trust	in	him	and	she	believes	he	has	a	different	(i.e.	a	more	minimal)	way	of	
emotionally	relating	and	is	not	simply	‘closing	[her]	off’.	
Attunement	has	been	linked	to	greater	relationship	contentment	(Cohen,	
Schulz,	Weiss	&	Waldinger,	2012;	Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005)	and	such	moments	of	
attunement	could	build	up	and	form	part	of	the	fabric	of	couples	lives,	improving	
how	they	relate	to	each	other	both	on	and	off	MDMA.	Yet,	this	does	not	seem	to	be	
combined	with	a	shift	to	a	more	empathic	sense	of	self	for	Mark:	‘I	don’t	know	if	it	
really	has	made	me	more	empathetic	not	on	the	drug’.	Rather,	these	experiences	
ripple	out	through	a	deeper	level	of	understanding,	‘it’s	given	me	the	ability	to	
understand	what	that	empathy	means.’	If	not	able	to	better	share	and	respond	to	
Jenny’s	everyday	emotional	state,	this	understanding	might	help	him	give	greater	
space	to	Jenny’s	emotions.	
	 The	value	of	attunement	for	Emily	and	Dan	might	also	been	seen	as	
contextualised	through	reference	to	gender	relations,	although	this	is	not	framed	as	
a	contentious	issue	in	the	way	it	was	for	Jenny	and	Mark:		
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Dan:	Yeah,	well,	I	would	say	I’m	more	cerebral	in	my	thinking	and	sometimes,	
I	could	even	say	I	was	a	little	cut	off	from	my	emotions	and	certainly	like	the	E	
connects	you	to	your	emotions	pretty	powerfully	
Emily:	yeah…I	would	agree	with	that…I’m	a	lot	more	emotional	but	they’re	
kind	of	willy-nilly	sometimes	and	the	E	can	bring	em	to	kind	of	one	thing	[…]	
Interviewer:	and	is	that,	being	able	to	sort	of	connect	with	your	emotions	
more,	how	does	that	affect	like	how	you’re	interacting	with	each	other,	with	
Emily?	
Dan:	um…I	don’t	know.	Probably	makes	her	feel	happier.	
Emily:	it	does	
Dan:	I’d	guess	
[pause]	
Interviewer:	so	Emily	you,	so	you	sort	of,	uh,	would	you	say	that	you	enjoy	
Dan	being	more	emotional?	
Emily:	absolutely,	yeah	I	do…he’s	not	an	unemotional	person	but	he’s	guarded	
with	his	emotions…even	still.	Not	to	any	detriment	but	it’s	always	nice	to	
hear…nice,	mushy	affectionate	things	[laughs]	(Couple	interview:	Emily	&	
Dan)	
	
Emily	describes	Dan	as	‘not	an	unemotional	person’	but	someone	who	is	emotionally	
‘guarded’.	However,	for	Dan,	MDMA	‘connects	[him]	to	[his]	emotions	pretty	
powerfully’	and	eases	expression	of	them,	of	which	Emily	particularly	enjoys	hearing	
the	‘nice,	mushy	affectionate	things’.	Emily’s	presentation	of	herself	as	‘a	lot	more	
emotional’	again	fits	into	the	standard	discourse	of	women’s	enhanced	emotional	
expressiveness	(Strazdins	&	Broom,	2004).	While	the	couple	are	talking	about	
greater	connnection	and	expression	of	their	own	emotions,	it	seems	as	though	
connecting	with	the	self	on	an	emotional	level	would	also	help	with	sharing	in	and	
being	able	to	appropriately	respond	to	another’s	emotional	state:	the	fulcrum	of	
attunement	(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008).	Whereas	Dan’s	usually	‘cerebral’	
approach	might	hamper	genuine	understanding	of	and	responsiveness	to	Emily’s	
cues	and	needs.	Indeed,	a	link	has	been	reported	between	emotional	expressiveness	
and	empathy	(Roberts	&	Strayer,	1996).	Furthermore,	if	someone	is	more	expressive	
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of	their	emotional	state,	it	might	be	easier	to	share	in	their	emotions.	Therefore,	
perhaps	Dan	being	less	guarded	with	his	emotions	on	MDMA	could	also	provide	
another	avenue	through	which	attunement	might	become	more	possible.		
Helena	and	Jakub,	married	and	together	for	7	years,	performed	a	similarly	
gendered	emotional	script,	though	they	were	more	explicit	in	their	awareness	of	it:		
	
Helena:	I	think	that	was,	that	made	us	more,	much,	much	stronger	as	a	
couple	and	me	kind	of	trusting	you,	um.	Because	I	could	relate	to,	share	with	
you,	uh,	my	kind	of	childhood	traumas,	I	could	describe	to	you	how	things	
were	and	kind	of	trust	you	and	kind	of	feel	the	empathy,	feel	that	you,	you	
trust,	that	I	can	trust	you	and	also	that	you	care.	You	kind	of	mirror	my	
feelings,	it’s	not	just	‘ok’	but	‘oh,	oh,	that’s	so	horrible’…it	feels	natural...	It	
feels	safe	[…]	
Jakub:	but	I	spontaneously	started	talking	about	my	parents,	you	know,	my	
emotions...I	think	like	the	fact	that	I	was	talking	about	my	emotions	made	you	
interested	in	it	
Helena:	yes,	yes,	absolutely	(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
	
Helena	describes	the	empathic	attunement,	‘relate	to,	share	with…my	kind	of	
childhood	traumas…feel	the	empathy’,	and	nurturing	responsiveness,	‘it’s	not	just	
“ok”	but	“oh,	oh,	that’s	so	horrible”’,	from	Jakub	as	crucial	to	building	trust	and	
strengthening	coupledom	(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008).	This	fits	with	research	
emphasising	the	connective	power	of	partners	being	attuned	to	one	another	
(Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005;	Cohen,	Schulz,	Weiss	&	Waldinger,	2012).	The	way	the	
couple	relate	to	each	in	other	in	everyday	life	also	seems	informed	by	traditional	
cultural	scripts.	Jakub	embodies	several	traditionally	masculine	traits	across	the	
interview	such	as	being	initially	attracted	to	Helena	based	on	her	physical	
appearance,	wanting	to	‘fix	things’	rather	than	sharing	in	problems	and	viewing	
marriage	as	a	gesture	for	his	partner,	rather	than	something	he	was	primarily	
motivated	to	pursue.	The	fact	that	him	‘talking	about	[his]	emotions’	sparked	
Helena’s	interest	in	MDMA	and	the	emphasis	she	places	on	him	being	able	to	
‘mirror…[her]	feelings’	suggests	a	gap	between	his	previous	ability	to	emotionally	
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engage	and	the	emotional	connection	she	desired.	All	of	these	elements	together	
reinforce	the	idea	of	attunement	as	mediated	by	gender.	Moreover,	the	affective	
haven	of	MDMA	seemed	to	allow	Jakub	to	emotionally	attune	to	Helena	beyond	
gendered,	cultural	restraints:	a	practice	that	echoed	out	into	their	everyday	lives,	
making	them	‘much	stronger’	as	a	couple;	perhaps	allowing	both	partners	to	feel	
loved	and	cared	for	as	found	in	the	attunement	literature	(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	
2008).	
	 While	feeling	attuned	might	come	across	as	an	instantaneous	process,	this	is	
not	the	whole	story;	there	seems	to	have	been	a	journey	to	reach	this	shared,	
emotional	plane.	This	is	best	illustrated	through	Mark’s	metaphor	for	attunement:	
	
Mark:	I	think	it’s	kind	of	like,	erm,	I	don’t	wa-,	cos	it’s	not	a	funny	thing,	how	
you	would	conceptualise	an	inside	joke,	where	we’re	getting	it,	we’re	just	
getting	how	the	world	works	and	you	see	people	around	us	and	it’s	kind	of	
like,	you	know,	this	experience	is	just	ours	like	no	one	else…it’s	that	feeling	
that	it’s	so	unique…so	great	because	other	people	don’t	have	this	
feeling.		And…nobody	can	take	that	away…	
Jenny:	I	was	just,	ah,	I	like	what	you	said	about	it	being	an	inside	joke.		I	think	
that’s	
Mark:	but	it’s	not	funny	
Jenny:	yeah	
Mark:	but	it’s	almost	like	an	empathetic	inside	joke	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	
Jenny)	
	
Emotion	is	conceptualised	in	this	work	as	a	process,	emerging	from	a	particular	
situation,	socio-cultural	context	and	personal	biography	(Burkitt,	2014).	Here,	we	can	
see	how	feeling	emotionally	attuned	is	embedded	in	the	history	of	the	couples’	
everyday	lives.	Mark	describes	this	feeling	as	‘so	great’	due	to	its	
‘unique[ness]…other	people	don’t	have	this’.	Both	Jenny	and	Mark	talk	about	
themselves	as	unconventional	and	the	fact	that	they	‘didn’t	fit	[the]	mould’	was	part	
of	what	initially	drew	them	together.	The	exclusionary	nature	of	this	attunement	
‘this	experience	is	just	ours	like	no	one	else’,	could	therefore	be	seen	as	a	continued	
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affirmation	of	their	distance	from	others.	They	may	only	be	‘inside’	a	small	group	of	
two	but	there	are	special	things	to	be	understood	from	this	vantage	point	that	the	
outside	simply	does	not	have	access	to.	Such	a	sense	of	belonging	and	validation	of	
our	identity	has	been	suggested	as	one	of	the	ways	in	which	attunement	enhances	
personal	and	relational	wellbeing	(Siegel,	2007;	Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008).		
Feeling	so	attuned	is	also	about	their	in-depth	knowledge	and	experience	of	
each	other.	The	fact	they	are	‘just	getting	how	the	world	works’	implies	a	shared	
world	view;	while	its	content	is	not	explicitly	defined	in	the	interview,	it	is	alluded	to	
by	the	way	they	describe	themselves	as	sharing	something	in	common	that	was	
different	from	others,	‘I	think	everybody	else	in	in	our	class	just	presumed	we	would	
find	each	other’.	Couples	frequently	emphasised	how	MDMA	only	enhances	a	pre-
existing	sense	of	connection	and	it’s	helpful	to	consider	the	fact	that	Jenny	and	Mark	
had	been	together	for	six	years	before	they	took	MDMA	living	‘intertwined	lives’	
where	they	do	almost	all	of	their	‘daily	activities’	together.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	
moments	of	attunement	were	dictated	by	the	number	of	years	a	couple	had	been	
together	but	that	MDMA	cannot	fabricate	connections;	instead,	just	as	in	everyday	
life,	these	connections	are	thoroughly	contingent.	Therefore	it	is	suggested	that	
despite	MDMA’s	reputation	for	prosocial	effects	such	as	feeling	close	and	more	
empathetic	(Morgan	et	al.,	2013),	moments	of	emotional	attunement	might	still	
require	a	history	of	interpersonal	closeness.	Certainly,	emotional	attunement	on	
MDMA	was	not	described	at	the	start	of	relationships,	though	several	of	the	couples	
described	their	shared	MDMA	use	as	instigating	their	romantic	relationship.	
Furthermore,	since	emotions	are	viewed	as	deeply	contextual	phenomena,	
(Burkitt,	2014),	being	emotionally	tuned	into	and	understood	by	your	partner	is	not	
seen	as	pre-cultural	or	pre-social	but	as	interwoven	with	how	Western	societies	
conceptualise	relationships.	It	has	been	argued	that	this	culture	privileges	the	couple	
above	all	else:	an	exclusive	dyad	which	is	a	haven	from	the	outside	world	(Finn,	
2014).	Similarly,	this	moment	is	about	just	the	two	of	them	‘we’re	getting	it’	and	is	
fundamentally	protected	from	an	encroaching	outside	world,	‘nobody	can	take	that	
away’.	Thus,	this	experience	of	emotional	attunement	is	about	more	than	feelings	of	
deep	connection	but	also	how	these	feelings	are	contextualised	as	‘unique’	and	how	
they	reaffirm	both	their	shared	experience	on	the	fringes	of	‘normal’	society	and	
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socio-cultural	norms	around	love.	Additionally,	it	is	not	only	the	‘feeling’	that’s	
crucial	to	this	experience	but	a	certain	amount	of	shared	understanding,	‘just	getting	
how	the	world	works’.	As	argued	in	the	first	chapter,	one	of	our	guiding	cultural	
scripts	is	of	romanticism:	relationships	are	built	on	feeling,	precisely:	‘a	wondrous	
reciprocal	feeling	that	both	parties	see	the	world	in	precisely	the	same	way’	(de	
Botton,	2016,	p49,	own	emphasis).	This	understanding	seems	to	map	neatly	here	
onto	Mark’s	conceptualisation	of	attunement	as	‘an	empathetic	inside	joke’:	part	
feeling,	part	shared	view	of	the	world.	In	this	way,	emotions	experienced	on	MDMA	
can	be	seen	not	as	somehow	cut	off	and	set	apart	from	the	world	but	a	continuation	
of	it.	Or,	to	be	exact,	a	continuation	and	affirmation	of	our	romantic	ideal	of	love.		
We	have	seen	how	moments	of	attunement	are	produced	through	a	
multitude	of	interconnected	layers	of	experience:	a	distinct	affective	dynamic,	bodily	
presence	in	shared	space,	conceptual	appreciation	of	the	absence	of	talk,	and	
discursive	communication.	Being	emotionally	attuned	has	been	linked	to	increased	
relationship	contentment	(Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005;	Cohen,	Schulz,	Weiss	&	
Waldinger,	2012)	and	it	is	suggested	the	sharing	in	emotional	experience	that	took	
place	on	MDMA	produced	valuable	moments	of	closeness,	whose	worth	was	
grounded	in	and	framed	by	gendered	relational	differences.	
	
4.2	Disclosure:	‘you	can	[say]	whatever	you	want’	
	
The	affective	atmosphere	of	MDMA	seemed	to	both	encourage	partners	to	disclose	
and	to	respond	to	disclosures	in	helpful	ways.	The	heightened	feelings	of	safety	and	
muting	of	fear	made	it	is	easer	to	talk,	while	the	dampening	of	anger	and	heightened	
positive	affect,	like	feelings	of	love	and	safety,	made	it	easier	to	receive	and	accept	
these	disclosures.	Participants	spoke	repeatedly	about	how	they	felt	more	free	to	
talk:	
	
Dan:	It’s	like,	no	matter	what	she	said,	it	was	like	everything	made	me	love	
her	more	and	more	[…]	
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you	could	say	like	most	of	it	but	obviously	it’s	a	lot	more	work…And	so	instead	
of	doing	that	stuff,	it’s,	it’s	the	safe	tree	you’re	in	and	so	you	can	[say]	
whatever	you	want	(Couple	interview:	Emily	&	Dan)	
	
Ayesha:	you	know	one	person’s	going	to	be	really	honest	and	the	other	
person’s	going	to	listen	and	accept…I	think	that’s	actually	a	very	safe	
environment	to	chat	through	stuff		(Couple	interview:	Ayesha	&	Sam)	
	
Mark:	It’s	that	it	allows	you	to	be	completely	nonjudgmental	and	talk	about	
issues	that	are	very	very	difficult…it	forces	you	to	actually	talk	about	them	
calmly,	without	any	fear	or...the	feeling	of,	erm,	being	insecure	or	that	you’re	
gonna	be	judged	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
The	sense	of	protection	offered	by	MDMA’s	affective	atmosphere	is	striking;	akin	to	
an	emotional	safe	haven.	Dan’s	image	of	‘the	safe	tree	you’re	in’	encapsulates	this:	
he	is	removed	from	the	world,	so	high	up	as	to	be	untouchable.	The	ground	in	this	
image	seems	to	be	an	analog	for	the	everyday	consequences	of	things	you	might	say,	
like	dealing	with	someone’s	emotional	hurt	when	you	say	the	wrong	thing.	MDMA	
seems	to	take	participants	out	of	these	messy,	affective	repercussions;	it	removes	
the	feeling	that	‘you’re	gonna	be	judged’,	which,	in	turn,	makes	you	feel	‘safe’	so	you	
can	talk	about	things	‘calmly,	without	any	fear’.	All	these	aspects	coalesce	to	make	it	
much	easier	‘to	say	harder	things’	or	‘talk	about	issues	that	are	very	very	difficult’.	
Looking	particularly	at	Ayesha	and	Mark’s	descriptions	of	this	affective	atmosphere,	
reciprocity	is	also	brought	to	the	fore.	Ayesha	describes	this	as	one	person	‘being	
really	honest’	while	the	other	‘listen[s]	and	accept[s]’,	creating	a	‘very	safe	
environment’	for	conversation.	Furthermore,	the	role	an	abundance	of	positive	
emotions	might	play	in	fashioning	an	aura	of	acceptance	is	indicated	by	how	Dan	
recalls	everything	his	partner	said	‘made	[him]	love	her	more	and	more’.	Mark	
emphasises	how	MDMA	‘allows	you	to	be	completely	nonjudgmental’	(own	
emphasis)	as	well	as	to	feel	that	you	yourself	‘won’t	be	judged’.	These	kinds	of	open	
conversations	were	also	rarely	premediated:	‘it	just	comes	out.	I	never	thought	about	
“oh,	do	I	have	some	more	problems	I	want	to	talk	about?”	[laughter]’	(Eva).	The	
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spontaneity	of	this	relational	style	was	particularly	emphasised	by	many	couples:	it	
felt	like	an	organic	process.	These	were	difficult,	complex	conversations	in	
themselves,	it	would	likely	be	a	relief	not	to	also	anxiously	anticipate	their	onset.	
This	reciprocal	safe	space	produced	an	array	of	disclosures,	from	relationship	issues	
to	traumatic	memories.	These	could	be	significant,	and	at	times	resonate	outside	of	
the	bubble,	into	the	rhythms	of	everyday	life.		
	
4.2.1	Relationship	disclosures	
	
The	emotional	safe	haven	of	MDMA	provided	a	place	to	disclose	about	relationship	
matters	for	many	of	the	participants.	Dan	describes	a	conversation	him	and	his	
partner,	Emily,	had	on	MDMA	where	they	both	revealed	they	had	committed	
infidelity:	
	
Dan:	you	feel	like	you’re	floating	in	a	warm	tub	of,	warm	goo…like	a	
protective	barrier	around	your,	yourself	so	you	say	all	things	that	you	
wouldn’t	say	otherwise…I	don’t	think	we	would	ever	say	‘em.	As	close	as	we	
are	and	all	the	rest	of	it.	There’s	things	that	you	just	worry	about	someone’s	
reaction	to	things	and	all	that…it	got	everything	out	and	um	it’s	funny	though	
cos	then	the	MDMA	wears	off…and	that	shit’s	all	out	there	though.	Then,	you	
know,	it	was	all	processed	in	its	own	time	and,	um,	yeah,	so	it’s	great	though	
cos	I	suppose	if	we	weren’t	meant	to	be	together,	it	still	would	have	been	
great.	Cos	that	would	have	been	out	there	and	it	was	an	honest	thing.	But,	it	
was	out	there	and	we	worked	through	it	(Couple	interview:	Dan	&	Emily)	
	
The	muting	of	negative	and	accentuation	of	positive	emotion	within	the	bubble	can	
be	seen	to	be	mirrored	in	the	description	of	a	‘protective	barrier’	forming	around	
Dan,	shielding	him	from	his	own	anxiety	about	other	people’s	reactions,	and	how	he	
‘float[s]	in	a	warm	tub	of	warm	goo’	totally	at	ease.	In	this	state,	Dan	can	‘say	
anything’;	things	that	‘you	wouldn’t	say	otherwise’	irrespective	of	how	‘close’	a	
couple	they	are.	It	is	clear	that	he	values	honesty	as	part	of	intimacy,	even	at	the	
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expense	of	relationship	longevity:	‘if	we	weren’t	meant	to	be	together,	it	still	would	
have	been	great...it	was	an	honest	thing.’	It	also	seems	apparent	that	everyday	ways	
of	relating	are	not	always	conducive	to	this	level	of	honesty	–	the	worry	he	feels	over	
Emily’s	response	inhibits	his	disclosures.	However,	he	feels	MDMA	can	provide	this	
open	and	honest	space,	where	everything	is	‘out	there’	between	the	couple.	A	lack	
of	interpersonal	barriers	and	emphasis	on	honesty	could	be	seen	as	reminiscent	of	
the	disclosing	model	of	intimacy	discussed	in	Chapter	One	and	mentioned	earlier	in	
this	chapter.	This	was	argued	to	be	a	simplification	and	exaggeration	of	the	process	
of	building	and	sustaining	intimacy	(Charles	et	al.,	2008;	Crow,	2002,	Duncan	&	Smith	
2006;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015;	Jamieson	1998,	2005;	Irwin	2005;	Smart	2007;	Smart	&	
Shipman	2004),	yet,	it	was	maintained,	there	does	seem	to	have	been	a	cultural	shift	
in	how	we	think	about	intimacy.	This	can	be	witnessed	here	in	the	emphasis	Dan	
places	on	full	disclosure	and,	indeed,	in	that	same	emphasis	placed	throughout	this	
section	by	many	different	couples.	Perhaps,	how	couples	do	intimacy	on	a	day-to-
day	basis	does	not	reflect	such	an	emphasis	on	disclosure	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015),	but	
the	affective	atmosphere	of	MDMA	is	more	primed	for	this	kind	of	intimate	practice.	
This	is	not	to	say	the	bubble	is	idyllic.	Emily	elsewhere	comments	she	felt	safe	during	
their	conversation	but	it	‘didn’t	make	[her]	feel	great’	and,	as	Dan	notes,	‘the	MDMA	
wears	off’	but	‘that	shit’s	all	out	there’.	The	protective	casing	wears	away.	Indeed,	
these	revelations	of	infidelity	led	to	painful	consequences	–	distress	and	turbulence	
between	the	pair	in	the	days	after	and	then	a	year-long	separation.		
Yet,	Dan	still	seems	to	be	framing	this	as	a	part	of	a	wider	process	of	moving	
forward,	in	an	honest	way,	and	that	the	emotional	fallout	was	entangled	with	this.	
Indeed,	difficult	feelings	and	frustration	have	been	suggested	to	be	a	sign	of	
processes	of	transformation	(Bjergkilde,	2017).	Of	course,	it	is	crucial	to	
contextualise	this	idealisation	of	honesty	in	Dan	and	Emily’s	life	circumstances	at	the	
time	–	they	had	been	together	a	number	of	years	but	were	not	married	and	did	not	
have	children.	Perhaps	such	a	disruptive	disclosure	might	not	have	been	so	welcome	
in	a	later	life	stage.	However,	extramarital	infidelity	is	a	significant	secret	to	keep,	
91%	of	surveyed	American	adults	described	it	as	morally	wrong	in	a	nationwide,	
representative	survey	from	Gallup	(2013).	It	does	not	seem	too	great	a	leap	to	think	
someone	would	want	to	know	if	their	partner	was	having	an	affair.	Given	the	high	
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moral	acceptability	of	divorce	–	68%	of	American	adults	felt	divorce	was	tolerable	
(Gallup,	2013)	–	information	about	a	partner’s	infidelity	can	now	be	acted	upon;	in	
contrast	to	previous	periods	in	history	when	divorce	was	simply	not	seen	as	a	viable	
option.		
For	other	participants	too,	it	seemed	that	MDMA	could	provide	an	affective	
relational	space	amenable	to	significant	relationship	disclosures;	but	rather	than	
inhibiting	‘worry’	as	Dan	spoke	of,	the	dampening	of	fear	and	shame	proved	crucial:	
	
Mark:	we’ve	been	struggling	with,	now	that	we’ve	been	in	a	relationship	for	
seven	years,	just	somewhat	struggling	with	the	concept	of	monogamy…and	
dealing	with	the	trust	issue	and	all	of	this	stuff	and	this	is	why	this	drug	is	so	
great.	It’s	that	it	allows	you	to	be	completely	nonjudgmental	and	talk	about	
issues	that	are	very,	very	difficult...it	forces	you	to	actually	talk	about	them	
calmly,	without	any	fear	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
Jakub:	Even	like	when	you’re	talking	about	positive	things	about	your	
fantasies…which	you	may	feel	guilty	about…it	just	feels	like…This	is	me,	this	is	
where	I	am	and	it’s	ok	to	be	here…	
Helena:	no	fear	and	no	shame	and	I	think	that’s	really	important,	the	shame,	
um,	the	feeling	of	shame	just	disappear	and	um,	the	funny	thing	is	that	you	
don’t	feel	ashamed	the	day	after	MDMA	either	(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	
Jakub)	
	
For	Mark,	being	able	to	discuss	‘very	difficult’	issues	together,	like	non-monogamy,	
stems	directly	from	the	‘completely	nonjudgmental’	bubble	of	MDMA,	where	the	
fear	of	raising	such	topics	in	everyday	life	has	been	allayed.	Non-monogamy	is	a	
problematic	and	often	morally	loaded	topic	for	many	couples	(Reibstein	&	Richards,	
1992)	and	is	consistently	rated	less	positively	by	both	monogamous	individuals	and,	
surprisingly,	by	non-monogamous	people	too	(Conley,	Moors,	Matsick	&	Ziegler,	
2013).	Yet	other’s	acceptance	of	us	is	crucial:	to	belong	and	be	accepted	within	a	
social	group	is	one	of	our	most	fundamental	needs	(Baumeister	&	Leary,	1995).	
Comparably,	Helen	and	Jakub	detail	an	absence	of	guilt	and	shame	as	facilitating	
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dialogue	about	their	sexual	fantasies.	Jakub	is	capable	of	greater	self-acceptance,	
‘it’s	ok	to	be	here’,	and	Helena	talks	about	how	‘shame	just	disappear[s]’	on	MDMA	
in	the	context	of	sharing	sexual	fantasies.	Shame	originates	from	internalising	‘the	
gaze	and	voice	of	the	other’	(Fuchs,	2002,	p240)	and	encapsulates	the	frustration	of	
our	deep	need	to	belong.	Acceptance	could	be	seen	as	the	locus	of	the	difficulty	in	
discussing	both	of	these	topics,	and	the	safe	haven	of	MDMA	provided	a	way	to	
discuss	contested	concepts	like	non-monogamy	or	particular	sexual	fantasies,	
without	invoking	culturally-sanctioned	and	visceral	emotional	scripts	e.g.	anger	or	
disgust.		
	 Additionally,	both	of	these	accounts	engage	with	a	particular	interpersonal	
standard	for	a	high	level	of	honesty	and	disclosure	(Klesse,	2006),	termed	the	
disclosing	model	of	intimacy	(Jamieson,	1998)	where	partners	engage	in	an	all-
encompassing	but	fragile	emotional	intimacy:	only	committed	to	as	long	as	both	
parties	derive	enough	satisfaction	from	it	(Giddens,	1992).	Yet,	many	scholars	
(Jamieson,	1998;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015;	Smart,	2007)	have	extensively	criticised	this	
notion	for	its	neglect	of	other	vital	components	to	love	such	as	practical	care,	social	
networks	and	couple	time	together	not	focussed	on	conversation.	Once	we	step	
outside	of	this	lens,	it	is	possible	to	question	the	wisdom	behind	such	a	‘tell	all’	
approach,	which	could	be	seen	to	contextualise	the	value	many	couples	derived	
from	their	MDMA	disclosures.	A	total	lack	of	barriers	might	be	seen	to	disallow	
private,	mental	lives	and	propose	an	unattainable	and	undesirable	standard	for	what	
intimacy	looks	like.	Certainly,	for	Ayesha	and	Sam	there	was	a	complex	mix	of	
liberation,	second	thoughts	and	coming	to	terms	with	the	things	they	had	revealed.	
They	describe	disclosing	things	that	were	‘very	private’	(Ayesha)	and	‘quite	personal’	
(Nick)	which	for	day(s)	afterwards	they	were	doubtful	they	should	have	disclosed:	‘I	
did	talk	about	things	that	the	next	morning	I	thought,	I	really	don’t	think	I	wanted	to	
say’	(Ayesha,	having	spoken	to	a	group	of	friends,	including	Sam);	‘the	next	day	or	
kind	of	a	couple	of	days	afterwards,	you	kind	of	feel	like	“oh,	I	just	feel	like	a	bit	of	an	
idiot”’	(Sam,	having	spoken	only	to	Ayesha).	However,	when	pressed	whether	she	
regretted	what	she’d	said,	Ayesha	pushed	back,	‘I	almost	felt	a	bit	liberated	I’d	say…	I	
bonded	a	lot	better	with	my	friends	by	telling	them	things’.	Along	the	same	lines,	
Sam	recalls	coming	to	terms	with	the	disclosure	through	realising	that:	
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the	people	you’ve	sort	of	shared	it	with	kind	of	care	about	you	and	don’t	
judge	you…so,	in	the	end,	you	actually,	I	think	it	feels	probably	quite	good	in	
the	long-term	
	
There	seems	a	sense	then	in	which	such	unbridled	honesty	can	underscore	the	value	
of	existing	relationships.	Both	Ayesha	and	Sam	were	initially	worried	about	their	
disclosures	distorting	people’s	opinions	of	them,	but	witnessing	these	fears	as	
unfounded	confirmed	the	strength	of	these	bonds.	Once	more,	acceptance	by	others	
seems	to	be	the	touchstone	by	which	a	disclosure’s	worth	is	measured.	In	this	
manner,	sharing	things	about	yourself	on	MDMA	opens	up	an	avenue	to	having	parts	
of	your	self	accepted	that	you	would	never	think	(or	want)	to	share	in	the	first	place.		
However,	at	another	point,	Sam	comes	across	as	less	effusive	–	he	mentions	
how	sharing	this	information	has	‘not	really	kind	of	served	[him]’,	it	was	not	
something	he	felt	he	had	to	‘get	off	his	chest’.	Although	he	seems	to	have	come	to	
terms	with	the	disclosure,	the	discomfort	involved	with	this	process	is	not	framed	as	
an	essential	part	of	moving	forward,	as	it	was	for	Dan	when	he	managed	the	painful	
consequences	of	revealing	infidelity.	Instead,	Sam	seems	to	question	the	disclosing	
model	of	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992)	and	whether	it	really	benefitted	him	or	his	
relationship	in	this	instance.	It	is	an	important	consideration	that	MDMA	might,	in	
some	circumstances,	enable	disclosures	which	are	not	desired.	Jenny	describes	a	
similar	feeling:	
	
I	guess	sometimes	I	get	this	feeling	like	was	I	too	vulnerable	the	day	before?	
Did	I	share	too	much?...I	don’t	know	now	that	I	feel	regretful	for	having	
shared	anything	but	almost	like	kind	of	overly	exposed…	but	then,	you	know,	I	
think	about	the	experience	on	the	whole	and	I	realise	that	it	was	actually	a	
positive	thing.	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
Jenny	details	a	kind	of	emotional	exhaustion	in	the	days	directly	after	using	MDMA,	
she	feels	‘overly	exposed’	and	interrogates	the	value	of	disclosing	so	much,	‘did	I	
share	too	much?’	but	is	hesitant	to	ascribe	regret	to	her	experience,	ultimately	
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concluding,	‘it	was	actually	a	positive	thing’.	Jenny	might	take	up	the	cultural	script	
of	intimacy	as	disclosure	to	a	greater	degree	than	Sam,	or	perhaps	she	does	not	have	
the	same	incentives	to	contain	her	thoughts	and	feelings	as	Sam	does	due	to	the	way	
masculinity	is	perceived	in	society	(Seidler,	2007).	Whatever	the	case,	the	production	
of	a	more	open,	honest	way	of	relating	on	MDMA	does	have	repercussions	outside	
the	space	and	couples	should	be	aware	of	the	potential	for	spontaneous	disclosures.		
The	safe	haven	of	disclosure	was	not	just	confined	to	the	space	and	time	of	
MDMA	use,	but	rippled	outwards	into	everyday	life:	
	
Jakub:	Once	you	break	the	taboo	of	talking	about	something,	it’s	that	much	
easier	to	talk	about	it	again	by	simply	recalling	a	conversation	you	had	
(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
	
Helena:	I	always	felt	like	MDMA	was	allowing	us	to	talk	about	issues	that	we	
were	obviously	unable	to	talk	about	without	MDMA.	But	then	after	a	few	
times,	we	were	able	to	talk	about	things	without	using	the	MDMA…It	was	
actually	something	that	we	were	able	to	take	away	from	the	experience	and	
actually	use	it	outside’	(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
	
The	concept	of	life-space	(Lewin,	1936	in	Brown	&	Reavey,	2015)	can	be	helpful	
here.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	life-space	allows	for	a	consideration	of	the	ways	
in	which	past	memories	or	imagined	futures	are	folded	into	the	current	situation	
(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Past	conversations	can	be	very	much	ongoing	in	the	
present;	these	intensive	connections	of	memory	go	out	and	over	the	boundaries	of	
time	and	space	and,	in	this	way,	the	disclosures	on	MDMA	can	be	seen	to	weave	into	
and	become	part	of	how	they	relate	to	each	other	on	a	day-to-day	level.	Jakub	
emphasises	how	he	can	‘simply	recall’	a	previous	conversation	had	on	MDMA;	this	
intensive	connection	indelibly	shaping	the	range	of	possible	actions	in	his	present	
(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Helena	adds	that	it	became	about	more	than	a	process	of	
remembering,	the	couple	became	able	to	enact	a	different,	more	candid	style	of	
relating	in	their	day-to-day	lives,	opening	up	entirely	new	topics	for	discussion,	‘after	
a	few	times,	we	were	able	to	talk	about	things	without	using	the	MDMA’.	Again,	
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what	takes	place	on	MDMA	is	not	confined	to	the	space	and	time	of	that	experience	
but	ripples	out	to	construct	different	everyday	practices	of	intimacy.		
Yet	it	is	not	quite	this	straightforward.	In	their	interview,	Helena	and	Jakub	
oscillate	between	attributing	this	new	style	of	relating	to	MDMA	or	to	the	personal	
therapy	they	had	been	receiving	around	that	time.	The	question	is	clearly	ambiguous	
in	their	minds,	with	Jakub	hinting	at	a	reciprocal	relationship	between	MDMA	and	
therapy:	
	
it’s	hard	to	say	how	much	impact	MDMA	had	in	preparing	me	for	opening	up	
so	much	[in	therapy].	Because	it	wasn’t	hard	at	all	–	it	just	happened	(Couple	
interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
	
This	is	a	sentiment	echoed	elsewhere	by	Helena	who	describes	how	taking	MDMA	at	
the	weekend	could	leave	her	more	open	in	her	therapy	session	during	the	week.	This	
suggests	another	context	in	which	a	more	open	way	of	being	on	MDMA	could	
transform	practices	of	intimacy	outside	of	the	drug	experience:	the	therapeutic	
relationship.	If	Jakub	has	already	experienced	a	profound	sense	of	openness	on	
MDMA,	it	might	become	easier	to	recreate	that	with	his	therapist,	which	might	be	
considered	a	conducive	environment	to	therapeutic	practice.	An	important	thing	to	
note	is	that	while	moments	on	MDMA	may	be	couched	in	idyllic	language,	couples	
also	conceptualise	these	experiences	as	involving	a	degree	of	difficulty	and	effort,	
such	as	the	psychological	‘work’	of	therapy,	as	for	Helena	and	Jakub,	or	the	‘work’	
required	to	sustain	relationships,	as	in	Mark’s	account:	
	
Mark:	the	first	couple	of	times	we	would	think	at	the	end	‘oh,	that	just	solved	
all	our	problems’.	And	then	we	would	find,	no,	when	we	would	go	back	to	our	
daily	lives	and	we	still	have	to	work	on	those	issues.	It	brings	them	up	for	us	to	
talk	about	and	gets	the	ball	rolling	but,	no,	it	doesn’t,	it	doesn’t	resolve	the	
things,	you	still	have	to	work	after	the	fact	to	really	make	it	happen.	(Couple	
interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
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For	Mark,	a	temporary	utopian	aftermath	where	he	felt	MDMA	had	‘solved	all	their	
problems’	soon	dissipated.	Rather,	he	pinpoints	the	role	of	MDMA	to	help	‘bring	
issues	up’	and	‘get…the	ball	rolling’	but	that	he	still	had	to	put	in	the	‘work’	to	
resolve	them.	Mark	seems	to	draw	on	the	relationship	as	work	discourse	(Chapman,	
2014;	McKay,	Fanning	&	Paleg,	2006)	to	underscore	the	difficulty	of	integrating	
difficult	disclosures	into	his	relationship,	‘[MDMA]	doesn’t	resolve	the	things,	you	still	
have	to	work	after	the	fact	to	really	make	it	happen’.	He	could	be	seen	to	draw	on	
the	strong	cultural	narrative	of	the	‘good	couple’	who	‘work	hard	to	achieve	a	
healthy	relationship’	(Eldén,	2011,	p150).	Eldén	has	termed	this	a	popular	therapy	
approach,	where	labour	is	conceptualised	as	the	continued	reflection	on	and	
discussion	of	the	relationship:	what	works	well	and	what	does	not	and	where	it	is	
going.	While	Eldén	critiques	this	popular	therapy	narrative	for	individualising	issues	
and	deferring	to	expert	definitions	of	what	constitutes	the	good	couple,	it	could	be	
seen	to	play	a	valuable	role	for	Mark.	Having	to	work	at	a	relationship	offers	a	
counterbalance	to	the	affective	idyll	of	MDMA.	This	discourse	primes	him	for	having	
to	actively	deal	with	the	emotional	aftermath	of	MDMA,	rather	than	romanticising	
its	potential	for	his	relationship.			
	 	
4.2.3	Remembering	together	
	
While	the	safe,	reciprocal	space	of	MDMA	facilitated	a	wide	range	of	disclosures,	it	
allowed	several	participants	to	dwell	on	personal,	distressing	experiences	in	
particular.	The	‘expanded’	view	of	memory	will	be	employed	here,	where	memory	is	
understood	as	a	distributed	system	of	feeling	rather	than	all	‘in	the	head’	(Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015,	p43),	to	illustrate	the	relationality	of	this	disclosing	process.	Karl	
describes	the	trauma	of	being	involved	in	a	car	accident	in	which	a	‘very	close	friend’	
lost	their	life:	
	
Karl:	um	it’s	a	hard	thing	to	explain,	like	I	could	say	like	imagine	you’re	stuck	
with	an	experience	and	you	can’t	really	tell	anyone	because	you	know	they	
won’t	understand	and	you	also	don’t	want	to	go	deep	into	it	because	they	
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might	find	it	annoying	or	hard	or	difficult	um.	So	you’re	stuck	with	that,	you	
can’t	really	talk	to	anyone	about	it	um	except	for	in	the	past	I’ve	talked	to	like	
a	psychiatrist	about	it	but	being	able	to	share	it	with	someone	who’s	really	
close	to	you,	a	friend	or	even	a	lover,	it,	it’s	um…you	lose	a	lot	of	weight	on	
your	shoulders	when	you	do	that.	It’s	um,	yeah	[chuckles],	it’s	something	you	
don’t	usually	share	and	it	is,	it	is	a	big	and	important	part	of	my	life	so	I’m	
happy	I	can	share	it	with	her....	it	makes	my	life	a	lot	easier.	It’s	actually	
changed	a	lot	for	me	um,	before	that	I,	I	think	I	had	nightmares	pretty	much	
every	other	day	and	since	then	that’s	pretty	much	stopped…because	of	the	
MDMA	um,	you	don’t	feel	the	pain	and	the	bad	feelings…and	um,	um	I	feel	
less	of	those	bad	feelings	it	was	a	bit	of	uh	traumatic	for	her	as	well.	Um,	she	
has	told	me	many	times	that	she’s	really	glad	that	she	did.	It’s	a	small	price	to	
pay.	
Interviewer:	mmm.	And	how,	and	how	kind	of	important	was	MDMA	in	
helping	you	tell	your	girlfriend	about	it?	
Karl:	um…that’s	quite	hard.	I	think	it	was	very	important	um,	it’s	not	so	much	
that	the	M-,	that	I	was	holding	back	um,	the	MDMA	was	more	to	let	
myself…um	I	don’t	think	I	would	have	been	able	to	force	myself	to	relive	those	
events	without	um	the	help	of	MDMA…I	would	just	start	getting	too	sad	and	
too	uh	emotional,	that	I	would	just	stop…	[chuckles]	and	I	wouldn’t	see	a	
point	in	trying	to	talk	(Diary	interview)	
	
He	had	to	‘force	[him]self’	to	relive	this	experience,	something	he	found	possible	
inside	the	protective	bubble	of	MDMA	due	to	the	way	it	dampened	his	‘sad[ness]’	
and	‘bad	feelings’.	His	description	fits	with	the	emotional	effects	–	reduced	fear	
response	and	increased	feelings	of	relaxation	–	that	have	been	proposed	as	an	
explanation	for	the	use,	and	success,	of	MDMA-assisted	psychotherapy	for	
conditions	including	PTSD	(post-traumatic	stress	disorder)	(Mithoefer	et	al.,	2012;	
Sessa,	2011).	The	language	he	uses	is	striking:	of	blockages,	‘you’re	stuck’,	and	
burdens,	‘a	lot	of	weight	on	[his]	shoulders’,	which	permeate	deep	down	into	his	
subconscious	mind,	‘I	had	nightmares	pretty	much	every	other	day’.	This	halting	and	
burdening	of	his	experiencing	of	the	world	can	be	better	understood	through	a	
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process-orientated	view	of	memory.	The	question	of	forgetting	is	crucial	for	what	
Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)	term	‘vital	memories’:	‘memories	that	become	pivotal	to	
trying	to	make	sense	of	a	life’	(p3),	which	are	often	distressing	or	difficult.	Karl’s	
memory	of	the	car	accident	he	was	involved	with	could	be	seen	as	a	vital	memory,	it	
seems	to	have	left	a	mark	on	his	life	and	structured	his	experience	in	a	profound	
way.	Bergson	understood	forgetting	as	a	protection	against	the	domination	of	the	
present	by	the	past.	For	Karl,	we	could	see	this	particular	vital	memory	as	having	an	
unwelcome	level	of	dominion	over	his	present:	it’s	an	‘important	part	of	[his]	life’	
that	he	alone	was	‘stuck’	with	and	was	still	causing	him	distress	in	the	present.	
Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)	describe	the	kind	of	‘active,	selective	forgetting	that	goes	
on	around	vital	memories…as	a	form	of	displacement,	an	effort	to	redirect	the	flow	
of	experience	while	retaining	the	connection’	(emphasis	in	original,	p72).	Sharing	
these	tragic	events	with	his	partner	could	be	viewed	as	such	a	displacement:	it	is	no	
longer	a	‘weight’	he	alone	must	bear,	it	becomes	a	shared	memory	between	the	two	
of	them;	a	part	of	who	he	is	that	can	be	seen	by	someone	‘really	close	to	[him]’.	It	
also	follows	in	the	footprints	of	a	therapeutic	understanding	of	the	self	(Brownlie,	
2014;	Illouz,	2008):	Karl	ties	his	well-being	to	the	talking	through	of	this	memory	
with	his	girlfriend.	Restraining	expression	of	the	event	was	causing	him	a	great	deal	
of	distress,	he	had	nightmares	‘pretty	much	every	other	day’,	yet	this	was	completely	
excised	through	talk,	‘it	makes	my	life	a	lot	easier’.			
	 While	perhaps	not	considered	vital	memories,	other	participants	also	pointed	
to	a	rupture	in	their	experience	as	a	result	of	distressing	events	or	situations.	For	
Eva,	this	was	an	estrangement	from	her	mother:	
	
Eva:	and	I	had,	uh,	some	problems	with	my	family	or	with	my	mother	and	this	
was	like,	um…I	haven’t	talked	to	her	since	years.	I	don’t	know	when,	when	
was	the	last	time.	And	it	was	like,	every	few	weeks	I	thought	about	it	and	then	
we	took	MDMA	together,	I	think	it	was	fourth	time	or	third	time,	something	
like	that	[Lars:	yeah]	and	then	I	started	talking	about	it	and	it	was	like	‘ok,	
now	I’m	free.	I,	I	can	deal	with	this.	No	problem.	I	live	with	this,	it’s	part	of	my	
life.	It’s	no	problem	for	me	anymore.’	And	since	then	I,	I	thought	about	all	this	
stuff,	like	two	or	three	times	and	it	was	one	and	a	half	years	ago	or	one	year	
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ago.	It	was	like	a	therapy	and	I	was	so	glad	that	he	was	the	person	I	can	talk	
to	about	it	and	after,	the	next	day,	I	was	like,	I	was	free.	Because	it	was	a	part	
of	my	mind.	It	was	a	barrier	in	my	mind	and	the	barrier’s	gone.	I	was	and	this	
was	part	that	I’m	the	person,	who	I	am	now.			
I	didn’t	realise	it	as	a	problem	I	had.	It’s	just	that	I	thought	every	few	weeks	
about	it	and	then	sometimes	I	was	like	‘oh,	I	don’t	want	to	think	about	it’.		It’s	
just	like	came,	I	don’t	know	where	it	came	from…I	just	really	wanted	to	talk	
about	it,	I	don’t	know	why.		I	think	it	was	important	that	he	knows	it	and	he	
knows	me,	like	who	I	really	am.		And	I	learnt	who	I	really	am	and	it	was	nice	
to	share	it	(Couple	interview:	Eva	&	Lars)	
	
Similarly	to	Karl,	Eva	speaks	of	past	events	obstructing	her	experience:	the	
estrangement	from	her	mother,	‘I	haven’t	talked	to	her	since	years’	was	like	a		
‘barrier	in	[her]	mind’.	This	‘barrier’	seemed	to	act	to	cordon	off	these	memories	and	
prevent	their	integration	into	a	cohesive	sense	of	self;	in	other	words,	they	were	in	
her	mind	but	did	not	feel	part	of	her	mind.	After	she	speaks	to	her	partner,	‘the	
barrier’s	gone’	and	the	experience	becomes	part	of	‘who	[she	is]	now’.	Again,	we	
could	see	her	talking	through	of	this	situation	as	allowing	for	an	‘active,	selective	
forgetting’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p71)	of	past	events,	she	recalls	how	she	used	to	
think	about	it	‘every	few	weeks’	though	she	did	not	‘want	to’	but	afterwards	this	
constricted	to	‘like	two	or	three	times’	in	the	space	of	a	year	or	so.	This	selective	
‘“canalisation”	of	the	past’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p71)	allows	for	only	the	parts	of	
the	past	that	can	produce	a	greater	sense	of	agency	to	flow	uninterrupted	into	the	
present.	Perhaps	this	might	involve	acknowledging	the	ways	in	which	this	distance	
from	her	mother	has	made	her	into	the	(strong,	resilient)	person	she	is,	certainly	her	
forgetting	seems	to	enhance	her	present	agency:	she	feels	a	sense	of	liberation,	‘I	
was	free’.		
	 Helena	also	recalls	talking	about	distressing	childhood	memories	on	MDMA	
with	her	partner,	Jakub:	
	
Helena:	I	think	that	was,	that	made	us	more,	much,	much	stronger	as	a	
couple	and	me	kind	of	trusting	you,	um.	Because	I	could	relate	to,	share	with	
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you,	uh,	my	kind	of	childhood	traumas,	I	could	describe	to	you	how	things	
were	and	kind	of	trust	you	and	kind	of	feel	the	empathy,	feel	that	you,	you	
trust,	that	I	can	trust	you	and	also	that	you	care.	You	kind	of	mirror	my	
feelings,	it’s	not	just	‘ok’	but	‘oh,	oh,	that’s	so	horrible’…it	feels	natural.	It	
feels	like,	it’s	so	easy	to	say	it.	And	like	I	remember	very	often	like	even	telling	
him	‘oh	my	god,	it	does	feel	so	weird	to	be	able	to	say	it	just	like	that.	It	just	
happens’	[Jakub:	yeah]	and	then	you	have	this	kind	of	process,	kind	of,	you’re	
reflecting	on	it,	thinking	‘oh	my	god,	how	am	I	able	to	do	that?	How’s	it	
happening?’	Like	it’s	so	nice.	It	feels	safe,	it	feels,	um,	normal,	it	feels	good	to	
be	able	to	do	that.	And	it	also	makes	you	wonder	‘why	haven’t	I	done	that	
earlier?’	Like	why	haven’t	I	said	it	like,	I	don’t	know,	like	last	year	or	
something?	[Jakub:	yeah]	you	know	why	did	I	need	to	wait	that	long.	Um,	so	
yeah,	I	don’t	know	what	you	feel	but,	for	me,	it	just	feels	so	natural,	it	just	
very	faultless,	like	it	just	flows	(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
	
Helena	places	less	emphasis	on	personal	liberation	from	distressing	memories	than	
Eva	or	Karl	do.	Though	this	is	perhaps	due	to	the	‘personal	breakthroughs’	she	had	
around	these	memories	occuring	initially	in	therapy.	Here,	her	disclosure	is	
contextualised	within	her	connection	to	Jakub,	‘that	made	us…much	stronger	as	a	
couple’.	The	authenticity	of	his	empathic	response,	‘you	kind	of	mirror	my	feelings,	
it’s	not	just	“ok”	but	“oh,	oh,	that’s	so	horrible”’	to	how	‘shar[ing]	[her]	kind	of	
childhood	traumas’	builds	the	‘trust’	between	them	and	is	real	evidence	of	the	‘care’	
he	has	for	her.	Helena	feels	Jakub	is	genuinely	sharing	in	her	painful	emotional	
experience,	tapping	into	the	importance	of	feeling	your	partner	is	emotionally	
attuned	to	you,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	theme.	Emotional	attunement	has	been	
linked	to	feelings	of	belonging	and	closeness,	and	greater	relationship	satisfaction	
(Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005;	Cohen,	Schulz,	Weiss	&	Waldinger,	2012).	The	benefit	
Helena	derives	from	talking	to	Jakub	and	his	empathic	receipt	of	her	feelings	is	
underscored	through	how	‘it	just	feels	so	natural’.	Moreover,	her	words	echo	the	
language	of	obstruction	found	in	Karl	and	Eva’s	accounts	–	he	is	‘stuck’	in	an	
experience,	she	has	a	‘barrier’	in	her	mind	–	but	from	the	other	side.	Instead	of	
talking	about	blockages,	Helena’s	description	mimics	the	release	you	feel	when	there	
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are	no	more	obstructions,	‘it	just	flows’.	Yet,	this	is	in	the	context	of	her	relationship,	
as	though	she	felt	the	undisclosed	memories	were	holding	them	back;	artificially	
blocking	a	point	of	connection.	This	draws	on	ideas	of	closeness	as	grounded	in	
mutual	disclosure,	a	‘telling	all’	approach	(Giddens,	1992),	The	affective	atmosphere	
of	MDMA	–	the	feelings	of	‘safe[ty]’,	enhanced	connection	to	your	own	emotions	
and	ability	to	respond	in	an	emotionally	sensitive	way	–	could	be	seen	to	
collaboratively	weave	a	more	conducive	pattern	to	a	positive	experience	of,	even	
difficult,	disclosures.		
	 Whereas	Helena	frames	her	experience	of	disclosure	in	how	it	connected	her	
to	her	partner,	Eva	and	Karl’s	accounts	seemed	to	lean	more	heavily	on	what	the	
disclosure	did	for	them.	Talking	about	distressing	memories	was	argued	to	allow	
them	to	engage	in	an	‘active,	selective	forgetting’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p71)	of	
events	that	opened	up	greater	possibilities	for	agency	in	their	present.	Yet,	for	all	the	
participants,	sharing	memories	from	their	past	could	be	argued	to	serve	a	social	
function	too.	Studies	have	found	sharing	personally	meaningful,	autobiographical	
memories	builds	on	and	maintains	intimacy	(Alea	&	Bluck,	2003;	Barnier,	Sutton,	
Harris	&	Wilson,	2008;	Thorne,	Cutting	&	Skaw,	1998);	indeed,	it	has	been	suggested	
that	the	fundamental	reason	to	share	autobiographical	memory	is	social	in	nature	
(Bruce,	1989;	Nelson,	1993).	All	of	the	memories	described	could	be	considered	as	
personally	meaningful,	they	have	all	left	a	‘mark’	on	Helena,	Eva	and	Karl’s	lives	in	
some	way	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Therefore,	the	sharing	of	such	memories	on	
MDMA	could	be	seen	to	inspire	closeness,	as	well	as	tapping	into	the	personal	
benefits	of	disclosure	allowing	them	to	‘selective[ly]	forget’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	
p72).		
	
4.3	Emotional	erasure:	The	power	of	collaborative	forgetting	
	
We	have	seen	how	distressing	events	and	feelings	flowed	into	couples’	
conversations.	Just	as	remembering	difficult	things	together	could	fortify	a	couple’s	
bond,	so	too	could	forgetting	together.	Dan	and	Emily	talk	about	this	as	a	
communicative	‘clean	slate’:		
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Emily:	the	E	just	helps	you	stay	focussed	on	the	task	at	hand.	That	is	probably	
just	a	big	part	of	it,	just	not	having	those	other	defence	things	you	have:	the	
attitude	or	the	little	personal	quirks	during	an	argument...those	are	gone,	all	
totally	gone	and	you’re	seriously	just	dealing	with	the	issue.	Like	Dan	and	I	
can	start	talk-,	arguing	normally	some	day	and	95%	of	the	time,	we’ll	be	
arguing	about	arguing	[laughs]	like	arguing	about	the	way	we’re	arguing,	
rather	than	the	issue…	
Interviewer:	what	do	you	mean	by	that,	like	arguing	about	the	way	that	
you’re	arguing?	
Dan:	um,	a	big	part	of	communication	is	non-verbal	so	just	a	certain	tone	of	
voice…can	set	the	whole	thing	off	so…the	E	makes	you	talk	totally	different	
then	[Emily:	yeah]	so	it’s	like,	it’s	a	whole	fresh,	clean	slate	of	communication	
that	is	kinda	difficult	to	access	(Couple	interview:	Emily	&	Dan)	
	
So	far,	the	MDMA	bubble	has	been	described	as	muting	‘negative’	feelings	like	anger	
and	fear,	but	here	this	is	manifested	in	a	peculiar	way:	as	a	break	with	past	patterns	
of	hostile	communication.	The	use	of	‘whole,	fresh,	clean’	forms	a	powerful	triad,	
underscoring	the	purifying	effect	of	MDMA.	The	normal	way	they	relate	to	each	
other	can	be	bogged	down	with	‘personal	quirks’	or	an	‘attitude’	that	produces	
tension;	they	often	end	up	arguing	about	how	they	argue.	A	‘certain	tone	of	voice’	or	
other	non-verbal	cues	can	be	more	preoccupying	than	the	content	of	the	argument.	
In	contrast,	all	the	things	written	on	their	interpersonal	‘slate’	are,	on	MDMA,	
forgotten	which	enables	them	to	‘seriously	just	deal…with	the	issue’.	Emily	and	Dan	
seem	to	speaking	here	about	their	dynamic,	what	Fuchs	(2013)	calls	their	
interpersonal	atmosphere.	He	uses	this	term	to	draw	attention	to	the	encompassing,	
felt	quality	that	arises	between	two	or	more	people	and	while	he	refers	to	this	kind	
of	‘affective	climate’	(p8)	in	the	context	of	psychopathology,	it	could	be	equally	
applied	to	the	‘in-between’	created	through	everyday	interpersonal	dynamics.	Part	
of	what	creates	this	is	our	bodily	‘resonance’:	our	tone	of	voice,	facial	expression,	
bodily	gestures	and	demeanour.	The	couple	can	be	seen	to	portray	their	
interpersonal	atmosphere	as	sometimes	blocking	clear	communication	and	fostering	
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a	degree	of	hostility.	Emily	talks	elsewhere	about	sometimes	needing	to	
psychologically	defend	herself	from	Dan	due	to	the	nature	of	his	work,	‘I	feel	like	he’s	
using	[the	tools	of	his	work]	on	me	sometimes’,	manifesting	here	as	a	defensive	
‘attitude’	perhaps.	In	addition,	Dan	mentions	how	instrumental	a	‘certain	tone	of	
voice’	can	be	in	‘set[ting]	the	whole	thing	off’;	another	aspect	of	our	bodily	
resonance	(Fuchs,	2013).		
In	contrast,	Dan	sees	them	as	being	able	to	communicate	afresh	on	MDMA,	
unencumbered	by	past	dynamics,	a	state	‘difficult	to	access’	in	ordinary	life.	They	
describe	the	atmosphere	between	them	on	MDMA	as	nonjudgmental	and	safe	and	
that	this	‘makes	you	talk	totally	different[ly]’.	In	keeping	with	the	therapeutic	
cultural	script	that	‘it’s	good	to	talk’	(Brownlie,	2014),	remembering	and	talking	
through	past	difficulties	tends	to	be	encouraged	while	the	practice	of	relational	
forgetting	can	be	viewed	with	suspicion;	perhaps	framed	as	a	‘sweeping	under	the	
rug’	of	what	needs	to	be	openly	addressed.	However,	there	is	a	body	of	work	in	
memory	studies	that	emphasises	the	power	of	forgetting	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015;	
Harris,	Sutton	&	Barnier,	2010;	Middleton	&	Brown,	2005).	The	domination	of	the	
computer	model	of	memory,	where	we	are	supposed	to	take	in	information	and	
then	accurately	reproduce	it,	further	cements	the	equation	of	forgetting	with	failure	
but	this	misses	the	ways	in	which	forgetting	can	be	desirable.	For	example,	the	
selective	forgetting	of	distressing	events	can	create	better	possibilities	for	how	we	
can	act	in	the	present	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Just	as	remembering	can	serve	social	
functions	such	as	teaching	others,	eliciting	empathy	or	developing	and	sustaining	
intimacy	(Alea	&	Bluck,	2003),	it	has	been	argued	that	forgetting,	too,	can	serve	a	
social	purpose	(Harris,	Sutton	&	Barnier,	2010).	For	example,	forgetting	the	
relationships	of	the	past	can	be	helpful	to	a	couple	at	the	beginning	a	new	
relationship	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Indeed,	the	forgetting	that	Dan	and	Emily	
describe	on	MDMA	seems	rooted	in	its	social	function:	it	allows	them	to	better	
communicate	with	one	another	and	build	on	their	intimacy.	This	is	not	a	total	
erasure	of	how	they	communicate,	rather	it	is	a	selective	forgetting	of	the	‘personal	
quirks’,	‘attitudes’	and	‘tone	of	voice’	that	have	in	the	past	soured	their	dynamic.	This	
forgetting	helps	construct	a	different	interpersonal	atmosphere	between	them:	one	
of	greater	acceptance	and	clarity	so	they	can	stay	‘focussed	on	the	task	at	hand’,	
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rather	than	getting	sidetracked	into	the	grooves	of	a	defensive	or	tense	pattern	of	
communication.	
For	two	other	couples,	taking	MDMA	also	seemed	to	facilitate	an	‘active	
forgetting’	of	the	past	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p13).	Both	cases	involved	a	
dissipation	of	more	intense	present-moment	anger	and,	again,	seemed	to	bring	
couples	closer:	
	
Joe:	taking	E	and	then,	yeah,	the	next	thing	you	remember	is	that	you’re	sat	
next	to	each	other	on	the	rug…we’d	go	from	being	18	foot	apart	to	2	cm	
apart	down	there.	That’s	my	image	of	it…you	just	move	like	that	and	it	never	
fails.	However	much	rowing	we’d	done,	it	never	failed	once.	There	wasn’t	
once	when	it	carried	on…into	that	space.	That	wipes	it	away	(Couple	
interview:	Rachel	&	Joe)	
	
Helena:	It	was	really	cold…um,	so	he	borrowed	me	his	hat	and	then	after	a	
while	he	wanted	to	have	it	back	and	I	don’t	want	him	to	take	it	back.	So	we	
started	like	arguing,	um,	and	we	were	walking	through	the	bridge,	um,	and	
he	just,	you	just	basically	threw	it	into	the	water,	the	hat...I	remember	like	I	
was	really	pissed	off	with	him…and	then	I	couldn’t	actually	process	everything	
that	was	going	on,	I	couldn’t	actually	make	sense	of	why,	why	I	was	feeling	so	
pissed	off	with	him,	so	hurt.	Um,	and	we	didn’t	talk	till	we	took	MDMA	but	
during	the	process	I	remember	spontaneously	thinking	about	this	event.	It	
wasn’t	something	I	was	intending	to	do	but	I	remember	thinking	about	it	and	
all	of	a	sudden…realising	how	much	I	stepped,	I	was	stepping	over	your	
boundaries	and	behaving	like	a	child	who	was	very	needy	and	wanting	you	to	
be	my	parent…and	I	think	that	was	a	very	significant	shift	in	my	way	of	
thinking	about	this	and	noticing	how	my	own	issues	were	affecting	our	
relationship…One	of	those	moments	where	you	kind	of	realise,	um,	things	and	
so	something	on	the	cognitive	level	and	on	the	emotional	level	that	changes,	
that	we’ve	noticed.	(Couple	interview:	Helena	&	Jakub)	
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The	affective	atmosphere	of	MDMA	is	clearly	demarcated	by	Joe,	‘that	space’,	which	
is	‘wiped’	clean	of	its	murky,	argumentative	build-up	and	the	hostility	and	anger	that	
surely	accompany	it.	This	emotional	cleansing	‘never	fails’	and	is	physically	
manifested	in	the	way	him	and	his	partner	of	25	years,	Rachel,	used	to	‘go	from	
being	18ft	apart	to	2cm	apart’.	For	Joe,	taking	MDMA	seems	to	be	like	pressing	a	
reset	button:	the	anger	and	frustration	interrupting	their	closeness	is	removed	and	
they	can	once	again	come	together	physically	and	emotionally.	Due	to	the	
embeddedness	of	our	emotions	in	our	personal	biographies	(Burkitt,	2014),	it	is	
important	to	note	these	experiences	took	place	in	the	emotionally	turbulent	early	
days	of	their	relationship.	They	had	both	left	their	partners	to	be	with	each	other	but	
while	Rachel	found	the	separation	bearable,	Joe	was	struggling	with	guilt	over	
leaving	his	ex-partner.	He	was	‘still	kind	of	in	a	relationship’	with	her,	though	he	
describes	this	as	rooted	in	a	belief	in	‘fairness’	rather	than	stronger	depth	of	feeling.	
In	this	context,	a	joint	forgetting	could	be	seen	as	socially	functional:	the	removal	of	
anger	and	hurt	originating	from	a	particular	set	of	circumstances,	rather	than	their	
dynamic,	allows	them	to	re-experience	the	bond	that	brought	them	together.	
Crucially,	a	more	intense	bond	than	they	experienced	with	their	previous	partners.	
This	is	not	to	suggest	that	those	difficult	events	were	simply	forgotten,	they	spent	a	
long	time	discussing	them	on	MDMA,	but	their	emotional	association	to	these	
events	was	altered.	Emotions	are	a	large	part	of	what	give	events	and	situations	
their	meaning	(Fuchs,	2013;	Cromby,	2015)	and	if	MDMA	helps	produce	positive	
emotional	associations	and	dims	negative	ones,	then	the	meaning	of	information,	
like	your	partner’s	connection	to	someone	else,	might	change.	This	is	also	suggested	
to	be	contextualised	by	their	particular	scenario	e.g.	a	deep	connection	to	one	
another	which	outshone	previous	relationships.	This	emotional	erasure	enabled	the	
couple	to	have	‘incredibly	painful	conversations…that	weren’t	painful’	and	do	so	
enveloped	in	an	emotional	closeness	manifested	by	their	‘2cm	apart’	bodies.		
	 Yet,	there	is	another	lens	through	which	to	see	this	emotional	erasure.	
Despite	the	way	Joe	frames	his	continued	relationship	with	his	previous	partner	as	
out	of	‘fairness’,	the	fact	remains	that	in	a,	likely	monogamous,	relationship	with	
Rachel,	he	was	being	unfaithful.	This	does	not	seem	to	be	the	sole	focus	of	their	
arguments	but,	certainly,	a	part	of	them.	Rachel	states	that	she	does	not	think	they	
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would	still	be	together	if	not	for	taking	MDMA	at	that	point	in	their	relationship.	
Perhaps	MDMA,	then,	can	be	seen	as	creating	an	affective	space	that	overrode	
hurtful	behaviour	which	otherwise	might	have	caused	to	them	to	break	up.	This	
could	be	seen	as	prefigured	in	some	of	the	literature,	for	example,	the	‘instant	
marriage’	syndrome	of	MDMA	coined	by	Timothy	Leary	is	a	similar	concept	but	in	
reverse:	couples	who	might	otherwise	never	become	romantically	involved,	do	so	
under	the	blur	of	intensely	positive	and	muted	negative	emotionality.	This	softening	
of	the	pain	associated	with	infidelity	from	a	partner	could	be	potentially	problematic	
since	sexual	(and	often	emotional)	fidelity	is	often	considered	a	non-negotiable	part	
of	a	couple	relationship	(Finn,	2012).	Therefore,	taking	MDMA	might	be	seen	to	
promote	relationship	longevity	at	the	cost	of	personal	boundaries	and	pain.	
However,	it	is	worth	noting	people	do	value	fidelity	to	different	degrees	(e.g.	the	
consensual	non-monogamy	movement)	and	this	took	place	in	the	very	early	days	of	
their	relationship,	which	has	now	continued	for	over	twenty	years	and	which	the	
couple	frame	as	central	to	their	lives.		
Helena	also	seems	to	describe	MDMA	performing	an	emotional	‘resetting’	
after	an	argument.	Yet,	while	this	immediately	draws	Joe	and	Rachel	back	together,	
for	Helena	closeness	only	comes	after	she	has	reached	a	new	understanding	of	the	
situation.	She	emphasises	how	she	was	‘really	pissed	off’,	‘so	pissed	off’	and	‘hurt’	
with	her	partner	that	they	‘didn’t	talk’	until	taking	MDMA;	even	though	she	couldn’t,	
at	the	time,	‘actually	process’	why	she	felt	so	intensely.	MDMA	acts	as	a	neutralising	
agent	for	her	anger,	removing	it	from	the	interaction	-	she	doesn’t	mention	it	again	
and	converts	to	cognitive	terms	such	as	‘realising’	and	‘thinking’.	The	removal	of	
strong,	negative	emotions	aids	in	a	clearer	examination	of	the	situation	where	
Helena	considers	her	own	behaviour	and	how	she	‘stepped…over	[his]	boundaries’	
by	behaving	in	a	childish	way,	which	precipitates	a	‘very	significant	shift	in	[her]	way	
of	thinking	about…how	[her]	own	issues	were	affecting	[their]	relationship’.	This	kind	
of	newly	acquired	insight	or	ability	to	embrace	other	perspectives	has	been	
described	previously	as	part	of	MDMA	use	(Duff,	2008;	Hinchliff,	2001).	Helena	
realises	it	is	not	purely	about	what	Jakub’s	done	to	her;	also	recognising	how	her	
own	behaviour	feeds	into	his,	creating	a	behavioural	feedback	loop.	This	taps	into	a	
recognised	change	process	in	couples	therapy:	of	taking	personal	responsibility	for	
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relationship	experiences	(Kurri,	&	Wahlström,	2005;	Greenberg,	James	&	Conroy,	
1988).	The	idea	is	that	we	can	only	change	ourselves,	not	others,	so	taking	
responsibility	highlights	something	which	is	within	our	power	to	potentially	change	
i.e.	our	own	behaviour.	This	awareness	is	the	first	step	to	actually	focussing	on	that	
personal	behaviour,	thought	pattern	or	emotional	response	and	creating	the	desired	
change.	For	Helena,	MDMA’s	muting	of	her	overwhelming	anger	facilitates	a	
recognition	of	her	child-like	neediness	and	how	she	was	constructing	Jakub	as	her	
parent,	rather	than	her	partner.	Within	this	context,	Jakub’s	gesture	of	throwing	the	
hat	into	the	river	could	be	construed	as	him	(perhaps	overzealously)	resisting	the	
unwanted	parental	role	being	thrust	upon	him.		
In	fact,	both	Helena	and	Jakub	have	been	to	individual	therapy	so	it’s	unclear	
whether	Helena	taking	responsibility	in	this	way	on	MDMA	was	a	spontaneous	
process	or	more	linked	to	her	experiences	there.	As	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter,	
they	both	wrestle	with	assigning	weight	to	the	input	of	therapy	vs.	MDMA,	pulling	in	
both	directions	before	Helena	comes	to	a	balanced	conclusion:	
	
I	think	for	our	relationship	it	was	just	a	combination	of	us	both	going	through	
individual	therapy,	and	having	MDMA	experience.	Like	this,	these	both	factors	
kind	of	influence	each	other	(Couple	interview:	Helena	and	Jakub)	
	
MDMA	and	therapy	took	place	at	the	same	time	and	‘influence[d]	each	other’.	The	
former	seems	to	lay	the	emotional	groundwork	for	the	latter	as	Helena	explains	how	
lingering	‘emotional	fragility’	from	weekend	MDMA	use	would	work	to	‘facilitate	
breakthroughs	in	[her]	therapy’.	Research	has	suggested	MDMA	to	be	a	catalyst	to,	
rather	than	a	replacement	for,	the	therapeutic	process:	Montagne	(2001)	referred	to	
a	therapist	who	equated	a	single	MDMA-assisted	session	with	5	months	of	non-
assisted	therapy.	One	of	the	suggested	mechanisms	through	which	this	is	
accomplished	is	by	helping	in	the	‘processing	[of]	difficult	emotions	that	have	a	deep	
component	of	fear	and/or	anxiety’	(Doblin,	2002,	p10).	For	the	couple,	this	might	
make	discussion	of	painful	things	on	MDMA	more	bearable,	indeed	earlier	in	the	
chapter	Helena	discusses	how	she	appreciates	Jakub	being	with	her	and	mirroring	
her	feelings	as	she	discusses	traumatic	childhood	memories.	Similarly,	a	leftover	
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sense	of	emotional	openness	from	previous	MDMA	use	might	feasibly	have	had	a	
comparable	if	less	exaggerated	effect	in	Helena’s	personal	therapy	sessions.	
‘Afterglow’	effects	from	MDMA	have	been	recorded	as	being	felt	for	several	days	
post-MDMA	use	(Freye,	2009;	Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994).	
Arguably,	Joe	and	Helena’s	accounts	speak	to	the	social	nature	of	memory.	
As	discussed	previously,	in	the	same	way	that	sharing	memories	has	been	found	to	
help	maintain	relational	intimacy	(Alea	&	Bluck,	2003),	forgetting	is	also	argued	to	
serve	a	social	goal.	This	is	not	a	total	forgetting	as	‘the	past	in	its	entirety	is	never	
erased’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p72),	but	highly	selective:	for	Joe	and	Helena,	the	
details	of	past	events	are	remembered	on	MDMA	but	the	visceral	nature	of	their	
anger	regarding	them	disappears.	Similarly,	for	Dan	and	Emily	it	is	hostility,	the	
defensive	and	judgmental	‘tone	of	voice’,	that	is	stripped	out	of	their	experience.	
This	partial	forgetting	allows	couples	to	maintain	their	connection	with	these	
experiences	while	only	remembering	the	parts	which	can	help	shape	better	
possibilities	for	intimacy	in	the	present.	As	Brown	and	Reavey	(2015)	conclude	
perhaps	‘we	need	to	learn	how	to	actively	forget,	just	as	much	as	we	need	to	learn	
how	to	recollect’	(2015,	p75).	
	
4.4	Conclusions	
	
MDMA	produces	an	emotional	safe	haven	for	couples:	one	largely	protected	from	
fear,	anger	and	shame	and	populated	with	happiness,	connection	and	safety.	There	
is	also	a	greater	connection	to	one’s	own	emotions	and	an	increased	capacity	to	
express	them.	This	is	reflected	in	experimental	research	where	MDMA	increases	the	
ability	of	participants	to	recognise	positive	emotions	(Hysek	et	al.,	2012)	while	their	
ability	to	recognise	negative	emotions	is	impaired	(Bedi	et	al.,	2010;	Hysek	et	al.,	
2012);	and	MDMA	increases	emotional	empathy	(Schmid	et	al.,	2014)	a	shift	that	is	
thought	to	go	some	way	in	explaining	the	associated	prosocial	effects	(Kirkpatrick,	
Lee,	Wardle,	Jacob	&	de	Wit,	2014).	These	effects	create	an	altered	emotional	
dynamic	between	couples,	changing	what	they	did	and	the	meaning	of	the	practices	
they	engaged	in.		
	146	
Firstly,	couples	seemed	more	emotionally	attuned	to	one	another,	which	has	
been	linked	with	increased	relationship	contentment	(Cohen,	Schulz,	Weiss	&	
Waldinger,	2012;	Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005).	This	was	suggested	to	hold	particular	
significance	due	to	the	way	attunement	on	MDMA	recalibrated	gender	roles,	in	
particular	men’s	increased	emotional	expression	and	responsiveness.	In	addition,	
this	attunement	was	argued	as	produced	through	a	multitude	of	interrelated	modes	
–	affective,	conceptual	and	spatial.	Secondly,	the	nonjudgmental	affective	
atmosphere	of	MDMA	helped	participants	to	disclose	their	thoughts	and	feelings	
more	freely.	This	facilitated	a	range	of	relationship	disclosures,	which	were	argued	to	
be	constrained	by	day-to-day	life	and	the	honesty	of	which	was	highly	valued.	
However,	these	disclosures	were	not	without	cost	or	discomfort.	In	addition,	
distressing	memories	were	disclosed.	Remembering	together	allowed	participants	to	
engage	in	an	‘active,	selective	forgetting’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p2)	of	these	past	
events,	opening	up	new	possibilities	for	personal	agency	in	the	present	and	was	
suggested	to	strengthen	the	bond	between	partners	(Alea	&	Bluck,	2003).	Finally,	
the	distinct	affective	space	of	the	bubble	could	erase	past	feelings	of	anger	and	
reconstitute	a	couple’s	interpersonal	atmosphere	(Fuchs,	2013).	The	dispersal	of	
anger	could	assist	in	recognising	personal	responsibility	in	disputes	or	invoke	a	joint	
forgetting	of	painful	circumstances.	Alternatively,	this	erasure	wiped	away	a	tense	
interpersonal	atmosphere,	which	was	inhibiting	clear	communication.	In	all	of	these	
cases,	selective	forgetting	seemed	to	allow	for	couples	to	re-establish	their	
understanding	and	closeness.		
	 Thus,	as	many	scholars	have	persuasively	argued	(Brownlie,	2014;	Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015;	Jamieson,	1998;	Smart,	2007),	there	were	a	range	of	practices	that	made	
couples	feel	close,	from	being	in	physically	proximity	and	on	the	same	emotional	
wavelength	to	revealing	secrets	about	themselves	and	their	relationship.	The	next	
chapter	will	build	on	the	multiplicity	of	things	couples	did	that	made	them	feel	close	
on	MDMA,	turning	attention	to	their	movement	through	and	interaction	with	
spaces.		
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Chapter	5	–	Shifting	boundaries,	(un)moving	bodies	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	MDMA	produced	an	organic,	affective	atmosphere	of	love	
and	connection,	which	mediated	emotional	and	discursive	practices	of	closeness.		
Another	key	mediator	of	intimate	practices,	the	spatial,	embodied	mode	of	
experience,	will	be	explored	in	this	chapter.	In	particular,	the	intertwinement	of	this	
spatial	mode	with	boundaries	between	self	and	other	and	within	the	self	will	be	
considered	while,	in	the	next	chapter,	the	focus	shifts	to	boundaries	couples	draw	
around	MDMA	experiences,	separating	these	experiences	from	their	everyday	lives	
and	other	people.		
The	relational	understanding	of	space	taken	in	this	work	appreciates	how	
space	is	produced	through	intensive	connections,	like	emotion,	memory	and	
perception,	to	objects	and	people	encountered	in	the	past	or	imagined	future	
(Brown,	2012)	and	extensive,	material	features	of	space	(DeLanda,	2005).	As	couples	
moved	in	and	through	spaces	and	interacted	with	features	of	these	settings,	
different	possibilities	for	action	were	opened	up,	reformulating	and	reproducing	
subjectivity	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	These	subjectivities	seemed	to	be	entangled	
with	a	sharpening	or	shifting	of	the	boundaries	within	and	beyond	the	self.	Firstly,	
couples’	sporadic	movement	through	and	interaction	with	settings	on	MDMA	will	be	
discussed.	This	pattern	of	movement	produced	playful	subjectivities,	which	
underscored	the	individual	identities	of	partners	and	the	alien	nature	of	the	objects	
that	popped	up	in	the	experience.	In	contrast,	continuous	motion	led	to	a	blurring,	
rather	than	reinforcement,	of	boundaries	within	the	self.	This	boundary	is	argued	as	
entrenched	by	both	cognitivism	and	social	constructionism	and	exists	between	
discourse/mind	and	body	(Cromby,	2004)	–	movement	on	MDMA	seemed	to	tug	at	
this	divide,	producing	a	whole,	embodied	subjectivity	for	participants.	Finally,	
couples	also	spoke	of	a	lack	of	movement,	sitting	together	in	material	arrangements	
that	locked	in	physical	closeness.	From	these	settings	emerged	a	new	sense	of	
shared	subjectivity	as	arguably	the	most	crucial	boundary	of	all,	between	self	and	
other,	became	hazy.			
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5.1	Defined	boundaries	and	playful	subjectivities	
	
The	boundaries	between	self	and	other,	self	and	world	in	some	MDMA	experiences	
remained	strongly	defined.	In	these	memories,	couples	moved	through	urban,	
natural	and	home	settings,	their	attention	regularly	diverted	by	objects	and	other	
material	features	of	the	spaces,	which	they	would	stop	to	explore.	This	suspendable	
forward	momentum	seemed	primed	to	produce	a	landscape	of	adventure	and	
discovery,	experienced	by	Mark	and	Jenny	when	they	took	MDMA	with	another	
couple:	
	
Jenny:	we	took	the	MDMA	in	downtown	[city	1],	erm,	and	we	walked	around,	
they	had	an	outdoor	art	exhibit,	which	was	really	cool…	
Mark:	it	just	works	so	seamlessly	that,	erm,	you	don’t	know	how	it	happens,	
erm	at	one	point	we	found	a	piano	outside	and	we	were	playing	piano	and	
walked	around	inside	of	a	drugstore,	umm…and	it,	just	a	whole	bunch	of	
many	experiences	just	seemed	like	the	greatest	thi-I	think	if	anyone	was	
watching	that	they	would	think	that	we	were	just	completely	boring	but	I	
think	it’s	kind	of	funny	that	the	playing	piano	experience	was	really,	err,	a	
highlight	of	the	evening	and	were	were	just,	you	know,	we	don’t	know	how	to	
play	piano	but	we	were	playing	piano	[chuckles]	
Jenny:	they	had	all	these,	err,	big	pianos	outside	that	anyone	could	play,	it	
was	little	thing	going	on	in	[city	1].	Yeah,	I	mean	we	just	kept	finding	various,	
fun	outdoor	stuff	like	that.	There	was	just,	the	weather	was	like	perfect	and,	
umm,	it	was	really	nice	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
Mark	and	Jenny	recount	walking	around	the	city	encountering	‘various,	fun	outdoor	
stuff’.	There	is	a	sense	of	playful	exploration	as	they	‘seamlessly’	move	from	one	
thing	to	another;	magnified	by	the	spontaneity	of	their	discoveries,	they	‘just	kept	
finding’	things.	This	playfulness,	where	results	matter	less	than	the	pure	fun	of	the	
moment	(Perel,	2007),	is	showcased	further	by	how	they	‘d[id]n’t	know	how	to	play	
piano	but	[they]	were	playing	piano’	and	the	humour	with	which	this	story	is	retold,	
‘[chuckles]’.	The	movement	of	their	bodies	through	the	space	and	the	objects	they	
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encounter	embodies	all	aspects	Brown	(2009)	sees	as	defining	a	state	of	play:	
‘Stepping	out	of	a	normal	routine,	finding	novelty,	being	open	to	serendipity,	
enjoying	the	unexpected,	embracing	a	little	risk,	and	embracing	the	heightened	
vividness	of	life.’	(Brown,	2009,	p173).	They	embrace	the	unknown	and	the	
serendipitous,	they	have	no	plan	for	the	evening’s	activity	and	instead	respond	to	
the	unusual	things	they	come	across,	and	there	is	a	little	risk	too,	being	in	a	public	
space	on	an	illegal	substance.	The	novelty,	in	fact,	seems	crucial	as	Mark	emphasises	
how	‘there’s	no	going	back	to	the	first	or	second	time	that	[they]’ve	taken	it’	with	the	
other	couple,	Luke	and	Rebecca;	‘there’s	no	way	to	recreate’	the	depth	of	enjoyment	
the	couple	experienced	when	taking	MDMA	with	others	was	entirely	new.		
Couples	who	took	part	in	a	novel,	exciting	activity	together	have	been	shown	
to	behaviourally	express	and	experience	increased	relationship	satisfaction	
compared	to	couples	who	did	something	familiar	and	enjoyable	together	(Aron,	
Aron,	Norman	&	McKenna,	2000).	This	suggests	that	Mark	and	Jenny	being	open	to	
the	unexpected	and	engaging	in	activities	they	have	never	done	before,	‘we	don’t	
know	how	to	play	piano’	and	taking	MDMA	with	other	people,	might	refresh	their	
connection.	Certainly,	they	speak	about	the	night	with	affection.	Mark	describes	the	
experience	as	‘so	good’	and	Jenny	describes	it	as	‘bringing	[them]	all	together’.	She	
was	worried	about	feeling	like	an	‘outsider’	in	the	group:	things	with	Luke,	Mark’s	
best	friend,	had	been	strained	and	she	had	never	met	his	partner,	Rebecca,	before.	
She	goes	on	to	talk	about	how	her	‘relationship	with	Luke	strengthened	a	lot’	and	
how	it	was	‘an	instant	bonding	experience’	with	Rebecca;	the	two	couples	have	also	
met	up	several	times	and	completed	several	projects	together	since.	Therefore,	
Jenny’s	experience	indicates	how	playful	movement	on	MDMA	might	help	build	and	
re-form	non-romantic	connections	too.	Since	the	couple	is	not	a	segmented	unit	but	
embedded	in	social	networks	(Smart,	2007;	Gabb	&	Fink,	2015)	which	can	offer	
support	in	sustaining	a	relationship,	Jenny	and	Mark’s	connections	to	others	are	still	
important	for	them	as	a	couple.	Friends	and	family	can	provide	vital	support	for	
relationships	in	times	of	difficulty	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015):	support	Luke	might	be	better	
placed	to	provide	now	the	tension	between	him	and	Jenny	has	dissipated.	There	is	a	
cultural	recognition	of	the	need	to	work	at	maintaining	relationships,	though	this	
often	doesn’t	feel	like	work	to	partners	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	To	add	to	this	
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relationships	as	work	discourse,	perhaps	this	work	is	about	more	than	simply	
spending	time	together,	rehearsing	a	mutually	enjoyable,	if	familiar	routine.	Rather,	
it	is	also	about	couples	adventuring	together	as	well	as	with	others,	taking	a	leap	into	
what	feels	like	an	unknown	or	unexpected	world.		
	 The	way	in	which	MDMA	can	help	promote	this	‘open[ness]	to	serendipity’	
(Brown,	2009,	p173)	can	be	further	seen	in	the	following	description	from	Mark	and	
Jenny:		
	
Mark:	oh,	it’s	a	very	strange	thing	because	we	might	have	a	plan	for	saying	
we’re	just	gonna	walk	to	this	place	to	see	this.	But	you	find	that	you	just	start	
walking	and	you	get	into	these	neighbourhoods	or	things	you’ve	never	seen	
before	and	you	never	would	have	come	across	just	in	your	everyday…		
Jenny:	we	end	up	finding	unexpected	things	like…like,	there’s	this	like	this	
staircase…we’d	never	know	that	there	was	like	a	staircase	there,	err	
Mark:	we’ve	walked	by	it	hundreds	of	times		
Jenny:	yeah,	we	walk	by	it	hundreds	of	times	and	it	seems	like	when	
(indistinguishable)	walked	by	and	like	‘woah,	there’s	stairs	there’There’s	
something	about	the,	erm	
Mark:	opens	your	mind	(Couple	interview:	Mark	and	Jenny)	
	
Even	when	they	‘have	a	plan’	to	go	somewhere	in	particular,	they	find	themselves	
waylaid.	Moving	through	space	becomes	an	unpredictable	event,	‘But	you	find	that	
you	just	start	walking	and	you	get	into	these	neighbourhoods	or	things	you’ve	never	
seen	before’.	A	purposeful	trip	becomes	a	more	poetic	wandering	and	journeying;	it	
is	this	sense	of	absorption	and	seeming	purposelessness	that	is	argued	as	central	to	
play	(Brown,	2009)	and	not	always	deemed	valuable	by	our	modern	society	where	
the	focus	is	often	on	productivity	or	benefit	(Perel,	2007).	The	way	in	which	we	make	
sense	of	ourselves	and	our	world	through	movement	(Del	Busso,	2009;	Johnson,	
2008;	Sheets-Johnstone,	1999)	is	on	display	here	as	the	couples’	planned	walk	
morphs	into	spontaneous	play.	This	adventuring	is	not	only	about	discovering	places	
that	are	actually	new	to	them	but	looking	at	places	they	‘walked	by…hundreds	of	
times’	a-new,	noticing	what	they	have	never	noticed	before,	‘“woah,	there’s	stairs	
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there”’.	Thus,	we	can	see	how	the	difference	in	state	that	MDMA	produces	
combined	with	movement	through	and	interaction	with	the	spaces	of	drug	use	can	
open	up	an	adventurous,	exciting	vista	of	experience.		
This	sense	of	play	and	adventure,	even	in	familiar	surrounds,	is	carried	
through	in	Eva	and	Lars’	description	of	walking	around	the	city	suburbs	where	they	
live.	It	is	a	‘nice	neighbourhood’	with	‘small	gardens’	and	‘a	small	zoo’	on	the	edge	of	
a	forest.	As	they	move	through	this	landscape,	they	jokingly	adopt	an	object	for	the	
evening	to	‘share’	their	experience	with	them:		
	
Eva:	everytime	I’m	taking	MDMA,	I	have	a	new	best	friend	for	the	evening…so	
sometimes	it’s	a	chestnut	or	flower	[laughter]	or	branch	and	the,	when	we	are	
going	home,	I	release	my	new	best	friend	back	to	the	nature	[laughter].	It	
started,	I	don’t	know,	with	the	glowsticks	
Lars:	no,	it	was	the	thread	was	the	first	thing.	The	red	thread.	
Eva:	red	was	it?...	
Lars:	we	had	found,	I	think	I	found	it	in	my	pocket.	It	was	a	long,	red	thread	
and	we,	it	bounded	round	my	wrist,	it	bounded	round	her	wrist	and	I	was	like	
[puts	on	silly	voice]	‘oh,	the	thread	connects	us	now…’	[laughter]…	but	they	
become	a	tradition…	
Eva:	I	think	it	started	when	we	went	to	a	party	in	another	city	and	then	there	
was,	there	were	some	other	people	and	then	on	MDMA	you	think	‘everybody	
is	my	new	best	friend’	just	like	and	then	I	think	I	transfer	it	to	some	strange	
item	that	I	think	‘ok,	we	have	a	nice	timeWe	should	share	our	nice	time	with	
something,	I	don’t	know’	
Lars:	with	the	chestnut	[he	laughs]	
Eva:	with	the	chestnut,	with	the	glowstick	and	then	sometimes	I	talk	to	it,	
‘well	look	at	this,	look	at	this’…	a	bit	crazy	but	like,	really	like	a	child….it’s	not	
serious	
Lars:	it’s	the	thing	you	do	on	MDMA	because,	you	know,	like	sometimes	you	
do	stuff	and	like	‘oh	yeah,	you’re	my	new	best	friend,	come	with	me!’	It’s	just	
Eva:	it’s	just,	we	don’t	take	it	seriously	(Couple	interview:	Eva	&	Lars)	
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In	a	similar	way	to	Mark	and	Jenny,	their	attention	is	captured	by	separate	features	
of	the	material	world	they	encounter,	which	go	on	to	shape	their	experience.	The	
movement	of	their	bodies	through	this	setting	is	again	crucial	to	the	pleasures	they	
experience	as	they	take	a	part	of	the	natural	world,	‘a	chestnut	or	flower	[laughter]	
or	branch’	and	carry	it	with	them	to	‘share	[their]	nice	time’.	Once	again,	this	tale	is	
recounted	with	‘[laughter]’,	generously	sprinkled	through	their	re-telling,	which	
helps	express	and	produce	a	lightheartedness.	Yet,	while	this	play	is	full	of	child-like	
silliness,	underlined	by	Eva’s	insistence,	‘we	don’t	take	it	seriously’,	it	could	also	be	
seen	as	child-accommodating	due	to	the	manner	in	which	they	interact	with	the	
things	they	encounter.	In	other	words,	the	object	selected	is	treated	much	like	a	
person	or,	more	specifically,	a	child:	it	is	placed	within	the	network	of	social	ties,	‘my	
new	best	friend’,	carried	with	them	throughout	their	journey	and	spoken	to,	‘“well	
look	at	this”’,	in	an	attempt	to	engage	it	with	the	world	around	them.	Eva’s	attempt	
to	involve	the	adopted	object	with	their	surroundings	is	the	same	kind	of	strategy	
parents	employ	to	engage	their	children	with	the	outside	world:	drawing	attention	
to	salient	points	in	order	to	develop	language	use	and	awareness	(Callanan,	1985).	
Eva	further	expands	on	her	thought	process	around	incorporating	the	objects,	‘ok,	
we	have	a	nice	time.	We	should	share	our	nice	time	with	something,	I	don’t	know’.	
The	idea	of	‘shar[ing]	[their]	nice	time	with	something’	again	seems	to	chime	with	a	
parental	identity.	Langdridge,	Connolly	and	Sheeran	(2000)	found	the	most	
frequently	advocated	reasons	for	wanting	a	child	could	be	seen	as	‘satisfying	a	need	
for	the	couple	to	share	and	commit	to	something	that	belongs	to	both	of	them’	
(p327).	The	objects	procure	joint	involvement	from	the	couple,	seen	most	vividly	in	
the	way	Lars	jokes,	‘It	was	a	long,	red	thread…it	bounded	round	my	wrist,	it	bounded	
round	her	wrist	and	I	was	like	[puts	on	silly	voice]	“oh,	the	thread	connects	us	now…”	
[laughter]’.	Thus,	the	objects	acts	to	‘connect	[them]’	together,	though	the	boundary	
between	self	and	partner	remains	sharp.	The	very	fact	they	need	the	‘long,	red	
thread’	to	connect	them	implies	there	is	a	distance	to	cross,	unlike	the	experiences	
couples	described	of	merging	together	on	MDMA,	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	
this	chapter.	
Thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	Eva	and	Lars	are	engaging	in	a	particular	form	of	
imaginary	play	for	‘grown-ups’;	the	couple	are	playing	at	what	it	would	be	like	to	be	
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parents.	In	the	first	analysis	chapter,	we	saw	how	couples	talked	through	feelings,	
memories	and	relationship	issues,	whereas	here	other	forms	of	negotiation	come	to	
the	fore.	Through	and	with	these	natural	objects,	Eva	and	Lars	experience	an	
embodied,	affective	sense	of	what	it	might	be	like	to	parent	together	and	consider	
whether	this	is	something	they	would	like	to	try	for	real.	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	found	
their	participants	used	pets	in	a	similar	way:	as	substitute	children	who	could	help	
couples	imagine	and	play	out	how	parenting	might	be	in	the	future.	These	kinds	of	
imaginary	play	can	render	potent	topics	like	having	children	safe	to	some	degree:	
there	is	no	need	to	state	an	explicit	position	and	it	is	a	benign	environment	within	
which	to	trial	such	a	drastic	change.	
	 Beyond	connecting	with	the	object,	Eva	and	Lars	might	also	be	seen	to	
connect	to	each	other	through	it.	This	kind	of	mediated	connection	has	been	shown	
in	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	wide	scale	study	of	long-term	relationships,	where	a	
participant	describes	bonding	with	her	partner	through	playing	with	their	pet	
hamster.	In	both	of	these	cases,	the	mediation	of	the	couples’	experience	by	an	
animal/object,	treated	as	having	some	level	of	awareness,	opens	up	new	possibilities	
for	interaction	(c.f	Latour,	2005).	If	joint	verbal	and	physical	engagement	with	their	
pet	allows	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	participant	to	‘bond’	with	her	partner,	then	the	
same	kind	of	interaction	with	an	object	might	mimic	the	same	benefit	for	Eva	and	
Lars.	Certainly,	a	greater	sense	of	playfulness	appears	to	be	licensed,	as	Eva	and	Lars	
behave	‘like	a	child’	doing	‘little	stupid	things’.	Perel	(2007)	characterises	play	as	
‘carefree	and	unselfconsious’	(p216-7),	a	capacity	innate	to	children	that	generally	
disappears	as	we	come	into	adulthood.	Researchers	have	emphasised	the	
importance	of	play	not	only	for	children’s	development	(Ginsburg,	2007)	but	also	for	
the	wellbeing	of	adults	(Brown,	2009;	White,	2012).	Indeed,	the	object	play	draws	
the	couple	in	on	multiple	occasions,	it	‘became	a	tradition’	and	is	‘fun’.		
For	couples,	playing	together	has	been	suggested	to	help	rekindle	
relationships	and	enhance	emotional	intimacy	(Brown,	2009).	Brown	collected	
hundreds	of	‘play	histories’	and	of	the	couples	he	spoke	to	who	were	experiencing	
difficulties	in	their	relationship,	he	says	the	‘defining	factor’	of	couples	able	to	
reconnect	was	‘find[ing]	ways	to	play	together’	(p158).	He	also	suggests	that	it	is	
play’s	indefatiguable	capacity	for	silliness	that	allows	couples	to	‘drop	their	guard’	
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and	‘be	fully	with	each	other’	(p158)(emphasis	in	original).	There	is	limited	research	
examining	the	link	between	playing	and	relational	quality,	though	the	studies	that	
have	been	done	show	it	as	positively	associated	with	relationship	satisfaction	
(Proyer,	2014;	Aune	&	Wong,	2002)	and	its	impact	mediated	by	other	factors	like	
humour	(Driver	&	Gottman,	2004).	For	example,	cultivating	playfulness	has	been	
linked	to	the	capacity	to	employ	humour	in	a	conflict	scenario,	which	has	been	found	
to	predict	future	relationship	quality	(Driver	&	Gottman,	2004).	Despite	the	
promising	beginnings	of	such	research,	the	significance	of	play	for	adults	is	rarely	
acknowledged	(White,	2012).	Indeed,	the	purposelessness	of	play	seems	at	odds	
with	‘our	culture	of	high	efficiency	and	constant	accountability’	(Perel,	2007,	p217)	
or	in,	other	words,	our	tendency	always	to	think	in	terms	of	benefits	of	doing	
something	e.g.	playing	squash	for	our	cardiovascular	health.	This	is	showcased	by	
the	declining	rates	of	play	even	for	children	over	the	past	50	years	(Gray,	2011),	with	
many	kindergartens	allocating	between	2	to	3	hours	for	maths	and	reading	and	as	
little	as	30	minutes	per	day	to	unstructured	play	(Alliance	for	Childhood,	2009).		
MDMA	is	a	crucial	constituent	of	this	ludic	space	for	Lars,	‘it’s	the	thing	you	
do	[on	the	drug]’;	an	assertion	supported	by	experimental	studies	where	participants	
self-report	a	significant	increase	in	playfulness	(Bedi	&	de	Wit,	2011;	Wardle,	
Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2014).	However,	play	has	not	been	emphasised	within	MDMA	
research,	with	explorations	of	this	more	playful	state	largely	limited	to	particular	
social	contexts	within	clubbing	culture	(Malbon,	1999;	Northcote,	2006;	Thornton,	
1995).	These	spaces	could	be	described	as	‘liminal’	(Turner,	1984;	Stenner,	2016;	
Stenner	&	Moreno-Gabriel,	2013;	Stenner	&	Greco,	2017),	as	transcending	everyday	
social	structures	and	allowing	for	club	goers	to	play	with	different	identities	(Malbon,	
1999),	particularly	adult	identities	in	the	transitional	period	from	adolescence	to	
adulthood	(Thornton,	1995,	Northcote,	2006).	The	latter	is	facilitated	by	the	acting	
out	of	adult	activities,	such	as	sex	and	drug-taking,	on	a	‘voyage	of	discovery’	
(Northcote,	2006,	p7).	This	seems	very	different	from	the	kind	of	play	that	Eva	and	
Lars	engage	in,	which	is	centred	on	the	light-hearted	silliness	of	childlike	play,	rather	
than	the	carnival	atmosphere	and	spectacle	of	rave	culture.	Additionally,	the	couple	
are	in	their	late	20s	and	are	mired	in	financial	commitments	such	as	renting	a	flat	
and	are	in	full-time	employment.	This	contrasts	with	the	younger	age	range	spoken	
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about	in	some	MDMA	research,	who	are	in	a	more	transitional	stage	of	their	lives;	in	
limbo	between	being	cared	for	as	children	and	the	responsibilities	of	adult	life.		
However,	there	are	similarities	that	could	be	drawn	between	the	playfulness	
associated	with	rave	culture	(Malbon,	1999;	Northcote,	2006;	Thornton,	1995)	and	
Eva	and	Lars’	MDMA	experiences:	the	couple	are	still	temporarily	playing	with	their	
identity	within	a	protected	space.	In	addition,	their	play	is	similarly	contained	by	
their	drug	use	spaces.	This	ludic	exploration	is	not	a	chaotic	state	but	carefully	
contained	within	the	geographical	limits	of	outside	space:	the	object	tends	to	be	a	
part	of	the	natural	world,	‘a	chestnut	or	flower…or	branch’	and	is	‘release[d]…	back	
to	the	nature’	before	they	return	home.	This	cordoning	off	could	be	argued	to	render	
their	play	‘safe’	as	it	is	physically	delineated	from	their	home	and	tied	to	the	natural	
contexts	of	many	of	their	MDMA	trips.	This	could	apply	equally	to	distinguishing	
childlike	play	from	their	adult	world	as	well	as	drawing	a	line	around	playing	at	
parenthood	before	returning	to	their	more	carefree,	early	adult	lifestyle.	Equally,	the	
haphazard	way	in	which	they	come	across	the	object	could	be	seen	to	make	the	
exploration	less	threatening;	it	doesn’t	have	the	sweaty	anticipation	of	‘The	Talk’,	
which	couples	might	plan	ahead	of	time.		
As	outlined	in	Chapter	Two,	process	thinkers	emphasise	environments	as	
affording	certain	possibilities	for	acting,	thinking	and	feeling	(Brown	&	Reavey,	
2015).	The	organism	and	its	environment	are	intricately	entwined	within	such	an	
ecological,	relational	approach	and	spatial	affordances	are	therefore	wrapped	up	in	
the	dynamics	of	drug	use	contexts	too.	Turning	to	the	physical	features	of	the	space,	
it	can	be	seen	how	they	afford	the	playful	practice	discussed	previously:	it	is	
planned,	semi-urban	space	and	therefore	easily	journeyed	through.	In	contrast,	Eva	
and	Lars	point	out	that	not	all	spaces	are	a	good	fit	for	MDMA	experiences	e.g.	they	
describe	being	disorientated	on	MDMA	and	getting	lost	in	a	nearby	forest.	It	is	also	
important	to	take	into	account	the	socio-cultural	background	of	where	they	live	and	
the	practices	this	allows	and	prevents	(Duff,	2007).	It	is	a	‘nice…quiet’	suburban	
neighbourhood,	which	gives	them	access	to	certain	sorts	of	space	that	might	not	be	
so	readily	available	in	other	areas	e.g.	‘scenic’	gardens	and	other	natural	features	
that	they	draw	their	objects	from,	‘a	chestnut	or	flower…or	branch’.	Other	
neighbourhoods	might	either	not	have	these	spaces	or	they	might	be	rendered	
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practically	unusable	due	to	issues	with	violence	or	intimidation	(Holt	et	al.,	2009).	
Furthermore,	city	spaces	are	more	likely	to	be	surveilled	and	policed	by	both	state	
and	commercial	parties	(Chatterton	&	Hollands,	2002),	making	suburban	spaces	a	
less	risky	environment	within	which	to	consume	drugs.	It	might	also	mean	the	
couple	feel	less	regulated	in	the	space	and	therefore	greater	feelings	of	freedom	are	
afforded.	Therefore,	moving	through	picturesque,	ordered	and	unsurveilled	spaces	
on	MDMA	affords	a	sense	of	adventure	for	Eva	and	Lars	that	might	not	be	so	
available	to	other	couples	and	has	real	protective	consequences	against	the	legal	
ramifications	of	drug	use.	
The	same	playfulness	that	came	through	in	Eva	and	Lars’	and	Mark	and	
Jenny’s	experiences	was	also	recounted	by	another	couple,	Leanne	and	Matt.	
Conversely,	however,	Leanne	and	Matt	journey	around	their	home	and	not	through	
outside	space.	This	might	be	seen	as	partially	responsible	for	the	way	in	which	being	
playful	seemed	disruptive	as	well	as	productive	for	social	connection,	since	other	
people	share	this	space	with	them:	
	
Leanne:	we	were	up	all	night	one	night	and	we	ran	out	of	rizzlers	so	we	
started	finding	new	things	we	could	smoke	and	at	first,	‘ah,	finding	like	books	
that	would	be	funny	to	smoke’	…and	faces	that	would	be	funny	to	smoke,	um,	
from	magazines	and	things.	And	at	that	time	no	one	had	any	money	apart	
from	Matt	had	had	this	big	injection	of	cash	because	he’d	been	in	this	car	
accident	so	we	were	all	just	spending	that	basically	
Matt:	[laughs]	
Leanne:	but	we	only	had	ten	pounds	left	and	Matt	had	promised	it	to	Rich,	
um,	so	he	could	get	to	work	the	next	day.	And,	but	4	in	the	morning	we	were	
like	‘let’s	smoke	the	tenner.	That’ll	be	funny’.	So	we	smoked	this	tenner	
[laughs]	(Couple	interview:	Leanne	&	Matt)	
	
Their	focus	on	‘finding	new	things’,	rooting	through	their	possessions,	gives	an	
exploratory	sense,	though	more	contained	as	they	are	inside	their	home.	Leanne	and	
Matt	are	imbued	with	a	childlike	silliness,	trying	to	outdo	each	other	in	finding	‘faces	
that	would	be	funny	to	smoke’.	At	first	they	start	with	‘books’	and	‘magazines’	
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before	hitting	upon	a	‘tenner’	and	smoking	that	too.	These	objects,	like	the	piano	for	
Mark	and	Jenny	or	the	chestnut/flower/branch	for	Eva	and	Lars,	are	integral	to	their	
experience	(Latour,	2005).	The	playfulness	the	couples	engage	in	is	only	possible	
with	and	through	these	objects:	without	the	books	there	is	nothing	to	playfully	
repurpose,	the	piano	offers	up	the	skill	that	Mark	and	Jenny	haphazardly	
approximate	and	without	the	branch,	there	would	be	nothing	for	Eva	and	Lars	to	
entreat	to	appreciate	the	world	around	them.	This	provides	a	practical	glimpse	of	
how	being	a	subject	depends	on	object-related	concerns	(Stenner,	2008).	In	a	
process	ontology,	subjects	are	not	cordoned	off	from	objects	but	interdependent	
with	them.	As	Stenner,	Bhatti	and	Church	(2012)	argue,	this	argument	has	much	
wider	implications	than	simply	troubling	the	subject/object	dichotomy	(for	further	
details,	see	p9)	however,	for	our	purposes	here,	this	attitude	of	interdependence	
allows	us	to	see	how	experience	is	never	abstractable	from	its	spatial,	material	
circumstances.	The	playful	subjectivity	that	participants	take	up	on	MDMA	depends	
on	the	objects	they	encounter.		
	 We	can	also	think	about	these	objects	as	more	than	passive	intermediary	but	
an	active	mediator	(Latour,	2005).	An	intermediary,	according	to	Latour	(2005),	
‘transports	meaning	or	force	without	transformation:	defining	its	inputs	is	enough	to	
define	its	outputs’	(p39),	while	with	a	mediator	its	‘specificity	has	to	be	taken	into	
account	every	time.	Mediators	transform,	translate,	distort,	and	modify	the	meaning	
or	the	elements	they	are	supposed	to	carry’.	The	ten	pound	note	does	not	merely	
reflect	or	transport	meaning	or	what	Latour	calls	‘force’,	therefore	it	is	necessary	to	
pay	heed	to	the	specificity	of	what	is	doing	the	connecting.	For	example,	the	
meaning	of	this	event	takes	on	a	force	of	its	own	with	regard	to	their	relationship	
with	their	housemates.	The	ten	pound	note	had	real-world	value	for	their	
housemate,	Rich,	who	needed	and	was	promised	it	‘so	he	could	get	to	work	the	next	
day’.	The	casual	destruction	of	it	is	named	by	Leanne	as	‘symptomatic	of	why	we	
ended	up	falling	out	with	our	housemates’	yet	it	is	seems	more	than	‘symptomatic’	
or	symbolic	of	this	rupture:	it	is	productive	of	it.	Not	having	that	money	for	their	
housemate	adds	to	and	extends	the	crack	forming	between	the	priorities	of	the	
couple	and	their	friends	at	the	time:	the	former	were	concerned	with	each	other	and	
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having	as	much	fun	as	they	could	whereas	the	latter	had	ties	to	university	work	or	
jobs,	taking	life	‘more	seriously’,	as	Leanne	comments	elsewhere	in	the	interview.		
So	far	in	this	chapter,	the	use	of	MDMA	has	only	been	spoken	about	as	a	
binding	force	for	relationships.	In	the	case	of	Leanne	and	Matt,	it	is	possible	to	see	
again	how	the	objects	encountered	afford	an	adventurous	and	playful	experience,	
which,	in	turn,	can	transform	connections.	Yet	the	effect	is,	unusually,	conflicted.	
While	a	return	to	childlike	silliness	could	have	aided	in	building	their	intimacy	as	a	
couple	in	the	early	stages	of	their	relationship,	it	distorted	other	important	
connections	in	their	lives:	their	friendships.	While	exploring	the	possibility	of	a	‘dark	
side’	of	play,	where	playing	too	much	can	morph	into	a	destructive	force,	as	with	
excessive	gamers	and	gamblers,	for	example,	Brown	(2009)	suggests	that	some	of	
these	cases	are	where	‘play	is	being	used	to	deal	with	difficult	emotions’	(p177).	It	is	
suggested	this	idea	can	help	to	better	illuminate	the	couple’s	experiences,	in	
combination	with	a	relational,	psychological	understanding	of	space	(Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015).	The	process-orientated	thinkers	use	Lewin’s	(1936)	concept	of	‘life-
space’	to	conceptualise	space	as	produced	through	intensive	connections,	of	
memory	and	perception,	between	people	and	objects,	people	and	places,	people	
and	other	people.	The	focus	here	is	on	the	connections	which	link	a	scene	to	other	
times	and	places,	such	as	a	bathtub	in	a	museum	connected	to	the	bathtub	of	an	old	
woman’s	childhood	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015),	rather	than	how	temporally	or	spatially	
distant	these	times	and	places	are.	First,	we	need	to	look	at	how	Matt	describes	
their	use	of	MDMA	at	the	time:	
	
Matt:	in,	in	the	house	we’d	been…we	must	have	been	awake	for	2	nights…	I	
remember	really	consciously	going	to	brush	my	teeth	in	the	mirror	and	
knowing	that	I	should	go	to	bed…I	remember	feeling	really	like	it	was	a	waste	
cos	I	feel	this	kind	of,	this	feeling…that	I’ve	built	up	over	such	a	long	time,	the	
minute	I	go	to	sleep,	I’m	going	to	wake	up	and	I’m	going	to	feel	like	it’s	gone.	
Do	you	know	what	I	mean?	And	I	felt	really	like	it	was	a	waste	but	actually,	
you	have	got	to	go	to	sleep,	haven’t	you?	(Couple	interview:	Matt	&	Leanne)	
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Despite	the	extreme	exhaustion	Matt	must	have	felt,	‘been	awake	for	2	nights’,	
paralleling	the	compulsive	behaviour	of	a	video	gamer	who	just	keeps	on	playing,	he	
feels	like	going	to	sleep	would	be	a	‘waste’	of	the	‘feeling…[he’d]	built	up	over	such	a	
long	time’.	Following	the	concept	of	life-space	according	to	Lewin	(1936)	as	the	‘set	
of	connections	that	links	the	immediate	scene	to	other	spaces	and	actors,	which	are	
crucial	to	understanding	any	given	psychological	event’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	
p50),	we	might	see	connections	to	the	past	and	the	anticipated	future	as	having	
particular	purchase	for	Matt	here,	as	having	a	presence	despite	their	spatial-
temporal	distance.	Matt	describes	going	through	‘dark	times’,	where	he	would	
express	his	pain	in	sometimes	visceral	ways,	such	as	‘razoring	on	[his]	arm’	and	that	
taking	MDMA	‘was	the	first	time	he	was	happy’.	This	link	to	the	distressing	feelings	
of	the	past	also	opens	up	a	connection	to	an	imagined	future:	where	he	feels	that	
distress	again.	Thus,	we	could	see	the	reality	of	his	past	and	his	imagined	future	as,	
in	some	sense,	‘folded	into’	(Langdridge	et	al.,	2012,	p15)	his	life-space	when	he	
stares	at	his,	exhausted,	image	‘in	the	mirror’.	This	shapes	his	possibilities	for	action,	
bubbling	up	in	how	he	clings	to	what	he	describes	as	the	‘beauty’	of	MDMA	
experiences	in	comparison	to	some	of	the	‘shit’	he’s	experienced	in	his	own	life.	
Therefore,	it	might	be	seen	that	‘difficult	emotions’	(Brown,	2009,	p177)	contribute	
to	this	sense	of	the	play	going	slightly	awry	and	culminating	in	an	alienation	of	their	
housemate.		
In	addition,	the	lack	of	boundarying	of	the	couples’	MDMA	use,	which	may,	
again,	have	been	shaped	by	the	distress	they	describe,	could	have	contributed	to	
play	crossing	over	into	a	more	negative	force.	They	were	taking	MDMA	several	times	
a	week	together,	which	might	be	described	as	a	heavy	pattern	of	use	(although	
studies	tend	to	distinguish	this	in	terms	of	lifetime	prevalence	rates	e.g.	using	MDMA	
on	more	than:	30	occasions	(Parrott,	Sisk	&	Turner,	2000),	50	occasions	(Reneman	et	
al.,	2001),	and	100	occasions	(Parrott	et	al.,	2002)).	This	pattern	of	use	took	place	at	
university,	where	Leanne	and	Matt	describe	having	copious	amounts	of	free	time.	
Meeting	each	other	in	this	scenario	made	‘their	default	state	together	play’,	to	which	
they	describe	‘drip-feeding’	jobs	and	other	commitments	over	the	years.	In	contrast,	
Eva	and	Lars	and	Mark	and	Jenny	only	start	taking	MDMA	together	when	they	are	
older	and	already	in	employment.	These	responsibilities	could	be	viewed	as	
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constraining	their	use	of	MDMA	to	a	much	lower	frequency	(once	a	month	or	less),	
as	has	been	found	in	other	research	(Peters,	Kok	&	Schaalma,	2008);	their	
playfulness	does	not	overspill	into	the	concerns	of	their	life	in	the	same	way.	
External	commitments	are	sometimes	portrayed	as	threatened	by	MDMA	use	(Topp	
et	al.	1999),	yet	here	the	opposite	effect	seems	to	occur,	where	external	
commitments	keep	MDMA	use	in	check.	We	will	leave	this	idea	for	now	but	return	to	
it	in	the	next	analysis	chapter,	which	examines	boundaries	around	use	in	greater	
detail.		
It	has	been	argued	that	the	fluid,	meandering	texture	to	couples’	MDMA	
movement	through	space	produces	playful	subjectivities.	The	objects	afford	such	
adventure	by	virtue	of	their	distinctness:	they	are	separate	from	the	couples	and	
seem	to	unexpectedly	pop	up	in	their	experiences.	Playfulness	was	argued	as	a	
generally	ignored	facet	of	couple	relationships;	the	vast	majority	of	research,	and	the	
advice	from	psychological	professionals,	focusses	on	analysing	what’s	wrong	with	a	
relationship	and	how	that	can	be	mended	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2014).	In	these	couples’	
accounts,	we	see	how	MDMA	can	help	‘actually	produce…joy’	(Brown,	2009,	p173).	
The	material	features	of	the	space	and	the	opportunities	this	affords	for	navigation	
and	interaction	produced	a	novel,	exciting	landscape	of	adventure	for	couples,	
where	moments	of	silliness,	child-like	exuberance	and	imaginary	play	shaped	and	
refreshed	their	connection.	
	 	
5.2	‘Getting	your	body	flowing’	in	motion:	A	whole,	embodied	self	
	
It	has	been	argued	in	this	thesis	that	despite	their	differing	theoretical	orientations,	
both	cognitivism	and	social	constructionism	create	a	schism	between	the	body	and	
the	mind/self	(Cromby,	2004).	Mainstream,	cognitive	psychology	was	argued	as	part	
of	a	Cartesian	dualist	legacy	which	was	also	presented	as	structuring	our	lived	
experience	(Gillies	et	al.,	2004;	van	Manen,	1998):	we	identify	our	selves	with	our	
mind,	separate	from	our	‘tool-like’	secondary	bodies.	This	creates	a	boundary	within	
our	self,	fragmenting	our	‘body-mind’	system	(Dewey,	1925/1981,	cited	in	Johnson,	
2008)	into	body	and	mind.	However,	it	will	be	argued	in	this	section	that	by	engaging	
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in	certain	bodily	practices	on	MDMA,	this	body/mind	boundary	begins	to	lose	
distinction	and	blur,	allowing	participants	to	experience	themselves	as	whole,	
embodied	selves.	Rachel	and	Joe	describe	the	ball	game	they	would	play	with	friends	
when	coming	up	on	MDMA:	
	
Joe:	to	stop	him	[doing	housework],	he	said,	‘right,	let’s	hit	a	ball	around’	and	
it’s	just	become	a	very	big	part,	the	way	I’ve	described	that	shows	where	
people’s	minds	are,	it’s	interesting.	It	shows	who	the	conscious	people	are,		
[simultaneously]	
Joe:	who	the	people	who’ve	got	problems	with	each	other	are	
Rachel:	and	we	have	that.	I’ve	got	a	house	full	of	bits	and	pieces		
[simultaneously]	
Rachel:	that	we	never	broke	anything	
Joe:	cos	you	can’t	pass	to	them	or	you	won’t	pass	to	them…	
Rachel:	we’ve	never	managed	to	break	anything	
Joe:	no,	we’ve	come	very	close,	I	think	we’ve	come	very	close	to	breaking	
limbs	and	things	but	
Interviewer:	[laughs]	
Rachel:	getting	over-zealous	and	yeah,	you	find	like	that	your	arms	are	8ft	
long	all	of	a	sudden	cos	[ball	game]	does	get	the	adrena-,	cos	you’re	not	at	a	
rave	so,	lots	of	people	at	raves	would	be	dancing	and	that’s	a	similar	thing	
cos	you’re	getting	your	body	flowing…that’s	what	we	do	instead	of	dancing	
for	half	an	hour,	isn’t	it?	(Couple	interview:	Joe	&	Rachel)	
	
Joe	describes	initially	using	the	ball	game	to	combat	his	friend’s	anxiety	during	the	
come-up	instead	of	‘just	sit[ting]	around’	but	it	has	become	‘a	very	big	part’	of	how	
the	couple	take	MDMA	with	their	friends.	Rachel	compares	the	practice	to	‘dancing’	
at	‘raves’,	the	most	well-known	setting	for	ecstasy	use	(Bogt	et	al.,	2002):	both	serve	
the	purpose	of	‘getting	your	body	flowing’.	The	effortless	flow	of	their	bodies	is	
mirrored	by	many	other	participants	who	describe:	‘flow[ing]’	(Mark),	‘feel[ing]	a	lot	
more	fluid’	(Abby),	‘natural	flow	of	movement’	(Clara)	and	a	bodily	‘limberedness’	
(Leanne).	Their	movement	is	contained	–	each	player	takes	up	a	different	point	in	
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the	room	–	and	focussed	–	it	tracks	and	only	occurs	in	concert	with	the	ball;	unlike	
the	meandering	journeys	of	the	previous	theme.	Unusual	changes	seem	to	be	
happening	within	Rachel’s	bodily	experience,	she	describes	it	as	‘flowing’	and	how	
‘your	arms	are	8ft	long	all	of	a	sudden’.	To	describe	something	as	a	flow	invokes	
water	imagery:	an	indivisibility	of	flesh	and	being.	Her	body	also	becomes	more	
visible	and	powerful,	extended	into	the	world,	‘8ft	long’	and	filled	with	‘adrena-[lin]’,	
whereas	our	bodies	usually	fade	into	the	background,	being	that	which	all	our	
perceptual	capacities	point	away	from	(Mesle,	2008).	She	uses	the	same	language	
later	to	describe	dancing:	
	
Interviewer:	So	when	you	were	dancing	together,	how	did	it	feel	in	your	body,	
if	you	remember?	
Rachel:	yeah,	can’t	describe	it	though	
Interviewer:	[laughs]	yeah,	this	is	tricky	for	people	
Rachel:	fluid,	uh…better	than	fluid,	um,	I	want	to	say	coordinated	but	I	don’t	
mean,	that’s	quite	a	cold	[chuckles]	way	of	describing	itUm…	
Joe:	free	
Rachel:	yeah,	one	very	easy,	at	one	with	the	music,	um,	flowing	(Couple	
interview:	Joe	&	Rachel)	
	
Again,	she	feels	‘fluid’	but	even	‘better	than	fluid’,	‘at	one	with	the	music’,	illustrating	
Duff’s	(2008)	emphasis	on	how	crucial	the	things	people	do	on	drugs	are	to	the	
pleasures	experienced.	Here,	it	is	movement	in	dance	that	allows	her	to	‘flow’	and	
be	‘at	one’:	there	is	no	separation	between	the	thinking	mind	and	controlled	body,	
as	has	been	argued	to	be	the	case	in	cognitivist	thought	and	its	dualist	heritage	
(Brown	&	Stenner,	2001).	She	rejects	the	language	of	‘coordinat[ion]’	for	its	
‘cold[ness]’	and	instead	alights	on	being	‘at	one’.	Co-ordination	could	be	seen	to	
imply	a	top-down	control	of	limbs	and	movements	whereas	‘one[ness]’	speaks	to	a	
lack	of	dictation	and	separation,	a	wholeness	to	self	and	body.	We	need	to	return	to	
the	ball	game	and	introduce	the	work	of	Serres	(1995)	to	get	a	sense	of	why	this	
might	be.		
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Serres	(1995)	describes	objects	as	slowing	down	and	stabilising	social	
relations	–	without	them	such	relationships	would	be	‘as	airy	as	clouds’	(p87)	–	and	
are	thus	culturally	encoded	with	multiple	meanings.	Like	Latour	(2005),	Serres	sees	
objects	as	crucial	mediators	of	human	relationships	and,	as	such,	jointly	productive	
of	human	experience.	One	of	the	most	salient	cultural	meanings	of	a	ball	is	play	and	
it	is	suggested	this	allows	for	the	‘flowing’	embodied	experience	described.	At	a	
point	of	anxiety	in	the	drug	trip,	the	ball	collects	the	friends	together	in	an	
unthreatening	social	interaction,	guided	by	specific	cultural	scripts	e.g.	
catching/holding/passing.	It	could	be	seen	to	co-produce	and	stabilise	(Serres,	1995)	
a	more	embodied	sense	of	self,	where	everything	flows	and	perhaps,	as	Joe’s	later	
comment	suggests,	you	feel	‘free’.	The	interaction	with	and	movement	of	the	ball	
and	body	could	thus	be	seen	as	an	active,	and	effective,	strategy	to	produce	a	less	
anxious	subjectivity	in	the	come-up,	one	of	the	most	frequently	reported	negative	
side-effects	of	MDMA	across	the	entire	data	set,	and	emphasises	the	active	nature	
of	subjectivity	as	it	interacts	and	is	reformulated	with	the	material	world	(Brown	&	
Stenner,	2009).		
It	is	evident	that	this	continuous,	flowing	body-mind	state	is	bound	up	with	
the	movement	Rachel	and	Joe	describe	and	how	that	movement	is	contained.	Their	
attention	isn’t	pulled	from	one	feature	to	the	next,	as	was	the	case	for	couples	
playfully	journeying	through	landscapes,	but	honed	in	on	this	physical	focal	point.	As	
will	be	illustrated,	this	is	not	dependent	on	a	particular	form	of	extensive	
containment,	certain	physical	boundaries	or	border	configurations,	but	an	intensive	
connection	between	(human	and	non-human)	bodies	(DeLanda,	2005).	Other	
participants	described	similar	experiences	of	the	body/mind	boundary	becoming	
more	fluid	but	in	very	different	contexts:	Abby	and	Ryan	are	massaging	each	other	
on	a	sofa	inside	a	nightclub	and	Clara	is	hula	hooping	outside	on	the	deck	of	her	
friend’s	garden:	
	
Abby:	well	you’re	that	much	more	mentally	focussed	on	it	um	you	know	
when,	if	you’re	giving	me	a	neck	rub	at	home,	you	know,	the	telly	might	be	on	
or	my	mind	might	be	thinking	about	something	that’s	happened	that	day	or,	
you	know,	I’ll	be	focussing	on	it	but	not	the	exclusion	of	everything	
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else…whereas	if	you	give	me	a	neck	rub	at	a	club	when	we’re	coming	up,	I	am	
100%	focussed	on	the	sensations	of	you	touching	me	in	the	environment	of	
the	music	and	the	drug	effects	
Ryan:	and	it’s	sort	of,	it’s	a	lot,	it	feels	a	lot	more	natural	how	you	doing	
it…you	know	when	I’ve	sort	of	given	neck	rub,	‘am	I	doing	it	in	the	right	
place?’	
Abby:	yeah	
Ryan:	you	know	it’s	‘am	I	getting	the	right	lumps?’	You	sort	of	
Abby:	it	feels	
Ryan:	you	flow	with	it	
Abby:	it	feels	a	lot	more	fluid,	yeah…everything	comes	extremely	natural…	
Ryan:	yeah,	that	comes	with	the	drug	as	well.	It’s	like...dancing,	you	lock	into	
dancing	and	it	feels	the	most	natural	thing.	In	the	same	way,	giving	you	a	
neck	rub	feels	the	most	natural	thing	(Couple	interview:	Abby	&	Ryan)	
	
Clara:	I	mean,	when,	you’re	on,	whether	it’s	on	acid	[LSD]	or	mushrooms	or	
molly	[MDMA]	and	you’re	hooping	like	you	get	so	completely	lost	in	what	
you’re	doing	like	it	is	just	the	most	like	natural	flow	of	movement	…and	
especially	with	the	lights	on	um	on	the	hula	hoop	like	you	get	transfixed	on	
what	you’re	seeing	cos	you’re	just	seeing	light	trails	literally	all	over	your	
body…like	you	have	no	thought	about	anything	else	that’s	happening	like	
outside	of	the	hoop	which	is	around	your	body	which	is	really	cool.	Uh,	it’s	
making	me	miss	hooping	right	now,	I	want	to	go	do	that	[laughs]…it’s	super	
relaxing	and	also	like	super	stimulating	at	the	same	time	cos	of	the	lights	and	
how	the	lights	affect	your,	you	know,	eyes	when	you’re	like	on	a	substance	
um	so	it’s,	yeah,	it’s	awesome…	whether	it’s	on	your	shoulders	or	your	legs	or	
your	waist	um	but	you	just	kind	of	feel	like	your	limbs	just	kind	of	keep	
continuing	cos	everything,	cos	you’re	moving	like	so,	even	if	you’re	not	
moving	quickly	just	kind	of	all	feels	like	a	blur	like	mixed	together	um	as	far	as	
like	whether	you’re	like	you	know	passing	it	from	hand	to	hand	or	moving	it	
up	and	down	your	body	(Couple	interview:	Clara	&	Nick)	
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All	the	participants	experience	a	fluid	physicality,	‘feels	a	lot	more	fluid’	(Abby),	‘you	
flow	with	it’	(Ryan),	‘natural	flow	of	movement’	(Clara)	in	relation	to	their	embodied	
practices,	and	the	way	they	interact	with	another	human/non-human	actor	(Latour,	
2005).	Clara	describes	how,	due	to	the	constant	movement	involved	in	hooping,	
where	the	hoop	ends	and	her	body	begins	becomes	unclear:	‘everything…feels	like	a	
blur	like	mixed	together’.	Her	‘limbs	just	kind	of	keep	continuing’	out	beyond	their	
usual	fleshy	boundaries:	losing	all	definition.	The	fuzziness	between	her	body	and	
the	hoop	is	reinforced	by	her	description	of	being	physically	marked	by	the	LED	
hoop’s	light	patterns,	‘seeing	the	light	trails	literally	all	over	your	body’.	This	
language	of	‘continuing’	‘mi[xing]’	and	‘flow[ing]’	evokes	a	lack	of	distinction	and	
separation.	If	things	are	‘mixed	together’	or	if	they	‘flow’	like	water,	they	are	
indivisible:	a	complete	whole.	This	is	reinforced	by	how	Clara	describes,	‘you	get	so	
completely	lost	in	what	you’re	doing’.	The	sense	of	a	separate	self	that	is	‘you’	gets	
‘lost’	in	the	embodied	activity;	it	ceases	to	exist	as	independent	from	the	body	but	
becomes	part	of	the	broader	body-mind	system	which	is	us	(Dewey,	1925/1981,	
cited	in	Johnson,	2008).	Dualist	thought	has	been	argued	to	make	people	feel	their	
mind	is	‘watching’	the	body;	creating	a	fission	between	them	(Gillies	et	al.,	2004)	–	
and	although	this	study	was	also	performed	with	women,	there	is	no	indication	that	
dualist	ideas	might	not	also	structure	men’s	experience	of	their	embodiment.	
Indeed,	the	dualist	fission	between	mind	and	body	has	a	long	cultural	history,	from	
the	identification	of	the	self	with	the	ethereal,	immortal	soul	by	Descartes	to	the	
reincarnation	of	this	idea	in	modern	psychology	where	the	self	is	the	cognitive-
processer	mind,	and	is	expressed	with	eloquence	by	Bordo:	
	
Mind/body	dualism	is	no	mere	philosophical	proposition	to	be	defended	or	
dispensed	with	by	clever	argument.	Rather	it	is	a	practical	metaphysic	that	
has	been	deployed	and	socially	embodied	in	medicine,	law,	literary	and	
artistic	representations,	the	psychological	construction	of	the	self,	
interpersonal	relationships,	popular	culture	and	advertisements.	(1993,	p14)	
		
For	example,	the	vaunting	of	‘mind	over	body’	is	a	common	refrain	with	the	world	of	
self-help	and	dieting	(Spitzack,	1990).	While	dualism	can	be	a	functional	concept:	
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creating	distance	between	self	and	body	can	be	helpful	in	managing	pain,	for	
instance	(Gillies	et	al.,	2004),	certainly	it	seems	unproductive	and	unnecessary	to	
divide	our	selves	in	this	way.	We	are	our	bodies,	just	as	much	as	we	are	our	minds	
and	a	division	between	them	leads	to	an	incomplete	and	partial	view	of	our	
experience.	Movement	has	been	been	found	to	fracture	the	dualist	scaffolding	of	
our	embodied	experience	(Del	Busso,	2009;	Chisholm,	2008)	and	it	is	suggested	that	
the	heightened	physical	sensations	experienced	on	MDMA	(Duff,	2008)	might	allow	
participants	to	more	easily	experience	embodied	pleasure	through	a	moving	body.	
A	sense	of	a	whole,	embodied	self	could	also	been	as	jointly	invoked	by	Abby	
and	Ryan	in	their	description	of	a	‘neck	rub’,	although	they	draw	more	specifically	on	
the	language	of	water,	‘flow’	and	‘fluid’.	It	‘feels	a	lot	more	fluid’	for	Abby;	liquid	
cannot	be	cut	up	and	divided	like	you	would	a	solid	substance,	it	flows	intrinsically	
whole.	It	could	be	argued	that	on	MDMA	this	wholeness	is	precipitated	by	a	greater	
connection	to	her	body:	instead	of	her	‘self’	coordinating	disjointed	fingers	and	
arms,	it	just	‘feels	fluid’:	her	body-mind	is	one.	Ryan’s	description	of	how	‘you	flow	
with’	(own	emphasis)	the	massaging	movement	is	telling.	It	is	‘you’,	the	self,	which	
flows	with	and	the	body:	again	pointing	to	a	reintegration	of	separately	experienced	
body/self.	This	is	affirmed	with	the	contrast	Ryan	makes	with	his	usual,	cognitively	
interrupted,	experience,	‘“am	I	doing	it	in	the	right	place?”...“am	I	getting	the	right	
lumps?”’.	Abby	also	describes	the	act	of	massaging	as	distancing	herself	from	her	
everyday,	reflective,	subjectivity,	‘where	you’re	‘thinking	about	something	that’s	
happened	that	day’.	Thus,	this	distancing	from	the	thinking	self	together	with	the	
fluidity	of	the	self	could	be	argued	to	represent	the	process	of	the	joining	together	of	
the	body	and	mind	to	become	one	‘whole’	embodied	self	(Del	Busso,	2009).	This	was	
described	as	one	of	the	ways	in	which	women	embodied	pleasure	in	Del	Busso’s	
(2009)	research;	when	they	experienced	a	‘joining	together	mind	and	body	and	
becoming	“one”’	(p166).	Indeed,	Abby’s	use	of	‘sensations’	and	‘natural[ness]’	to	
describe	the	neck	rub	evokes	a	pleasurable	scene,	sensation	being	strongly	
associated	with	physiological	pleasures	(c.f	Duff,	2008).	
Subjectivity	has	already	been	described	as	produced	with	the	materiality	of	
the	world	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	The	embodied,	mindful	subjectivity	experienced	
here	could	be	seen	as	entangled	with	a	specific	actor.	In	Clara’s	account,	the	hoop	
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can	be	seen	to	mediate	her	experience	of	her	body	by	‘afford[ing]’	and	‘render[ing]	
possible’	(Latour,	2005,	p72)	the	messy	entanglement	of	her	‘limbs...like	a	blur	like	
mixed	together’.	Grosz	(1994)	discusses	how	Merleau-Ponty	saw	as	part	of	this	
process	of	continual	self-world	interaction,	the	world	impacting	on	and	transforming	
the	fundamental	materiality	of	the	body	e.g.	lifting	weights	builds	muscle,	
reconstituting	bodily	composition.	Another	example	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	that	Grosz	
draws	attention	to	is	the	stick	used	to	scratch	an	itch	that	cannot	quite	be	reached,	
‘from	this	point…the	stick	is	no	longer	an	object	for	me	but	has	been	absorbed	or	
incorporated	into	my	perceptual	faculties	or	body	parts’	(1994,	p91).	In	the	same	
way,	we	can	understand	the	boundaries	between	Clara’s	body	and	the	hoop	as	not	
fixed	at	the	skin,	but	the	hoop	as	being	folded	into	her	body,	‘continuing’	with	her	
body	as	she	is	‘passing	it	from	hand	to	hand	or	moving	it	up	and	down’	and	
‘allow[ing]’	(Latour,	2005,	p72)	everything	to	‘blur…together’.	Similarly,	Ryan’s	body	
could	be	seen	as	impacting	on	and	being	absorbed	by	Abby’s	as	she	massages	him.	
This	is	grounded	in	the	visceral	realities	of	touch	and	its	inescapable	mutuality:	as	
soon	as	you	are	touched,	you	touch	the	other	person	back	(Gabb,	2011).	For	Rachel	
and	James	too,	‘getting	your	body	flowing’	turns	on	the	ball	in	their	game	and	how	
its	cultural	meanings	allow	them	to	experience	their	bodies	differently.		
‘You’re	getting	your	body	flowing’,	‘flow[ing]	with’	the	movement,	‘feel[ing]	a	
lot	more	fluid’:	all	the	participants’	bodies’	just	seem	to	effortlessly	flow.	This	fluidity	
was	experienced	within	an	embodied	activity,	which	engaged	another	(human	or	
non-human)	actor.	This	actor	provided	a	physical	focal	point	around	which	the	
heightened	sensory	world	of	MDMA	could	pivot	and	co-produce	an	embodied	
subjectivity.	This	shift	to	a	whole,	embodied	self	broke	down	the	self	or	mind/body	
boundary	culturally	encoded	through	dualist	thought.	This	reaffirms	other	findings	
that	link	movement	to	experiencing	an	embodied	sense	of	self	(Del	Busso,	2009;	
Chisholm,	2008)	but	also	extends	them	in	the	way	in	which	human	and	non-human	
bodies	can	mediate	and	transform	this	embodied	becoming	(Latour,	2005).	Namely	
that	another	person	or	object	can	provide	a	focal	point	for	movement,	enabling	the	
cognitive	stream	of	experience	normally	regarded	as	the	self	to	get	‘lost’	in	the	
embodied	activity.	This	integration	of	mind	and	body	into	a	broader	body-mind	
system	(Dewey,	1925/1981,	cited	in	Johnson,	2008)	was	also	experienced	as	
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pleasurable,	a	concept	sorely	neglected	in	discussions	of	drug	use	(Duff,	2008;	
Moore,	2008).	It	appears	that	movement	on	MDMA	in	concert	with	other	bodies	can	
blur	boundaries	within	the	mind/body;	as	well	as	emphasising	the	distinction	
between	self	and	world,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	theme.	The	boundary	between	
self	and	other,	in	concert	with	particular	material	and	affective	settings,	can	also	be	
reformed	by	MDMA	–	partners	begin	to	blur	into	one	another	–	as	will	now	be	
explored.	
	
5.3	Merged	selves:	Becoming	one	in	stillness	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	partners	described	feeling	deeply	emotionally	attuned	with	
one	another	on	MDMA.	Three	couples	experienced	a	more	extreme	sense	of	
‘oneness’,	where	they	describe	feeling	as	though	they	had	become	the	same	person.	
It	could	be	argued	that	Western	culture	actually	endorses	an	understanding	of	love	
as	a	merging	with	the	other	(Perel,	2007).	Within	this	framing,	love	is	all	about	
getting	closer	and	reducing	the	distance	between	two	people,	as	leading	
‘intertwined	lives’:	each	partner	orientates	towards	the	other	and,	in	doing	so,	is	
completed.	The	language	we	use	for	romantic	partners	such	as	‘other	half’	and	
‘soulmate’	is	one	manifestation	of	this.	We	are	only	‘half’	of	a	thing	that	needs	its	
‘other	half’	to	make	it	whole	again	while	the	connection	to	our	romantic,	sexual	
‘mate’	is	so	overwhelming	that	it	is	forged	through	our	very	‘soul’;	the	historic	seat	
of	consciousness.	This	communion	is	total	-	emotional,	mental	and	sexual	-	and	feeds	
into	discourses	around	the	desirability	of	monogamy	(Barker	&	Langdridge,	2010),	
precluding	physical	and	more	nebulously	defined	‘emotional’	affairs.	
In	couples’	descriptions,	merging	on	MDMA	was	not	a	gradual	progression	
towards	the	other	but	a	transient	and	transcendental	phenomena,	yet	still	tied	to	
pre-existing	feelings	of	closeness.	Material	settings	and	objects	were	crucial	to	
ensuring	the	stillness	and	bodily	closeness	that	seemed	to	prefigure	such	
experiences:	couples	were	always	encased	together	in	an	intimate	material	
arrangement,	for	example,	Eva	and	Lars	discuss	being	‘fused	together’	while	in	a	
bathtub	on	MDMA:	
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Lars:	we	had	the	whole	bathtub,	that	was	great	
Eva:	and	it	was	very	specialIt	was	a	special	bonding,	I	don’t	know…and	it	was	
like	being	in	his	head	and	I	don’t	know…we	were	not	two	person,	we	were	one	
person…	really	strong	
Lars:	it	was	good	ecstasy	[…]	
Lars:	I	don’t	know,	I	can’t	describe	it…because	there	was	the	water	and	the	
water	was	between	us	and	everything	and	skin	[he	chuckles]	
Eva:	warm	and	floating	
Lars:	of	course	it	was	dark	in	in	the	bathroom.	We	just	had	a	light	in	the	main	
room	and	it	was	shining	a	bit	
Eva:	and	glowsticks…	I	had	glowsticks	with	me	
Lars:	it	was,	it	felt	like	we	were	fused	together,	I	thinkLike	one	piece.	
Eva:	it	was	really	crazy…I	just	think	I	lost	a	little	bit	of	myself	or	not,	I	don’t	
lost	it	[sic],	I	was	absolutely	open	with	myself…and	I	just	felt	that	he	was	the	
only	person	who	can	know	who	I	really	am…	when	he	sat	behind	me	in	this	
warm	water…I	was,	like,	flying	to	the	music	(Couple	interview:	Eva	and	Lars)	
	
The	events	unfold	in	a	hotel	bathroom,	from	the	focal	point	of	the	bathtub.	It	
becomes	an	important	figure	in	the	story,	a	‘non-human	participant’	(Latour,	2005);	
intrinsic	to	how	events	are	managed	and	negotiated.	Indeed	memories	are	often	
recollected	around	a	central	object	(c.f	Reavey	&	Brown,	2015).	The	bathtub	creates	
a	physically	close,	fluid	space,	where	there	is	only	‘skin’	and	‘water’.	Everyday	
barriers	to	embodied	contact	and	a	sense	of	physical	distance	cease	to	exist	as	
boundaries	are	seemingly	‘liquified’.	The	fact	that	it	was	‘dark	in	the	bathroom’,	with	
the	light	from	the	next	room	just	‘shining	a	bit’,	also	seems	to	contribute	to	the	
fuzziness	of	the	physical	boundaries.	There	were	‘glowsticks’	too,	gently	illuminating	
this	‘warm	and	floating’	world.	Through	the	juxtaposition	of	light,	darkness	and	
water,	Lars	and	Eva	jointly	construct	an	ethereal	realm,	prefiguring	the	almost	
mystical	character	of	their	emotional	experience,	‘it	felt	like	we	were	fused	together’.	
The	concept	of	an	‘affective	atmosphere’	could	open	up	our	understanding	of	how	
this	process	of	merging	occurs.	Anderson	(2009)	describes	an	affective	atmosphere	
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as	‘[having	a]	singular	affective	qualit[y]’	(p79)	yet	as	‘indeterminate’	(p80),	as	
detailed	in	Chapter	Two.	
The	paradoxical	nature	of	affective	atmospheres	is	fully	present	in	Eva	and	
Lars’	memory	which	might	be	best	described	as	‘hold[ing]	a	series	of	opposites’	
(Anderson,	2009,	p80):	as	both	otherworldly	yet	tied	to	the	earthy	fleshiness	of	their	
bodies	and	skin.	This	emanates	from	the	way	the	room	is	lit,	the	water,	their	naked,	
loving	bodies	together	and	the	music.	The	blurring	possibilities	of	the	water	and	the	
‘dark[ness]	in	the	bathroom’	punctuated	only	by	the	dim	light	of	‘glowsticks’	builds	a	
sense	of	mystery	and	unknown	possibilities	forming.	This	sense	of	potentiality	could	
be	seen	as	aided	by	the	higher	grade	affordance	the	bathtub	offers	(Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015).	Affordances	are	actions	made	possible	for	an	organism	through	its	
environment,	such	as	a	nut	that	can	be	eaten,	and	higher	grade	affordances	are	
shaped	by	cultural	knowledge;	in	this	case	water	as	a	place	of	transformation,	often	
through	a	process	of	being	purified	e.g.	baptism.	The	expanse	of	‘skin’	invites	an	
impression	of	innocence	and	naturalness	as	well	as	visceral,	bodily	experience,	set	
apart	from	the	strictures	of	ordered	society,	while	the	music	propels	them	into	
soundscapes	outside	of	our	earthly	existence	‘flying	to	the	music’.	These	are	also	two	
people	deeply	in	love,	they	are	‘one	piece’	and	know	who	each	other	‘really	[is]’,	
feelings	which	would	have	undoubtedly	coloured	their	experience	and	which	strike	
anyone	about	their	memory	of	it.	The	weaving	together	of	all	these	different	
elements	creates	a	felt	sense	of	otherliness,	which	could	help	explain	how	such	an	
unusual	and	contra-rational	event	of	‘fusing	together’	can	take	place.	This	
otherwordly/earthly	atmosphere	seems	to	be	a	collective	property	of	the	different	
elements	yet	not	solely	reducible	to	them	and	quasi-autonomous.	The	way	the	
atmosphere	exceeds	the	bodies	and	objects	within	it	while	being	intrinsically	tied	to	
them	speaks	again	to	the	intrinsic	ambiguity	of	the	concept	(Anderson,	2009).		
The	fluidity	of	the	material	space	manifests	itself	not	only	in	the	physical	but	
also,	metaphysically,	as	a	deep	sense	of	closeness,	‘it	was	a	special	bonding’.	The	
sense	of	closeness	it	creates	is	so	profound	that	the	most	fundamental	boundary	of	
all	is	blurred:	that	between	self	and	other,	‘we	were	not	two	person,	we	were	one	
person.’	Yet,	despite	initially	painting	this	as	a	loss	of	selfhood,	Eva	is	quick	to	
distance	herself	from	that	idea,	‘I	don’t	lost	[sic]	it’.	Her	reaction	here	could	be	seen	
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to	express	the	cultural	tension	between	love	as	total	union	and	the	approbation	that	
might	be	visited	upon	someone	who	has	‘lost’	themselves	in	their	partner.	For	
women,	this	might	be	viewed	as	particularly	salient	since	relationships	tend	to	be	
construed	as	‘women’s	business’	(Dryden,	1998)	and,	indeed,	historically	a	woman	
was	largely	defined	by	her	marital	status	e.g.	only	some,	married	women	could	vote	
in	the	UK	before	wider	voter	enfranchisement	was	introduced	in	the	early	20th	
century	(Heater,	2006).	Indeed,	here	we	see	a	further	reflection	of	this	gendered	
distinction	as	Eva’s	focus	is	firmly	on	the	‘special	bonding’	but	Lars	reinterprets	this	
in	neurochemical	rather	than	relational	terms,	‘it	was	good	ecstasy’.	
	Rather	than	a	disappearance	of	selfhood,	Eva	frames	the	experience	as	
revealing	a	greater	connection	to	her	sense	of	self,	‘I	was	absolutely	open	with	
myself’	and	to	Lars,	‘he	was	the	only	person	who	can	know	who	I	really	am’.	Instead	
of	attempting	to	iron	out	the	apparent	contradiction	between	feeling	as	though	her	
and	Lars	were	‘one	person’	while	reasserting	her	separate	selfhood,	‘absolutely	open	
with	myself’,	this	tension	might	be	viewed	in	a	more	productive	light.	Specifically,	as	
providing	resources	for	different	kinds	of	narrative	which	make	room	for	more	
powerful	versions	of	present	agency	(Haaken,	1998).	Her	experience	of	a	separate	
self	while	also	experiencing	their	selves	as	‘one’	could	be	seen	to	speak	to	an	
attempt	to	balance	dyadic	closeness	and	distance.	She	is	simultaneously	herself	but	
part	of	a	wider	whole	with	him:	neither	subject	position	is	elevated	above	the	other,	
rather	they	exist	in	balance.	This	tension	between	distance	and	closeness	was	
something	expressed	by	many	of	the	participants	in	this	research.	They	told	stories	
about	‘intertwined	lives’	which	later	became	more	distinct	or	posed	rhetorical	
questions	at	interview	about	whether	they	were	too	distant	or	entangled	with	one	
another.	This	balancing	act	between	closeness	and	distance	might	be	seen	as	
significant	act	of	negotiation	in	a	relationship	(Ben-Ari	&	Lavee,	2007a;	Lavee	&	Ben-
Ari,	2007b).	Ben-Ari	(2012)	argues	that	closeness	and	distance	are	not	opposed	poles	
of	the	same	continuum	but	can	be	understood	as	a	multidimensional,	unified	
concept.	Couples	can	reach	a	shared	understanding	of	what	distance	and	closeness	
means	to	them,	like	one	partner	acknowledging	the	other	partner’s	need	to	be	alone	
without	feeling	threatened	by	it,	and	this	becomes	an	expression	of	a	higher-order	
closeness.	Ben-Ari	describes	his	approach	as	informed	by	dialectical	thinking,	which	
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is	suggested	to	resemble	psychosocial	process	thought	which	views	objective	reality	
and	subjective	experience	as	integrated,	both	part	of	the	process	of	the	becoming	of	
actual	occassions	which	underlies	the	world	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Perhaps	then,	
this	ambiguous,	contradictory	sense	of	joint/individual	subjectivity	could	be	seen	too	
as	an	expression	of	‘higher-order	closeness’;	a	productive	tension	which	allows	for	
greater	personal	agency	while	still	being	together	as	a	couple.	Eva	is	both	fully	her	
individual	self,	yet	part	of	a	greater	interconnected	whole	with	Lars.		
The	experience	of	merging	on	MDMA,	where	boundaries	between	self	and	
other	seem	to	‘melt’	(Matt),	was	spoken	about	by	other	couples	within	the	research.	
Rachel	and	Joe,	together	over	20	years	and	in	their	early	60s/late	50s	respectively,	
describe	their	experiences	of	the	phenomena:	
	
Joe:	taking	E	and	then,	yeah,	the	next	thing	you	remember	is	that	you’re	sat	
next	to	each	other	on	the	rug	down,	we	used	to	do	E	in	the	corner	of	the	room	
quite	a	lot	cos	it’s	full	of	beautiful	cushions	that	we	could	lounge	around	
on…we’d	go	from	being	18ft	apart	to	2cm	apart	down	thereThat’s	my	image	
of	it…that	happened	all	the	time,	all	the	time…	
Interviewer:	How	would	you	feel	when	you	were	sitting	there,	together?	
Rachel:	like	we	were	one	little	ball…we	were	one	thing,	really	
Joe:	very	quickly	[…]	
Rachel:	lots	of,	lots	of	hippy-dippy	stuff	happenedLots	of	stuff	like	we	see	the	
same	things,	I	heard	once,	we	were	sitting	very	close,	actually	we	were	in	the	
bath,	weren’t	we?		Very	close	and	I	heard	music…and	I	couldn’t	work	out	
where	the	music	was	coming	from,	this	sounds	so	daft,	and	I	went,	I	told	Joe	
and	he,	you’d,	you’d,	had	some,	you’d	made	up	a	song	in	your	head	
Joe:	the	best,	the	best	indie	song,	ever,	yeah	
Rachel:	yeah	and	I,	I	can	hear	what	he	was	making	up	sort	of	thing	so	that’s	
Joe:	what	I	described	
Rachel:	often	kind	of,	I	do	not	believe	in	telepathy	or	a	lot	of	things	like	that	
but	there	were	moments	where	we	were	on	the	one,	that’s	how	I	put	it	
(Couple	interview:	Rachel	&	Joe)	
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They	were	‘one	thing’	on	MDMA	together.	This	total	indistinctness	is	further	
reinforced	by	the	image	of	being	‘one	little	ball’:	a	‘ball’	or	circle	being	the	only	
shape	that	has	an	infinite	number	of	angles	and	no	natural	points	of	division.	How	
they	are	but	‘2cm	apart’	on	the	floor,	implying	a	completely	intertwined	mess	of	
flesh,	reinforces	this	lack	of	precision	between	them.	It	is	also	telling	that	they	
become	a	‘little	ball’.	If	you	add	one	thing	to	another,	the	end	result	would	usually	
be	expected	to	be	larger	than	both	individually.	However,	when	two	things	
completely	merge	there	exists	a	fusion	of	properties	that	belies	simple	addition,	
making	the	fact	they	are	such	a	‘little…one	thing’	more	conceivable.		
The	second	experience	of	merging	or	becoming	‘one’	once	again	unfolds	from	
the	bathtub,	however	its	peculiar	qualities	e.g.	surrounding	water,	skin-to-skin	
contact	do	not	feel	as	crucial	as	they	did	previously.	The	possibilities	present	in	this	
‘situation’	(Lewin,	1936)	do	not	flow	uniquely	from	the	bath	as	such;	it	is	no	‘spectral	
object’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p127).	Rather,	the	possibilities	for	embodiment	it	
affords	seem	to	be	key	to	understanding	how	Rachel	felt	she	was	‘on	the	one’	with	
Joe.	They	are	physically	close,	Rachel	describes	them	both	as	‘sitting	very	close’,	and	
then	emphasises	again,	‘very	close’.	Presumably,	they	are	also	relatively	still	–	for	
two	adults,	a	bathtub	generally	provides	little	room	for	large	movements.	These	
interactional	possibilities	are	also	afforded	by	other	objects	–	a	seating	area	of	
‘beautiful	cushions’	on	the	floor	in	the	first	extract.	This	illustrates	that	it	is	less	the	
physical	dimensions	of	the	space	(a	Euclidean	understanding	of	space	where	
measurement	is	an	extrinsic	grid	mapped	onto	the	environment)	that	are	crucial	or	
the	particular	objects	at	play.	Rather,	it	is	the	connections	between	objects	and	
people	(where	measurement	is	taken	as	intrinsic	to	the	environment	itself)	that	
lends	continuity	or	‘invariance’	to	these	experiences	(Lewin,	1936;	Brown,	2012;	
Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).		
It	could	be	argued	that	the	powerful	emotional	connection	between	Joe	and	
Rachel	is	gifted	stability	through	the	objects	(the	cushions,	the	bath)	of	their	MDMA	
memories	and	the	possibilities	for	bodily	connection	they	afford	(Serres,	1995).	Joe	
emphasises	the	physical	mirroring	of	their	emotional	dynamic,	‘we’d	go	from	being	
18ft	apart’	when	they	were	arguing	to	‘2cm	apart	down	there’	on	the	cushions	after	
they’d	taken	MDMA.	Similarly,	Rachel	seems	to	use	physical	proximity	to	help	
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explain	mental	proximity	as	she	juxtaposes	the	two,	‘sitting…very	close	[in	the	bath]	
and	I	heard	music’.	The	cushions	being	‘down	there’	on	the	floor	could	also	be	seen	
to	add	further	solidity	to	the	dramatic	shift	from	negative	to	positive	affect.	Their	
bodies	move	not	only	closer	together	but	onto	a	whole	different	physical	
perspective.	This	provides	a	shift	in	visual	perspective	and	places	them	in	an	area	
separate	from	the	everyday	uses	of	the	space:	the	sofa	is	usually	the	focal	point	of	
activity	in	a	living	room.	These	spatial	shifts	could	help	to	ease	and	reaffirm	a	
transition	in	the	way	Rachel	and	Joe	are	relating,	even	minor	differences	in	spatial	
setting	have	been	shown	as	impactful	in	other	studies,	for	example	women	who	
could	see	trees	from	their	tower	blocks	in	Chicago	reported	their	personal	difficulties	
as	less	severe	(Kuo,	2001).	Thus,	the	space	and	objects	could	be	seen	to	perform	a	
visible	anchoring	of	an	experience	that	is	full	of	the	intangible.	They	could	assist	
couples	in	making	sense	of	and	integrating	these	unusual	experiences	into	their	
overall	worldview,	particularly	for	Joe	and	Rachel,	who	repeatedly	disavow	what	
they	describe	as	‘hippy-dippy’	things.	They	take	care	to	distance	themselves	from	
any	such	label	throughout	their	interview,	shown	here	in	the	definitive	way	Rachel	
states	she	‘do[es]	not	believe	in	telepathy	or	a	lot	of	things	like	that’.	Indeed,	the	
interaction	within	these	physically	close,	material	arrangements	produces	a	joint	
subjectivity	that,	in	its	mysticalness,	would	likely	never	be	available	to	this	staunchly	
non	‘hippy’	couple	in	their	everyday	lives.	Elsewhere	in	the	interview	Rachel	also	
links	feeling	‘at	one’	with	Joe	to	feeling	at	one	more	broadly,	with	the	natural	world:	
	
Joe:	that	was	pretty	amazing,	um,	yeah.	At	one	with	nature…	
Rachel:	well,	also,	we	were	always	at	one	with	each	other.	I	never	felt,	I	
always	felt	safeAlways,	always,	always.	In	whatever,	well	obviously	at	home	I	
felt	safe	but	in	whatever	situation	we	were	in	–	I	never	felt	unsafe…	and	that	
had	a	lot	to	do	with	being	completely	at	one	with	Joe	(Couple	interview:	Joe	&	
Rachel)	
	
Joe	discusses	being	‘at	one	with	nature’,	which	Rachel	links	back	to	being	‘always	at	
one	with	each	other’:	the	two	seem,	for	her,	irrevocably	intertwined.	Thus,	the	
production	of	a	joint,	merged	subjectivity	where	she	is	‘completely	at	one’	with	Joe	
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could	be	seen	to	linger	on:	in	everyday	life,	‘we	were	always	at	one	with	each	other’	
and	in	other	MDMA	experiences.	Many	of	the	MDMA	experiences	they	talk	about	
occur	outside,	in	unusual	situations,	perhaps	meriting	the	provision,	‘whatever	
situation	we	were	in	–	I	never	felt	unsafe’,	such	as	camping	alone	on	the	top	of	a	hill,	
being	surrounded	by	fireflies	and	swimming	in	the	sea	with	jellyfish,	and	their	
connection	with	nature	is	underscored.	It	is	suggested	therefore	that	collapsed	
self/other	boundaries	opened	Rachel	up	to	broader	experiences	of	diffuse	
boundaries,	such	as	a	oneness	with	nature.	Furthermore,	such	an	identification	with	
nature	has	been	found	to	mediate	the	link	between	psychedelic	drug	experiences	
(e.g.	LSD,	psilocybin,	mescaline)	and	increased	concern	for	the	environment	and	
ecological	practices	(Forstmann	&	Sagioglou,	2017);	perhaps	a	similar	process	could	
be	work	at	here	with	MDMA.		
It	is	also	important	to	consider	why	the	space	is	an	appropriate	context	for	
their	MDMA	use	and	the	features	that	afford	this	‘one[ness]’	they	describe	(Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015;	Duff,	2007).	Their	experiences	of	merging	takes	place	in	private	space,	
in	the	home	they	shared	together	at	the	time.	They	portray	taking	MDMA	and	
having	sex	as	inseparable	during	this	period,	an	entanglement	that	is	only	made	
possible	by	the	privacy	of	the	space	they	inhabit.	They	also	take	care	to	emphasise	
the	spaciousness	of	the	flat,	‘really	big	flat	in…plenty	of	floor	space…really,	really	big	
living	room,	high	ceiling’,	which	feeds	into	the	dramatic	physical	narrative	of	going	
from	being	so	far	apart	to	so	close	together	on	MDMA.	The	amount	of	free	space	in	
a	room	and	having	access	to	a	private	living	space	rather	than	just	a	bedroom	could	
feasibly	evoke	a	different	atmosphere,	perhaps	more	conducive	to	the	experiences	
they	describe.	The	importance	of	privacy	for	couples	is	underscored	by	Eva,	who	
discusses	booking	a	hotel	to	take	MDMA	in	as	a	way	of	avoiding	unwelcome	
interactions	from	Lars’	flatmates,	‘we	hadn’t	had	our	peace	because…there	were	
people	every	time…they	wanted	to	talk	to	us’.	It	is	notable	that	both	couples’	access	
to	private	space	hinges	upon	a	certain	measure	of	economic	power:	Rachel	and	Joe	
could	afford	to	rent	their	own	flat	and	despite	a	lack	of	ownership	over	their	living	
space	at	the	time,	Eva	and	Lars	had	the	power	to	(at	least	temporarily)	buy	privacy.	
The	experiences	of	couples	who	do	not	have	such	economic	freedom	would	be	an	
important	adjunct	here	to	determine	whether	the	lack	of	private	living	space	and	
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possible	intrusion	from	others	dampens	the	possibilities	for	such	intense	experiences	
of	‘being	one’.		
	
5.4	Conclusions	
	
This	chapter	has	made	two	main	arguments:	that	subjectivity	is	materially,	as	well	as	
discursively,	distributed	and	composed	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009)	and	that	MDMA	
experiences	can	refigure	key	boundaries	within	and	beyond	the	self.	Firstly,	we	have	
seen	how	the	ongoing	practices	of	the	self	interact	with	the	material	settings	of	the	
couples’	MDMA	use.	Journeying	through	(usually	outside)	spaces	brought	up	a	host	
of	objects	and	material	features	which	could	be	engaged	with.	These	interactive	
possibilities	produced	a	playful	sense	of	self,	allowing	couples	to	(re)connect	in	a	
carefree,	joyous	way.	A	different	kind	of	movement	–	continuous,	contained	and	in	
concert	with	an	object/person	–	formulated	a	whole,	embodied	sense	of	self.	The	
object/person	acted	as	a	focal	point	to	the	bodily	experience,	encouraging	and	
cementing	this	subjectivity.	Finally,	interaction	with	certain	material	set-ups	–	a	bath	
or	cushions	–	where	there	was	a	lack	of	movement	produced	a	very	peculiar	kind	of	
‘merged’	subjectivity,	a	total	sense	of	‘oneness’.		
	 These	material	settings	and	bodily	practices,	and	the	subjectivities	produced,	
then	mediated	participants’	experiences	of	boundaries.	Defined	boundaries	went	
hand-in-hand	with	playful	subjectivities:	the	sporadic	nature	of	movement	and	
novelty	of	the	objects	encountered	underscored	separation	between	self	and	
partner,	self	and	the	world.	MDMA	has	rarely	been	seen	as	a	ludic	space,	but	here	
this	playfulness	was	key	to	the	pleasures	couples	experienced;	play	being	linked	to	
adult	well-being	generally	(Perel,	2007),	as	well	as	providing	a	conduit	through	which	
to	revitalise	closeness	(Brown,	2009).	Continuous,	contained	movement	(usually)	
around	the	focal	point	of	an	object/person	produced	a	blurring	of	boundaries	within	
the	self/mind	and	body.	This	fragmented	the	dualist	logic	which	has	been	found	to	
structure	our	experience	of	embodiment	(Gillies	et	al.,	2004;	Van	der	Manen,	1998)	
and	produced	an	experience	of	being	a	whole,	embodied	self.	Such	an	embodied	
subjectivity	was	also	seen	as	distinctly	pleasurable	(Del	Busso,	2009).	Finally,	
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physically	close	material	settings	and	a	lack	of	movement	gave	rise	to	a	merged	
subjectivity,	where	the	couple	felt	‘as	one’.	These	hazy	boundaries	were	argued	to	
lead	to	an	elusive	sense	of	closeness:	the	total	merging	between	self	and	other	that	
our	culture	seems	to	applaud	(Perel,	2007).	Yet,	the	repercussions	went	beyond	this:	
to	an	actual	balancing	between	self	and	couple	identity	and	communion	with	nature	
as	well	as	with	your	partner.	The	emphasis	placed	in	this	chapter	on	materality	is	not	
to	‘reduce’	MDMA	experiences	to	the	tangible,	rather	to	show	how	these	elements	
are	bound	up	with	the	remarkable	subjectivities	and	experiences	produced.	Indeed,	
there	seem	to	be	a	paradoxical	sense	throughout	that	these	experiences:	they	are	
full	of	the	tangible,	of	fleshy	bodies	close	together,	physical	sensations	and	solid	
objects,	yet	seem	to	produce	something	bordering	on	intangible,	a	fluidity	of	
embodied	experience	and	merging	of	selves.	Together,	this	shows	the	continued	
humanity	of	drug	experiences,	which	have	been	marginalised,	both	legally	and	
socially	(Moore,	2008),	and	yet	also	how	they	go	beyond	and	expand	the	boundaries	
of	our	living,	experiencing	bodies.		
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Chapter	6	–	‘Never	drop	without	your	significant	other.	That	way	lies	
ruin’:	The	boundary	work	of	couples	who	use	MDMA	together	
	
In	previous	chapters,	MDMA	experiences	tended	to	be	portrayed	as	unstructured	
and	spontaneous:	flowing	naturally	from	one	conversation,	place	or	activity	to	the	
next.	Yet	in	this	chapter,	we	will	look	to	the	symbolic	boundaries	within	and	beneath	
this	‘flow’.	Process	philosophy	views	what	happens	at	the	borders	of	systems	as	
crucial	to	their	constitution	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009)	and,	as	such,	this	chapter	will	
use	the	ideas	of	anthropologist	Mary	Douglas	and	psychologist	Paul	Stenner	around	
order,	disorder	and	what	lies	at	the	threshold	between	the	two.	Both	scholars	have	
an	interest	in	the	ordering	of	systems	but,	importantly,	might	seem	to	approach	this	
from	‘the	other	way	up’.	By	this,	it	is	meant	that	instead	of	first	looking	at	what	
constitutes	the	system,	how	things	are	ordered,	their	gaze	immediately	falls	to	what	
is	excluded	from	the	system.	For	Douglas	(2001),	this	means	exploring	what	a	culture	
considers	unclean	and	dirty	to	understand	the	purity	and	order	that	culture	is	
striving	to	create,	and	for	Stenner	(2013),	a	consideration	of	who	might	be	shut	out	
in	order	for	a	relationship	to	flourish.	
Many	of	the	participants	described	carefully	assembling	the	spatial-temporal	
boundaries	of	MDMA	experiences.	These	functioned	not	just	to	control	their	use	and	
distinguish	themselves	as	responsible	drug	users,	but	to	enable	and	constrain	certain	
kinds	of	intimate	interactions	and	feelings,	as	found	in	other	studies	(Foster	&	
Spencer,	2013;	MacLean,	2015).	The	first	two	themes	examine	how	boundarying	
MDMA	experiences	as	‘special’	and	set	apart	from	everyday	life	modulated	the	
experiences	of	couples:	enhancing	enjoyment	and	the	love	they	felt	for	each	other.	
Correspondingly,	the	exclusionary	boundaries	drawn	to	keep	others	out	of	this	space	
worked	to	preserve	the	intimacy	and	fun	had	on	the	drug	for	the	benefit	of	the	
couple,	as	explored	in	the	final	theme.	
	
6.1	Assembling	the	temporal	borders	of	‘special’	MDMA	space-time	
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Couples	actively	constructed	boundaries	between	‘special’	MDMA	space-time	and	
the	everyday.	‘Space’	in	this	chapter	will	refer	to	the	material	spaces	of	MDMA	use,	
whereas	‘space-time’	will	be	used	to	distinguish	the	experiential	borders	of	MDMA	
use.	Certainly,	there	were	exceptions	to	this	practice	of	segmentation:	three	couples	
spoke	about	how	MDMA	had	been	part	of	the	rhythm	of	their	everyday	lives	–	
reflected	in	their	at	least	weekly	use	of	the	drug	for	several	years	(though	for	all	
three	the	level	of	use	had	since	decreased	dramatically).	However,	for	most,	MDMA	
use	was	an	anticipated	event	that	jutted	out	from	the	flow	of	daily	activities.	In	fact,	
the	word	‘special’	itself	frequently	emerged	as	a	descriptor:	‘taking	the	MDMA	is	like	
a	special	event’	(Tomás,	diary);	‘Nowadays	I	save	MDMA	for	special	occasions’	(Ken,	
diary);	‘makes	it	more	like	special’	(Carrie,	diary);	‘it’s	a	special	thing	for	us’	(Eva,	
couple	interview);	‘those	entire	2-4	hour	windows	[on	MDMA]	are	so	special’	(Nick,	
couple	interview).	These	boundaries	often	had	a	temporal	aspect,	marking	out	
certain	times	within	which	they	would	take	MDMA:	
	
‘I	feel	excited.	We	don’t	take	this	often	at	all	(maybe	2-3	times	a	year)	so	
taking	the	MDMA	is	like	a	special	event’	(Tomás,	diary)	
‘We	have	both	been	waiting	for	this	day	for	a	long	while’	(Karl,	diary)	
‘We	take	it	around	3	times	a	year…	I	found	that	taking	it	[too]	much	[in	the	
past]	reduced	the	emotional	value	for	me,	it	tended	to	become	more	about	
getting	high	and	fucked	up.’	(Ken,	diary)	
	
MDMA	should	be	used	‘[not]	often	at	all’	–	this	mirrors	the	general	sense	among	
couples	that	the	passing	of	a	certain	amount	of	time	between	use	(usually	one	to	
four	months)	legitimised	their	drug	use.	Thus,	the	borders	between	acceptable	and	
unacceptable	use	became	manifest;	with	use	that	was	‘[too]	much’	and	seen	to	
neglect	health	looked	down	on.	Karl	sums	up	the	attitude	of	the	majority	of	
participants	when	he	says,	‘any	“smart”	human	being	knows	they	did	something	that	
was	stressful	on	their	body	and	should	take	some	time	off’.	What	begins	as	a	
testament	to	health	seemed	to	have	become	something	more,	with	Tomás	drawing	
a	direct	line	between	not	taking	MDMA	‘often	at	all’	to	the	experience	feeling	like	‘a	
special	event’.	Keeping	an	event	occasional	can	serve	to	build	excitement	around	it:	
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bank	holidays	would	hardly	be	so	anticipated	if	they	were	weekly	events.	Karl	might	
describe	it	as	‘a	bit	of	pain’	waiting	so	long	between	using	MDMA	but	it	is	arguably	
hard	to	imagine	quite	the	same	levels	of	‘excitement’	he	reports	in	the	preceding	
days	if	taking	MDMA	were	more	intertwined	with	the	pattern	of	his	daily	life.	
However,	infrequency	does	not	automatically	romanticise	an	event,	it	is	
something	about	MDMA	experiences	combined	with	occasional	use	that	hits	just	the	
right	key.	In	a	similar	vein	to	Tomás,	Ken	finds	that	narrowing	the	acceptable	times	
to	take	MDMA	retains	the	‘emotional	value’	of	the	experience	for	him.	He	talks	
about	the	‘peak’	period	of	his	use	(once	a	fortnight)	as	fundamentally	dangerous,	in	
retrospect,	and	something	he	attributes	to	the	folly	of	being	‘younger’,	a	finding	
echoed	across	other	studies	showing	how	ecstasy	use	decreases	with	age	(e.g.	Van	
den	Eijnden,	1998	cited	in	Vervaeke	&	Korf,	2006).	He	has	also	grown	to	value	the	
emotional	aspect	of	MDMA,	which	he	sees	as	diminished	by	more	intense	patterns	
of	use	where	it	is	more	about	‘getting	high	and	fucked	up’.	While	taking	MDMA	
together	was	special	to	couples	for	many	reasons,	the	way	it	made	them	feel	was	a	
main	thread	running	through	their	accounts.	For	Ken,	being	on	MDMA	reminded	him	
and	his	partner	‘how	we	feel	for	one	another’	–	something	that	was	always	there	yet	
‘life	and	the	workday’	could	sometimes	‘get	in	the	way’	of.	And	this	feeling	was	only	
preserved	when	MDMA	was	a	rare,	anticipated	event.	Karl,	too,	‘feel[s]	closer’	to	his	
partner	and	Tomás	speaks	about	how	the	drug	‘allowed	us	to	connect	more	than	we	
do	normally’,	crucially	not	fabricating	but	enhancing	their	connection,	‘just	feel	what	
I	already	felt	but	more’.		
The	specialness	of	these	experiences	was	further	delineated	through	
coordinating	MDMA	use	with	important	life	events.	Like	when	Eva	returns	home	
from	several	months	abroad	and	she	takes	MDMA	with	her	partner	as	a	kind	of	
‘homecoming	party’	or	when	Karl	describes	his	girlfriend	having	her	‘last	exam	
today’	as	the	‘perfect’	time	to	do	MDMA.	Other	less	significant	but	still	out-of-the-
ordinary	events	were	also	linked	to	use	such	as	seasonal	changes,	Carrie	uses	MDMA	
‘one	time	during	each	season’	to	mark	‘the	end	of	something	or	the	beginning’,	and	
‘a	close	friend…visiting	from	out	of	town’	(Ken).	This	shows	how	MDMA	use	is	
integrated	into	couples’	lives,	but	instead	of	falling	into	everyday	or	even	weekly	
routines,	it	seems	to	be	part	of	another,	distinct	thread	comprised	of	‘special’	
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moments	(Larson	&	Bradney,	1988).	This	both	further	constricts	when	MDMA	might	
be	used	–	relying	on	the	alignment	of	external	factors	such	as	careers,	natural	
changes	and	social	calendars	–	and	amplifies	the	feelings	experienced,	since	couples	
are	likely	to	have	a	positive	‘mindset’	(Zinberg,	1986),	well-established	as	an	
influential	force	for	how	drugs	are	experienced.		
Therefore,	casting	MDMA	use	as	special	and	outside	of	the	norm	went	hand-
in-hand	with	framing	certain	times	of	use	as	unacceptable.	In	contrast	to	research	
which	depict	the	couple	either	as	a	kind	of	cage,	locking	partners	into	cycles	of	
problematic	drug	use	(MacRae	&	Aalto,	2000)	or	a	factor	to	be	considered	in	
interventions	attempting	to	regulate	individuals’	use	(Fals-Stewart,	O'Farrell,	
Birchler,	Córdova	&	Kelley,	2005),	relationships	here	seemed	to	act	to	control	drug	
use.	Couples	tied	MDMA	use	to	certain	time	frames	and	significant,	infrequent	
events	in	their	lives.	Aside	from	being	inadvisable	on	a	health	level,	they	found	too	
that	overuse	could	take	the	(emotional)	shine	off.	
	
6.2	Eliminating	and	enchanting	everyday	life:	Ritualised	practices	of	separation	
	
As	well	as	having	a	temporal	dimension,	a	sense	of	specialness	became	manifest	in	
what	the	couples	did	to	mark	out	these	experiences	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	This	is	in	
keeping	with	other	researchers	interested	in	spirituality	and	ritual	such	as	Holloway	
(2003)	who	speaks	of	a	need	to	shift	attention	away	from	‘an	(already)	ordered	
division’	and	‘toward[s]	a	heterogeneous	ordering	that	relies	on	a	practice	of	
differentiation’	(p1968).	In	other	words,	instead	of	thinking	of	boundaries	(or	what	
Holloway	calls	‘divisions’)	as	pre-existing	–	they	simply	are	–	we	should	think	of	
boundaries	as	emerging	from	boundary-making	practices,	or	‘practice[s]	of	
differentiation’	–	they	are	enacted.	This	is	directly	comparable	to	the	‘practices’	
approach	to	intimacy	discussed	earlier	(Jamieson,	1998,	2012;	Morgan,	1996,	2011;	
Gabb	&	Fink,	2015),	which	precipitated	a	framework	shift	from	what	intimacy	is	to	
the	practices	people	use	to	do	intimacy.		
	 On	the	whole,	MDMA	experiences	became	part	of	a	ritualised	process	for	
couples;	these	rituals	not	only	expressed	couples’	values,	such	as	care	for	health	and	
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prioritisation	of	their	relationship,	but	also	modified	the	nature	of	their	experiences	
(Douglas,	2001).	Key	to	the	ritualistic	boundarying	of	MDMA	experiences	was	a	
pushing	out	of	daily	concerns.	This	was	often	performed	through	practices	that	
engaged	with	the	materiality	of	the	world:	couples	reordered	spaces,	objects	and	
their	own	bodies.	This	‘rhythm	and	choreography’	(Holloway,	2003,	p1962)	of	spatial	
and	material	elements	can	be	seen	in	Carrie’s	description	of	the	build	up	to	taking	
MDMA	with	her	partner	of	two	and	a	half	years:	
	
Carrie:	Like	we	ate	healthier	the	days	before	and	we’ve	taken	a	nap	[…or	
maybe	do	some	yoga	or	meditate	to	like	calm	myself	down…]	and	like	we’re	
ready	to,	uh,	engage	in	this	activity.	Uh,	and	I	find	it	nice	that	it’s	like:	I	am	
clean,	the	house	is	clean.	We	have	actually	made	an	effort	to	make	it	easy	or	
like,	or	make	the	trip	as	good	as	possible…like	before	we	take	the	MDMA,	I’m	
like	‘ok,	the	bed	should	be	made.	We	should	have	flowers	there,	ok,	kettle	
on’…uh,	we	have	some	chewing	gum,	like	set	the	scene	but	like	on	MDMA.	
And	it’s	important	that	we	have	like	a	water	bottle	with	us…	I	think	like	the	
idea	of	how	we’re	going	to	do	it	makes	it	more	important	to	set	the	setting	
than	while	actually	on	it	
Interviewer:	what	kind	of	scene	are	you	trying	to	set?	
Carrie:	a	scene	where	like	we	can	be	together	and	like,	uh,	talk	without	there	
being	anything	other	that	disturbs	us…and	that’s	why	I	turn	off	my	cellphone,	
for	example,	because	I	know	it	won’t	disturb	me	if	it’s	off	(Diary	interview)	
	
Her	preparations	seem	all-encompassing	and	bestow	a	real	sense	of	occasion;	
MDMA	being	treated	here	as	an	important	guest.	She	performs	what	is	arguably	a	
secular	ritual	of	purification,	which	Douglas	(2001)	defines	as	involving	‘separating,	
tidying	and	purifying’	(p2):	she	purifies	her	body	and	mind,	‘ate	healthier’,	‘we’ve	
taken	a	nap’,	‘some	yoga	or	meditat[ion]’,	‘I	am	clean’;	tidies	her	home,	‘the	house	is	
clean’,	‘the	bed	should	be	made’,	‘we	should	have	flowers	there’	and	separates	out	
MDMA	space-time,	‘set	the	scene’,	‘we	can	be	together…without	there	being	
anything	other	that	disturbs	us’.	Moreover,	the	actions	she	engages	in	to	reshape	
her	body	and	her	environment	are	crucial	to	the	special	space-time	produced;	the	
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body	is	thus	seen	to	be	actively	engaged	in	making	sense	of	the	space	and	bordering	
it	from	its	everyday	uses	(Kong,	2001;	Holloway,	2003).	While	less	elaborate,	some	
cleansing	process	was	spoken	about	by	several	participants:	‘We	took	some	vitamins,	
had	food,	cleaned	the	apartment’	(Effy	&	Aron);	‘we	take	some	vitamins	and	
magnesium	and	drink	juice…and	we	clean	the	flat	and…we	take	a	bath’	(Eva	&	Lars);	
‘we’d	given	[the	room]	a	quick	hoover	and	tidied	anything	that	looked	out	of	place	
until	it	was	firmly	in	place’	(Melanie).		
Ritual	can	shape	our	experience	by	actively	reformulating	the	past	and	
returning	us	to	an	earlier	state	of	cleanliness	and	purity	(Douglas,	2001;	Balee,	2016).	
For	example,	for	some	Southeast	Asian	Muslims,	coming	into	contact	with	a	dog,	
even	accidentally,	requires	ritual	bathing	to	restore	their	former,	unpolluted	state.	
This	example	illustrates	how	the	rescripting	of	the	past	that	takes	place	within	
cultures	is	incurred	by	a	specific	polluting	event.	In	relation	to	Carrie’s	experiences,	
reformulating	the	past	could	be	seen	to	occur	in	a	slightly	different	way.	Rather	than	
purifying	the	polluting	influence	of	something	particular,	it	is	everyday	life	which	she	
seems	to	find	polluting.	She	invokes	a	purer,	simpler	state,	where	her	and	her	
environment	are	cleansed	of	the	dirt	of	the	everyday	and	not	subject	to	its	endless	
tasks	and	complications.	This	dirt	of	the	everyday	is	both	the	visible	dirt	of	an	
unclean	home	and	the	figurative	dirt,	which	can	accumulate	within	the	body	and	
mind,	purged	through	yoga,	healthy	eating	and	meditation.	The	latter	
conceptualisation	could	be	understood	as	the	intersection	of	current	discourses	
around	healthy	living	(Roy,	2008)	and	the	rise	of	Eastern	practices	in	the	Western	
world,	coming	to	mainstream	popularity	particularly	in	the	past	decade	e.g.	almost	
two	thirds	of	GPs	in	the	UK	think	it	would	be	useful	for	their	patients	to	learn	
mindfulness	meditation	skills	(Halliwell,	2010)	and	13.2%	of	the	American	population	
have	practiced	yoga	in	their	lifetime	(Cramer	et	al.,	2015).	This	purification	ritual	
thus	marks	a	boundary	between	MDMA	space-time	and	everyday	concerns	and	
fluctuations	in	mood.	This	could	also	set	the	tone	for	what	is	possible	within	this	
space:	a	restoration	to	a	simpler,	perfected	kind	of	intimacy.		
The	idea	of	accessing	a	simpler,	idealised	intimacy	on	MDMA	could	be	seen	
as	reinforced	by	Carrie’s	later	interview	comments:	
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Like	I	also	find	it	easier	to	understand	what	he	needs	because	like	instead	of	
being	concerned	about	what	I	think	about	it,	it’s	easier	to	like	open	up	the	
empathy	and	try	to	understand	what	he	needs…	I	can	focus	all	my	attention	
on	him…without	like	extra	noise	around	it.	Like	in	everyday	life	I	feel	like	my	
mind	is	getting	in	the	way	or	things	I	should	do	is	getting	in	the	way…or	like	
circumstances	getting	in	the	way.	Uh	so	it’s	easier	to	be	like	uh	on	only	one	
track	without	anything	else	to	think	about	(Diary	interview)	
	
The	fact	that	Carrie	is	talking	about	empathy	here	comes	as	no	surprise	–	it	is	one	of	
the	most	well-known	effects	of	MDMA	(Bedi,	Hyman	&	de	Wit,	2010;	Dumont	et	al.,	
2009;	Hysek	et	al.,	2013).	However,	added	to	this	is	the	suggestion	she	modulates	
empathy	in	important	ways	through	her	performance	of	ritual.	It	becomes	clear	that	
it	is	her	everyday,	cognitive	self	that	she	has	worked	so	hard	to	exclude,	it	is	the	
‘noise’	of	her	‘mind’,	normally	associated	with	our	thoughts,	that	‘get[s]	in	the	way’	
and	obstructs	the	free	flow	of	her	‘empathy’.	Such	mental	noise	is	barricaded	from	
MDMA	space-time	through	her	ritualistic	diligence:	a	dirty	flat	could	act	as	a	visible	
reminder	of	the	‘things	[she]	should	do	[that]	get…in	the	way’,	yoga	and	meditation	
have	been	found	to	calm	rumination	(Kinser,	Bourguignon,	Whaley,	Hauenstein	&	
Taylor,	2013;	Deyo,	Wilson,	Ong	&	Koopman,	2009)	and	separating	the	space	from	
the	intrusions	of	others	and	pre-empting	physical	needs	by	resting	and	eating	
properly	means	that	‘circumstances’	can’t	possibly	‘get…in	the	way’.	All	these	
practices	cultivate	a	barrier	around	MDMA	space-time,	which	her	thinking	self	
cannot	cross	and	where	her	compassionate,	feeling	self	can	blossom;	opening	up	an	
idealised,	simpler	kind	of	intimate	space	where	she	can	focus	only	on	her	partner.		
Hence,	the	MDMA	space-time	that	Carrie	constructs	with	her	ritualistic	
separation	of	this	space	from	everyday	life	makes	room	for	non-everyday	ways	of	
feeling	and	being:	an	unselfish,	giving	love.	Yet,	in	addition	to	this	ideal	of	love,	the	
value	of	the	experience	is	also	embedded	in	everyday	relationship	practices	that	
pivot	around	the	importance	of	quality	couple	time	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	‘Date	night’	
has	become	a	ubiquitous	concept	and	something	regularly	touted	as	a	salve	for	
ebbing	relationship	connection	and	excitement.	Couples	in	Gabb	and	Fink’s	(2015)	
research	spoke	about	the	importance	of	this	negotiated	time	for	the	couple	to	be	
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together.	This	could	be	relatively	unstructured	and	part	of	the	everyday	or	‘strictly	
rule	bound,	to	separate	it	from	daily	routines	and	make	such	time	feel	special	and	
especially	meaningful’	(p30),	as	is	the	case	for	Carrie.	Date	nights	were	part	of	
‘relationship	work’,	practices	that	strengthened	and	sustained	couple	intimacy	in	
long-term	partnerships.	Hence,	the	quality	time	Carrie	carves	out	for	her	and	her	
partner	on	MDMA,	where	outside	distractions	are	methodically	eliminated,	could	be	
seen	as	part	of	a	broader	spectrum	of	relationship	work	practices	that	prioritise	time	
together.	In	other	words,	MDMA	use	could	be	seen	as	a	particular	kind	of	date	night.	
For	Carrie,	this	covered	well-worn	territory	such	as	catching	up	with	her	partner,	
discussing	personal	and	relational	issues	as	well	as	simply	feeling	the	love	she	had	
for	him	on	a	more	visceral	level,	‘instead	of	just	like	loving	with	your	heart,	you’re	
loving	with	your	fingers	as	well’.	
	 This	ritualistic	preparation	and	separation	of	MDMA	space-time	was	
performed	in	a	different	way	by	another	couple;	purifying	and	enhancing	their	
surroundings	and	selves:	
	
Eva:	So,	we	take	some	vitamins	and	magnesium	and	drink	juice	and	we	buy	
some	wheat	beer	and	we	have	ginger	tea	because	of	our	stomach,	it’s	
brilliant.	And	we	clean	the	flat	and…we	take	a	bath	and	stuff.		It’s	just	for	all	
the	preparation.	And	this…it’s	a	special	thing	for	us…	
Lars:	it’s	like	a	ritual…that	we	do	like,	cleaning	and	everything	is	good.	And	
we	don’t	want	to	have	like	any	negative	influences	on,	uh,	on	our	trip.	Not,	
not	an	untidy	flat	or	something…	
Interviewer:	would	that,	if	you	had,	if	like	the	flat	was	dirty	or	something	how	
would	that	influence	your	experience	of	taking	MDMA?	
Lars:	I	would,	urgh,	I	wouldn’t	feel	so	comfortable…if	there	are	clothes	
everywhere	and,	I	don’t	know,	a	suitcase	standing	around	and	then	you	get	
up	and	you’re	not	very	coordinated	and	you	walk	into	a	chair	[laughter]	or	
you	trip	over	some	clothes	or,	say	you	want	to	dance	or	something	and	the	
whole	floor	is	nuts…and	it’s	not	pretty	
Eva:	yeah,	it	should	be	pretty.	It’s	important	to	have	some	candles	and	we	
have	some	tapestries	we	hang	on	the	walls…and,	um,	what	we	have	
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additionally	is	something	like	massage	oil	because	we	like	to	get	massages	
and	glowsticks,	I	love	glowsticks	[laughter]	(Couple	interview:	Eva	&	Lars)	
	
Once	more,	there	are	acts	of	self-	and	environmental	purification,	‘we	take	some	
vitamins’,	‘we	take	a	bath’,	‘clean	the	flat’	but	beyond	this,	MDMA	space	is	marked	
out	as	‘a	special	thing’	in	another	way:	through	the	inclusion	of	celebratory	items.	
The	adornments	of	‘tapestries’,	‘glowsticks’	and	‘candles’	alter	their	surroundings	
and	make	visible	a	kind	of	carnival	atmosphere;	reinforced	by	how	the	couple	later	
describe	taking	MDMA	together	as	‘a	little	celebration	of	our	relationship’.	One	of	
the	ways	ritual	modifies	experience	is	by	sharpening	focus:	it	can	frame	an	
experience	in	a	particular	way	and	thereby	invoke	expectancies	e.g.	how	a	bedtime	
story	settles	a	child	into	the	calmness	needed	for	sleep.	Eva	and	Lars	could	be	said	to	
be	performing	a	temporal-spatial	‘framing’	(Milner,	1955	cited	in	Douglas,	2001)	
where	the	acts	they	perform	fashion	a	symbolic	frame.	Inside	this	frame	are	
desirable	elements	–	warmth,	cosiness	and	celebration	–	and	held	outside	are	
undesirable	elements,	‘any	negative	influences’	–	everyday	disorder	and	
‘untid[iness]’	–	the	grime	accumulated	on	and	within	their	bodies	and	home.	Hence,	
whenever	they	perform	all	these	acts	together,	it	could	be	argued	they	are	weaving	
a	familiar	frame,	shifting	their	state	to	one	of	freshness	and	festivity;	opening	up	
new	ways	of	being	and	connecting	in	the	re-enchanted,	familiar	space	of	home.		
Many	of	these	aspects,	though	differently	described,	relate	to	the	spatial	
rearrangement	of	their	environment.	Thus,	the	visual	appearance	of	their	living	
space	seems	crucial	to	symbolically	marking	out	the	space	from	its	day-to-day	
functionality.	The	explanation	of	why	this	is	so	relates	to	James	Gibson’s	concept	of	
affordance,	which	describes	the	relationship	between	an	organism	and	its	
environment,	previously	outlined	in	Chapter	Two.	His	ecological	approach	
emphasises	how,	by	means	of	an	exchange	of	meaning,	an	organism	and	its	
environment	evolve	together.	These	meanings	are	‘behavioural…signs	to	an	
organism	that	actions	are	possible’	(Pickering,	2007,	p72).	An	affordance	then	is	an	
action	the	environment	makes	feasible	for	an	organism	and	may	be	exemplified	in	
natural	objects,	berries	that	may	be	eaten	and	trees	that	may	be	sheltered	beneath,	
or	cultural	objects,	cups	to	drink	from	or	churches	to	worship	within.		
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	 Therefore,	it	could	be	said	that	the	couple	are	so	committed	to	rearranging	
and	sculpting	their	living	space	because	this	offers	up	different	affordances,	different	
possibilities	for	action,	which	they	might	want	to	take	up	on	MDMA.	For	example,	
there	is	the	opportunity	to	‘dance’	since	all	errant	items	have	been	tidied	away	and	
to	walk	through	the	space	with	ease	when	you	might	‘not	[be]	very	coordinated’.	
Humans	can	also	notice	‘higher	grade’	affordances	which	are	shaped	by	cultural	
knowledge	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015)	e.g.	the	strong	cultural	stories	around	water	as	a	
place	of	transformation,	for	example	baptism,	shape	how	we	might	understand	a	
pool	in	the	middle	of	a	forest	as	a	space	of	reinvention	and	purification.	The	way	Eva	
and	Lars	modify	the	light	with	‘candles’	and	‘glowsticks’	could	also	be	seen	to	offer	
them	new	possibilities	for	being.	This	muted	lighting	seems	to	imitate	firelight,	
around	which	exists	a	rich,	cultural	history.	A	point	for	communities	to	gather	
around	together;	to	relax,	hear	stories,	sing	songs	and	enjoy	themselves.	This	sense	
of	cosy	togetherness	could	alter	how	the	couple	behave	and	feel	by	relaxing	them	
and	bringing	them	closer	together.	Similarly,	the	‘tapestries’	they	use	draw	on	a	long	
history	of	people	adorning	their	environments	to	make	visible	a	celebratory	
atmosphere,	which	might	imbue	the	space	with	new	possibilities	for	festivity	and	
fun.	
Ritual	can	also	be	seen	to	modulate	couples’	experiences	as	they	initiated	
friends	into	MDMA	use.	These	‘rites	of	passage’	(Turner,	1987)	were	carefully	
constructed	affairs,	centred	around	making	the	transition	from	non-user	to	user	as	
smooth	as	possible;	with	the	couple	working	together	to	produce	the	right	kind	of	
intimate	space.	As	Ken	describes:	
	
It	is	…	[Rob’s]	first	time,	so	I’m	obsessively	planning	out	the	experience	for	
him.	I	plan	to	give	him	halves	of	a	tablet,	20	minutes	apart	to	smoothen	out	
the	come-up.	I	myself	will	drop	later	on,	only	after	he’s	hit	and	rolling	well.	I	
want	to	be	sober	in	case	anything	happens	[…]	
Jittery,	and	having	second	thoughts,	but	this	is	usual…I	remind	myself	that	
I’ve	properly	prepared	for	this,	and	thought	through	the	several	scenarios	
how	tonight	might	play	out…I	don’t	know	how	many	people	I’ve	introduced	to	
MDMA	in	the	past,	but	nowadays	the	answer	is	‘practically	never.’	There’s	a	
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lot	more	shit	drugs	going	around	and	coupled	with	age	it’s	just	made	me	a	lot	
more	cautious	in	general.	That	said,	we’ll	be	a	tight	group	of	friends,	in	a	
controlled	environment,	and	the	stuff	I’m	giving	them	was	tested	and	bought	
off	a	DNM.	[…]	
We’ve	gone	over	the	logistics,	and	the	playlist.	Most	we’ve	discussed	is	how	
we’ll	deal	with	the	newbie	later	tonight,	we’re	both	gonna	bring	our	friendly	
and	cool	A-game	to	put	him	at	ease	and	hopefully	have	himself	a	great	drop.	
Topics	to	avoid	and	push,	what	to	do	if	he	gets	anxious,	That’s	it.	(Diary)	
	
Ken’s	parting	phrase,	‘That’s	it’,	is	not	intended	to	be	ironic	but	could	feel	that	way	
after	he	describes	his	‘obsessive…planning’,	precise	calculation	of	dosage	
administration	and	prepping	of	conversational	topics.	His	actions	demarcate	the	
experience	as	a	significant	event	and	construct	a	particular	kind	of	boundaried,	safe,	
positive	space.	There	is	nothing	for	Rob,	the	‘newbie’,	to	worry	about	or	consider:	all	
the	‘logistics’	have	already	been	taken	care	of.	Ken	takes	preventative	measures	
against	the	‘shit	drugs’	that	might	threaten	the	safety	of	the	space	by	‘test[ing]’	and	
buying	MDMA	through	a	‘DNM’	(dark	net	market	website):	both	recognised	harm	
reduction	practices	(Allott	&	Redman,	2006;	Buxton	&	Bingham,	2015).	There	is	also	
a	science-like	precision	with	his	division	of	the	complete	dose	and	‘20	minute’	time	
spacing	to	‘smoothen	out	the	come-up’.	Furthermore,	by	positioning	himself	
temporarily	at	the	borders	of	this	space,	‘in	case	anything	happens’,	him	and	his	
‘sober[iety]’	act	as	a	watchful	guard,	protecting	the	peace.		
The	space-time	Ken	and	his	partner	construct	is	not	only	physically	safe,	but	
also	emotionally	safe;	there	is	a	real	sense	here	of	the	‘emotion	work’	they	are	
performing.	Emotion	work	is	a	term	originally	used	by	Hochschild	(1983)	to	refer	to	
the	additional	‘invisible’	labour	performed	by	flight	attendants	and	involves	the	
management	of	one’s	own	feelings	to	create	an	observable	facial	and	bodily	display.	
The	idea	has	since	been	adapted	for	familial	and	relationship	contexts,	where	‘this	
work	tends	to	involve	the	enhancement	of	others'	emotional	well-being	and	the	
provision	of	emotional	support’	(Erickson,	1993,	p888).	The	enhancement	of	Rob’s	
emotional	well-being	seems	to	be	the	primary	mover	behind	Ken	and	his	partner’s	
collation	of	a	discursive	agenda,	‘topics	to	avoid	and	push’	and	their	brainstorming	of	
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strategies	to	combat	any	possible	anxiety	from	Rob	speaks	to	their	readiness	to	
provide	emotional	support,	should	it	be	needed.	Furthermore,	their	moulding	of	
their	own	emotional	appearance	for	the	benefit	of	Rob,	‘we’re	both	gonna	bring	our	
friendly	and	cool	A-game’,	maps	onto	the	observable	facial	and	bodily	displays	
Hochschild	(1983)	represents	as	key	to	the	performance	of	emotion	work.	Thus,	
these	emotion	work	practices	open	up	a	safe	space	where	Rob	can	feel	totally	‘at	
ease’:	people	are	‘friendly’,	conversation	is	tailored	to	a	thought-out	script	and	
anxieties	are	detected	and	responded	to.		
The	deep	sense	of	mastery	on	display	throughout	Ken’s	account	seems	akin	
to	watching	the	film	of	a	great	director:	there	appears	a	natural	transition	from	one	
scene	to	the	next,	the	tone	is	seamlessly	set	and	then	shifted	and	all	the	while	a	
narrative	organically	emerges.	Yet,	while	the	film	may	appear	free-flowing,	this	
belies	the	countless	hours	of	scripting,	rehearsing,	re-filming	and	editing	that	went	
into	its	production.	It	is	this	free-flowing	experience	that	Ken	tirelessly	constructs:	he	
places	Rob	front	of	house,	witness	to	the	collective	assemblage	of	his	vision	of	‘ease’	
and	emotional	well-being	while	shielding	him	from	the	backstage	preparatory	work.	
The	anticipation	and,	indeed,	priming	for	emotional	intimacy	gives	the	sense	of	a	
rather	sanitised	emotional	space.	It	is	quite	out	of	the	norm	to	have	your	personal	
emotional	well-being	so	painstakingly	considered	and	catered	to.	Perhaps	this	might	
limit	the	possibility	for	certain	types	of	emotional	growth	experience,	which	are	
often	considered	to	be	tied	to	the	experience	of	a	certain	degree	of	adversity	or	
struggle,	and	incompatible	with	excessive	intervention	from	others	(Brown,	2015).		
	 Ken	‘remind[ing]	[him]self	that	[he’s]	properly	prepared’	could	be	seen	as	a	
self-soothing	strategy	for	managing	his	anxiety.	In	emotion-focussed	couples’	
therapy,	to	self-soothe	means	drawing	on	internal	resources	to	regulate	personal	
distress,	and	has	been	found	to	be	as	important	for	relationship	satisfaction	as	it	is	
for	easing	individual	suffering	(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008).	While	not	in	a	
therapeutic	environment,	Ken’s	self-directed	reminders	do	seem	to	overlap	with	this	
concept	and	constitute	an	attempt	to	self-soothe.	His	anxiety	is	emphasised	in	
particular	in	relation	to	the	‘newbie’	but	is	also	a	regular	feature	of	taking	MDMA:	
‘Jittery,	and	having	second	thoughts,	but	this	is	usual’.	Control	is	a	key	strategy	for	
managing	anxiety	and	with	the	level	of	careful	management	on	display	in	Ken’s	
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account,	it	seems	likely	he	might	often	engage	in	practices	that	frame	the	experience	
for	calm.	It	should	be	noted	how	much	of	a	joint	strategy	the	process	is,	‘we’	is	
repeated	several	times.	This	suggests	the	couple	might	participate	in	mutual	
soothing,	where	both	partners	attempt	to	alleviate	the	distress	of	one	another	
(Greenberg	&	Goldman,	2008),	as	they	help	to	prepare	each	other	for	the	ingestion	
of	what	is	a	powerful,	psychoactive	drug.		
Of	course,	not	all	couples	prepared	to	the	same	degree	that	Ken,	Eva	and	
Lars,	and	Carrie	did.	For	those	who	didn’t	wholly	rearrange	their	space	or	who	took	
MDMA	outside	the	home,	an	object	could	embody	a	certain	kind	of	mood.	This	is	the	
third	avenue	by	which	ritual	can	alter	experience,	what	Douglas	(2001)	calls	the	
‘method	of	mnemonics’	where	an	external	symbol	helps	co-ordinate	feelings,	
thoughts	and	actions:	Douglas	gives	the	example	of	an	actor	whose	performance	is	
tied	together	by	a	new	prop.	For	example,	Karl	buys	‘glowlights’	to	provide	some	
psychological	breathing	space.	They	punctuate	the	continuous	‘busy	talking’	and	
inspire	a	state	of	play,	where	he	can	just	‘lay	back…enjoy	the	show’.	Similarly,	Jenny	
brings	a	‘blinky	ring’	to	her	and	Mark’s	joint	interview,	which	is	‘fun	to	play	with’.	She	
never	interacts	with	it	apart	from	when	they	take	MDMA,	and	coming	across	it	in	her	
bag	is	a	‘fun	surprise’:	prompting	some	joviality	and	lightness	to	the	otherwise	rather	
serious	business	of	‘dealing	with	all	the	issues	that	[they]	have’.		
Thus,	it	is	suggested	that	the	ritualistic	preparations	couples	perform	–	
gathering	supplies	and	objects	for	use,	cleaning/adorning	their	homes	and	
themselves,	working	out	how	the	night	will	work	on	a	practical	level,	calculating	
dosages	and	calming	themselves	through	yoga	or	reminding	themselves	they’ve	
‘properly	prepared	for	this’	(Ken)	–	serve	to	both	control	their	use	and	to	enhance	
the	way	they	feel.	Everyday	tasks,	items,	bodies	and	spaces	are	repurposed	and	
become	part	of	a	ritualistic,	preparatory	process.	In	doing	so,	couples	physically	
embody	a	sense	of	specialness	as	well	as	acting	it	out	through	a	constellation	of	
objects:	the	ordinary	becoming	‘enchanted	through	the	enactment	of	the	sacred’	
(Holloway,	2003,	p1968)	or,	what	it	is	referred	to	here	in	a	secular	context	as	the	
‘special’.	This	can	be	seen	as	representing	how	the	boundaries	couples	construct	
should	not	be	envisaged	as	simple	segmentation	of	special	MDMA	space	from	the	
everyday,	rather	that	MDMA	space	is	made	special	through	the	everyday.	This	is	
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reflected	in	how	they	talk	about	a	revival	and	reinvigoration	of	existing	feelings	of	
love	and	connection:		
	
Lars:	It	was	like	‘I	want	to	love	you	even	more,	let’s	take	MDMA’	[…]	
it’s	like	celebrating,	yeah,	that’s	really	good	because	that’s	what	we	do.		We	
celebrate	our	relationship	on	[a]	level	that	you	just	can’t	celebrate	if	you’re	
sober	because	it’s	just	not	chemically	possible	(Couple	interview:	Eva	&	Lars)	
We	feel	closer	and	we	feel	more	connected	(Karl,	Diary)	
It	makes	us	flash	back	to	that	night	[we	got	together],	and	the	weeks	
immediately	after,	when	we	were	starting	to	realise	our	feelings	for	one	
another	(Ken,	Diary)	
	
Being	on	MDMA	doesn’t	construct	entirely	new	ways	of	relating	and	feeling,	it	
extends	and	enriches	existing	feeling:	early	feelings	are	‘flash[ed]	back	to’,	there’s	
‘more	connect[ion]’	and	‘even	more’	love;	yet	it	does	so	in	powerfully	novel	ways	
that	are	otherwise	‘not	chemically	possible’.	Ritualistic	production	of	MDMA	space	
combined	with	the	particular	empathic	qualities	of	the	drug	allow	couples	to	feel	
their	familiar,	assumed	love	at	a	greater	level	of	intensity.	Lars	speaks	for	many	of	
the	(male)	participants	when	he	frames	the	experience	firmly	within	a	
neurochemical	discourse,	but	how	he	and	his	partner,	Eva,	attempt	to	shape	the	
atmospheres	of	their	MDMA	spaces	betrays	their	understanding	of	other	influences.	
This	was	mirrored	across	both	studies,	with	all	couples	describing	some	attempt	to	
control	and	influence	the	atmosphere	of	their	MDMA	experiences:	whether	that	is	
through	rearranging	their	space,	physical	and	mental	cleansing,	planning	out	
music/activities	or	bringing	in	particular	items.			
It	is	argued	then	that	couples	mark	out	MDMA	space-time	through	and	with	
the	everyday;	both	temporally	and	corporeally.	They	carve	out	acceptable	times	of	
use	–	sometimes	tying	these	to	the	high	points	in	their	lives	–	in	addition	to	
completing	chores,	taking	baths,	decorating	their	home	and	going	shopping	for	
supplies.	In	contrast	to	other	research	that	portrays	the	couple	relationship	as	an	
obstruction	to	regulated	drug	use,	couples	here	seem	to	help	boundary	and	control	
their	MDMA	experiences	together.	Yet,	more	than	this,	MDMA	use	seems	to	inhabit	
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a	special	zone,	where	familiar	spaces,	selves	and	connections	can	be	reformed	and	
re-enchanted.	Sometimes	the	hum	of	daily	life	muffles	how	couples	really	feel	for	
one	another,	sometimes	MDMA	provides	the	space	for	a	more	compassionate,	less	
analytical	self	to	emerge	or,	perhaps,	the	couple	just	want	to	feel	even	more	in	love.	
	
6.3	Policing	the	intimate	borders	of	MDMA	space-time:	just	the	two	of	us?	
	
So	far,	we	have	been	thinking	about	MDMA	space-time	as	effortfully	assembled	by	
couples.	Their	ritualised	ordering	of	spaces,	objects	and	selves	seemed	to	serve	to	
control	the	experience	so	that	the	right	kind	of	(emotional	and	physical)	
environment	could	be	produced	–	for	themselves	and	others.	A	re-enchantment	of	
the	everyday	was	performed:	the	familiar	space	of	home	was	transformed	through	
ritualised	process	and	existing	feelings	of	love	enriched.	This	assemblage	also	
involved	a	pushing	out	of	the	everyday	and	its	concerns;	and	it	is	this	exclusionary	
perspective	that	the	present	theme	will	build	upon.		
Spoken	about	particularly	was	the	exclusion	of	others	from	couples’	MDMA	
experiences:	limiting	who	was	invited	in	and	in	what	way	they	were	part	of	the	
experience	forming	a	much	needed	barrier	around	this	emotionally	fertile	space.	
Paul	Stenner’s	(2013)	ideas	around	what	he	calls	foundation	by	exclusion	are	helpful	
in	exploring	these	barriers	further;	he	discusses	how	we	can	think	about	phenomena	
as	being	created	and	maintained	not	only	through	what	is	included	but	what	is	
excluded:	
	
‘it	is	through	a	relation	to	the	exclusion	or	expulsion	of	‘the	third’	or	of	
‘thirdness’	that	unity	and	identity	are	created	and	maintained.		The	
implication	is	that	behind	the	foundation	of	something	unified	(something	
that	might	be	described	as	a	system)	there	lurks	expulsion	and	exclusion,	and	
that	this	exclusion	is	necessary	(rather	than	incidental)	to	the	ongoing	
constitution	of	the	system.’	(p56)	
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‘System’	is	used	here	broadly	to	refer	to	a	social	system,	an	organism,	a	system	of	
experience	or	of	knowledge.	Therefore,	we	can	conceive	of	both	a	couple	and	their	
MDMA	experiences	as	systems	in	this	sense.	Initially,	let	us	think	about	the	couple	as	
a	unified,	ordered	system	and	how	this	might	be	related	to	an	exclusion	of	
‘thirdness’.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	others	(in	the	case	of	a	monogamous	
couple,	this	would	perhaps	be	‘all	others’)	are	‘included	as	excluded’	(Stenner,	2013,	
p58,	referencing	Agamben)	or,	rather,	the	excluded	third	mediates	and	is	creative	of	
the	couple	relationship.	However,	as	well	as	the	excluded	third	being	creative	of	the	
couple	system	it	can	also	destabilise	it.	An	extra-dyadic	romantic	tryst	can	interrupt	
the	couple	system,	exposing	the	previously	invisible	mediator	(of	‘all	others’);	the	
excluded	third	which	was	necessary	for	the	relationship	to	function.	
Therefore,	‘the	relationship	of	the	system	to	the	thirdness	of	its	noise	
is…fundamentally	ambivalent’	(Stenner,	2013,	p78),	being	both	productive	(third-as-
mediator)	and	disruptive	(third-as-interrupter).	If	we	apply	the	principle	of	the	
excluded	third,	along	with	corresponding	notions	of	mediation	and	interruption,	to	
the	system	of	experience	constitutive	of	MDMA	space-time,	interesting	questions	
emerge.	Who	is	being	excluded	from	MDMA	space-time	and	why?	At	what	point	
does	third-as-mediator	cross	over	into	third-as-disruptor?		
	
6.3.1	Who	is	being	excluded	from	MDMA	space-time	and	why?	
	
Regarding	the	first	query,	while	the	‘who’	varies	from	couple	to	couple,	it	will	be	
argued	the	‘why’	is	the	same:	MDMA	use	becomes	part	of	exclusive,	shared	couple	
space	and	thus	mandates	protection.	Most	often,	participants	saw	taking	MDMA,	to	
some	degree,	as	a	couple	‘thing’.	Coupledom	is	predicated	on	the	inhabitation	of	a	
space	which	is	just	‘for	us’	(Finn,	2010):	this	symbolic	territory	including	favourite	
hobbies	and	past-times,	inside	jokes,	places	and,	often,	sex	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	
Couples	would	incorporate	MDMA	experiences	within	this	couples’	space,	so	that	
MDMA	use	became	a	thing	the	couples	did	together	and	formed	part	of	the	story	of	
their	relationship.	This	was	performed	by	couples	in	different	ways:	the	majority	
were	content	to	practice	a	less	visible	exclusion,	others	could	be	present	but	their	
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partner	had	to	be	there	too,	while	a	few	didn’t	want	anyone	else	physically	present	
when	they	took	MDMA	together.	This	was	the	case	for	Carrie;	she	takes	MDMA	with	
‘[her]	boyfriend,	and	only	him’:	
	
I	guess	our	roommate	will	be	home,	watching	TV	and	stuff,	and	I	guess	that’s	
ok.	As	long	as	she	doesn't	behave	as	strangely	as	she	did	last	time…wanting	
to	smell	the	MDMA	and	giving	us	allergy	/	anxiety	pills	for	the	come	down.	I	
guess	that	freaked	me	a	little	bit	out,	and	is	why	I'm	not	that	keen	being	in	
the	same	room	as	her	while	we	trip.	[…]	
For	me,	it’s	important	to	do	it	alone	with	Erik.	I	find	it	important	because	he's	
my	favorite	person,	and	I	guess	I’ve	gotten	used	to	it.	I’ve	taken	MDMA	alone	
twice	and	together	with	some	friends	once,	but	the	way	I	and	Erik	do	it,	is	the	
way	I	most	appreciate.	I	feel	safe	with	him.	There's	no	drama.	I	trust	him,	and	
I	also	know	what	to	expect	from	the	experience,	since	we’ve	done	it	a	couple	
of	times.	As	I	said,	I	trust	him,	so	if	anything	uncomfortable	should	rise	to	the	
surface,	something	I,	he	or	we	need	to	talk	about,	I	don’t	fear	it.	[…]	
I	don’t	know	exactly	what	to	expect.	I	hope	it	will	be	a	calm	and	cosy	night.	I	
hope	that	we’ll	both	come	home	from	work,	relax	for	a	while,	make	a	pillow	
fort	in	our	bedroom	and	stay	there	till	the	night	comes…	(Diary)	
	
Carrie	describes	wanting	a	separate	space	for	her	and	her	partner	to	take	MDMA:	
‘I'm	not	that	keen	being	in	the	same	room	as	[housemate]	while	we	trip’;	‘it’s	
important	to	do	it	alone	with	[partner]’.	The	extent	to	which	this	is	the	result	of	
explicit	negotiation	between	the	couple	is	unclear;	what	is	clear,	however,	is	her	
‘appreciat[ion]’	and	fervent	implementation	of	this	principle.	Others	are	barred	from	
entering	this	sacred,	couples’	space:	her	housemate	intrudes	on	their	experience	
with	‘strange’	behaviour,	which	to	an	observer	might	not	seem	all	that	strange	(such	
as	‘smell[ing]	the	MDMA’:	users	are	known	to	inspect	drugs	before	taking	them	e.g.	
Van	Hout,	2014),	and	she	speaks	at	interview	about	‘uncomfortable	circumstances’	
arising	when	she	took	MDMA	without	her	partner	and	an	accompanying	
‘overwhelming’	sense	of	‘sadness	or…frustration’.	Again,	the	fact	there’s	‘no	drama’	
with	her	partner	indicates	there	is	‘drama’	with	others.	Moreover,	not	only	is	the	
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physical	presence	of	others	unwelcome,	even	their	virtual	presence	is	carefully	
excluded	as	Carrie	recalls	‘turn[ing]	off	my	cellphone…nobody’s	going	to	call	you,	
nobody’s	going	to	come	and	nobody’s	going	to	like	pop	up’.		
This	blockading	of	others	is	manifested	perfectly	in	their	bedroom	‘pillow	
fort’,	which	places	them	psychologically	and	materially	behind	a	protective	barrier.	
Mark	Finn’s	(2005;	2012)	ideas	around	the	discursive	construction	of	coupledom	are	
helpful	in	illuminating	what	might	be	going	on	here.	He	discusses	how:	‘the	
emotionally	and	sexually	connected	dyad	[of	the	couple]	is	prioritized	as	the	context	
for	a	full	expression	of	intimate	closeness	and	as	that	which	contributes	most	to	
relationship	satisfaction,	unity,	and	thus	stability’	(Finn,	2012,	p614-5)	(emphasis	in	
original).	It	could	be	argued	that,	for	Carrie,	MDMA	space-time	acts	as	a	particular	
instance	of	the	‘full	expression	of	intimate	closeness’	that	Finn	claims	defines	
contemporary	ideas	of	coupledom.	In	the	previous	theme,	the	way	Carrie	ritualises	
the	process	of	taking	MDMA	was	discussed:	her	orchestration	of	space,	objects	and	
her	embodied	self	enables	the	production	of	what	could	be	seen	as	a	purified,	
idealised	intimate	space-time.	Here,	we	can	see	how	others	are	conceptualised	as	
little	more	than	potential	interruption	to	this	intimate	flow,	she	doesn’t	want	anyone	
else	‘in	the	same	room’	or	even	‘popping	up’	virtually	via	mobile	phone.		
The	reasons	behind	Carrie	wanting	to	take	MDMA	alone	with	her	partner	are	
ostensibly	about	the	inadequacy	of	sharing	the	experience	with	others:	there	is	too	
much	‘drama’	where	difficult	emotions	like	‘sadness’	and	‘frustration’	can	appear.	
However,	it	is	suggested	that	excluding	others	from	MDMA	space-time	also	acts	as	a	
way	of	reserving	the	positive	qualities	of	that	experience	purely	for	the	benefit	of	
the	couple.	Carrie	discusses	MDMA	as	enabling	a	deep	level	of	connection:	she	is	
able	to	‘focus	all	[her]	attention	on	him’	and	‘what	he	needs’	as	well	as	deep-rooted	
concerns	of	hers	being	able	to	rise	to	the	surface	in	unexpected	ways,	‘we’re	on	the	
MDMA	and	like	‘oh	I	want	to	talk	about	this.	This	has	been	bothering	me	but	I	didn’t	
know	before	now’.	If	‘intimacy	[is	seen]	as	a	form	of	“inner”	exposure’	(Finn,	2012,	
p615),	for	which	the	couple	is	the	ultimate	context,	and	MDMA	facilitates	such	
exposure,	it	makes	sense	to	limit	and	place	barriers	around	the	experience.	On	the	
one	hand,	a	space	so	full	of	possibilities	for	intimacy	can	be	an	exciting	and	
rejuvenating	place	to	be	for	a	couple	but,	on	the	other	hand,	there	might	be	a	
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danger	of	someone	who	is	not	your	partner	crossing	an	intimate	threshold.	
Coupledom	is	predicated	on	the	inhabitation	of	a	space	which	is	just	‘for	us’	(Finn,	
2010)	and	Carrie	seems	to	be	incorporating	MDMA	experiences	within	this	couples’	
space.	Thus,	these	potentially	boundary-crossing	experiences	are	contained	and	can	
be	used	as	a	shared	resource	for	maintaining	their	bond	(see	also	Gabb	&	Fink,	
2015).		
The	borders	of	MDMA	space-time	for	Carrie	might	therefore	seem	generated	
by	the	general	exclusion	of	‘all	others’.	However,	this	belies	the	very	specific	third	
excluded	from	their	MDMA	experiences	and	relationship:	her	partner’s	ex-girlfriend,	
Ida.	Carrie	describes	how	Ida	became:	
	
this	totem	of	insecurity	so	every	time	she	was	mentioned	or	I	saw	her,	I	
remembered	those	feelings	from	when	like	I	and	Erik	started	hooking	up	and	
insecurities	about	like	“are	we	going	to	be	together	or	are	we	not	going	to	be	
together?”	(Diary	interview)	
	
The	emotion	on	display	here,	although	not	explicitly	named	by	Carrie,	seems	to	be	
jealousy:	her	insecurities	about	the	possible	loss	of	Erik,	‘“are	we	going	to	be	
together	or	are	we	not	going	to	be	together?”’,	are	tied	to	his	ex-girlfriend,	a	
conceivable	rival	for	his	affections.	Jealousy	has	often,	along	with	emotions	more	
broadly,	been	considered	an	intrapsychic	experience:	a	character	trait	or	a	way	of	
thinking	(Langdridge	et	al.,	2012).	However,	the	process-orientated	perspective	
taken	in	this	work	views	emotions	as	attributes	of	systems	(Stenner,	2013)	or	
patterns	of	relationship	(Burkitt,	2014),	rather	than	things	existing	inside	of	us.	This	
is	particularly	apparent	with	jealousy,	which	‘names	the	troubled	relationship	of	a	
subject	to	a	rival	they	wish	to	exclude’	(Stenner,	2013,	p53).	Its	inherent	basis	in	
patterns	of	relationship	is	hard	to	deny	since	it	is	unable	to	form	without	at	least	
three	figures:	a	subject,	an	object	of	desire	and	a	rival	for	that	object;	a	‘triangular	
structure	of	relations’	(Stenner,	2013,	p75).	Thus,	jealousy	could	be	seen	as	a	
location	within	these	relations,	rather	than	purely	as	an	intrapsychic	experience	
(Stenner,	2013);	although	we	do	of	course	feel	our	patterns	of	relationship	to	others	
as	well	(Burkitt,	2014).	In	the	initial,	uncertain	stages	of	their	relationship,	‘when	
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[they]	started	hooking	up’,	Carrie	(subject)	sees	Ida	(rival),	unfairly	or	fairly,	as	
threatening	to	interrupt	the	fragile	connection	she	has	formed	with	Erik	(object)	and	
therefore	wishes	to	exclude	her.	She	seems	unable	to	shake	this	jealousy	and	the	
‘insecurities’	wrapped	up	with	it;	even	when	their	relationship	becomes	more	stable,	
she	still	‘remember[s]	those	feelings’.	The	solidification	of	her	diffuse	feelings	into	a	
‘totem	of	insecurity’	(own	emphasis)	could	be	argued	to	illustrate	their	depth;	the	
material	world	has	traditionally	been	seen	as	unchanging,	more	real	than	the	
immaterial	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).	Indeed,	feeling	jealous	towards	Ida	seems	to	
have	been	a	significant	undercurrent	in	Carrie’s	life,	‘[it	was	a]	huge	drama	for	over	
two	years…I	was	despising	her’.	What	Carrie	describes	could	also	be	seen	as	similar	
to	the	psychoanalytic	defence	mechanism	of	‘splitting’:	an	unconscious	attribution	of	
our	own	negative	qualities	to	another	(Grosz,	2013).	If	Ida	is	the	container	for	all	of	
Carrie’s	insecurities,	then	Carrie	no	longer	has	to	deal	with	these	issues.	Since	the	
shameful	parts	of	herself	belong	to	someone	else,	she	can	see	herself	as	good.		
	 This	jealous	undercurrent	plays	out	in	various	ways	in	relation	to	Carrie’s	
MDMA	experiences.	All	the	borders	Carrie	puts	up	to	exclude	others	from	the	
couple’s	MDMA	space-time	might	be	considered	more	specifically	to	exclude	Ida	in	
particular,	she	is	part	of	their	social	circle	‘every	time	we	meet	at	a	party	or	like	a	
birthday’,	and	thus	could	potentially	‘pop	up’	virtually	or	be	part	of	a	wider	group	if	
they	took	MDMA	with	friends.	Perhaps	the	unconscious	thinking	here	is	that	there	
can	be	no	problem	with	the	third	if	they	are	not	allowed	in	in	any	way.	Despite	this	
blanket	exclusion,	the	presence	of	Ida	as	excluded	third	has	still	been	felt	in	past	
MDMA	experiences:	
	
Carrie:	Because	I’d	been	talking	about	[Ida]…[on]	a	MDMA	trip	with	Erik	in	
May…like	last	year.	I	said	the	same	thing	‘she	is	the	not	the	problem.	It’s	
what,	like,	I’ve	made	her	the	problem.’	Like	even	though	I	said	it,	I	didn’t	like	
realise	it…uh,	so	it	took	like	half	a	year	then	I	was	like	‘oh,	that’s	what	I	
meant.	Oh,	ok.’…	I	know	what	I	meant	cos	I	can	like	feel	it	and	understand	
it…it	was	like	[clicks	fingers]	(Diary	interview)	
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Discussing	‘[Ida]…[on]	a	MDMA	trip	with	Erik’	brings	clarity	and	foreshadows	a	
process	of	taking	responsibility	for	Carrie,	‘she	is	the	not	the	problem…	I’ve	made	her	
the	problem’;	mirroring	reports	of	MDMA	as	an	agent	for	increased	clarity	and	
contemplation	(Vollenweider	et	al.,	1998;	Sessa,	2007).	This	could	be	understood	as	
having	two	very	different	impacts,	depending	on	the	system	considered.	Jealousy	
has	been	framed	as	an	attribute	of	a	psychosocial	system	produced	via	the	excluded	
third	(Stenner,	2013),	which,	in	this	case,	seemed	to	be	Ida.	Yet,	Carrie	here	seems	to	
remove	Ida	from	the	position	of	‘rival’	for	Erik’s	affections,	‘she	is	not	the	problem’.	
In	doing	so,	the	triangle	of	relations	necessary	for	jealousy	cannot	form	and	the	
system	collapses;	rendering	the	third	obsolete.		
In	contrast	to	the	dissolution	of	a	system	that	gives	rise	to	jealousy,	the	
virtual	presence	of	the	third	appears	productive	for	the	constitution	of	the	MDMA	
experiential	system.	This	fits	with	how	the	third	can	reinvigorate	a	system	and	that	a	
system	without	any	interruptions	becomes	stagnant	(Stenner,	2013).	In	the	context	
of	a	romantic	relationship,	jealous	awareness	of	the	third	can	make	someone	
remember	what	was	so	special	about	their	partner	in	the	first	place	(Perel,	2007).	
Despite	all	of	Carrie’s	careful	boundary	construction	to	exclude	others	from	the	
couples’	MDMA	experiences,	the	third	still	crosses	over,	albeit	on	a	virtual	level.	
Interestingly	though,	this	interruption	doesn’t	damage	the	system	but	rather	
revitalises	it.	The	couples’	MDMA	space-time	is	not	somewhere	she	simply	cycles	
through	the	same	positions	she	has	always	maintained	or	somewhere	that	requires	
the	wholesale	exclusion	of	(certain)	others	in	order	to	be	a	positive	experience.	
Instead,	consideration	of	the	third	leads	her	to	a	powerful	realisation	of	her	own	
culpability;	often	considered	a	first	step	on	the	path	to	change,	since	acknowledging	
personal	responsibility	leaves	the	door	open	to	changing	one’s	own	actions	or	
mindset	in	some	way	(e.g.	couples	therapy:	Kurri,	&	Wahlström,	2005;	Greenberg,	
James	&	Conroy,	1988).		
Carrie’s	realisation	plays	out	mainly	within	MDMA	space-time,	in	phases.	She	
at	first	‘said	it	[but]	I	didn’t	like	realise	it’	on	a	MDMA	‘trip’	with	Erik,	then	‘half	a	year	
later’	says	the	same	thing	but	this	time	she	‘feel[s]	it	and	understand[s]	it’	(own	
emphasis).	Only	when	she	feels	the	understanding	is	there	a	light	bulb	moment,	‘it	
was	like	[clicks	fingers]’,	highlighting	again	the	vital	role	feelings	play	in	grasping	and	
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moving	through	our	world	(Solomon,	2008).	After	this	point,	Carrie	‘sent	[Ida]	a	
message,	we	took	a	cup	of	coffee	and	talked	out.	And	what	had	been	a	huge	drama	
for	over	two	years,	was	for	my	part	gone	after	that	revelation.	That	was	pretty	nice’.	
Thus,	this	personal	revelation	echoes	out	of	MDMA	space-time,	into	the	everyday	
world,	where	Carrie	acts	to	resolve	what	had	been	a	very	lengthy	issue,	‘for	over	two	
years’.	Carrie’s	shift	in	perspective	and	the	repercussions	of	this	reinforce	how	the	
effects	of	MDMA	experiences	are	not	contained	within	that	immediate	space-time;	
they	linger	on.	Just	as	the	traces	of	MDMA’s	bubble	could	still	be	felt	for	days,	weeks	
and	perhaps	months	after	the	original	experience,	so	too	can	the	impact	of	a	
boundary	being	(even	virtually)	crossed.	
	 Other	couples	enacted	an	emotional	border	around	their	MDMA	
experiences:	while	others	could	be	present,	their	partner	was	always	there	too.	
Thus,	in	effect,	still	‘reserving’	the	MDMA	experience	for	the	couple	in	some	way.	
Abby	and	Ryan,	who	used	to	take	MDMA	together	but	stopped	after	having	children,	
describe	this:	
	
Abby:	We	pretty	much	always	hang	out	together…you	know	we	wouldn’t	be	
‘oh	Ryan’s	off	in	that	room,	I’m	off	in	this	room.’	
Ryan:	yeah	if	we	went	with	a	group	of	friends	
Abby:	yeah	
Ryan:	it	would	be	us	two	and	a	group	of	friends	
Abby:	yeah	
Ryan:	so	if	our	friends	wanted	to	go	and	dance	in	another	room	and	we	
wanted	to	dance	in	this	room,	it	would	always	be	
Abby:	we’d	stay	together…you	know	if	he	goes	off	to	the	loo,	I’d	stay	put	until	
he	got	back	(Couple	interview)	
	
While	they	go	out	with	their	friends,	their	night	revolves	about	being	with	each	
other,	‘we’d	stay	together’.	They	also	look	out	for	one	another,	prioritising	each	
other’s	musical	preferences	and	dutifully	waiting	if	one	of	them	goes	‘off	to	the	loo’.	
They	do	this	because	they	‘always	want	to	spend	our	time	together’:	just	as	this	is	
true	in	their	everyday	life,	it	extends	to	MDMA	space-time	too	and	emphasises	how	
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drug	experiences	are	continuous	with	and	incorporated	into	people’s	lives.	In	
contrast	to	the	separate,	isolatable	phenomenon	the	epidemiological	paradigm	has	
arguably	painted	drug	use	to	be	(Foster	&	Spencer,	2013).	Taking	MDMA	becomes	a	
thing	‘[they’ve]	done	together’,	compared	to	a	‘really	amazing,	once-in-a-lifetime	
holiday	with	your	boyfriend	or	girlfriend’,	and	part	of	the	‘shared	life’	they	see	as	
essential	for	maintaining	a	close	relationship.	This	maps	onto	the	findings	of	other	
research,	where	couples	saw	making	time	to	do	special	things	together	as	a	crucial	
part	of	relationship	‘work’	that	sustained	their	connection	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	
Many	participants	emphasised	the	value	of	having	MDMA	use	as	part	of	the	roster	of	
shared	couple	experiences	due	to	the	way	it	magnified	their	feelings	for	one	another	
and	fun	had	together.	Bringing	MDMA	use	inside	the	borders	of	exclusive,	couple	
space	thus	allowed	couples	to	lay	claim	to	these	fun,	bonding	experiences	as	theirs,	
something	that	could	be	used	as	a	shared	resource	to	bond	them	together	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015).		
The	emotional	content	of	MDMA	experiences	was	articulated	as	a	
particularly	rich	resource,	and	one	that	needed	to	be	guarded	against	others	outside	
the	couple	unit.	This	is	illustrated	by	Ken’s	description	of	a	more	explicit	boundary	
around	MDMA	experiences	as	something	belonging	to	the	couple	and	which	
partners	cannot,	on	their	own,	share	with	others:	
	
It’s	essential	that	my	wife	be	present.	Since	we	first	got	together,	neither	of	us	
has	ever	partied	when	the	other	wasn’t.	This	is	not	a	rule	we	agreed	upon,	it	
just	turned	out	that	way.	Personally,	if	my	wife	wasn’t	around,	I	doubt	I’d	be	
in	the	mood	to	party.	Back	when	I	was	starting	to	drop,	a	friend	told	me	the	
best	thing	was	to	never	drop	without	your	significant	other.	That	way	lies	
ruin.	May	sound	dumb	but	10+	years	later,	turns	out	its	pretty	good	advice.	
[…]	
When	I	was	single	the	best	advice	I	ever	got	on	using	X	was,	don’t	talk	to	the	
same	girl	the	entire	night,	because	you	WILL	fall	in	love	with	her.	For	a	week,	
and	you’ll	be	torn	up	about	it	the	entire	time.	Much	better	to	talk	to	multiple	
people,	keep	moving	around,	don’t	over	expose	yourself	to	any	single	soul	for	
too	long.	(Diary)	
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While	this	boundary	is	presented	as	organic,	not	‘a	rule	we	agreed	upon’,	and	part	of	
a	passive	process,	‘it	just	turned	out	that	way’,	this	belies	how	the	idea’s	origin	is	
later	located	in	his	friend’s	‘good	advice’.	The	cordoning	off	of	MDMA	as	couple’s	
space	in	fact	seems	to	be	a	reasoned-through,	if	rather	opaque,	decision:	‘That	way	
lies	ruin’.	This	melodramatic	turn	of	phrase	further	hinting	here	at	the	potential	
danger	of	MDMA	experiences	for	couples	if	not	boundaried	to	some	degree.	It	is	
initially	unclear	why	it	is	‘essential’	that	his	wife	be	with	him	on	MDMA,	to	‘drop’	
without	her	would	cause	‘ruin’,	but	the	threat	becomes	apparent	when	discussed	in	
the	context	of	being	single.	Ken	is	wary	about	‘over	expos[ing]’	himself	to	‘any	single	
soul’	since	this	will	form	an	intense,	albeit	not	long-term,	connection,	‘you	WILL	fall	
in	love	with	her.	For	a	week…’.	This	echoes	what	Timothy	Leary	coined	as	the	‘instant	
marriage	syndrome’	on	MDMA;	repeated	in	humourous	tales	of	caution	against	
falling	‘in	love’	with	strangers	by	Beck	and	Rosenbaum’s	(1994)	participants.	The	
emotional	connection	forged	by	MDMA	is	considered	so	strong,	Ken	must	‘keep	
moving	around’;	using	the	restless	movements	of	his	body	to	order	the	social	space	
(Holloway,	2003;	Kong,	2001)	and	erect	an	emotional	barrier,	cutting	off	the	depth	
of	intimacy	in	his	interactions.	The	danger	of	taking	MDMA	is	palpable:	you	could	
feel	‘torn	up’	for	a	week	afterwards.	
It	is	a	small	leap	to	consider	how	this	danger	might	be	magnified	if	already	
part	of	a	couple,	described	as	‘a	unity’,	a	‘little	cosmos’,	a	‘field’	emerging	from	what	
it	excludes	(Stenner,	2013).	It	is	this	sense	of	a	special,	shared	space	inaccessible	to	
those	outside	this	unity	that	is	so	crucial	to	coupledom	(Stenner,	2013;	Finn,	2010);	
and,	it	seems,	in	fortifying	the	stable,	couple	structure	against	the	possibilities	for	
reconfiguration	found	within	intimate	MDMA	experiences.	This	special,	shared	space	
for	Ken	and	his	wife	on	MDMA	seems	to	be	centred	on	emotional	intimacy:	others	
can	be	physically	present	but	the	level	of	intimacy	wrapped	up	with	MDMA	is	only	to	
be	experienced	when	both	partners	are	there.	This	was	typical	for	many	of	the	
participants	we	spoke	to	who	only	ever	took	MDMA	with	their	partner	there:	
Melanie	writes	how	she	‘wants	[her	partner]	there’,	calling	him	‘an	integral	part	of	
the	MDMA	architecture’;	Eva	and	Lars	refer	to	MDMA	as	‘a	little	celebration	of	our	
relationship’	and	have	only	taken	it	together	since	becoming	a	couple;	Mark	and	
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Jenny	only	take	MDMA	together	since	they’re	‘using	it	for	relationship	and	
therapeutic	reasons’;	Effy	describes	it	as	‘very	important’	for	her	partner	to	be	with	
her	on	MDMA.	
The	danger	of	navigating	MDMA	space	without	your	partner	is	keenly	felt	by	
Ken,	‘that	way	lies	ruin’.	While	other	couples	did	not	verbally	articulate	the	
emotional	dangers	of	taking	MDMA	without	your	partner,	their	actions,	always	
taking	it	together	and	often	staying	physically	close	to	each	over	the	course	of	the	
experience,	could	be	argued	to	tell	the	same	story.	There	are	two	notions	of	the	
couple	that	inform	this	viewpoint.	The	first	is	that	exclusivity	is	a	pre-requisite	to	the	
couple	relationship.	As	argued	previously,	a	system	is	created	through	what	it	
excludes	and	a	certain	degree	of	emotional	exclusivity	has	been	well-established	as	
entangled	with	a	couple	relationship.	For	example,	Giddens	(1992),	in	his	influential	
work	The	Transformation	of	Intimacy,	makes	a	case	for	the	necessity	of	exclusionary	
practices	to	build	the	trust	which	is	crucial	for	intimacy,	‘the	disclosure	of	what	is	
kept	from	other	people	is	one	of	the	main	psychological	markers	likely	to	call	forth	
trust	and	to	be	sought	after	in	return’	(p138-9).	Couples	spoke	repeatedly	about	the	
deep	level	of	connection	found	in	MDMA	experiences.	And	if	deep	intimacy	is	seen	
as	a	preserve	of	the	couple,	then	always	having	your	partner	with	you	on	the	drug	
could	be	seen	to	provide	some	kind	of	insurance	against	destabilising	emotionally	
exclusive	coupledom.		
The	second	is	that	our	romantic	partner	is	the	person	we	are	supposed	to	
experience	our	most	intense	feelings	with	(de	Botton,	2016)	and	with	whom	the	
level	of	intimacy	is	the	deepest,	beyond	all	other	connections:	friends,	parents	and	
other	family	members	(the	only	exception	being	children)	(Perel,	2007).	Couples	very	
much	did	articulate	the	emotional	power	of	taking	MDMA,	like	an	intensification	of	
positive	and	muting	of	negative	feelings,	as	discussed	in	the	first	analysis	chapter.	
Arguably,	partners	might	want	to	share	such	intense	feelings	with	their	partner	or	
they	could	be	worried	about	the	impact	of	themselves	or	their	partner	sharing	such	
intense	feelings	with	someone	else	–	jealousy	is	a	frequent	bedfellow	of	romance	(de	
Botton,	2016).	Thus,	MDMA	experiences	are	subsumed	within	the	vast	array	of	other	
things,	places	and	practices	that	make	up	special,	couple	space;	with	partners	rarely	
traversing	this	emotionally	potent	territory	alone.		
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6.4.2	When	does	third-as-mediator	become	third-as-disruptor?	
	
For	other	couples,	who	was	being	excluded	from	MDMA	space-time	was	less	clearly	
defined.	In	contrast	to	the	explicit	boundaries	Carrie	and	Ken	drew	and	the	
boundaries	implied	by	Abby	and	Ryan,	the	experiences	of	Karl	and	his	partner,	Ana,	
highlighted	the	possible	invisibility	of	the	mediating	third.	Thus,	these	experiences	
are	suited	to	answering	the	second	question	posed	at	the	start	of	this	section:	what	
is	the	tipping	point	between	third-as-mediator	and	third-as-disruptor?	Karl	openly	
discussed	his	desire	to	experience	MDMA	with	others.	To	this	end,	he	and	Ana	had	
invited	a	mutual	female	friend	to	join	them,	prior	to	this	they	had	only	taken	it	alone	
together.	Karl	begins	his	diary	by	saying:		
	
We	will	be	using	MDMA	together	with	[Olivia]	(female,	same	age	as	
girlfriend).	The	plan	is	to	get	closer	connected	as	friends	and	find	a	way	to	
bond	beyond	normal	friendship	(not	in	a	sexual	way,	more	towards	soul	
mates).	(Diary)	
	
He	hopes	MDMA	will	help	him	get	‘closer	connected’	to	their	mutual	friend,	Olivia,	
and	emphasises	elsewhere	how	he	wants	to	experience	this	‘much	deeper	level’	of	
connection	with	more	of	his	friends.	He	is	also	explicit	that	this	bonding	will	‘not	[be]	
in	a	sexual	way’;	suggesting	that	the	couple	haven’t	discussed	boundaries	around	
extra-dyadic	sex	(or	they	have	and	it	is	not	an	expected	part	of	the	experience).	
Boundaries	are	described	as	key	for	rendering	the	potentially	disruptive	third	safe	in	
non-monogamous	contexts:	not	through	the	specific	content	of	the	boundary	but	by	
the	very	existence	of	some	prior,	mutually-agreed	upon	position	(Finn,	2010;	
Stenner,	2013).	On	MDMA	some	‘sexual	moments’	do	take	place,	though	Karl’s	
involvement	seems	limited,	‘mostly	my	girlfriend	and	her	that	were…	trying	a	couple	
of	things:	kissing,	um,	touching	a	bit’.	The	day	afterwards,	Karl	‘woke	up	to	the	girls	
chatting	and	we	were	all	very	happy,	a	little	tired	but	generally	feeling	great’	and	
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describes	how	close	he	feels	with	his	girlfriend	and	how	they	cuddled	the	whole	
night	in	bed	together.		
However,	a	couple	of	days	after	use	a	different	tone	comes	through	in	Karl’s	
girlfriend’s	experience	of	the	night:		
	
My	girlfriend	on	the	other	hand	had	a	pretty	bad	nightmare	about	me	dating	
other	girls.	So	i	guess	she	is	feeling	worried	about	losing	me.	Since	she	doesn’t	
currently	live	with	me	i	guess	that	using	the	mdma	and	being	so	close	with	
me,	and	then	not	seeing	me	for	a	day	must	have	been	a	bit	bad.	[…]	
One	thing	i	did	not	expect	did	happen	today,	my	partner	asked	if	we	could	use	
MDMA	again	“soon”.	In	about	2-3	weeks.	She	felt	like	she	had	to	hold	back	a	
bit	with	our	friend.	Mostly	when	it	comes	to	her	self	expression	and	enjoying	
music.	(Diary)	
	
It	is	striking	that	Karl	connects	Ana’s	‘bad	nightmare	about	me	dating	other	girls’	
purely	with	the	contrast	between	their	intense	closeness	on	MDMA,	‘being	so	close	
to	me’,	and	physical	separation	afterwards,	‘then	not	seeing	me	for	a	day	must	have	
been	a	bit	bad’.	It	seems	like	a	more	direct	line	could	be	drawn	between	another	
person	in	their	sexually	intimate	space	for	possibly	the	first	time	and	her	worries	
about	Karl’s	fidelity.	This	could	stem	from	her	own	eagerness	to	explore	her	sexuality	
with	someone	else,	it	is	Ana	and	Olivia	who	most	of	the	‘sexual	moments’	are	
between.	Dreams	have	long	been	considered	a	haven	for	unconscious	feelings	by	the	
psychoanalytic	perspective	(Freud	&	Bonaparte,	1954).	It	is	not	necessary	to	fully	
ascribe	to	the	psychoanalytic	approach,	however,	to	appreciate	that	we	might	not	be	
fully	conscious	of	all	our	feelings,	particularly	those	feelings	we	feel	troubled	by	the	
expression	of	in	our	everyday	lives.	And	feeling	jealous	and	experiencing	doubts	
about	your	faithfulness	or	your	partner’s	could	indeed	be	seen	as	unsettling	and	
problematic	to	manage.		
There	was	no	intention	on	Karl’s	part	to	bond	‘in	a	sexual	way’	with	Olivia,	
but	there	were	‘sexual	moments’	between	‘mostly’	Ana	and	Olivia;	implying	there	
was	some	level	of	sexual	encounter	between	all	three	of	them.	Jealousy	has	been	
discussed	earlier	in	the	theme	as	a	psychosocial	system	produced	through	the	
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excluded	third	(Stenner,	2013).	Ana’s	desire	to	exclude	the	third	can	be	seen	in	her	
request	to	‘use	MDMA	again	“soon”’	with	just	her	partner,	Karl,	breaking	their	
established	pattern	of	longer	gaps	between	use,	and	how	she	‘had	to	hold	back’	
when	Olivia	was	there.	The	triangle	of	relations	necessary	for	jealousy	to	form	is	also	
present:	Ana’s	(subject)	‘pretty	bad	nightmare’	about	Karl	(object)	being	with	other	
women	could	betray	how	she	felt	threatened	by	some	of	the	‘sexual	moments’	that	
developed	on	MDMA;	leading	her	to	see	their	mutual	friend	(rival)	as	potentially	
disruptive	to	the	valued	subject-object	connection.	Alternatively,	it	might	be	the	
shadow	of	Ana’s	own	desire	for	their	friend,	Karl	recalls	how	‘my	girlfriend	kind	of	
has	a	huge	crush	on	[Olivia]’,	on	MDMA	that	reminds	her	that	Karl	too	might	have	
desire	for	others	(an	as-yet-unidentified	rival).	The	normalcy	and	naturalness	of	
monogamy	is	a	taken-for-granted	cultural	rule	(Pieper	&	Bauer,	2005).	Therefore,	
irrespective	of	the	possibility	of	non-monogamous	paths	to	coupledom,	
encroachment	of	this	ideal	might	have	unsettling	repercussions	and,	of	course,	non-
monogamous	experiences	can	prompt	jealous	feelings	(McLean,	2004).	In	addition,	
the	apparent	lack	of	pre-determined	boundaries	might	have	contributed	to	a	failure	
to	categorise	the	experiences	on	MDMA	in	a	way	which	would	protect	the	unity	of	
the	couple	(Barker	&	Langdridge,	2010).	This	could	be	understood	as	telling	us	about	
two	issues:	the	hidden	boundaries	around	MDMA	experiences	for	Ana,	which	was	
shown	up	by	the	unexpected	shift	from	third-as-mediator	to	third-as-interrupter	and	
the	narrow	threshold	between	third-as-productive	(an	object	of	desire	in	this	case)	
and	third-as-disruptive	for	couples	within	MDMA	experiences	and	life	more	broadly.		
First,	let	us	turn	to	the	boundaries	of	MDMA	space-time.	If	behind	the	unity	
and	order	of	a	system	of	experience,	like	MDMA	experiences,	necessarily	lies	
expulsion	(Stenner,	2013)	then	we	might	deduce	different	answers	to	the	question	
of	who	exactly	needs	to	be	excluded	for	Karl	and	Ana.	For	Karl,	the	experience	was	‘a	
lot	of	fun’;	he	had	‘really	wanted	to	have	more	people	involved	with	our	MDMA	use’	
and	this	seems	to	have	been	the	partial	culmination	of	that	desire.	Furthermore,	
when	asked	at	interview	about	whether	there	was	anything	he	missed	about	taking	
MDMA	just	with	his	girlfriend,	he	responds	‘there	wasn’t	really	anything	I	missed.	I	
didn’t	feel	I	had	to	hold	back	anything’.	Perhaps	the	thirdness	for	Karl	that	needs	to	
be	excluded	to	constitute	the	system	of	MDMA	experiences	would	be	those	he	does	
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not	feel	close	to;	he	laments	particularly	his	friends’	negative	perceptions	of	drug	
use,	‘[they	think]	you’re	obviously	ruining	your	life’,	since	he	wants	to	take	MDMA	
‘with	a	lot	more	of	a	[sic]	friends.’	The	idea	that	you	can	only	become	aware	of	the	
mediating	third	when	it	interrupts	seems	helpful	in	understanding	who	is	excluded	
from	MDMA	space-time	for	Ana.	The	free-flowing,	emotionally	open	‘bubble’	of	
MDMA	use	seems	to	have	been	interrupted	for	Ana	by	the	presence	of	the	couple’s	
friend,	‘[Ana]	had	to	hold	back	a	bit	with	our	friend.	Mostly	when	it	comes	to	her	self	
expression	and	enjoying	music’.	Implicit	here	is	an	acknowledgement	that	when	it	is	
just	the	two	of	them,	Ana	can	express	herself	freely	and	appreciate	the	music	
however	she	feels	like:	it	comes	so	naturally	that	the	mediator	is	not	noticed,	just	as	
language	is	invisible	in	communication	between	two	fluent	speakers	(Stenner,	2013).	
However,	when	someone	else	is	included	in	MDMA	space-time	it	seems	to	interrupt	
the	system	and	Ana	becomes	aware	of	that	which	was	mediating	it	in	the	first	place:	
the	exclusion	of	‘all	others’.		
This	seems	to	be	a	story	about	what	happens	when	boundaries	are	
unknowingly	encroached	and	tells	us	that	just	because	couples	do	not	openly	
delineate	barriers	around	their	MDMA	use,	does	not	mean	they	do	not	exist;	‘the	
absences,	the	unexpressed,	are	as	significant	as	the	spoken’	(Brownlie,	2014,	p132).	
As	stated	previously,	there	are	two	systems	which	the	third	seems	to	interrupt:	the	
couple	relationship	itself	and	the	couple’s	MDMA	space-time,	though	these	are	
intertwined.	Firstly,	the	unexpected,	sexual	parts	of	Ana	and	Karl’s	MDMA	
experience	with	their	mutual	friend	have	been	argued	to	disturb	the	couple	system;	
giving	way	to	an	emotional	aftershock	for	Ana	in	the	form	of	‘bad	nightmares’.	It	
could	be	argued	that	the	free-flowing,	intimate	character	of	MDMA	experiences	
might	present	particular	challenges	to	coupledom,	as	the	concept	is	widely	
understood	e.g.	as	a	monogamous	dyad.	Although	the	role	of	MDMA	in	producing	
this	experience	is	ambiguous,	it	is	a	space-time	where	things	seem	to	flow	
organically,	attention	is	often	present-focussed	and	more	negative	emotional	
responses	tend	to	be	muted.	Indeed,	the	experience	has	been	described	as	involving	
heightened	sensuality	(Zemishlany,	Aizenberg	&	Weizman,	2001).	Perhaps	events	
could	transpire	here	in	a	different	way.	
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Secondly,	the	presence	of	someone	outside	of	the	couple	seemed	to	
interrupt	the	unity	of	the	MDMA	experiential	system	for	Ana.	However,	this	differed	
from	Karl’s	experience,	who	didn’t	seem	to	miss	taking	it	just	as	a	couple.	Ana’s	
feelings	also	did	not	seem	apparent	to	him,	he	was	surprised	when	she	wanted	to	
take	MDMA	again,	just	the	two	of	them:	‘One	thing	i	did	not	expect	did	happen	
today,	my	partner	asked	if	we	could	use	MDMA	again	“soon”.’	It	seemed	that	
boundaries	around	who	to	exclude	were	not	just	made	by	couples	but	appeared	to	
them,	a	third	which	once	acted	as	a	mediator	could	suddenly	become	an	
interruption.	Thus,	it	is	suggested	that	it	might	be	helpful	for	couples	to	more	
explicitly	acknowledge	who	the	third	is	in	the	context	of	their	MDMA	experiences	
and	why	and	to	take	steps	to	minimise	any	disruptive	potential.	The	non-
monogamous	community	advises	negotiating	boundaries	first	(Veaux,	Hardy	&	Gill,	
2014;	Taormino,	2013;	Easton	&	Hardy,	2009),	and	the	same	principle	might	apply	to	
couples	wanting	to	take	MDMA	together.		
	
6.4	Conclusions	
	
This	chapter	has	illustrated	the	ways	in	which	couples	draw	boundaries	around	their	
MDMA	experiences:	segmenting	them	from	everyday	life	and	from	the	intrusions	of	
others.	Taking	MDMA	with	a	partner	encouraged	a	desire	to	make	the	experience	
special,	and	infrequent;	controlled	use	entangled	with	the	couple	dynamic.	
Boundaries	around	special	MDMA	space-time	were	embodied	through	the	
orchestration	of	self	and	space	(Holloway,	2003;	Kong,	2001).	Rituals	of	purification	
and	celebration	produced	an	idealised	kind	of	space;	simultaneously	capable	of	
pushing	out	everyday	concerns	and	re-enchanting	familiar	feelings.	There	is	also	a	
remarkable	sense	of	control	on	display	in	these	preparatory	accounts,	setting	up	a	
stark	contrast	with	the	idea	of	chaotic,	reckless	drug	use.			
It	was	suggested	that	shared	MDMA	experiences	can	modulate	and	enhance	
existing	feelings	of	closeness,	forming	part	of	the	broader	spectrum	of	relationship	
‘work’	practices	that	sustain	couple	relationships.	As	argued	by	Gabb	and	Fink,	it’s	
important	to	throw	the	spotlight	on	the	factors	that	sustain	rather	than	endanger	
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relationships	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2014).	Here,	couples	subsume	MDMA	experiences	into	
the	things	they	enjoy	doing	together,	that	refresh	and	revitalise	their	connection	to	
each	other.	As	such,	it	seems	that	MDMA	might	not	just	be	a	treatment	for	mental	
health	issues	such	as	PTSD	(Mithoefer	et	al.,	2011)	and	social	anxiety	in	autistic	
adults	(Danforth	et	al.,	2016),	but	could	also	work	as	an	enhancement	for	couple	
relationships.	Not	a	standalone	magic	bullet,	but	rather	something	far	less	
extraordinary:	a	very	particular	type	of	‘date	night’	where	feelings	of	love	flow	freely	
and	more	intensely	inside	an	ordered,	boundaried	space.	
The	chapter’s	final	theme	dwelt	on	how	MDMA	space-time	is	constituted	not	
only	by	what	it	includes	but	also	by	what	it	excludes,	or,	more	specifically,	who	it	
excludes.	This	exclusion	of	‘the	third’	or	‘thirdness’	is	part	of	the	ongoing	
constitution	of	the	system,	a	concept	Stenner	(2013)	terms	foundation	by	exclusion,	
and	is	used	to	frame	the	boundaries	couples	delineate	around	who	is	invited	into	
this	special	space.	Through	this	lens	of	boundaries	and	barriers,	and	how	they	shift,	
we	see	thorny	issues	such	as	jealousy	and	(in)fidelity	come	to	light.	Jealousy	was	
both	dissolved	by	and	emerged	from	MDMA	experiences.	For	Carrie,	the	multiple	
barriers	designed	to	exclude	others	from	the	couple’s	MDMA	space-time	were	still	
virtually	perforated	by	an	old	rival.	Yet	rather	than	being	unwelcome,	a	new	
understanding	was	reached	and	old	jealousies	laid	to	rest.	In	contrast,	inviting	a	
mutual	friend	into	Karl	and	Ana’s	MDMA	space-time	proved	disruptive	for	Ana:	
prompting	a	jealous	aftershock	of	emotion	and	exposing	a	hitherto	invisible	
boundary	for	their	relationship	and	MDMA	experiences.	While	Ken	and	his	partner	
invited	others	into	their	MDMA	space-time,	they	practiced	a	level	of	explicit	
emotional	exclusion	which	protected	the	couple	unit	from	too	much	intimacy	with	
others,	maintaining	emotional	(and	presumed)	sexual	fidelity.	In	fact,	for	all	these	
couples,	MDMA	space-time	seemed	laced	with	powerful	and	sometimes	dangerous	
levels	of	intimacy	that	needed	containing,	if	the	experiences	were	going	to	be	
productive	for	the	couple.	These	thresholds	were	sometimes	consciously	defined,	
sometimes	not,	but	always	eventually	made	themselves	apparent.		
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Chapter	7	–	Discussion	and	conclusions	
	
7.1	Summary	of	findings	
	
This	thesis	has	explored	how	couples	experience	intimacy	on	MDMA	and	how	these	
experiences	interweave	with	their	relationship.	The	three	previous	chapters	have	
presented	couples’	MDMA	experiences	as:	an	emotional	safe	haven,	spatially	
modulated,	and	boundaried.	Following	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015),	it	was	theorised	that	
couples	made	and	re-made	intimacy	through	their	interactions	on	MDMA,	what	they	
did	and	felt	together.	The	emotional	safe	haven	of	Chapter	Four	was	characterised	
as	a	‘bubble’	for	its	protective	qualities	and	distinct	relational	dynamic:	comprised	of	
enhanced	positive	emotional	patterns	(Burkitt,	2014),	such	as	love	and	joy,	and	
muted	negative	emotional	patterns,	such	as	fear	and	sadness;	and	also	involved	a	
greater	connection	to	a	participant’s	own	emotions	and	those	of	their	partner.	
Within	the	MDMA	bubble,	particular	practices	of	intimacy	were	facilitated:	couples	
were	first	described	as	experiencing	moments	of	emotional	attunement,	of	sharing	
in	and	sensitively	responding	to	their	partner’s	emotional	experience	(Greenberg	&	
Goldman,	2008);	these	moments	being	grounded	too	in	their	embodied	presence	in	
the	world,	like	the	inescapable	mutuality	of	touch	(Gabb,	2011).	These	were	
suggested	to	weave	into	the	fabric	of	how	couples	related	to	one	another	and	
perhaps	garnering	some	of	the	intimacy	benefits	previous	research	has	linked	to	the	
prevalence	of	attunement	in	romantic	relationships	(Connolly	&	Sicola,	2005;	Cohen,	
Schulz,	Weiss	&	Waldinger,	2012;	Jonathan	&	Knudson-Martin,	2012;	Reid,	Dalton,	
Laderoute,	Doell,	&	Nguyen,	2007).	Being	attuned	emotionally	was	also	argued	to	
unsettle	gender	norms,	with	men	becoming	more	emotionally	responsive:	an	effect	
valued	by	themselves	and	their	female	partners.		
The	second	intimate	practice	examined	was	the	process	of	talking	and	
listening	to	a	partner.	The	distinct	emotional	profile	of	the	bubble	–	an	increase	in	
positive	feelings	and	a	decrease	in	negative	feelings	–	was	posited	as	the	reason	why	
partners	felt	more	able	to	disclose;	although	disclosure	was	not	always	without	
consequence,	regret	or	emotional	difficulty,	exposing	the	limits	of	this	safe	haven.		
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The	worry,	fear,	shame	and	judgement	felt	in	everyday	life	was	argued	to	constrain	
certain	conversations	about	a	variety	of	relationship	issues	including	infidelity,	non-
monogamy	and	sexual	fantasies.	The	sharing	of	distressing	memories	on	MDMA	was	
also	focussed	on.	Remembering	these	difficult	times	with	a	partner	was	argued	to	
allow	for	‘an	active,	selective	forgetting’	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2015,	p72)	of	events,	
which	where	overwhelming	the	present.	Finally,	the	practice	of	collaborative	
forgetting	between	partners	was	explored.	The	bubble	was	argued	to	help	re-make	
couples’	‘affective	climate’	(Fuchs,	2013,	p8);	their	everyday	way	of	relating	to	one	
another	as	well	as	allowing	for	the	erasure	of	intense	feelings	of	anger;	allowing	
them	to	talk	through	and	think	about	their	anger	from	a	different	perspective,	
recapturing	physical	and	emotional	closeness.	
	 Practices	of	closeness	were	also	argued	as	mediated	by	space	and	movement	
in	Chapter	Five.	A	psychosocial,	process	account	has	argued	for	subjectivity	as	
materially,	as	well	as	discursively	produced	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009),	spaces	and	
objects	co-constituting	new	possibilities	for	agency.	This	was	borne	out	in	the	way	
participants	described	three	patterns	of	movement	on	MDMA	as	reformulating	
subjectivity;	a	process	mediated	by	shifting	boundaries	within	and	beyond	the	self.	
Intermittent	movement	through	and	interaction	with	material	settings	reinforced	
boundaries	between	self	and	other	and	produced	a	playful	subjectivity.	The	novelty	
of	the	objects	and	environmental	features	encountered	added	to	a	sense	of	fun	and	
lightheartedness	(Aron,	Aron,	Norman	&	McKenna,	2000).	Such	playful	subjectivity	
was	suggested	as	a	possible	enhancement	to	couples’	intimacy	(Brown,	2009;	Perel,	
2007)	and	as	a	means	of	‘playing	out’	different	alternatives	for	the	future,	such	as	
having	children	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	However,	for	one	couple,	Leanne	and	Matt,	a	
‘dark	side’	of	play	was	unearthed	(Brown,	2009),	as	their	silliness	interfered	with	
important	friendships	in	their	lives.	The	second	subjectivity	which	could	be	seen	as	
materially	composed	was	a	whole,	embodied	sense	of	self,	rather	than	the	
fragmentation	between	body	and	mind	fostered	by	cognitive	thought	(Dewey,	
1925/1981,	cited	in	Johnson,	2008)	and	argued	as	structuring	lived	experience	
(Gillies	et	al.,	2004;	van	Manen,	1998).	This	body/mind	boundary	within	the	self	
seemed	to	blurred	on	MDMA	through	continuous	motion.	This	movement	pivoted	
on	an	object	or	person,	an	‘actant’	(Latour,	2005)	that	co-produced	and	‘stabilised’	
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(Serres,	1995)	participants’	experience	of	a	fluid	physicality,	their	body	seemed	to	
‘flow’.	This	experience	was	not	dependent	on	extensive	properties	but	a	certain,	
intensive	connection	between	(human	and	non-human)	bodies	(DeLanda,	2005):	
with	participants	describing	similar	disruptions	of	the	body/mind	boundary	while	
playing	a	ball	game,	hula	hooping	and	giving	their	partner	a	massage.	This	seemed	to	
be	distinctly	pleasurable,	a	concept	often	lamented	as	absent	from	much	drugs	
research	(Moore,	2008;	Duff,	2008),	and	reaffirms	other	findings	that	link	movement	
to	experiencing	an	embodied	sense	of	self	(Del	Busso,	2009;	Chisholm,	2008);	while	
also	extending	them	in	the	way	in	which	human	and	non-human	bodies	can	mediate	
and	transform	this	embodied	becoming	(Latour,	2005).	Thirdly,	a	lack	of	movement	
within	material	settings	that	provided	some	sort	of	containment	–	a	bath,	a	pile	of	
cushions	–	could	weaken	the	boundary	between	self	and	other,	producing	a	
‘merged’	subjectivity.	Partners	experienced	this	as	a	profound	sense	of	closeness;	a	
total	communion	which	was	argued	to	adhere	to	strong	cultural	ideals	around	love	
(Perel,	2007).	These	diffuse	boundaries	were	also	suggested	to	open	up	broader	
possibilities	for	agency:	this	was	in	the	form	of	a	simultaneously	strong	
individual/couple	identity	for	Eva	and	connection	to	nature	for	Rachel.		
	 	Finally,	couples’	experiences	of	intimacy	on	MDMA	described	in	the	previous	
two	chapters	were	argued	as	modulated	by	the	symbolic	boundaries	couples	
constructed	around	their	drug	use.	A	theoretical	lens,	in	the	form	of	Stenner’s	(2013)	
and	Douglas’	(2001)	work,	concerned	with	what	is	excluded,	rather	than	included,	
from	a	system	was	used	to	reveal	the	boundaries	separating	off	couples’	MDMA	
experiences	from,	in	the	first	instance,	other	times	and	spaces,	and,	secondly,	other	
people.	Couples	were	argued,	on	the	whole,	to	carefully	assemble	spatial-temporal	
boundaries	of	use;	segmenting	MDMA	time	as	‘special’.	Temporal	boundaries	were	
fashioned	through	infrequent	use,	sometimes	tied	to	other	rare	life	events	like	
seasonal	change	or	the	end	of	exams,	and	functioned	to	control	couples’	experiences	
with	the	drug.	Boundaries	were	also	enacted	materially:	through	the	reordering	of	
spaces,	objects	and	bodies	(Holloway,	2003).	For	example,	Carrie	engaged	in	lengthy	
preparation	the	days	prior	to	taking	MDMA:	she	cleaned	her	flat,	ate	healthier,	made	
sure	she	was	well-rested	and	showered,	gathered	items	for	ease	of	use	such	as	
water	and	flowers	for	decoration	and	meditated.	While	other	participants	did	not	
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organise	themselves	and	their	surroundings	so	avidly,	almost	all	engaged	in	some	
kind	of	preparation:	from	the	collation	of	a	music	playlist	to	calculating	the	desired	
dosage.	These	processes	were	framed	as	ritualistic	acts,	which	not	only	expressed	
couples’	values,	such	as	health	and	responsible	drug	use,	but	also	modified	the	
nature	of	their	experiences	(Douglas,	2001).	Specifically,	the	construction	of	these	
boundaries	was	suggested	to	enhance	the	way	couples	felt	on	the	drug:	the	sense	of	
specialness	serving	to	re-enchant	familiar	intimate	connections.	As	such,	MDMA	
experiences	were	argued	to	form	part	of	‘relationship	work’	practices	which	sustain	
and	enhance	couples’	connection:	for	Ken	this	was	time	and	space	apart	from	the	
interference	of	everyday	life	and	for	Eva	and	Lars	a	way	of	feeling	even	more	in	love.	
In	addition	to	the	expulsion	of	everyday	life	from	MDMA	experiences,	who	was	
excluded	also	appeared	to	be	an	important	constituent.	The	intimate	closeness	
necessitated	by	the	exclusive	couple	dyad	(Finn,	2012)	and	faciliated	by	MDMA	use	
was	preserved	for	the	benefit	of	the	couple	through	excluding	others	emotionally	
and	physically,	the	‘excluded	third’	–	that	whose	exclusion	the	formation	of	a	system	
is	predicated	upon	(Stenner,	2013).	However,	the	excluded	third	still	crossed	over,	
virtually	and	physically,	into	MDMA	space,	with	vastly	differently	consequences:	
from	heralding	the	collapse	of	jealous	relations	to	the	formation	of	them;	pointing	to	
both	the	potential	productivity	and	danger	of	others	entering	couples’	MDMA	space.		
	
7.1.1	Research	questions	and	key	insights	
	
As	an	adjunct	to	chronologically	summarising	the	analysis,	it	will	also	be	helpful	to	
consider	the	research	questions	directly	and	how	they	might	be	answered.	The	main	
research	questions	of	this	thesis	were	defined	as	follows:	
	
1. How	do	couples	experience	closeness	in	their	everyday	lives	and	ecstasy	
experiences?	
a. What	kind	of	activities,	spaces	and	emotions	are	productive	of	couple	
intimacy?	
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2. How	do	people	understand	their	relationship	as	influenced	by	their	MDMA	
use?	
a. Are	there	aspects	of	the	relationship	they	feel	are	enhanced	by	their	
ecstasy	use?	
b. Are	there	aspects	of	the	relationship	they	feel	are	constrained	or	
harmed	by	their	ecstasy	use?	
	
From	the	previous	summary	of	findings,	it	is	apparent	that	being	close	forms	an	
important	part	of	MDMA	use	for	couples	and	that	these	experiences	interweave	
with	their	relationship.	It	can	also	be	seen	that	closeness	is	not	a	monolithic	entity	
which	can	be	captured	by	a	once-and-for-all	definition	but	a	dynamic	array	of	
practices	which	couples	do	differently	in	different	contexts	and	at	different	times,	as	
similarly	argued	by	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015).	For	example,	sharing	secret	desires	
fostered	intimacy,	drawing	on	disclosing	models	of	intimacy	(Giddens,	1992)	but	so	
too	could	what	was	left	unsaid	(Brownlie,	2014).	Equally	too,	an	act	of	intimacy	could	
be	co-produced	(Latour,	2005)	with	objects	couples	encountered	–	like	the	laughter	
induced	by	a	branch	adopted	as	the	couples’	‘best	friend’	for	the	night	–	as	well	as	
consisting	of	an	intense	mutuality	of	feeling.	Intimacy,	as	well	as	being	a	
spontaneous	occurrence,	was	also	actively	managed	by	participants	who	became	
architects	of	their	home’s	atmosphere	(Anderson,	2009)	or	constructed	exclusionary	
barriers	to	keep	out	less	intimate	others	(Stenner,	2013).	These	practices	were	
presented	as	mediated	by	a	multitude	of	intersecting	processes,	for	example,	in	
experiences	of	emotional	attuement	couples’	shared	feelings	of	happiness	and	love	
interwove	with	physically	being	‘there’	(Brownlie,	2014)	for	a	partner,	socio-cultural	
norms	around	gender,	relationship	history	and	personal	disclosure	to	produce	
experiences	of	closeness	that	were	difficult	to	access	in	their	everyday	lives	together.	
Closeness	was	also	shown	to	be	definable	in	relation	to	what	it	excluded.	For	
example,	the	physical	and	metaphorical	‘dirt’	(Douglas,	2001)	of	everyday	spaces	and	
life	was	ritually	cleansed	to	produced	an	ordered,	controlled	experience	of	intimacy.	
Hence,	it	is	suggested	these	findings	can	be	situated	within	a	modern	psychosocial	
understanding	of	a	process-relational	ontology	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Brown	&	
Reavey,	2015;	Brown,	2012;	Stenner,	2008),	where	nothing	‘can	be	abstracted	from	
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its	broader	scheme	of	relationality	and	process’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p37).	The	
experience	of	closeness	on	MDMA	cannot	be	cut	out	or	‘abstracted’	from	the	
relations	within	which	they	are	embedded,	like	the	relationship	of	MDMA	
experiences	to:	the	excluded	third	(Serres,	1980/1982	cited	in	Brown	&	Stenner,	
2009;	Stenner,	2013),	social	connections	(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Hunt,	Evan	&	
Kares,	2007;	Lynch	&	Badger,	2006;	Foster	&	Spencer,	2013)	or	the	space	of	use	
(Duff,	2008;	Farrugia,	2015).	Neither	can	practices	of	closeness	on	MDMA	be	
considered	apart	from	their	process,	the	history	of	situated	and	specific	encounters	
which	give	rise	to	them,	such	as	past	intimate	practices	of	relating	within	a	couple	or	
the	ritualised	process	of	preparation	(Douglas,	2001;	Holloway,	2003).	Rather,	
experiencing	intimacy	on	MDMA,	and	indeed	intimacy	more	broadly,	is	always	the	
product	of	multiple,	intersecting	relationships,	such	as	the	biological,	the	psychic	and	
the	social	and	has	atomic	foundations	which	are	in	a	continual	process	of	renewal	
(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009).		
	 To	recap,	space	has	been	conceived	of	as	dynamic	and	relationally	produced;	
borrowing	from	Lewin’s	(1936)	topological	understanding	of	space	(Brown	&	Reavey,	
2015).	Topology	treats	the	relationship	between	any	two	points	as	significant,	rather	
than	the	measurable	distance	between	them.	This	relationship	is	an	intensive	
connection	–	intensive	properties	are	that	which	cannot	be	divided,	such	as	
processes	of	perception,	emotion	and	memory	–	in	contrast	to	extensive	properties,	
that	which	extend	–	measurable,	physical	dimensions,	which	can	be	easily	divided	
(DeLanda,	2005).	This	concept	is	called	‘life-space’	and	is	an	unfolding	process,	
produced	through	these	relationships,	rather	than	a	static	‘container’	of	life	events	
as	in	the	traditional	understanding	of	space	(Massey,	1994).	The	particular	intensive	
properties	of	drug	use	spaces	have	been	argued	as	crucial	to	the	pleasures	
experienced	(Duff,	2008);	this	was	particularly	noted	with	regard	to	the	‘intensely	
energetic	and	uplifting’	nightlife	spaces.	This	argument	was	continued	here	through	
the	emphasis	on	how	objects	could,	in	combination	with	sporadic,	journeying	
movement,	produce	a	playful	subjectivity.	Again,	it	was	not	extensive	properties	of	
space	(being	both	inside	and	outside,	urban	and	suburban)	that	seemed	significant	
but	the	intensive	connections	couples	formed	with	the	objects	they	encountered.	A	
lack	of	movement	in	close	quarters	e.g.	a	bath	or	small	stack	of	cushions,	was	also	
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argued	to	produce	a	‘merged’	subjectivity,	an	experience	of	oneness.	Farrugia	(2015)	
found	the	containment	of	a	small	garage	or	bathtub	could	also	be	the	setting	for	
deeper	experiences	of	intimacy	for	young	men	but	for	couples	in	this	study	such	
settings	went	beyond	this:	producing	a	total	communion	of	mind	and	body.	In	line	
with	Duff	(2008)	and	Farrugia	(2015),	it	is	suggested	that	the	intensive	qualities	of	
spaces,	such	as	the	otherworldly	feeling	of	a	dimly	lit	bathtub	or	adventurous	
serendipity	of	urban	sprawl,	are	crucial	to	the	pleasures	experienced	on	drug	use	
and	that	close	attention	must	be	paid	to	the	objects	and	other	material	
organisations	of	settings.	The	concept	of	‘affective	atmospheres’	(Anderson,	2009)	is	
also	suggested	as	a	useful	adjunct	in	detailing	‘unique	“intensive”	properties’	(Duff,	
2008,	p388)	and	elucidating	the	way	in	which	an	intensive	quality	arises	from	yet	is	
not	reducible	to	the	human	and	non-human	bodies	which	constitute	it.		
Furthermore,	the	private	spaces	of	home	are	argued	to	be	distinct	in	this	
work	in	terms	of	the	possibilities	for	active	engagement	on	behalf	of	participants:	
they	could	be	cleaned,	decorated	and	arranged	in	a	ritualistic	fashion	(Douglas,	
2001).	In	this	way,	participants	created	certain	atmospheres	which	were	argued	to	
enhance	the	intimacies	experienced	therein:	a	cosy,	carnival	atmosphere	to	
celebrate	their	relationship	(Eva	and	Lars),	a	clean	and	ordered	environment,	closed	
off	from	the	rest	of	the	world	where	partners	could	focus	only	on	each	other	(Carrie)	
and	an	emotionally	sanitised	space	for	a	first-time	user	(Ken).	In	this	way,	the	
specialness	of	MDMA	experiences	can	be	seen	as	manifested	spatially	and,	through	
these	material	organisations,	participants	can	be	seen	as	actively	engaged	with	
shaping	their	drug	experience;	not	only	to	reduce	harm	but	to	maximise	the	
pleasures	and	intimacies	experienced	therein.		
	 Regarding	the	second	research	question,	the	connection	between	MDMA	use	
and	couples’	relationships	was	not	straightforward.	To	reiterate,	this	thesis	views	
relationships	as	materialised	through	everyday	practices	of	relating,	which	are	
themselves	shaped	by	cultural	and	material	constraints	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	This	
conceptualisation	has	been	argued	to	align	itself	with	a	process	ontology	where	
existence	is	realised	through	a	continual	activity	of	becoming	(Brown	&	Stenner,	
2009),	rather	than	fundamentally	comprised	of	permanent,	stable	substances.	In	
other	words,	a	relationship	is	an	ongoing	process,	rather	than	a	unitary	object	with	
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fixed	attributes.	Certainly,	a	fixed	essence	was	not	reflected	by	the	oscillating	
remarks	couples	made	about	MDMA	use	in	connection	with	their	relationship:	from	
affirming	they	would	still	be	together	without	the	drug	to	questioning	whether	they	
would;	from	insisting	their	relationship	would	be	the	same	to	deciding	it	would	be	
quite	different.	Ultimately,	many	felt	taking	MDMA	had	made	a	difference,	brought	
them	closer	in	some	way,	but	were	also	quick	to	point	out	they	didn’t	need	it,	
perhaps	in	order	to	maintain	a	‘positive’	impression	of	their	relationship	(Dryden,	
1998).	Intimacy	has	been	defined	in	this	work	as	‘the	quality	of	close	connection	
between	people	and	the	process	of	building	this	quality’	(Jamieson,	2012,	p1.1);	the	
process	comprising	of	the	things	people	do,	their	‘practices’	of	intimacy	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015),	which	‘enable,	generate	and	sustain’	a	subjective	sense	of	special	
closeness	(Jamieson,	2012,	p1.2)	e.g.	spending	time	together,	sharing	secrets,	
making	a	cup	of	tea.	This	means	that	intimacy	is	‘done’	and	‘felt’	instead	of	
something	a	relationship	either	‘has’	or	‘does	not	have’	(Smart,	2007).	In	their	
largescale	study	of	long-lasting	couples	relationships,	Gabb	and	Fink	(2015)	
identified	communication	as	one	of	four	primary	strands	of	how	couples	related	to	
each	other,	encompassing	multiple	elements	under	this	rubric	such	as:	talking	and	
listening,	emotional	closeness,	a	deep	knowing,	arguments	and	humour.	It	is	here	
argued	that	being	on	MDMA	with	your	partner	can	facilitate	these	kinds	of	
communicative	practices	and,	therefore,	‘generate	and	sustain’	closeness	within	
couple	relationships.	For	example,	humour	was	encouraged	by	the	ludic	mentality	of	
MDMA	in	combination	with	the	objects	encountered	moving	through	spaces.	
However,	mainly	it	was	the	emotional	safe	haven	MDMA	could	provide	which	
became	a	communicative	cornerstone.	Emotional	closeness	was	fostered	as,	on	one	
side,	there	was	an	ability	to	share	in	and	respond	to	a	partner’s	emotional	
experience	and	on	the	other,	a	greater	clarity	about	one’s	own	emotional	experience	
and	ability	to	express	it.	This	was	contextualised	within	gendered	patterns	of	
relating,	where	women	are	more	involved	with	the	emotional	dimension	of	life	
(Dryden,	1998).	This	didn’t	often	translate	to	a	different	relating	style	outside	of	
MDMA	space,	but	did	give	partners	experiences	of	feeling	understood	on	a	deep	
level	and,	for	many,	offered	‘a	point	to	reflect	back	on	[to]	work	as	a	reminder	to	be	
like	that’	(Emily).	Beyond	this,	the	protection	the	bubble	offered	from	negative	affect	
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and	judgement	forestalled	or	resolved	arguments	and	made	talking	and	listening	to	
each	other	easier,	particularly	on	difficult	topics.	Revealing	something	on	MDMA	
could	break	the	taboo	of	speaking	about	it	again	or	air	an	issue	couples	felt	needed	
to	be	aired.		
Indeed,	the	total	of	couples’	experiences	of	talking	and	listening	on	MDMA	
could	be	argued	to	construct	everyday	life	as	constraining	disclosure	in	certain	ways.	
The	worry,	fear,	shame	and	judgement	felt	in	everyday	practices	of	relating	seemed	
to	inhibit	difficult	conversations	couples	felt	they	needed	to	have	about	a	variety	of	
issues	including	infidelity,	non-monogamy	and	sexual	fantasies.	Gabb	and	Fink	
(2015)	consistently	emphasise	the	importance	of	paying	attention	to	everyday	
relating	practices	and	detail	talking	with	and	listening	to	a	partner	as	one	of	the	
myriad	practices	long-term	couples	engage	in	which	sustains	their	relationship.	
These	mutual	exchanges	were	presented	as	one	of	the	few	places	where	a	partner	
felt	their	voice	was	heard	and	could	freely	express	how	they	felt	and	what	they	
thought	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	Yet,	this	everyday	space,	perhaps	largely	consumed	
with	recounting	details	and	events	of	that	day,	is	portrayed	by	the	couples	in	this	
study	as	having	certain	limits,	in	particular	very	emotive	or	relationally	difficult	
topics.	However,	the	expansive,	affective	space	of	MDMA	redefines	these	
parameters.	Within	the	bubble,	significant	disclosures	and	conversations	are	made	
and	a	new	way	of	relating,	very	much	outside	of	the	everyday,	is	drawn	on;	pointing	
attention	to	how	out-of-the-ordinary	contexts	might	be	able	to	promote	and	
transform	our	capacity	for	certain	practices	of	intimacy.		
	 More	broadly,	MDMA	experiences	are	also	claimed	to	become	part	of	the	
special	pleasures	which	build	and	sustain	couple	relationships,	another	thing	
‘[they’ve]	done	together’	(Abby).	There	are	less	studies	focussed	on	relational	
practices	which	can	help	‘actually	produce…joy’	(Brown,	2009,	p173)(emphasis	in	
original)	–	the	focus	in	research	being	more	on	relationship	breakdown	than	
maintenance	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015)	–	but	the	playfulness,	laughter	and	embodied	
pleasures	of	MDMA	showcase	one	such	avenue.	Indeed,	these	experiences	are	
argued	to	become	part	of	exclusive	couples’	space	just	‘for	us’	(Finn,	2012)	in	the	
same	way	a	‘really	amazing,	once-in-a-lifetime	holiday’	(Abby)	or	a	‘special	song	or	
restaurant’	(Ken)	might.	In	particular,	MDMA	use	is	argued	to	form	part	of	a	
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spectrum	of	relationship	‘work’	practices	which	sustain	the	emotional	intensity	of	
the	couple	connection.	Taking	MDMA	together	functioned	as	a	kind	of	date	night	
where	couples	could	be	with	each	other	apart	from	the	rhythms	and	demands	of	
everyday	life,	to	get	‘closer	connected’	(Karl),	to	‘love	[their	partner]	even	more’	
(Lars)	or	to	remember	how	they	feel	for	each	other	without	the	work	day	‘getting	in	
the	way’	of	that	process	(Ken).	Participants	enacted	spatial-temporal	boundaries	to	
construct	MDMA	use	as	‘special’	and	segment	its	emotional,	physical	and	playful	
pleasures	from	everyday	life	and,	to	varying	degrees,	from	others	(Stenner,	2013).			
	 	The	focus	of	this	research	has	been	on	how	MDMA	might	enhance	intimate	
relationships	due	to	the	absence	of	this	from	previous	research.	However,	there	
were	also	ways	in	which	MDMA	use	acted	to	constrain	relationships.	There	was	a	
certain	amount	of	ambivalence	regarding	the	personal	cost	of	some	disclosures,	the	
emotional	exhaustion	and	exposure	it	took,	and	its	necessity	in	cementing	bonds.	In	
addition,	it	was	speculated	whether	the	more	intimate	and	sensual	character	
(Zemishlany,	Aizenberg	&	Weizman,	2001)	of	MDMA	experiences	might	have	had	a	
hand	in	facilitating	an	experience	of	non-monogamy	and	the	apparently	jealous	
feelings	which	followed.	The	ludic	space	of	MDMA	was	also	shown	to	contribute	to	
the	disruption	of	other	relationships	in	the	couples’	lives.	Ostensibly	this	seems	
outside	of	the	scope	of	their	relationship,	but	friends	and	family	have	been	found	to	
be	a	vital	support	for	couples	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015),	so	a	diffusion	of	these	
connections	might	have	an	indirect	impact.	In	addition,	broader,	less	desirable	
effects	of	MDMA	were	spoken	of	(e.g.	fatigue	in	the	days	after	use,	anxiety	during	
the	come-up)	but	these	were	not	presented	as	relational	in	nature.	
	
7.2	Implications	for	drug	theory	and	practice	
	
The	starting	point	of	this	thesis	was	the	drugs	literature,	rather	than	intimacy	on	an	
everyday	level,	and	hence	will	be	the	focus	here	when	reflecting	on	the	implications	
of	these	findings.	In	order	to	consider	the	findings’	wider	repercussions,	it	is	
necessary	to	return	to	how	research	has	conceptualised	drug	use.	As	outlined	in	
Chapter	One,	there	have	been	two	main	forces	in	drugs	research:	epidemiological	
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and	cultural	studies	(Hunt,	Moloney	&	Evans,	2009),	which	still	operates	as	a	useful	
heuristic	despite	more	recent	research	disturbing	the	clarity	of	this	distinction	(e.g.	
Baggott	et	al.,	2016;	Wardle	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Wardle,	Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2014).	
The	epidemiological	model	depicts	drug	use	as	a	separate,	individuated	
phenomenon	whose	‘risk’	is	determined	largely	by	pharmacology	(Foster	&	Spencer,	
2013).	This	means	that	drug	use	is	understood	as	largely	isolated	from	the	rest	of	life	
–	personal	histories,	relationships,	spaces,	feelings	and	pleasures	–	and	promoted	as	
a	peculiar	category	of	experience,	manifesting	varying	degrees	of	harm.	In	contrast,	
the	cultural	studies	approach	emphasises	agency,	pleasure	and	context	in	relation	to	
drug	use	(Hunt,	Moloney	&	Evans,	2009).	As	Duff	(2008)	argues:	
	
participants	described	drug	related	pleasures	that	obtained	primarily	in	the	
range	of	activities	and	practices	that	the	consumption	of	these	drugs	
facilitated.	Participants	here	insisted	that	the	consumption	of	different	drugs	
in	different	contexts	transforms	individual	behaviour	and	individual	practices	
(p386)		
	
The	findings	of	this	thesis	suggest	two	further	caveats.	Firstly,	the	consumption	of	
MDMA	within	different	contexts	also	transforms	relational	behaviour	and	relational	
practices,	and	indeed,	this	is	an	enduring	part	of	the	drug’s	appeal.	Such	relational	
practices	of	closeness	involved:	becoming	more	playful,	revealing	past	trangressions,	
opening	up	new	conversations	(e.g.	sexual	fantasies/non-monogamy),	expressing	
affection	verbally	and	physically	and	feeling	romantic	love	at	a	more	intense	
frequency.	These	practices	were	both	continuous	with	everyday	life,	though	
enhanced	and	intensified	(e.g.	a	deepened	feeling	of	love,	feeling	safe	to	disclose	
with	a	partner),	and	entirely	new	(e.g.	merging	together	as	‘one’,	knowing	you	are	
feeling	exactly	the	same	thing).	Thus,	MDMA	is	suggested	as	a	facilitative	context	for	
a	range	of	relational	practices,	which	weave	into	the	unfolding	of	couples’	intimacy.		
Indeed,	relational	practices	also	seem	to	have	an	impact	on	how	much	people	use	
the	drug	as	couples	tied	their	MDMA	use	to	certain	time	frames	and	significant,	
infrequent	events	in	their	lives.	Secondly,	practices,	whether	relational	or	
‘individual’,	cannot	be	understood	apart	from	their	broader	context.	Previous	
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research	broadly	aligned	with	the	cultural	studies	approach	have	highlighted	the	role	
of	local	spatial	contexts	(Duff,	2005,	2008),	gendered	dynamics	such	as	the	
importance	of	intimacy	for	men	(Farrugia,	2015)	and	freedom	from	the	male	gaze	for	
women	(Hinchliff,	2001),	socio-economic	factors	(Foster	&	Spencer,	2013),	a	
motivation	to	control	use	(Bahora,	Sterk	&	Elifson,	2009),	the	values	of	late	capitalist	
consumerist	society	(Olsen,	2009)	and	the	desire	for	personal	growth	(Beck	&	
Rosenbaum,	1994)	in	understanding	and	appreciating	the	meaning	of	drug	use.	This	
thesis	adds	to	the	previous	body	of	work	through	arguing	that	people’s	romantic	
relationships	(and	their	particular	relationship	histories)	situate	the	meaning,	
motivation	and	benefit	of	their	MDMA	use.	For	example,	how	the	acceptance	of	
painful	memories	by	someone	you	love	gives	the	telling	its	significance	and	the	way	
in	which	a	traditionally	gendered	emotional	division	in	a	relationship	could	ground	
the	value	of	men	becoming	emotionally	attuned	to	their	female	partners.	Therefore,	
even	without	intentional	relationship	use,	an	individual’s	intimate	relationship	might	
contextualise	and	explain	some	of	the	meaning	around	their	use	of	MDMA.		
If	MDMA	use	facilitates	a	range	of	intimate	practices	and	if	these	are,	in	turn,	
contextualised	by	personal	and	relational	histories,	then	the	complexity	of	the	lived	
experience	of	drug	use	must	be	acknowledged	(Duff,	2008).	Certainly,	this	does	not	
entail	a	shift	to	seeing	MDMA	use	as	some	kind	of	‘magic	bullet’	for	intimacy,	but	as	
one	thread	in	an	ongoing	relational	process	where	couples	make	and	re-make	their	
intimacy	together	(Gabb	&	Fink,	2015).	Moreover,	the	findings	show	how	MDMA	
experiences	can,	and	are,	being	managed	by	couples:	spatial-temporal	boundaries	
segment	drug	use	from	everyday	life	and	unwelcome	others	are	excluded	from	this	
emotionally	potent	space,	minimising	any	fallout	(though,	of	course,	these	
boundaries	are	not	absolute).	Through	taking	these	steps,	participants	show	an	
awareness	of	the	risks	and	pleasures	of	MDMA	use	and	a	willingness	to	self-regulate,	
which	has	been	reported	but	not	necessarily	always	emphasised	by	contemporary	
drugs	research.			
Of	course,	a	reconsideration	of	MDMA	use	is	more	than	simply	a	theoretical	
exercise;	it	has	implications	for	drug	policy	and	practice.	The	current	UK	Government	
policy	towards	drugs	summarises	the	‘issue’	of	drug	use	on	the	gov.uk	website	as	
follows:	
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Between	2011	and	2012,	an	estimated	8.9%	of	adults	used	an	illegal	drug.	For	
young	people	aged	between	16	and	24,	the	figure	was	19.3%.	Although	this	is	
the	lowest	level	of	drug	use	since	we	started	collecting	figures	in	1996,	drug	
misuse	continues	to	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	health,	wellbeing	and	
quality	of	life	of	too	many	people	(“2010	to	2015	government	policy”,	2015).	
	
Instead	of	imposing	an	idea	of	drug	use	as	inherently	risky,	‘drug	misuse’	(own	
emphasis)	which	has	a	‘negative	effect’	on	‘wellbeing’	and	‘quality	of	life’,	it	is	
suggested	that	drug	policy	should	develop	a	more	nuanced,	processual	view	of	drug	
use:	as	emerging	from	the	patterns	of	activity	and	feeling	people	experience	on	
them	(Cromby,	2017).	If	we	look	at	the	patterns	of	activity	that	have	been	identified	
alongside	MDMA	in	this	work,	we	can	see	that	taking	MDMA	can	form	part	of	
relating	practices	which	forge	and	fortify	a	relationship,	while	not	always	described	
as	being	easy	or	sustainable,	these	practices	crucially	can	be	a	part	of	the	unfolding	
of	a	couple’s	relationship.	The	credibility	of	harm	reduction	initiatives	which	do	not	
engage	with	users’	understanding	of	risk	and	pleasure	has	already	been	cast	into	
doubt	(Foster	&	Spencer,	2013).	The	UK	Government	also	emphasises	the	provision	
of	‘accurate	information	on	drugs	and	alcohol’	(Department	of	Health	and	the	Home	
Office,	2015).	It	is	here	specifically	argued	that	this	might	entail	information	of	more	
‘messy’	forms	of	emotional	harm,	which	have	hitherto	been	absent	from	harm	
reduction	information	and	was	raised	in	this	research	e.g.	being	too	emotionally	
(and	sexually)	intimate	with	someone	other	than	your	partner,	regretting	the	things	
you	might	reveal.	Taking	seriously	the	recommendation	of	Foster	and	Spencer	(2013)	
that	harm	reduction	initiatives	use	the	terms	of	drug	users	in	order	to	better	
resonate	with	them,	it	is	suggested	that	use	might	be	regulated	through	harnessing	
users’	desires	to	preserve	its	‘specialness’,	which	many	participants	emphasised	as	
important	to	them.	As	well	as	encouraging	couples	to	be	explicit	with	one	another	
about	their	boundaries	around	MDMA	use	–	who	they	want	to	take	MDMA	with	
them	and	why	–	which	has	been	described	as	instrumental	in	the	navigation	of	other	
practices	such	as	non-monogamies	(Barker	&	Langdridge,	2010;	Easton	&	Hardy,	
2011;	Taormino,	2008).		
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7.3	Validity	and	reflexivity	
	
One	of	the	main	criticisms	levelled	at	qualitative	research	is	that	‘anything	goes’	
(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006).	It	is	implied	that	since	qualitative	research	is	not	under	the	
same	strictures	as	quantitative	research,	it	might	be	compared	to	the	wild	west:	an	
unordered	domain	where	researchers	can	perform,	and	get	away	with	performing,	
studies	in	any	way	they	want.	This	careless	chaos	is	indeed	a	sobering	image.	
However,	there	have	been	multiple	efforts	to	conceive	guidelines	for	thinking	about	
validity	in	qualitative	research:	what	makes	‘good’	or	‘better’	qualitative	research	
(e.g.	Elliott,	Fischer	&	Rennie,	1999;	Parker,	2004;	Seale,	1999;	Silverman,	2000;	
Yardley,	2000).	While	some	scholars	tacitly	assume	that	qualitative	research	can	be	
evaluated	using	the	same	ideas	as	quantitative	research	(for	example,	with	measures	
ensuring	inter-rater	reliability	e.g.	Belser,	2016),	most	within	the	field	acknowledge	
the	need	for	separate	evaluative	criteria,	though	there	might	also	be	room	for	
overlap	(e.g.	Elliott	et	al.,	1999).	This	is	largely	justified	due	to	the	different	
epistemological	paradigm	of	qualitative	research	which	views	knowledge	as	situated	
and	contextual	(Parker,	2004).	This	was	certainly	an	underlying	assumption	of	this	
work.	However,	as	stated	in	Chapter	Three,	this	argument	is	often	extended	to	mean	
that	all	knowledge	is	‘subjective’	and	discursively	constructed	(Nightingale	&	
Cromby,	2002):	an	argument	not	endorsed	by	the	process-relational	perspective	
informing	this	thesis.	Rather,	discourse	is	viewed	as	one	strand	among	many,	
interconnected	processes	which	produce	experience,	including	the	material	world	
(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Stenner,	2008).		
	 For	this	work,	the	guidelines	provided	by	Elliott	et	al.	(1999)	were	broadly	
adhered	to	due	to	their	applicability	(across	methods	and	theoretical	investments)	
and	accessibility	(through	their	provision	of	clear	examples).	Their	seven	guidelines	
can	be	grouped	into	three	areas:	reflexivity,	transparency	and	coherence.	The	
analysis	produced	should	be	coherent	so	that	it	‘fits	together	to	form	a	data-based	
story’	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999,	p223)	–	by	seeking	the	opinion	of	another	researcher,	
comparing	it	to	another	piece	of	qualitative	research	and/or	asking	if	the	analysis	
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resonates	with	people	who	have	had	similar	experiences.	The	involvement	of	the	
supervisory	team,	two	senior	researchers,	in	the	preliminary	discussions	and	analysis	
of	the	data	was	considered	to	fulfill	this	requirement.	Their	academic	experience	
allowed	them	to	point	out	inconsistent	and	fragmented	aspects,	which	were	
impeding	the	overall	flow	and	‘fit’	of	the	analysis.	Being	transparent	about	who	your	
participants	were	(e.g.	including	demographic	information	such	as	gender),	what	
kind	of	research	question	you	were	answering	and	how	the	data	extracts	fit	into	the	
story	you	are	telling	was	another	key	aspect	to	validity.	To	this	end,	demographic	
information	was	included	when	discussing	methodology	in	Chapter	Three.	
Transparency	about	the	kind	of	empirical	project	embarked	upon	is	argued	to	be	
showcased	through	the	clear	elucidation	of	research	questions	in	Chapter	One	and	
their	answering	in	this	chapter.	In	addition,	the	research	was	carefully	situated	in	
terms	of	existing	academic	literature,	theoretical	orientation	and	methodological	
decisions	made	in	the	opening	chapters.	Finally,	what	Elliott	et	al.	(1999)	refer	to	as	
‘owning	one’s	own	perspective’	(p221),	more	commonly	known	as	reflexivity,	is	
consistently	highlighted	as	a	cornerstone	of	‘good’	qualitative	research	(Parker,	
2004;	Yardley,	2000;	Harré,	2004).	For	a	qualitative	researcher,	this	involves	an	
awareness	of	one’s	own	theoretical	and	personal	perspectives	on	a	subject	matter	as	
well	as	how	these	develop	through	the	research	process	and	the	role	they	play	in	the	
findings	produced	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999).	Of	course,	an	openness	to	new	
understandings	and	differing	perspectives	of	participants’	is	also	essential.	It	is	worth	
noting	too	how	scholars	emphasise	the	flexibility	of	these	guidelines,	albeit	in	
different	terms,	‘not	rigid’	but	‘explicit’	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999)	and	‘closed	enough	to	
guide	evaluation	and	open	enough	to	enable	transformation	of	assumptions’	
(Parker,	2004).	My	engagement	with	validity	and	reflexivity	will	be	categorised	here	
in	two	parts:	further	detail	about	who	the	participants	were	and	what	this	means	for	
the	scope	of	the	findings	and	the	influence	of	my	own	assumptions	and	experiences,	
as	primary	researcher,	upon	the	data	‘story’	told	(Mays	&	Pope,	2000).		
	
7.3.1	Situating	the	sample	
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As	outlined	in	Chapter	Three,	two	studies	were	conducted,	involving	semi-structured	
couple	interviews	and	written	diaries	with	optional	diary	interviews.	Couple	
interviews	were	chosen	due	to	the	richness	of	the	data	they	could	provide:	a	glimpse	
of	couples’	dynamics	in	practice,	where	partners	could	query,	disagree,	affirm	and	
interrupt	each	other	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	2012;	Duncombe	&	Marsden,	1996).	
Written	diaries	were	used	to	capture	everyday	minutiae	around	taking	MDMA	with	a	
partner	that	might	be	glossed	over	or	forgotten,	and	as	an	outlet	for	more	sensitive	
topics,	like	sex	(Kenten,	2010).	These	methodological	choices	necessitated	the	study	
criterion	of	having	taken	MDMA	five	times	or	more	with	a	current	partner.	While	
qualitative	research	is	not	concerned	with	sample	representativeness	in	the	same	
manner	as	quantitative	research,	it	does	seek	to	situate	the	sample	and	provide	
details	on	information	about	the	participants	that	might	help	define	the	scope	of	
findings’	generalisability	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999).	Indeed,	people	still	in	a	relationship	
with	a	partner	might	have	greater	reason	to	present	their	relationship,	and	the	
things	they’ve	done	together,	in	a	positive	light.	While	anecdotes	from	people	who	
did	not	qualify	for	participation	in	the	research	gave	similar	presentations	of	MDMA	
use	with	past	partners	(e.g.	‘We	would	just	talk,	bond,	and	say	how	we	really	feel	
about	things…Regardless,	we	just	broke	up	last	month.	We	hadn't	taken	ecstasy	for	
about	7	months	and	things	just	stopped	working	out.’),	Vervaeke	and	Korf	(2009)	
found	their	respondents	divided	over	the	influence	of	MDMA	on	intimate	
relationships	–	with	all	those	convinced	this	influence	was	positive	currently	in	a	
steady	relationship	and	those	who	described	both	positive	and	negative	effects	
largely	not	in	a	relationship	(7	out	of	10	respondents).	These	results	suggest	that	
relationship	status	could	be	key	in	shaping	results	produced	although	the	limited	
data	available	makes	it	hard	to	draw	a	more	substantial	conclusion,	making	it	of	
interest	for	future	work,	as	discussed	at	the	end	of	this	chapter.	
The	participant	sample	were	diverse	in	terms	of	age	(23-62),	gender	(13	
women	and	14	men)	and	geographic	location	(UK,	USA	and	the	EU)	but	were	alike	in	
terms	of	their	sexual	orientation,	being	exclusively	heterosexual.	Again,	the	fact	that	
all	participants	were	heterosexual	could	be	seen	to	provide	a	relevant	
contextualisation	of	some	of	the	findings	produced.	The	data	coded	for	the	
emotional	attunement	theme	in	Chapter	Four	was	understood,	due	to	the	literature	
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around	emotions,	relationships	and	gender,	as	hinging	on	gender.	Namely,	that	
women	felt	more	able	to	express	their	emotions	in	everyday	life	than	men,	a	well-
documented	phenomena	(Strazdins	&	Broom,	2004),	and	were	often	more	
empathetic	(Mestre,	Samper,	Frías	&	Tur,	2009).	However,	same-sex	relationships	
have	been	found	to	be	more	egalitarian	–	in	terms	of	both	the	division	of	household	
labour	and	the	responsibilities	of	relationship	maintenance	–	than	heterosexual	
relationships	(Connolly,	2005;	Gottman,	2011;	Knudson-Martin	&	Mahoney,	2009;	
Solomon,	Rothblum	&	Balsam,	2005)	and,	furthermore,	more	intentional	about	
facilitating	emotional	attunement	with	one	another	(Jonathan,	2009).	It	is	suggested	
then	that	these	findings	may	not	be	applicable	to	same-sex	couples	who	take	MDMA	
together:	an	important	consideration	since	those	who	self-identify	as	lesbian,	gay	or	
bisexual	are	at	least	three	times	as	likely	to	take	ecstasy	than	heterosexual	
individuals	(Home	Office,	2016;	Boyd,	McCabe	&	d’Arcy,	2003).	A	sample	which	
included	LGBT	couples	therefore	might	have	showcased	different	ways	the	
emotional	dynamic	of	MDMA	altered	their	relating	practices.		
	 Although	class	and	ethnicity	were	not	explicitly	recorded,	from	the	available	
information	e.g.	cultural	background/profession/face-to-face	interviews,	it	can	be	
reasonably	inferred	that	the	majority	of	participants	in	the	first	study	were	middle-
class	and	white.	Intersectional	theory	maintains	that	multiple	social	categories	
jointly	influence	experience,	often	summarised	as	race-class-gender,	and	this	applies	
to	both	disadvantaged	and	privileged	groups	(Cole,	2009).	Since	psychological	
research	has	been	argued	to	overrepresent	those	who	are	white	and	middle-class	
(Reid,	1993),	this	might	also	be	a	concern	for	this	sample.	Yet,	the	predominantly	
white	sample	reflects	the	ethnicity	of	MDMA	users	as	a	whole:	95%	of	people	who	
take	ecstasy	in	the	UK	are	white	(Home	Office,	2016;	Office	for	National	Statistics,	
2011).	Similarly,	ecstasy	users	are	more	likely	to	be	middle-class,	there	is	
approximately	1.64	times	the	number	of	middle-class	people	who	use	ecstasy	than	
their	working	class	counterparts	(Home	Office,	2016;	Caci,	2010).	Yet,	there	is	still	a	
class	gap	in	terms	of	MDMA	users	nationwide	and	the	current	sample.	The	more	
middle-class	nature	of	the	sample	may	well	have	increased	participants’	access	to	
resources,	for	example	the	ability	to	rent	private	homes	within	which	to	take	MDMA	
and	live	in	less	surveilled	neighbourhoods,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Five,	as	well	as	
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music	events	and	festivals,	which	were	described	by	many.	Without	access	to	these	
environments,	keeping	in	mind	the	co-constitution	of	experience	with	spaces	and	
objects	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Latour,	2005;	Serres,	1995),	couples’	experiences	of	
taking	MDMA	together	might	have	been	very	different.		
Recruitment	for	the	project	was	mainly	conducted	online,	a	strategy	already	
called	into	question	in	Chapter	Three.	It	was	suggested	that	people	using	websites	
relating	to	drug	use	might	be	more	aware	of	both	the	effects	of	MDMA	and	steps	to	
reduce	harm,	perhaps	crucially	distinguishing	their	experiences	from	MDMA	users	as	
a	whole.	Indeed,	two	of	the	online	sources,	rollsafe.org	and	bluelight.org,	present	
themselves	as	a	‘MDMA	harm	reduction	guide’	and	‘online	harm-reduction	
community’	respectively,	and	10	out	of	the	28	participants	were	recruited	here.	
Furthermore,	almost	all	of	the	diary	participants	highlighted	the	steps	they	took	to	
minimise	harm,	such	as	spacing	apart	their	use	(e.g.	maintaining	gaps	of	one	month	
or	more),	and	they	were	recruited	almost	entirely	from	the	harm	reduction	site	
rollsafe.org.	There	are,	however,	two	points	to	keep	in	mind	when	‘judging	the	range	
of	persons	and	situations	to	which	the	findings	might	be	relevant’	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999,	
p221).	Firstly,	there	were	eight	participants	who	didn’t	appear	to	employ	extensive	
harm	reduction	practices	and	several	more	who	were	not	explicit	about	their	intent	
to	reduce	harm,	indicating	some	variety	in	the	sample.	They	may	have	engaged	in	
strategies	on	MDMA	to	mitigate	harm	such	as	drinking	water	and	‘cooling	down’	but	
these	were	not	specifically	enquired	after.	Furthermore,	there	seems	to	be	a	
reasonable	prevalence	of	harm	reduction	practices	within	the	ecstasy-using	
community:	all	the	participants	in	Allott	and	Redman’s	(2006)	study	employed	some	
kind	of	harm	reduction	practice:	95%	drinking	water	on	the	drug,	70%	curtailing	their	
use	and	53%	taking	vitamins	or	other	natural	products	(often	referred	to	as	pre-	and	
post-loading).	Other	studies	also	report	a	broad	range	of	harm-reducing	strategies	of	
a	largely	preventative	(e.g.	spacing	out	use)	and	behavioural	(e.g.	taking	breaks	while	
on	MDMA)	nature	(Panagopoulos	&	Ricciardelli,	2005;	Gamble	&	George,	1997;	
Hansen,	Maycock	&	Lower,	2001;	Moore,	1993;	Shewan,	Dalgarno	&	Reith,	2000).	
However,	there	is	limited	data	available	on	the	prevalence	on	harm	reduction	
practices	and	samples	are	not	intended	to	be	representative	of	the	general	
population	or	the	drug-using	community.	Correspondingly,	the	lack	of	representative	
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data	makes	it	difficult	to	properly	situate	this	thesis’	sample,	although	from	the	
studies	so	far	conducted	it	appears	like	their	awareness	of	how	to	mitigate	harm	is	
not	disproportionate	with	other	users	who	take	part	in	psychological	research.		
	
7.3.2	Reflecting	on	my	own	assumptions	and	experiences	
	
Guiding	the	research	was	an	assumption	that	closeness	with	a	romantic	parter	was	
desirable	and	that	taking	MDMA	as	a	couple	might	enable	closeness.	The	idea	of	
MDMA	use	as	facilitative	of	social	bonds	was	built	up	through	my	own	conversations	
with	people	who	used	MDMA	as	well	as	previous	academic	(particularly,	Beck	&	
Rosenbaum,	1994;	Duff,	2008;	Greer	&	Tolbert,	1986;	Hinchliff,	2001)	and	non-
academic	reading,	‘The	rest	of	the	night	was	glorious.	I	grew	extremely	close	to	[my	
boyfriend],	and	we	are	still	together	to	this	day’	from	E:	The	Incredibly	Strange	
History	of	Ecstasy	(Pilcher,	2008,	p37).	Particularly	after	transcribing	and	coding	the	
first	couple	interview,	I	became	aware	of	the	lack	of	attention	paid	to	exploring	
other	threads	of	MDMA	use:	
	
Kara:	like,	erm…,	like	we’d	argue	–	if	we’d	go	clubbing	the	night,	the	week..	If	
we’d	go	clubbing	that	week,	the	week	after	we’d	definitely	have	an	
argument,	wouldn’t	we?		About	something…he’d	only	have	to	say	something	
slightly	and	I’d	get	really	upset	about	it,	we’d	have	a	row,	wouldn’t	we?	
Liam:	hmm	
Kara:	but	I	do	think	though	like	cos	I	know	you	were	saying	about	this	whole	
like	forgetting	stuff,	I	think	that	it’s	difficult	to	take	out	the	MDMA	and	the	
alcohol	because	we	were	heavy	drinkers,	weren’t	we	at	the	time?	(Couple	
interview:	Kara	&	Liam)	
	
For	Kara	and	Liam,	‘go[ing]	clubbing’	was	intertwined	with	ecstasy	use.	The	link	Kara	
draws	between	this	activity	and	‘definitely	hav[ing]	an	argument’	the	week	after	
opens	up	a	less	rosy	vista	of	ecstasy	and	closeness.	She	mitigates	this	with	their	
alcohol	consumption	as	‘heavy	drinkers’	and	I	do	not	probe	further,	allowing	the	
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conversation	to	tail	off.	In	fact,	studies	have	pointed	to	polydrug	use	as	a	significant	
factor	in	the	long-term	effects	of	ecstasy	use	(Soar,	Parrott	&	Turner,	2009).	When	
transcribing	and	coding	this	initial	interview,	I	became	aware	of	other	instances	
where	I	did	not	pursue	more	ambiguous	comments	on	closeness	and	MDMA,	
prepped	as	I	was	with	assumptions	of	relational	harmony,	rather	than	dischord.	As	a	
result,	questions	were	added	to	the	interview	schedule	for	the	first	study	intended	
to	bring	out	these	aspects	(e.g.	‘tell	me	about	any	times	you	felt	distant	from	each	
other	while	on	MDMA?’;	‘describe	to	me	an	MDMA	experience	that	was	difficult	for	
you	in	some	way’)	and	within	the	second,	diary	study	(e.g.	‘what	parts	of	the	
experience	are	you	not	looking	forward	to?).	My	experiences	and	investments	could	
also	be	seen	to	shape	the	research	findings	in	almost	the	inverse	direction:	a	failure	
to	notice	‘responsible’	drug	use.	I	have	been	part	of	a	harm	reduction	organisation	
and,	through	supervisory	discussion,	realised	my	familiarity	with	the	practices	
involved	was	dulling	the	significance	I	accorded	them	in	the	analytical	process.	They	
had	become	unremarkable	to	me	and,	as	a	consequence,	I	initially	overlooked	their	
role	in	the	boundary-making	processes	described	by	participants,	which	would	
eventually	form	the	basis	of	Chapter	Six.	This	scenario	reinforces	the	importance	of	
performing	a	‘credibility	check’	(Elliott	et	al.,	1999,	p222)	on	the	data	story.		
Returning	to	my	hesitancy	around	probing	Kara	and	Liam	further,	it	is	clear	to	
me	from	my	research	journal	that	this	reluctance	was	complicated	by	my	worries	
around	power	dynamics	within	the	interview	context.	Aware	of	the	implicit	power	
exercised	by	the	researcher,	who	occupies	a	position	of	relative	authority	and	
control	since	they	are	asking	the	questions	and	directing	the	‘investigation’	
(Brinkmann	&	Kvale,	2005;	Wilkinson,	1998),	I	sought	to	rebalance	the	scales.	This	
was	done	by	following	the	participants’	lead	in	what	they	wanted	to	talk	about	and	
ensuring	their	comfort	by	not	asking	too	many	‘difficult’	questions.	However,	this	
approach	seemed	to	have	the	opposite	effect.	Kara	and	Liam	attempts	to	ask	for	
clarification	throughout	the	interview	and	highlighting	their	concerns	over	the	
meaningfulness	of	their	participation	at	the	end	of	the	interview	(e.g.	‘Cos	I	was	
saying	“oh,	like,	I	don’t	know	what	we	need	to	say	or	what	we	need	to	like	bring	or	
like,	what	you,	what	would	be	most	benefical	to	you	I	guess.	That	was	what	I	was	
most	mindful	of”)	tell	a	different	story.	Indeed,	my	own	discomfort	at	not	being	able	
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to	steer	the	interview	enough	towards	romantic	relationships	and	MDMA	use	would	
likely	also	have	been	perceptible	by	them,	constricting	the	interactional	dynamic.	As	
the	interviewing	process	progressed,	it	became	clear	that	taking	more	of	a	lead	
increased	participants’	comfort	levels	and	that	when	I	was	more	open	to	the	idea	
that	couples	might	be	ok	with	presenting	a	non-perfect	image	of	their	relationship,	
many	spoke	openly	about	the	difficulties	they	had	experienced	together.		
Linking	up	with	my	initial	reluctance	to	disquiet	participants	by	asking	them	
hard	questions	was	a	reticence	on	my	part	to	ask	about	or	discuss	sex	in	the	couple	
interviews.	Practically,	this	meant	certain	avenues	were	left	unexplored.	Mark	and	
Jenny,	the	second	couple	I	interviewed,	spoke	about	non-monogamy	but	this	was	
quickly	steered	away	from	due	to	my	own	impression	that	it	was	‘couples’	business’.	
Similarly,	Joe	and	Rachel	spoke	about	the	deep	entanglement	of	sex	and	MDMA	
(‘[sex	was	a]	huge,	massive	part	of…our	taking	E	together’	(Rachel))	but,	again,	this	
was	not	delved	into	too	deeply.	This	is	not	to	say	that	sex	should	be	made	part	of	the	
conversation	but	that	I	was	letting	my	own	comfort	levels,	rather	than	those	of	my	
participants’,	become	the	determining	factor.	In	fact,	interviewing	couples	together	
has	been	argued	to	hold	an	ethical	advantage	over	interviewing	partners	alone.	If	
both	members	of	a	couple	are	present,	consent	can	be	sought	in	the	moment	over	
whether	a	disclosure	can	be	made	to	the	researcher	(Bjørnholt	&	Farstad,	2012).	This	
was	the	case	with	Mark	and	Jenny,	as	the	following	exchange	shows:	
	
Mark:	Yeah,	are	you	looking	for	details?	(he	laughs)	
Interviewer:	I	mean,	whatever	detail	you	feel	comfortable	in	sharing,	really	
Mark:	[says	something	to	Jenny]	
Jenny:	oh,	if	you	want	to	share,	that’s	fine	
Mark:	Yeah.	I	mean	we’ve	been,	we’ve	been	struggling	with,	now	that	we’ve	
been	in	a	relationship	for	seven	years,	just	somewhat	struggling	with	the	
concept	of	monogamy	(Couple	interview:	Mark	&	Jenny)	
	
As	a	result	of	these	reflections,	and	similar	comments	from	my	supervisors,	I	
engaged	more	when	sexuality	came	up	in	interviews.	For	example,	my	clarification,	
‘when	you	say	like	fantasies	do	you	mean	like	sexual	fantasies	or	other	things?’,	
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prompted	a	longer	discussion	about	how	‘sex	was	one	of	the	things	we	really	worked	
on	MDMA’	(Helena).	In	addition,	a	specific	question	was	included	in	the	second	
study,	in	the	written	diaries:	‘were	there	any	differences	in	your	sexual	relationship	
with	your	partner?’		
	 Transcribing	and	analysing	the	couple	interviews	from	the	first	study	also	
made	me	aware	of	the	extent	to	which	self-disclosure	and	communication	
foregrounded	my	understanding	of	intimacy.	For	example:	
	
Kara:	yeah,	as	I	say,	like	me	and	Beth	used	to	spend	the	Saturday	night	
together,	didn’t	we?		We’d	have	a	curry	and	then	we’d	just	sit	at	hers	and	we	
just	wouldn’t	really	talk	that	much,	we’d	just	like	sit	close	to	each	other	
Interviewer:	yeah	
Kara:	maybe	hold	each	other’s	hands,	I	don’t	know-	
Interviewer:	sorry,	what	would	you	do	then	during	the	night	that	you	were	
together?	
Kara:	listen	to	music	really.	Just	have	music	on	and	sit	there	and	just	be	in	the	
moment	together,	I	guess	(Couple	interview:	Kara	&	Liam)		
	
Kara’s	description	of	not	‘really	talk[ing]	that	much’	and	‘just…sit[ting]’	with	her	
friend	are	met	with	my	confusion	and	unfair	incredulity,	‘sorry,	what	would	you	do	
then	during	the	night	that	you	were	together?’	An	absence	of	talk	being	regarded	as	
not	enough	to	occupy	a	whole	night’s	worth	of	ecstasy	use.	Similarly,	my	
understanding	of	intimacy	as	built	through	talk	can	be	seen	as	shaping	the	follow-up	
prompts	I	used	in	couple	interviews;	after	Emily	recounts	sitting	with	her	partner	on	
MDMA,	I	ask,	‘and	what	happens	when	you’re,	when	you’re	sat	there:	are	you	kind	of	
talking	while	this	is	going	on	or	are	you	just,	what’s,	what’s	happening?’	Despite	
attempting	to	end	the	question	on	a	more	neutral	keel,	‘just…what’s	happening?’,	
my	initial	assumption,	‘are	you	kind	of	talking’	reveals	my	own,	culturally	normative	
ideas	around	intimacy.	Hence,	while	the	initial	questions	used	were	open-ended	(e.g.	
‘can	you	tell	me	about	this	experience?’;	‘tell	me	about	a	point	in	the	(last)	
experience	where	you	felt	(particularly)	close	to	each	other?’),	further,	unscripted	
prompts	were	shaped	by	my	own	concept	of	closeness	e.g.	as	verbally	produced	and		
	231	
might	have	subtly	revealed	to	participants	how	I	thought	they	‘should’	be	doing	
closeness.	Over	the	course	of	the	research	process,	I	came	across	and	specifically	
sought	out	alternative	views,	particularly	from	Jamieson	(1998),	Brownlie	(2014)	and	
Gabb	and	Fink	(2015).	These	readings	were	instrumental	in	reformulating	my	idea	of	
intimacy	and	highlighting	to	me	the	subtle	ways	in	which	disclosure	and	
communication,	which	more	closely	matched	my	own	presumptions,	were	capturing	
my	attention	not	only	in	interviews	but	also	in	analysis	of	the	data.	For	example,	the	
emotional	attunement	theme	in	Chapter	Four	was	initially	organised	around	the	
verbal	communication	of	emotion	but,	after	careful	re-reading	of	the	data,	other	
aspects	of	their	emotional	experience	came	to	the	forefront,	such	as	the	significance	
of	simply	‘being	there’	physically	and	having	a	strong	sense	of	a	mutual,	emotional	
experience	without	this	always	being	grounded	in	talk	(Brownlie,	2014).	Indeed,	my	
gender	and	personal	experiences	of	sometimes	not	being	emotionally	‘heard’	in	
hetrosexual	relationships	may	also	have	influenced	the	decision	to	include	this	as	a	
main	theme.	At	the	beginning	of	the	PhD,	I	also	had	strong	ideas	about	experience	as	
an	intrapsychic,	cognitive	phenomenon	played	out	solely	‘in	the	head’.	Through	
readings	(particularly	Brown	&	Reavey,	2015;	Brown	&	Stenner,	2009)	and	
discussions,	my	two	supervisors	were	crucial	to	opening	up	my	understanding	of	
experience	as	not	confined	to	the	head	but	materially	mediated:	composed	of	
objects,	spaces	and	our	own	embodied	interactions.	This	resulted	in	the	findings	of	
Chapter	Five	around	spatially	distributed	subjectivity,	such	as	the	application	of	the	
diffuse	concept	of	an	‘affective	atmosphere’	(Anderson,	2009;	Fuchs,	2013),	which	
emerges	from	both	human	and	non-human	bodies	in	a	non-deterministic	manner.	
	
7.4	Future	research	and	concluding	remarks	
	
It	has	been	argued	in	this	thesis	that	couples	engage	in	and	value	practices	of	
intimacy	while	on	MDMA	together,	and	these	practices	intertwine	with	the	
continually	unfolding	process	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009)	of	their	relationship.	The	
methods	employed	sought	to	explore	couple	dynamics	in	practice	(couple	
interviews)	and	everyday	minutiae	around	the	time	of	taking	MDMA	with	a	partner	
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(written	diaries).	Both	approaches	performed	their	intended	role:	the	semi-
structured	interviews	provided	a	glimpse	of	how	partners	related	to	each	other	
(within	and	outside	of	MDMA	experiences)	and	how	this	changed	over	time,	while	
the	diaries	showcased	the	details	of	everyday	living	pertinent	to	and	shaped	by	
MDMA	use.	However,	a	consequence	of	this	methodological	approach	was	that	
criteria	for	inclusion	was	limited	to	people	currently	in	a	relationship.	Joint	
interviews	are,	of	course,	only	viable	when	couples	are	still	together	and	diaries	
sought	to	describe	ongoing	experience	of	taking	MDMA	with	a	partner.	In	future	
research	studies,	it	would	be	helpful	to	attain	a	better	understanding	of	the	role	of	
MDMA	use	in	past	relationships:	how	does	the	current	status	of	a	relationship	
influence	participants’	reflections	on	their	drug	use	together?	How	do	(remembered)	
practices	of	closeness	on	MDMA	vary	within	and	across	relationships	which	have	
since	been	dissolved	compared	to	those	still	ongoing?	These	results	would	extend	
and	contextualise	the	findings	of	this	thesis	further,	adding	another	layer	to	our	
understanding	of	how	MDMA	use	is	embedded	within	relationships,	past	and	
present,	and	how	relationships	can	be	(re)formed	through	the	things	people	do,	feel	
and	say	on	drugs.	
	 Throughout	the	thesis,	the	relational	nature	of	human	experience	has	been	
consistently	emphasised	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009;	Whitehead,	1926/1985,	1927–
1928/1985).	Experiences	of	intimacy	and	drug	use	have	been	argued	to	be	the	
product	of	multiple	intersecting	processes,	such	as	space,	emotion	and	discourse,	
which	are	continually	unfolding.	Considering	this,	another	fruitful	direction	for	future	
research	might	be	a	broader	examination	of	the	social	relationships	within	which	
drug	use	is	embedded.	Many	participants	spoke	of	other	relationships	entangled	
with	the	experiences	and	repercussions	of	taking	drugs:	of	friends,	friends	of	friends	
and	family.	This	is	also	a	recurrent	theme	in	ecstasy	research	generally,	with	many	
emphasising	bonding	with	others	on	the	drug	as	key	to	the	pleasures	experienced	
(Beck	&	Rosenbaum,	1994;	Duff,	2008;	Farrugia,	2015;	Foster	&	Spencer,	2013;	
Hinchliff,	2001).	In	particular,	it	might	be	useful	to	examine	how	reflections	on	
MDMA	can	ripple	out	into	wider	social	networks,	whether	they	are	part	of	the	drug	
experience	or	not.	For	example,	how	realisations	on	MDMA	might	precipitate	a	
(temporary	or	more	permanent)	shift	in	behaviour	towards	someone.	This	could	be	
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explored	through	a	similar	two-part	style	of	data	collection,	where	interviews	
provide	an	overview	and	diaries	produce	day-to-day	details,	would	be	
recommended.	As	part	of	the	interview	process,	it	is	suggested	the	use	of	relational	
maps	(Bagnoli,	2009;	Josselson,	1996;	Roseneil,	2006),	a	visual	elicitation	technique,	
could	be	an	appropriate	methodological	choice.	Visual	methods	used	in	this	thesis,	
relationship	timelines	(see	Iantaffi,	2011)	and	object	selection	(Del	Busso,	2009;	
Majumdar,	2011)	proved	helpful	in	evoking	more	‘concrete	experiences’	(Silver	&	
Reavey,	2010)	and,	perhaps,	less	rehearsed	accounts.	Similarly,	a	relational	map,	
where	participants	are	asked	to	draw	themselves	and	the	important	people	in	their	
lives	(Bagnoli,	2009),	could	be	particularly	evocative	(Prosser	&	Loxley,	2008)	and	
access	parts	of	experiences	that	are	hard	to	put	into	words	(Gauntlett,	2007).	They	
also	incorporate	spatial	(by	participants	judging	relative	distance	between	
themselves	and	the	people	in	their	lives)	and	visual	(through	drawing)	modalities	
that	are	not	often	engaged	with	in	traditional	interview	methods	but	have	been	
argued	to	more	keenly	reflect	the	multi-modal	nature	of	our	experience	(Reavey,	
2011).		
	 Finally,	I	would	like	to	return	to	the	drugs	literature	which	this	research	has	
been	grounded	in,	to	make	explicit	how	this	work	might	add	to	and	move	these	
ideas	on.	The	findings	of	this	thesis	support	thinking	about	drug	experiences	as	
continuous	with	and	contextualised	by	life	experiences,	while	simultaneously	
providing	moments	of	extension	and	enrichment	rarely	experienced	in	the	everyday.	
For	example,	MDMA	was	argued	to	be	viewed	as	a	kind	of	‘date	night’,	forming	part	
of	the	spectrum	of	relationship	work	practices	a	couple	might	engage	in	(Gabb	&	
Fink,	2015)	as	well	as	facilitating	moments	of	total	emotional	connection	and	mutual	
feeling,	beyond	what	they	experience	together	day-to-day.	While	the	idea	of	drug	
experiences	as	part	of	life	does	not	sound	revelatory,	it	could	be	argued	to	feel	out	
of	place	alongside	decades	of	research	performed	within	the	dominant,	
epidemiological	model	(Moore,	2008;	Rhodes,	Stimson,	Moore	&	Bourgois,	2010).	
This	model	has	been	described	as	cordoning	off	drug	use	as	a	peculiar,	often	
implicitly	moralised,	category	of	experience;	unevenly	constituted	of	‘harm’	and	
‘risk’	at	the	expense	of	any	of	the	pleasures	or	(the	spatially	situated,	embodied,	
emotional,	discursive)	things	people	do	on	drugs	which	motivate	their	use	(Duff,	
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2008).	This	epidemiological	framework	has	therefore	been	argued	here	to	‘abstract’	
and	‘cut	out’	(Brown	&	Stenner,	2009,	p34)	drug	experiences	from	their	wider	
scheme	of	relationality	and	process.	Other	studies	have	also	emphasised	the	
importance	of	context,	which	have	been	mostly	of	a	qualitative	nature	(Duff,	2008;	
Foster	&	Spencer,	2013;	Farrugia,	2015;	Hinchliff,	2001;	Olsen,	2009;	Solowij,	Hall	&	
Lee,	1992)	but	also	quantitative,	particularly	more	recently	(Baggott	et	al.,	2016;	
Wardle	&	de	Wit,	2014;	Wardle,	Kirkpatrick	&	de	Wit,	2014).	However,	the	key	
contribution	here	is	the	specific	focus	on	romantic	relationships;	how	what	couples	
did	and	felt	on	the	drug	was	woven	into	the	fabric	of	their	relationship.	Practices	of	
intimacy	were	continuous	with	(e.g.	talking	and	listening	to	one	another,	physical	
connection,	lightheartedness),	intensified	(e.g.	talking	about	particularly	meaningful	
or	distressing	things,	focussed	on	feeling	their	love	for	each	other	without	
distraction),	and	also	could	diverge	from	(e.g.	‘merging’	together	or	feeling	
emotionally	understood	by	their	partner	on	a	deeper,	distinct	level)	how	they	
related	to	each	other	on	a	day-to-day	basis.	It	is	hoped	that	highlighting	couples’	
diverse	experiences	of	closeness	in	relation	to	their	MDMA	use	will	continue	to	open	
up	our	understanding	of	the	ways	drug	experiences	intertwine	with,	and	might	
potentially	enrich,	our	lives.		
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Appendices	
	
Appendix	One:	Advert	–	Study	One	
	
Have	you	taken	MDMA	with	your	partner	five	times	or	more?	If	so,	it	would	be	great	
to	hear	from	you!	
	
I'm	completing	PhD	research	at	London	Southbank	University,	which	is	looking	at	
people's	experiences	of	taking	ecstasy	with	their	partner	and	how	they	feel	this	has	
affected	their	relationship.	The	study	is	qualitative	and	would	involve	writing/talking	
about	your	experiences.	It	is	largely	UK-based	but	there	are	still	parts	of	the	research	
that	could	be	done	if	you're	living	outside	of	the	UK,	particularly	in	the	EU.	
	
All	contact	will	be	completely	confidential.	If	you	are	interested	or	would	like	to	
know	more,	please	pm	me	or	email	me	at:	anderk10@lsbu.ac.uk.	Thanks!	
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Appendix	Two:	Advert	–	Study	Two	
	
MDMA:	the	love	drug?	A	qualitative	study	
		
The	study	will	involve	a	joint	interview	with	both	you	and	your	partner	and	the	
researcher.		It	will	last	between	1.5	-	2	hours.		In	the	interview,	you	will	be	asked	to	
talk	about	particular	times	you've	taken	MDMA	together.	
		
Requirements:	
• 18	years	or	older	
• Taken	MDMA	with	your	current	partner	5	times	or	more	
• Never	received	treatment	for	drug	addiction	
If	you	think	you	might	be	interested	in	the	study	or	want	to	know	more	details	go	to:	
https://www.callforparticipants.com/study/HPXXQ/mdma-the-love-drug-a-
qualitative-study	
	
		
Can	be	done	in	person	(UK-based	couples)	or	over	Skype.	
	
Thanks!	
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Appendix	Three:	Participant	Information	Sheet	–	Study	One	
	
The	Experiences	of	Couples	Who	Take	MDMA	Together	
	
My	name	is	Katie	Anderson	and	I	am	doing	research	for	a	PhD	at	London	Southbank	
University,	with	approval	from	the	University’s	Research	Ethics	Committee.		
	
I	am	interested	in	talking	to	people	who	take	MDMA	with	their	parter	and	how	they	
feel	these	ecstasy	experiences	have	affected	their	relationship.		Everything	you	say	
will	be	completely	confidential.			
	
Before	you	decide	whether	to	take	part,	please	read	the	information	below.	If	you	
have	any	questions	or	would	like	to	discuss	any	thing	that	you	have	read,	please	feel	
free	to	ask	me.		
	
Who	can	participate	in	the	study?	
	
This	study	is	open	to	all	couples	who	have	taken	MDMA	together	at	least	five	times	
and	have	never	received	treatment	for	drug	addiction.	
	
What	will	the	study	involve?	
	
• Being	interviewed	together	with	your	partner		
• It	would	be	great	if	you	and	your	partner	could	bring	along	4-5	objects	or	
photos	to	help	you	remember	different	times	when	you’ve	taken	MDMA	
together.		I	would	look	at	these	in	the	interview	with	you	but	you	would	keep	
them	at	the	end	and	they	would	not	be	used	for	any	purpose	other	than	to	
help	you	talk	about	your	experiences.	
• The	interview	is	likely	to	last	between	1	½	-	2	hours	
• It	is	completely	up	to	you	what	you	would	like	to	discuss	in	the	interview,	you	
will	not	have	to	talk	about	anything	you	don’t	want	to	and	can	withdraw	your	
participation	from	the	study	at	any	time.	
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Where	will	the	interview	be?	
	
The	interview	can	be	carried	out	where	you	live,	in	a	private	space	at	London	
Southbank	University	premises	or	another	convenient	location.		Travel	expenses	and	
refreshments	will	be	provided.		Alternatively,	the	interview	can	also	be	carried	out	
over	Skype	(where	only	the	audio	would	be	recorded).	
	
How	will	what	I	say	be	kept	confidential?	
	
• Audio	recordings	will	be	kept	on	a	private	computer	which	no	one	else	has	
access	to	and	transcribed	into	password	protected	files	
• Your	name	will	not	be	linked	to	what	you	say	in	any	way	
• Any	identifying	information	(name	of	a	place,	for	example)	will	be	changed	in	
the	interview	transcripts		
• Only	I	will	listen	to	the	interview	recordings	and	only	the	project	supervisors	
will	have	access	to	the	full,	altered	transcripts		
Participants	should	be	aware	that	there	will	be	limitations	in	maintaining	
confidentiality	in	certain,	exceptional	circumstances	such	as	serious	concern	about	
the	risk	of	significant,	physical	harm	to	you	or	someone	else.		In	the	event	of	a	need	
to	break	confidentiality,	you	will	be	informed	of	this,	unless	the	urgency	or	
circumstances	of	a	situation	make	this	untenable.			
	
Breaking	confidentiality	is	a	very	serious	matter	and	will	only	be	undertaken	when	
someone’s	safety	is	at	risk.			
	
How	will	what	I	say	be	used?	
	
What	you	tell	me	will	only	be	used	for	academic	purposes	e.g.	conferences	or	
publications	in	journals.		
	
Do	I	have	to	take	part?			
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Whether	or	not	you	take	part	is	entirely	your	choice.	You	are	free	not	to	participate	
and	may	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time.		
	
Questions?	
	
Please	feel	free	to	contact	me	or	my	supervisor,	Paula	Reavey,	if	you	have	any	
questions	or	concerns.	
Yours	sincerely,	
Katie	Anderson	
Email:	anderk10@lsbu.ac.uk	
Tel:	07743163223	
	
Professor	Paula	Reavey	
Email:	reaveyp@lsbu.ac.uk	
Tel:	020	7815	6177	
	
I	look	forward	to	hearing	from	you!	
Katie	
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Appendix	Four:	Participant	Information	Sheet	–	Study	Two	
	
The	Experiences	of	Couples	Who	Take	MDMA	Together		
	
My	name	is	Katie	Anderson	and	I	am	doing	research	for	a	PhD	at	London	Southbank	
University,	with	approval	from	the	University’s	Research	Ethics	Committee.		
	
I	am	interested	in	talking	to	people	who	take	MDMA	with	their	parter	and	how	they	
feel	these	ecstasy	experiences	have	affected	their	relationship.		Everything	you	say	
will	be	completely	confidential.			
	
Before	you	decide	whether	to	take	part,	please	read	the	information	below.	If	you	
have	any	questions	or	would	like	to	discuss	any	thing	that	you	have	read,	please	feel	
free	to	ask	me.		
	
Who	can	participate	in	the	study?	
	
This	research	is	open	to	everyone	who	has	taken	MDMA	with	their	partner	at	least	
once	in	the	past	6	months	and	on	at	least	five	occasions	in	total.		Neither	partner	will	
have	received	treatment	for	drug	addiction.	
	
What	will	the	study	involve?	
	
• Writing	a	digital	diary	or	completing	a	diary	by	hand	in	the	days	before,	on	
and	after	an	ecstasy	experience	with	your	partner.	The	diary	will	last	one	
week	in	total	and	will	hopefully	include	daily	entries	
• Deciding	whether	to	take	part	in	an	optional	interview,	in	which	you	will	have	
the	opportunity	to	talk	about	your	diary	in	more	detail	with	the	researcher	
(this	should	last	between	30-45mins)	
• Digitally	sending	your	diary	to	the	researcher	before	the	interview	takes	
place	
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How	will	what	I	say	be	kept	confidential?	
	
• Audio	recordings	will	be	kept	on	a	private	computer	which	no	one	else	has	
access	to	and	transcribed	into	password	protected	files	
• Your	name	will	not	be	linked	to	what	you	say	in	any	way	
• Any	identifying	information	(name	of	a	place,	for	example)	will	be	changed	in	
the	interview	transcripts		
• Only	I	will	listen	to	the	interview	recordings	and	only	the	project	supervisors	
will	have	access	to	the	full,	altered	transcripts		
	
Participants	should	be	aware	that	there	will	be	limitations	in	maintaining	
confidentiality	in	certain,	exceptional	circumstances.		This	would	include	a	serious	
concern	about	risk	of	significant	physical	harm	to	a)	you	b)	another	person	c)	a	child.		
In	the	event	of	a	need	to	break	confidentiality,	you	will	be	informed	of	this,	unless	
the	urgency	or	circumstances	of	a	situation	make	this	untenable.		Breaking	
confidentiality	is	a	serious	matter	and	will	only	be	undertaken	when	someone’s	
safety	is	at	risk.		
	
How	will	what	I	say	be	used?	
	
What	you	tell	me	will	only	be	used	for	academic	purposes	e.g.	conferences	or	
publications	in	journals.		You	also	have	the	opportunity	to	read	and	review	what	I	
write.		
	
Do	I	have	to	take	part?			
	
Whether	or	not	you	take	part	is	entirely	your	choice.	You	are	free	not	to	participate	
and	may	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time.		
	
Questions?	
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Please	feel	free	to	contact	me	or	my	supervisor,	Paula	Reavey,	if	you	have	any	
questions	or	concerns.	
Yours	sincerely,	
Katie	Anderson	
Email:	anderk10@lsbu.ac.uk	
Tel:	07444015162	
	
Professor	Paula	Reavey	
Email:	reaveyp@lsbu.ac.uk	
Tel:	020	7815	6177	
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Appendix	Five:	Consent	form	
	
The	Experiences	of	Couples	Who	Take	MDMA	Together	
	
Please	tick	or	cross	to	consent:	
• I	have	read	the	information	sheet	on	the	research	and	have	been	given	a	
copy	to	keep.	I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	discuss	any	details	and	ask	
questions	about	this	information	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
• The	researcher	has	explained	the	nature	and	purpose	of	the	research	and	I	
believe	that	I	understand	what	is	being	proposed		 	 	 	 	
	
• I	understand	that	my	personal	involvement	and	my	particular	data	from	this	
study	will	remain	strictly	confidential.	The	identity	of	any	third	parties	I	
discuss	will	also	be	protected.		Only	the	researchers	involved	in	the	study,	
Katie	Anderson,	Paula	Reavey	and	Zoë	Boden	(all	staff	at	London	Southbank	
University),	will	have	access	to	the	data	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	
		
• I	have	been	informed	about	what	the	data	collected	will	be	used	for	
(research	purposes)	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	
• I	understand	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time	and	to	
withdraw	all	or	any	information	I	have	previously	given,	without	giving	a	
reason.		I	can	also	refuse	to	answer	any	question	at	any	point	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	
• I	understand	that	confidentiality	may	be	broken	in	exceptional	circumstances	
e.g.	serious	risk	to	the	safety	of	myself	or	someone	else	 		 	
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• I	consent	to	have	the	interview	audio	recorded	using	a	digital	recorder	and	
transcribed	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	
• I	consent	to	having	anonymised	direct	quotations	from	the	interviews	used	in	
publications	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	
• I	hereby	fully	and	freely	consent	to	participate	in	the	study	which	has	been	
fully	explained	to	me.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	
	
	
Participant’s	Name:	(Block	Capitals)	 	 ………………………..	
	
Participant’s	Name:	Signature	 ………………………..			Date:	…………………….	
	
As	the	Researcher	responsible	for	this	study	I	confirm	that	I	have	explained	to	the	
participant	named	above	the	nature	and	purpose	of	the	research	to	be	undertaken.	
	
Researcher’s	Name:		 ………………………..	
	
Researcher’s	Signature:	………………………..			Date:	…………………….	
	
If	you	are	at	all	concerned	about	any	aspect	of	this	research	study	please	contact:	
	
Main	Researcher	
Katie	Anderson	
Tel:	07444015162	
Email:	anderk10@lsbu.ac.uk	
	
First	Project	Supervisor	
Professor	Paula	Reavey	
Tel:	020	7815	6177	
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Email:	reaveyp@lsbu.ac.uk	
	
Second	Project	Supervisor	
Dr	Zoë	Boden	
Tel:	020	7815	5814	
Email:	bodenz@lsbu.ac.uk	
	
If	you	wish	to	speak	to	someone	not	directly	related	to	the	research,	please	contact	
the	Head	of	the	Psychology	Department	at	London	South	Bank	University,	Anthony	
Moss:	mossac@lsbu.ac.uk		
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Appendix	Six:	Interview	Schedule	–	Study	One	
	
Opening	questions	
	
How	did	the	two	of	you	first	meet?	
What	was	the	initial	draw?	
What	do	you	think	it	means	to	be	in	a	relationship	with	someone?	
o Tell	me	about	any	expectations	you	had	for	the	relationship	
	
Objects/photos	
	
For	each	item:	
• Can	you	tell	me	about	the	experience	this	represents?	
• Who	were	you	with?		
• Where	was	the	experience?	
o Tell	me	what	the	xxx	was	like	(sounds/atmosphere)	
o Tell	me	about	the	surroundings/the	room	(or	club)	you	were	in?	
• Can	you	describe	how	you	felt	when	xxxx	[give	specific	moment]	
o Can	you	describe	where	that	feeling	of	xxx	was	in	your	body?	
o Were	you	expecting	to	feel	like	that?	
Item	1:	
− Tell	me	what	you	found	valuable	about	this	experience	
o What	do	you	mean	by	xxxx?	
o What	makes	you	want	to	xxxxx?	E.g.	Talk	more	
§ If	vague	response	about	it	being	‘good’	for	a	relationship	why	
is	it	good?		What	is	it	about	talking	to	someone	else	that	is	
positive?	
o Were	there	times	you	felt	you	were	being	particularly	xxx?	
o How	xxxx	are	you	with	each	other	in	everyday	life?	
o How	much	should	you	aspire	to	be	xxxx	in	a	relationship?	
Item	2:		
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- What’s	different	about	the	relationship	when	you’re	not	on	mdma	together	
compared	to	when	you	are?	
o Do	you	miss	xxxx?	
Item	3:	
- Tell	me	about	how	this	experience	is	different	from	the	previous	one	
- Tell	me	about	a	point	in	the	xxxx	(last)	experience	where	you	felt	(particularly)	
close	to	each	other?	
o What	do	you	think	it	means	to	be	‘close’	to	someone?	
o What	kind	of	things	make	you	feel	close	to	the	other	person?	
Item	4:	
- Tell	me	about	why	you	brought	this	item	along	with	you?	
- Tell	me	about	any	times	you	felt	distant	from	each	other	while	on	mdma?	
o What	does	it	mean	to	feel	‘distant’	from	someone?	
	
Item	5:	
- Can	you	tell	me	a	bit	about	why	you	chose	this	item?	
- Tell	me	about	how	your	experiences	of	taking	mdma	together	changed	over	
time?	
• Can	you	remember	anything	else?	
- How	did	you	find	the	process	of	choosing	certain	experiences	to	talk	about?	
o What	about	finding	items	to	represent	those	experiences?	
	
Timeline	
	
Now,	I’d	like	you	to	draw	a	timeline	of	your	relationship.	So,	any	experiences	of	
being	in	a	relationship	together	that	you	feel	are	significant	in	some	way,	which	can	
include	taking	MDMA	as	a	couple	but	doesn’t	have	to.	You	can	begin	wherever	you	
like	and	draw	the	timeline	either	individually	or	together.	Any	questions?	Just	take	
as	much	time	as	you	need.		
− Can	you	talk	me	through	your	timeline?	
− 	
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For	each	timeline	experience	
	
- Can	you	describe	this	experience	in	as	much	detail	as	possible?	
o How	was	it	when	xxxx?		What	was	it	like	when	xxxx?	
o Tell	me	about	how	you	felt	when	xxxx?	
o Tell	me	what	was	happening	at	that	point	in	your	life	
o Describe	to	me	why	you’ve	included	this	experience	in	particular	
	
Reflecting	back	
	
− Can	you	tell	me	about	a	difficult	point	in	your	relationship?	
o Was	this	resolved?	How?	
− Describe	to	me	an	MDMA	experience	that	was	difficult	for	you	in	some	way	
− Can	you	think	of	any	times	where	you’ve	had	things	to	work	through	after	
you’ve	been	on	MDMA	together?	
− Why	do	you	think	your	relationship	has	lasted?		
o Tell	me	about	the	things	you	do	to	make	it	last	
− Can	you	tell	me	how	your	relationship	is	different	now	than	when	you	first	got	
together?	
o Tell	me	about	a	particular	experience	that	changed	how	you	felt	about	
the	relationship	
	
Current	experiences	of	relationship	
	
Thinking	about	how	you	are	together	now…	
− Tell	me	about	the	kinds	of	things	you	like	doing	together	
− Tell	me	about	a	time	recently	when	you	felt	close	to	the	other	person			
o Are	there	particular	things	your	partner	does	that	make	you	feel	closer	to	
them?		
− Tell	me	about	a	time	when	you	felt	distant	from	the	other	person	
− What	things	do	you	disagree	on?	(prompts:	values/beliefs/domestic	work/what	
you	do	together)	
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The	‘fit’	of	MDMA	within	the	relationship	
	
- How	do	you	think	your	relationship	affects	your	how	often	you	take	MDMA?	
- What	are	your	plans	for	your	MDMA	use	in	the	future?	e.g.	stay	the	
same/decrease/increase	
o If	different	amount:	what	are	you	hoping	to	achieve	by	
decreasing/increasing	the	amount?	
- Have	you	told	other	people	about	your	ecstasy	use	together?	
o What	perceptions	do	you	think	exist	about	couples	who	take	ecstasy	
together,	if	any?	
- Finally,	what	has	it	been	like	to	take	part	in	this	interview	today?	
- Do	you	have	any	questions	for	me	or	anything	further	you	want	to	say?	
- Thank	you	so	much	for	taking	part	in	the	study.	
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Appendix	Seven:	Written	Diary	Guideline	–	Study	Two	
	
Thank	you	for	agreeing	to	keep	a	diary.	This	one-week	diary	is	focussed	on	your	
experiences	of,	feelings	and	thoughts	about	taking	MDMA	with	your	partner.			
	
Please	try	to	fill	in	the	diary	every	day;	there	are	questions	to	think	about	for	each	
day	but	feel	free	to	write	about	anything	that	feels	important	to	you	about	MDMA	
use	with	your	partner.		You	don’t	have	to	answer	any	of	the	questions	you	don’t	
want	to.		You	may	want	to	look	back	on	previous	entries	but,	again,	don’t	feel	you	
need	to.		
	
When	completing	the	diary,	it	would	be	good	if	you	could	write	a	bit	about	your	
physical	sensations	on	MDMA,	for	example,	what	does	it	feel	like	in	your	body	when	
you	feel	a	certain	way	towards	your	partner?		You	could	also	describe	the	
environment	of	your	MDMA	experience:	the	sounds,	the	visuals	and	the	
atmosphere.		Don't	feel	you	have	to	write	about	these	things	though.	
	
Please	don't	worry	about	grammar	or	spelling.	
Your	diary	entries	and	your	identity	will	remain	completely	anonymous.	
	
	
Day	1.	Day	of	the	week:	________	
	
Please	write	down	any	thoughts/feelings	that	you	have	about	the	upcoming	
experience.		For	example:	
• Why	are	you	planning	to	take	MDMA?		Who	will	you	be	with?	How	important	is	
it	that	your	partner	is	there?	
• What	things	are	you	expecting	to	happen	and	how	are	you	expecting	to	feel?	
• What	parts	of	the	experience	are	you	particularly	looking	forward	to?	
• What	parts	of	the	experience	are	you	not	looking	forward	to?	
	
Day	2.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
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Please	write	down	any	thoughts/feelings	that	you	have	about	the	upcoming	
experience.		For	example:	
• Why	are	you	planning	to	take	MDMA?		Who	will	you	be	with?		How	important	is	
it	that	your	partner	is	there?	
• What	things	are	you	expecting	to	happen	and	how	are	you	expecting	to	feel?	
• What	parts	of	the	experience	are	you	particularly	looking	forward	to?	
• What	parts	of	the	experience	are	you	not	looking	forward	to?	
	
Day	3.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
On	the	day	you	are	going	to	take	MDMA,	you	might	consider:	
• How	do	you	feel	about	taking	MDMA	today?	
• What	have	you	and	your	partner	said	to	each	other	about	the	experience?	
	
If	you	want	to	write	anything	down	during	your	experience	feel	free,	but	don’t	feel	
you	need	to.	
	
Day	4.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
On	the	day	immediately	after	you	have	taken	MDMA,	consider	what	the	experience	
was	like	and	note	down	anything	that	strikes	you.		For	example:	
• How	was	the	experience	for	you?			
• How	do	you	think	the	experience	was	for	your	partner?	
• How	did	you	feel	towards	your	partner?		What	do	you	think	made	you	feel	that	
way?			
• Was	how	you	felt	towards	your	partner	different	from	how	you	feel	towards	
them	usually?	
• Were	there	any	differences	in	your	sexual	relationship	with	your	partner?	
	
Day	5.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
In	the	days	after	taking	MDMA,	write	down	any	further	feelings	or	memories	about	
your	ecstasy	experience,	such	as:	
• Do	you	feel	different	in	any	way	than	you	normally	would?		Do	you	usually	feel	
like	this	after	taking	MDMA?	
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• Are	you	behaving	any	differently	with	your	partner	than	you	normally	would?	
• If	you	could,	would	you	change	anything	about	the	way	you	were	with	your	
partner	while	on	MDMA?	
• Would	you	like	to	take	MDMA	more	or	less	often	with	your	partner?	
	
Day	6.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
In	the	days	after	taking	MDMA,	write	down	any	further	feelings	or	memories	about	
your	ecstasy	experience,	such	as:	
• Do	you	feel	different	in	any	way	than	you	normally	would?		Do	you	usually	feel	
like	this	after	taking	MDMA?	
• Are	you	behaving	any	differently	with	your	partner	than	you	normally	would?	
• If	you	could,	would	you	change	anything	about	the	way	you	were	with	your	
partner	while	on	MDMA?	
• Would	you	like	to	take	MDMA	more	or	less	often	with	your	partner?	
• Are	you	planning	to	take	MDMA	again	soon	together?	
	
Day	7.	Day	of	the	week	_______	
In	the	days	after	taking	MDMA,	write	down	any	further	feelings	or	memories	about	
your	ecstasy	experience,	such	as:	
• Do	you	feel	different	in	any	way	than	you	normally	would?		Do	you	usually	feel	
like	this	after	taking	MDMA?	
• Are	you	behaving	any	differently	with	your	partner	than	you	normally	would?	
• If	you	could,	would	you	change	anything	about	the	way	you	were	with	your	
partner	while	on	MDMA?	
• Would	you	like	to	take	MDMA	more	or	less	often	with	your	partner?	
• Are	you	planning	to	take	MDMA	again	soon	together?	
	
Thank	you	for	your	participation!	
If	you	would	like	to,	you	can	note	down	any	further	comments	you	wish	to	make	
here:	……………………………………….	
	302	
Appendix	Eight:	Thematic	map	–	Study	One,	Interview	6	
	
